THE MONGOL EMPIRE AND ITS LEGACY

EDITED BY

REUVEN AMITAI-PREISS AND DAVID O. MORGAN



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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AEME	*Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi.*
BSOAS	*Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies.*
CAJ	*Central Asiatic Journal.*
EI[1]	*Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 1st edition.
EI[2]	*Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 2nd edition.
EIr	*Encyclopaedia Iranica.*
HJAS	*Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies.*
IJMES	*International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies.*
JA	*Journal asiatique.*
JAOS	*Journal of the American Oriental Society.*
JESHO	*Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient.*
JRAS	*Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society.*
MS	*Monumenta Serica.*
PFEH	*Papers in Far Eastern History.*
ZDMG	*Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft.*

NOTES ON DATES AND TRANSLITERATIONS

1. All dates are given according to the Common or Christian Era (C.E. or A.D.), although in many of the papers dealing with the Islamic world, these are proceeded by *hijri*, or Muslim dates (A.H.).

2. The transliteration of Arabic and Persian is in accordance with the system found in the *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, although in the present volume, the Persian consonants **ż** and **v** will be rendered as in Arabic: **ḍ** and **w**.

3. In most papers, Chinese words and names have been transliterated according to the Wade-Giles system. Where Pinyin has been occasionally used, it has been left accordingly.

4. The editors have striven to achieve some measure of consistency with regard to Mongolian and Turkish names and terms, we hope, succeeding in rendering them in a form which would have been recognized by people of late medieval Inner Asian origin. Perhaps reflecting our Middle Eastern bias, we have preferred **q** to the **kh** often favored by some Mongolists and Sinologists. Thus we have rendered the name of the founder of the Yüan dynasty as Qubilai. This being said, Chinggis Khan is given thus, reflecting modern usage (if nothing else). The forbearance of the contributors to this volume as well as the general readers is requested on the matter of transliteration from these two languages.

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
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INTRODUCTION

The story of Chinggis Khan and the Mongols continues to generate interest among both scholars and larger circles in the general population. Books on the Mongols, academic and otherwise, sell well, and both documentaries and feature films on a Mongol theme are well received. From the popularity of the works of John of Plano Carpini and Marco Polo in the late middle ages down to the highly imaginative films of this century (starring John Wayne and Omar Sharif) purporting to relate the biography of Chinggis—or rather Genghis in this context—Khan, we have ample evidence of the important place in Western consciousness held by the Mongols. To a certain degree, at least, similar sentiments can be discerned in the different regions which the Mongols controlled, by those who experienced their rule and their descendants.

A partial explanation for this centuries-long fascination may be offered. The Mongols represent the culmination of a millennia long preoccupation of the sedentary world with the barbarians of the Eurasian Steppe, an early expression of which is the story of Gog and Magog in the Old Testament. But it is not only that the Mongols were more successful than any of their Inner Asian predecessors in erecting a tribally-based state and thereupon siphoning off the surplus of the surrounding sedentary states. They had set about conquering the then known word, creating the largest land empire in history, which lasted, albeit in attenuated form, for some 150 years (and in certain areas even longer). The conquest itself was effected with great fanfare, although contemporaries were horrified—justly so—by the extent of the destruction and killing. The result, not always appreciated by the majority of those who became their subjects, was the opening up of Asia from East to West and back again, creating great opportunities for cultural exchanges and interaction. Rulers such as Chinggis Khan, Qubilai, Hülegü, Ghazan and Özbeg, as well as epigones such as Tamerlane and Babur, are the stuff of which legend and literature are made. Ably assisted by the medieval equivalent of public relations consultants such as Marco Polo and Rashīd al-Dīn, the Mongols have remained on center-stage in the human imagination for hundreds of years.

The Mongols have had a place of pride not only in the popular mind. Scholars for generations have been seeking to tell their story, hoping to analyze their success, their eventual fall and the impact of their conquest and rule. The present collections of papers shows that this effort has not been limited to one region or continent, but embraces scholars from around the world. The papers published in this volume were based on some of those given at a conference which took place in 21–23 March 1991 at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), at the University of London.[1] The Conference was held under the auspices of the Centre of Near and Middle Eastern Studies at SOAS, and the Editors are grateful to the then Chairman of the Centre and its staff for their assistance with the conference. Thanks are also due to Colin Heywood and Martina Deuchler, who together with David Morgan convened the conference. Special gratitude should be extended to H.E. I. Ochirbal, then Mongolian ambassador to the United Kingdom, who kindly granted his patronage to the gathering, and to those bodies without whose financial assistance the conference could not have been held: the SOAS Research and Publications Committee, the Nuffield Foundation, the Korean Research Foundation, the British Institute of Persian Studies, the British Academy and Dawson International plc.

The history of the Mongol world empire and its successor states is by nature both world history and comparative history. It is the former, since this empire affected, although not uniformly or to the same extent, most of the "Old World." The study of the Mongol empires compels the student to delve into the history of China, India, the Islamic World and Christian Europe, in its Latin and Greek spheres. Without looking at these "regional" histories, one cannot understand the subject populations and the further development of the Mongol populations, as well as relations with those areas yet (or forever) unconquered. As for comparative history, the study of both the united empire as well as the successor states is well served by such an approach: what we learn about local administration, military policy or economic problems and their would-be solutions in one area of the Mongol empire may well illuminate similar matters on the other side of Asia. One could take this comparative method a step further, and compare the Mongols and their methods to other

[1] The original papers given by Charles Melville and T.H. Barrett, however, have been replaced by their contributions in the present volume.

rulers of steppe origin, but this would beyond the scope of the present project.

It was definitely considered appropriate, however, to look at one aspect of Mongol history: the effect of the Mongol conquest and rule on both the conquered population and the Mongols themselves. Most historians of the Mongols and their empire would surely agree that much of this "legacy" was not a negative one. It is not surprising that in a collective effort such as this, the treatment of both "Empire" and "Legacy" are not as complete and thorough as we might hope. For various reasons, the Golden Horde is unfortunately not represented in this collection, though it was discussed at the conference which gave rise to it. The Editors regret that although Mongol rule in the Islamic world is discussed here by several writers, little is said about long-term implications of their presence in the region. Some of these long-range effects are discussed in the papers dealing with Central Asia, Mongolia itself, and China, and the earlier "imperial" stage has not been forgotten either.

Even though there may be some gaps in this collection, which must cover a vast geographical and chronological sweep, we are confident that the papers published here provide a good overview of the various subjects on which historians of the Mongols' empire and the subsequent period are currently concerned: social and economic history, intellectual developments under the Mongols, the cultural life of the ruling elite and their ideology, the interaction with the indigenous elite and culture, source criticism and military history. Of course, many important historians of the Mongol empire are not among the contributors here and recent years have seen the publication of several significant studies. Mention might be made of Devin DeWeese's *Islamization and Native Religion in the Golden Horde: Baba Tükles and Conversion to Islam in Historical and Epic Tradition* (University Park, PA, 1994); Thomas Allsen's *Commodity and Exchange in the Mongol Empire: A Cultural History of Islamic Textiles* (Cambridge, 1997); and, Michal Biran's *Qaidu and the Rise of the Independent Mongol State in Central Asia* (London, 1997). Recent important collections of papers (from conferences on a Mongol theme) are J. Raby and T. Fitzherbert (eds.), *The Court of the Il-khans 1290–1340* ("Oxford Studies in Islamic Art," XII, Oxford, 1996), Stephan Conermann and Jan Kusber (eds.), *Die Mongolen in Asien und Europa* (Frankfurt, 1997), and D. Aigle (ed.), *L'Iran face à la domination mongole* (Tehran, 1997), and mention should be made of the collective effort edited

by I. de Rachewiltz, Hok-lam Chan, Hsiao Ch'i-ch'ing and P.W. Geier, *In the Service of the Khan: Eminent Personalities of the Early Mongol-Yuan Period* (Wiesbaden, 1993). These, taken together with many other recent studies and the papers in the present volume, testify to the vitality of Mongolian studies in general and the study of the history of their empire in particular.

Postcript: The Editors would like to express their gratitude to Mrs. Michal Biran (Jerusalem), who assisted with the preparation of the Chinese character glossaries at the end of three articles in the volume.

WHAT THE PARTRIDGE TOLD THE EAGLE: A NEGLECTED ARABIC SOURCE ON CHINGGIS KHAN AND THE EARLY HISTORY OF THE MONGOLS

ROBERT G. IRWIN

Aḥmad ibn Muḥammād Ibn ʿArabshāh was born in Damascus in 1392. Taken off into capitivity by Tamerlane in 1401, he grew up and studied in Samarqand. Later he travelled in Chinese Tartary, Khwārazm and the Dasht-i Qipchaq. (In his unpublished life of the Mamlūk Sultan, Jaqmaq, he mentions discussing the depredations of Tamerlane with Jalāl al-Dīn ibn Toqtamish in the Kipchak capital, Saray.) He travelled on to Astrakhan (where he spent four years) and he subsequently worked as a secretary for the Ottoman Sultan, Muḥammad I in Adrianople. Having returned to the Mamlūk lands in 1422, he produced his well-known and somewhat splenetic account of the career of Tamerlane, the *ʿAjā'ib al-maqdūr fi akhbār Tīmūr* in 1435. Ibn ʿArabshāh's major works were in Arabic, but he also knew Persian, Turkish and, allegedly, Mongolian. He died in Cairo in 1450.[1]

The *ʿAja'īb* apart, Ibn ʿArabshāh's other books have not received much attention. Among these works is his translation from Persian into Arabic of Saʿd al-Dīn Warawīnī's thirteenth-century collection of animal fables, the *Marzubān-nāma*.[2] Subsequently in 1448, Ibn ʿArabshāh produced an expanded adaptation, the *Fākihat al-Khulafā' wa-Mufākahāt al-Ẓurafā'*, or "Fruits of the Caliphs and Jokes of the Witty". Like *Kalīla wa-Dimna*, the *Fākihat* was a work in the mirrors-for-princes genre, a political treatise whose arguments are lightly disguised as animal fables.

[1] On the life of Ibn ʿArabshāh, see al-Sakhāwī, *al-Daw' al-lāmiʿ li-ahl al-qarn al-tāsiʿ*, (Cairo, 1934–6), vol. 2, pp. 126–31; Ibn Taghrībirdī, *al-Manhal al-ṣāfi* (Cairo, 1984), vol. 2, pp. 131–45; F. Wustenfeld, *Gesichtsschreiber der Araber* (Gottingen, 1882), pp. 216–8; W.J. Fischel, *Ibn Khaldun and Tamerlane* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1952), pp. 1–3; J. Pedersen, "Ibn ʿArabshāh," *EI*². Ibn ʿArabshāh's *ʿAjā'ib al-maqdūr fī akhbār timūr* was published by Golius in Leiden in 1636. It was translated into English by J.H. Sanders as *Tamerlane or Timur, the Great Amir* (London, 1936).

[2] On Wārawīnī's *Marzubān-nāma*, see E.G. Browne, *A Literary History of Persia* (Cambridge, 1928), vol. 2, p. 489; R. Levy, *The Tales of the Marzuban* (London, 1959).

It was edited and published by G. Freytag as *Liber Arabicus sive fructus imperatorum et Jocatio ingeniosorum* in Bonn in 1832.[3] Despite an enthusiastic review by Sylvestre de Sacy in the *Journal des Savants* in 1835,[4] after that brief upsurge in interest, the book hardly seems to have been read by anyone in the West. There are several possible reasons for the *Fākihat*'s failure to attract attention. Animal fables were no longer in fashion—even among nineteenth-century orientalists. Ibn ʿArabshāh wrote in a rhymed prose in which both grammar and sense were tortured and parts of his narrative were further muddied by rather a lot of high-flown invective. Some of his Arabic was incorrect and some of my readings are therefore speculative.

In the tenth and last chapter of the *Fākihat*, Ibn ʿArabshāh leaves off telling edifying fables and treats of the unedifying rise of Chinggis Khan and the history of the Mongol peoples in some detail.[5] It is evident that much of this detail has been borrowed and adapted by him from Juwaynī's *The History of the World Conqueror*, a work written in Persian in the 1250s.[6] However, unlike other historians writing in the Mamlūk lands, such as al-Maqrīzī and Ibn Taghrībirdī, Ibn ʿArabshāh seems to have made direct use of Juwaynī, rather than making use of those bits of his work transmitted in al-ʿUmari's fourteenth-century geographical work, the *Masālik al-Abṣār*. Moreover, though Ibn ʿArabshāh made extensive use of Juwaynī, some of his information seems to be original to him.

The context of Ibn ʿArabshāh's discussion of Chinggis Khan is a long discourse addressed by a partridge (courtier) to an eagle (king) on good order, in which we are told that order depends as much on the pens of the *ʿulamā'* as it does on the swords of kings, but this theme is soon dropped in favour of a long account of the career and depredations of Chinggis Khan. First the partridge, speaking on behalf of Ibn ʿArabshāh, offers a description of the manners and customs of the Mongols prior to the rise of Chinggis Khan, in which the Mongols feature as the steppe equivalent of the Jāhilī Arabs.[7]

[3] Ibn ʿArabshāh, *Liber Arabicus sive Fructus imperatorum et Jocatio ingeniosorum*, ed. G. Freytag (Bonn, 1832). There is also a (presumably late-nineteenth-century) undated Cairene version of the *Fākihat*.
[4] Sylvestre de Sacy, "Liber Arabicus", *Journal des Savants* (1835), 602–12, 652–67.
[5] Ibn ʿArabshāh, *Liber Arabicus*, pp. 227–50.
[6] ʿAṭā Malik Juwaynī, *The History of the World-Conqueror*, tr. J.A. Boyle (Manchester, 1958).
[7] Ibn ʿArabshāh, *Liber Arabicus*, pp. 227–9.

There follows an account of the origins of Chinggis Khan among the Qūtāt tribe, (but Juwaynī has Qiyāt), his service with Wang Khan and his rise in that Khan's service thanks to his knowledge of *firāsa* (physiognomy) and *furūsiyya* (horsemanship), his flight from Wang Khan and war against him, the war against Altun Khan, the war against the Khwārazmshāh, and the advance of the Mongol generals into Iran.[8] Chinggis's death and descent into the lowest of hells is only briefly related.[9] Although much of the narrative is cribbed from Juwaynī, there are parts where Ibn ʿArabshāh seems to have more detailed and perfectly plausible information. His account of the fate of Nishapur at the hands of Tolui's sister seems to be a case in point.[10] Taken as a whole the *Fākihat* offers a slightly monotonous account of treachery, butchery and desecration in one city after another. The loss of life was tragic of course, but Ibn ʿArabshāh particularly stressed the damage done to centres of Islamic learning by the westward advance of the Mongols.

The author's observations on Mongol life are of some interest—for example his report that the elite of the pre-Chinggisid Mongols could be distinguished from the rest only by their use of iron stirrups.[11] But most interesting of all is Ibn ʿArabshāh's account of the promulgation of the Mongol code, the *yāsa*. In recent years the original meaning of the word, *yāsa*, and the evolution of that term has attracted quite a lot of attention among scholars. In a series of articles on "The Great Yāsa of Chingis Khan", Professor David Ayalon, reacting to an earlier and underresearched work by A.N. Poliak, demonstrated that Mamlūk historians in Egypt were very poorly informed about Mongol law and that there was no good evidence that Mamlūk secular justice was influenced by a Mongol law code which was called the *yāsa*.[12] (I think that it is worth noting here that, while Ayalon in what he published succeeded in demonstrating that al-ʿUmarī, the key Mamlūk authority, took some of his information from Juwaynī, still Ayalon does not seem to have found a source for al-ʿUmari's detailed listing of some of the alleged ordinances in

[8] *Ibid.*, pp. 230–50.
[9] *Ibid.*, p. 250.
[10] *Ibid.*, p. 249.
[11] *Ibid.*, p. 228.
[12] David Ayalon, "The Great Yāsa of Chingiz Khān, A Re-examination," *Studia Islamica*, 33 (1971), 97–140 (part A); 34 (1971), 151–80 (part B); 36 (1972), 113–58 (part C1); 38 (1973), 107–56 (part C2).

the *yāsa*. Since some of the Mongol regulations which al-ʿUmarī lists are also noted by European travellers among the Mongols, al-ʿUmarī's information would appear to be accurate, at least in part, but we do not know where he got that information from.) Subsequently Dr. David Morgan has taken iconoclasm somewhat further and suggested that there is no good evidence to indicate that Chinggis Khan had promulgated a written code of law at the *quriltai* of 1206 or at any other time—and, even if there ever was such a code, we do not know what was in it.[13]

But Ibn ʿArabshāh thought that he knew what was in it. He placed his account of Mongol laws after his account of Chinggis's defeat of Altun Khan (601/1204–5) and before his account of the commencement of hostilities with the Khwārazmshāh—a placing which would be consistent with the promulgation of the *yāsa* at the 1206 *quriltai*, though Ibn ʿArabshāh does not actually say this.[14] Now the code which he purports to give an account of is not called by him the *yāsa*. He calls it the *tūra* (<Turkish *töre*). However, it is a written code of law—or, at least, something which approximates to law. According to the *Fākihat*, Chinggis Khan called on his wise men to find a script in which to write his language in. They suggested the "Mughul" script and this was used to render "Qūtātū", or the language of the Qūtāt tribe. It had a fourteen-letter alphabet. This script was used to write down everything, including their orders, declarations, histories, accounts and laws.[15]

Ibn ʿArabshāh's account of Mongol law and custom is somewhat polemical. According to him it included ordinances regarding hunting and warfare (which he does not trouble to go into) and various tyrannous rules, or *aḥkām*, which he finds more interesting. Among these latter, Ibn ʿArabshāh singles out the following:

1. Thieves may be crucified and adulterers strangled on the evidence of a single witness. If a man is spotted stealing from a tent, he should be crucified and his hands cut off with a javelin. All his property passes to the ruler—as do his children as slaves.

2. An accusation takes the precedence, whether it is true or a lie—or, to put it another way, the accused is held to be guilty until proved innocent.

[13] D.O. Morgan, "'The Great *Yāsā* of Chingiz Khān' and Mongol Law in the Ilkhanate," *BSOAS*, 49 (1986), 163–76.
[14] Ibn ʿArabshāh, *Liber Arabicus*, p. 233.
[15] *Ibid.*, pp. 232–3.

3. Freemen, peasants and ploughmen are to be enslaved.

4. The relatives of the husband have rights in his wife and can take turns in sleeping with her, though the husband has first claim. She can never leave the husband's clan and they retain her dowry.

5. There is no *ʿidda*, or waiting period after widowhood or divorce, nor is there any seclusion of the widow or divorcée during such a period.

6. The evidence of slave-girls and boys can be accepted against their elders and betters.

7. The orders of the ruler have instant force.

8. Compulsory gifts can be demanded and casual gifts between individuals can be turned into annual levies.

9. One must prostrate oneself on one's knees before the *ḥākim* (or magistrate in authority).

10. The family as a group (including the women) are held accountable for any crime committed by a member of that group.

11. The lowborn may not precede the noble, even if they are richer.

12. One may only act according to *ʿaql* (understanding) and refrain from anything that goes beyond that. Here, the implicit context is that of a legal ruling and *ʿaql*, what is independently known or what can be achieved through systematic reasoning, is implicitly contrasted with *naql*, tradition, or what is handed down.

13. The *ḥākim* has no discretion to exercise clemency.

14. Finally and bemusingly, if a man steals a camel from their encampment, or even a louse from a robe but then returns it, there is no penalty or fine, and if he wishes he crushes it, or, alternatively puts it down. And sometimes he chooses to return it to its original place, but, if he kills that creature, then the owner can go to law, claiming that he had raised the creature and nourished it with his own blood. Then the *ḥākim* may award the complainant blood-money. (Ibn ʿArabshāh finds this especially preposterous, but it is not clear why, unless, indeed, he is claiming that the Mongols engaged in litigation over dead fleas.)[16]

The collection of laws (though perhaps it should be regarded more as a registration of customary practices) in which the above menacing snippets are found is called the *tūra*. The scrolls, wrapped in silk

[16] *Ibid.*, pp. 233–4.

and decorated with gold, are stored in the royal treasury.[17] Having dealt with law, Ibn ʿArabshāh offers a few lines on Mongol chancery practice,[18] before going on to give an account of the ritual of the *quriltai*, with its elevation of the elected khan on a tiger-skin held by four of the leading emirs, the *nolo episcopari* protestations of the khan-to-be, and the triple prostration of the *jūk* by the khan's subjects and then the khan's prostration to the sun. The *tūra al-Jinkizkhāniyya* was invariably read out during the *quriltai* and the khan was made to swear that he would observe the *tūra* in a kind of *bayʿa*, or pact, with his subjects, who on their part also swore to observe it. After this, the khan distributed largesse and presided over the coronation celebrations. Elections of a khan were held in the spring, but *quriltais* could go on a year or two. The Chaghatai and the Mughuls still held these assemblies in the author's own times.[19]

From Ibn ʿArabshāh's account of its contents, the *tūra* would hardly seem to be the Central Asian equivalent of Justinian's *Codex*. However, Ibn ʿArabshāh's aim was not to give a systematic account of Mongol legal practice, but to single out areas where it differed disgracefully from the *Sharīʿa*. Being a Muslim himself, Ibn ʿArabshāh thought that Muslim law was the thing. He was not indulging in antiquarianism in giving some account of the *tūra*; these laws, he says still had force among the Khatai, the Qipchaqs, the Chaghatai and others.

Plainly much of what he describes is likely to have been pre-existing custom among the Mongols anyway and much of it was not law in any modern sense, but rather a series of decrees, maxims and ordained rituals, the observance of which was conducive to the good nomadic life—the pagan steppe equivalent of the Muslim *Sunna*. Given that a written language (actually based on the Uighur script) was developed for the Mongols during the lifetime of Chinggis Khan, surely the laws, maxims, and practices of the Mongols would have been one of the first things that the ruler would have wished to see preserved in that script? Juwaynī relates that Chinggis fixed laws, regulations and penalties for every matter and that these *yāsa*s and decrees were written down on scrolls and stored in the treasury.[20] Juwaynī stressed the degree to which these *yāsa*s were compatible

[17] *Ibid.*, p. 234.
[18] *Ibid.*, p. 234.
[19] *Ibid.*, pp. 234–5.
[20] Juwaynī, tr. Boyle, pp. 23–5.

with Muslim law: Ibn ʿArabshāh's very different account stressed the reverse, but, for good or ill, they both believed that there was this written code. Obviously Ibn ʿArabshāh's testimony, which comes late, is not strong evidence for this code, but it is evidence—another straw in the wind.

To conclude, the *Fākihat* is a text which deserves more attention. Indeed, it deserves to be translated in its entirety. It only remains to be noted that there are some curious anecdotes about Tamerlane in the earlier chapters of this intriguing collection of animal fables.

FROM *ULUS* TO KHANATE: THE MAKING OF THE MONGOL STATES c. 1220–c. 1290

PETER JACKSON

> Although authority and dominion ostensibly belong to one man, namely whoever is nominated *khan*, yet in reality all the children, descendants and uncles partake of kingship and property.[1]

So wrote the Persian historian Juwaynī in c. 1260. The Mongol conquests were regarded not as the possessions of the emperor or Great Khan (*qaghan, qa'an*) but as the joint property of the imperial family (*altan orugh*) as a whole, including female members. The sources suggest that there were a great many family members to cater for. The Franciscan friar William of Rubruck, who travelled east across the steppe in 1253, commented on the number of Chinggis Khan's descendants, who "are daily multiplying and spreading out over this vast wilderness."[2] Indeed, they appear to have doubled even while Juwaynī was writing, since the number of Chinggis Khan's descendants is put at more than 10,000 early in his work, but towards the end is said to exceed 20,000.[3] Such statistics hardly command confidence; though it is only fair to add that Rashīd al-Dīn, the great historian and wazir to the Mongol ruler of Iran in the early fourteenth century, credits Chinggis Khan's eldest son Jochi alone with approximately forty sons (of whom he was able to name, however, a mere fourteen).[4]

[1] 'Alā' al-Dīn Aṭā Malik Juwaynī, *Ta'rīkh-i Jahān-Gushā*, ed. Mīrzā Muḥammad Qazwīnī ([E.J.W.] G[ibb] M[emorial] S[eries], XVI. Leiden and London, 1912–37), I, 30–1, translation mine; *cf.* translation by J.A. Boyle, *[The] H[istory of the] W[orld-] C[onqueror]* (Manchester, 1958, 2 vols. with continuous pagination), p. 42.

[2] Rubruck, "Itinerarium," XXII, 2, in Anastasius Van den Wyngaert, O.F.M. (ed.), *S[inica] F[ranciscana]*, I. *Itinera et relationes fratrum minorum saeculi XIII et XIV* (Quaracchi-Firenze, 1929), 222; tr. Peter Jackson, *The Mission of Friar William of Rubruck: His Journey to the Court of the Great Khan Möngke 1253–1255*, introduction, notes and appendices by P. Jackson with D.O. Morgan (Hakluyt Society, 2nd series, 173. Cambridge, 1990), p. 142.

[3] Juwaynī, I, 32, and II, 68 (tr. Boyle, *HWC*, pp. 43, 594).

[4] Rashīd al-Dīn Faḍl-Allāh al-Hamadānī, *J[āmi' al-]T[awārīkh]*, II, ed. Edgar Blochet, *Tarikh-i Moubarek-i Ghazani* (GMS, XVIII/2. Leiden and London, 1911), p. 90; tr. J.A. Boyle, *[The] S[uccessors of] G[enghis] K[han]* (London and New York, 1971), p. 99.

The Four Uluses

Provision had to be made for all these descendants. During his lifetime Chinggis Khan is believed to have granted to each of his four sons by his chief wife—Jochi (d. 1226/7), Chaghatai (d. 1242), Ögödei (d. 1241), his successor as qa'an, and Tolui (d. 1232)—a territory in the Asiatic steppe-forest zone (i.e. excluding, as far as we can tell, sedentary areas). These "appanages" or "domains" are denoted as *ulus* in the sources, and are to be distinguished, incidentally, from the *qol-un ulus*, or "*ulus* of the centre," of which the qa'an himself was master and which is examined in the work of Professor Buell[5]—not, in this case, an appanage or a principality, but a kind of "royal demesne," to borrow the terminology of the Latin West. Around the time that Juwaynī wrote, however, momentous changes were taking place within the empire. The transfer in 1251 of the dignity of qa'an from the family of Ögödei to that of Tolui was followed by the suppression of most of the princes of the lines of Chaghatai and Ögödei who opposed the new regime: these two middle branches of the imperial dynasty were drastically pruned and their possessions in large measure redistributed, so that the *ulus* of Ögödei virtually ceased to exist and that of Chaghatai survived only in attenuated form.[6] The new qa'an, Möngke, then put his younger brothers, Qubilai and Hülegü, in command of operations in China and Persia respectively. After Möngke's death in 1259, Qubilai profited from his location in an area of valuable sedentary resources to make a successful bid for the imperial dignity in opposition to his brother Arigh Böke. Taking advantage of the civil war further east, a grandson of Chaghatai named Alughu succeeded in reconstituting Chaghatai's *ulus* in Turkestan, and Hülegü converted

[5] Paul D. Buell, "Kalmyk Tanggaci People: Thoughts on the Mechanics and Impact of Mongol Expansion," *Mongolian Studies*, 6 (1980), 43–4; see also his "Tribe, *qan* and *ulus* in early Mongol China: Some Prolegomena to Yüan history," unpublished Ph.D. thesis (Washington, 1977), pp. 36 ff. I am grateful to Dr. David Morgan for lending me a copy of this thesis given him by Professor Buell.

[6] W. Barthold, *Turkestan Down to the Mongol Invasion*, 3rd ed. by C.E. Bosworth, with additional chapter tr. by T. Minorsky (GMS, new series, V. London, 1968), p. 483. P. Jackson, "The Dissolution of the Mongol Empire," *CAJ*, 22 (1978), 202–6. David Morgan, *The Mongols* (Oxford, 1986), pp. 115–17. Th.T. Allsen, *Mongol Imperialism: The Policies of the Grand Qan Möngke in China, Russia and the Islamic Lands 1251–1259* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1987), pp. 22–44.

his own position into that of an *ulus*-holder on a par with the other major princes. Qubilai was recognized as qa'an only by Hülegü and his successors, the Ilkhans, in Persia.[7]

In the second half of the thirteenth century, then, the Mongol empire seems to disintegrate into a number of separate—and often mutually hostile—states. These were: (1) the so-called khanate of the Golden Horde, ruled by the family of Jochi and founded by Jochi's son Batu (d. 1255/6); (2) the khanate ruled by Chaghatai's line in Turkestan and Transoxiana; (3) the Ilkhanate in Persia and Iraq, governed by the descendants of Hülegü (d. 1265); and (4) the dominions of the qa'an in China and Mongolia, of the line of Qubilai (d. 1294), who as Toluids were more closely related to the Ilkhans than any other branch of the imperial dynasty. This pattern of four khanates, it should be noted in passing, was not materially affected by the opposition to Qubilai of Ögödei's grandson Qaidu in Central Asia, for Qaidu presided over what was essentially a magnified version of the Chaghatayid polity.[8] Nor did it make any difference when, after Qaidu's death, the Mongol world again acknowledged a single emperor, in the person of Qubilai's grandson and successor Temür Öljeitü, and the various khanates made peace with one another (1303–4), for the general reconciliation was shortlived. By this date the Ilkhanate was in practical terms autonomous, since Ghazan (1295–1304), who as a convert to Islam was eager to display his credentials as a Muslim sovereign, had deleted the qa'an's name from the coinage.[9]

From an early date, historians have grown accustomed to think of the Mongol world, at least until the collapse of Mongol government in Persia in the 1340s and the qa'an's expulsion from China in 1368, as consisting of these four states. Thus a fifteenth-century

[7] Jackson, "The Dissolution," pp. 227–35. John W. Dardess, "From Mongol Empire to Yüan Dynasty: Changing Forms of Imperial Rule in China and Mongolia," *M[onumenta] S[erica]*, 30 (1972–3), 126–32. Thomas T. Allsen, "Changing Forms of Legitimation in Mongol Iran," in G. Seaman and D. Marks (eds.), *Rulers from the Steppe: State Formation on the Eurasian Periphery* (Los Angeles, 1991), 226–7.

[8] The fullest survey of Qaidu and his empire is to be found in Michal Biran, *Qaidu and the Rise of the Independent Mongol State in Central Asia* (Richmond, Surrey, 1997). *Cf.* also the briefer account in W. Barthold, *Four Studies on the History of Central Asia*, tr. V. and T. Minorsky (Leiden, 1956–62, 4 parts in 3 vols.), I, 124–9; Paul Pelliot, *Notes on Marco Polo* (Paris, 1959–73, 3 vols. with continuous pagination), pp. 124–9; J.A. Boyle, "Ḳaydu," *EI*², more generally, Dardess, "From Mongol empire to Yüan dynasty," pp. 130–1.

[9] Allsen, "Changing Forms of Legitimation," pp. 230–2, 235–6.

history of the Mongols, purporting to have been written by Temür's grandson Ulugh Beg, bears the title *Ta'rīkh-u ulūs-i arba'a-yi Chingīzī* ("History of the four Chinggisid *uluses*"), by which are meant the powers listed above.[10] It must be stressed that this framework corresponded more to the realities of the early fourteenth century than to those of Chinggis Khan's own era. Only two of the *uluses* allotted by the conqueror to his four sons—those of Jochi and Chaghatai—are recognizable in the khanates that emerged after 1260. Unfortunately, many modern historians tend to speak of the *uluses* of Chinggis Khan's four sons in such terms as to imply either that these were coterminous with the whole empire or that the subsequent development of four separate regional khanates was in accordance with the conqueror's own design. Thus Professor Allsen, in his splendid book *Mongol Imperialism*, writes: "At Chinggis Qan's death in 1227, the empire was formally partitioned among his eldest sons." Or similarly, to quote the late Professor Joseph Fletcher, "Chinggis Khan had divided the territory of his realm into four 'nations' (*ulus*), which he gave to his four sons."[11] Professor Barfield has been an exception to this common tendency.[12] I, alas, have not;[13] and in the following paper, I want to ask what an *ulus* was, to investigate how many major *uluses* there were, to examine the emergence of *uluses* and khanates, and to try to offer a fresh perspective.

Ulus *and Rulership*

There is admittedly a single piece of textual evidence in favour of the view that the creation of an *ulus* for each of Chinggis Khan's four senior sons amounted to a division of the empire as a whole. Referring to events as early as c. 1235, the *Secret History of the Mongols* distinguishes the princes who rule an *ulus* (*ulus medekün kö'üt*: rendered

[10] See, on this work, which is no longer extant, Barthold, *Four studies*, II, 136–8.

[11] Allsen, *Mongol Imperialism*, p. 45. Joseph Fletcher, "The Mongols: Ecological and Social Perspectives," *HJAS*, 46 (1986), 37, 48. See also Paul Ratchnevsky, *Genghis Khan: His Life and Legacy*, tr. Thomas Nivison Haining (Oxford, 1991), p. 207; D.O. Morgan, "Who Ran the Mongol Empire?," *JRAS* (1982), 126–7. Not far distant is Professor Morris Rossabi's formulation: "In 1229 the four Chinggisid lines effected a compromise, which eventually resulted in the first territorial division of the Mongol domains": *Khubilai Khan: His Life and Times* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1988), p. 8.

[12] Thomas J. Barfield, *The Perilous Frontier: Nomadic Empires and China* (Oxford, 1989), p. 212.

[13] Jackson, "The Dissolution," p. 228.

by De Rachewiltz as "the princes in charge of a domain") from those who do not.[14] The context is the despatch of princes to represent various branches of the dynasty on the great westward campaign of 1236–42 under Batu; and the list of princes chosen does suggest that those "with an *ulus*" comprised simply the heads of the branches founded by Chinggis Khan's four sons.

And yet there is also a good deal of evidence that should discourage us from reading too much into this isolated passage in the *Secret History*. In the first place, our principal source for Mongol history after 1260, the *Jāmiʿ al-Tawārīkh* of Rashīd al-Dīn, is distressingly lax in its use of the term *ulus*. True, we read here of the *ulus* of Jochi or of Batu; but we also encounter the *ulus* of Batu's brother Orda, corresponding to the eastern territories of the Golden Horde and covering, apparently, much of western Siberia (the power tentatively labelled by modern historians "the White Horde").[15] In quite another direction, the language used of a great-grandson of Qubilai Qa'an named Örüg Temür is striking, to say the least. The son of Prince Ananda, who at this time (the end of the thirteenth century) was still alive and held most or all of the Tangut region, Örüg Temür is described as "established and secure on the throne of rulership (*pādishāhī*) in his own *ulus*."[16] And Rashīd al-Dīn employs the term *ulus* with relative frequency of the domains held by the progeny of Chinggis Khan's younger brothers in what is now eastern Mongolia and Manchuria, representing the army "of the Left Hand" (i.e. the east). Here he speaks of the *ulus*es of Jochi Qasar and Qachi'un's son Elchidei;[17] and tells us, too, that Taghachar, a descendant of the conqueror's youngest brother Temüge, held "a great deal of *ulus* and troops."[18]

Regarding this last group of princes Juwaynī has little to say, mentioning only that Temüge and others of his kin were stationed in

[14] *S[ecret] H[istory of the Mongols (Mangghol-un niucha tobcha'an)]*, § 270, tr. Igor de Rachewiltz, chap. 12, *PFEH*, 31 (March 1985), 27 (and commentary at 61 *ibid.*); *cf.* the translation by Francis Woodman Cleaves (Cambridge, Mass., 1982), p. 210.

[15] Thomas T. Allsen, "The Princes of the Left Hand: An Introduction to the History of the *Ulus* of Orda in the Thirteenth and Early Fourteenth Centuries," *AEMA*, 5 (1985 [1987]), 5–40.

[16] Rashīd al-Dīn, *JT*, II, 603 (tr. Boyle, *SGK*, p. 326).

[17] *Ibid.*, I/2, ed. I.N. Berezin, "Sbornik letopisei," *T[rudy] V[ostochnogo] O[tdeleniia] I[mperatorskogo] R[usskogo] A[rkheologicheskogo] O[bshchestva]*, 13 (1868), 89, 95; tr. O.I. Smirnova, *S[bornik] L[etopisei]*, I/2 (Moscow and Leningrad, 1952), 52, 54.

[18] *Ibid.*, p. 98 (tr. Smirnova, *SL*, I/2, 56).

northern China (*Khitāī*).[19] But Rashīd al-Dīn defines their territories more fully. The branch of Jochi Qasar lived in the north-east of Mongolia, around the Arghun and Qailar rivers and the Külün Nor, and Soviet archeologists have unearthed two of its walled towns in Transbaikalia.[20] Somewhere to the south, near the Ulqui river, close to the Great Wall and adjoining the Chorche region (Manchuria), was the territory of the descendants of Qachi'un, who had died relatively young but whose son Elchidei appears as the head of his line when troops and camping-grounds are being distributed. And to the north-east lay the pasturelands of Temüge, described as being situated "in the furthest parts of Mongolia."[21]

Moreover, to focus on the arrangements made by Chinggis Khan for his four sons by his chief wife is to ignore his other offspring. One at least of the conqueror's daughters seems to have possessed an appanage: Alaqa Begi was in charge of the affairs of the Önggüt, though it is possible that she owed this position to the fact that she was the widow of the late ruler.[22] More importantly, we are told nothing of the appanage conferred on Kölgen, Chinggis Khan's son by a lesser wife. It would indeed be surprising if Kölgen had received no pasturelands, since Rashīd al-Dīn says that his father put him on the same footing as his other sons and that in the general distribution of troops he was given four "thousands" just as they were (see below), and describes Kölgen's offspring as inheriting his station (*jāī*) and troops.[23]

The Distribution of Troops and Spoils

This brings us to the next question we have to address. What were the *ulus*es in the early decades of the empire, and how did they

[19] Juwaynī, I, 32 (tr. Boyle, *HWC*, p. 43).

[20] S.V. Kiselev (ed.), *Drevnemongol'skie goroda* (Moscow, 1965), pp. 23–58, 325–69. Dardess, "From Mongol Empire to Yüan Dynasty," p. 119.

[21] Rashīd al-Dīn, *JT*, I/2, in *TVOIRAO*, 13 (1868), 89, 95–6, 98 (tr. Smirnova, *SL*, I/2, 52, 54–5, 56).

[22] Chao Hung, *Meng-ta pei-lu*, tr. W. Olbricht and E. Pinks, *Meng-Ta pei-lu und Hei-Ta shih-lüeh: chinesische Gesandtenberichte über die frühen Mongolen 1221 und 1237* (A[siatische] F[orschungen], 56. Wiesbaden, 1980), p. 24 (and see notes at pp. 31–3).

[23] Rashīd al-Dīn, *JT*, I/2, in *TVOIRAO*, 13 (1868), 130, and 15 (1888), 220–1 (tr. Smirnova, *SL*, I/2, 71, 276). We know from Chinese sources that Kölgen's son and grandson held the appanage of Ho-chien in Chih-li: *Y[üan] S[hih]*, chap. 107, ed. and tr. Louis Hambis, *Le Chapitre CVII du Yuan Che*, with notes by Paul Pelliot

come into existence?[24] The earliest general reference made in the *Secret History of the Mongols* to grants of property (*injü*) among the family of Chinggis Khan in c. 1206 relates to peoples, including both nomads and sedentary groups, and is surely anachronistic, since at that time the conqueror had yet to acquire any sedentary subjects.[25] But a slightly later passage carries more weight. Here, seemingly c. 1207, Chinggis Khan is shown apportioning a certain number of "thousands" to his mother Hö'elün, his surviving brothers Jochi Qasar, Temüge and Belgütei, his nephew Elchidei, and his four sons by his chief wife.[26] Rashīd al-Dīn, writing just under a century after these events, provides different figures for the sons, and as we have seen gives in addition a number for Kölgen, who is not mentioned in the *Secret History* at all.[27] This is in some measure corroborated by Juwaynī, who speaks in vague terms of grants to Chinggis Khan's "other, younger sons." Juwaynī indicates that the distribution to the four more senior sons was made from the Mongols and the Naiman tribe together with "all the troops" (i.e. nomads).[28] In time, these early grants were augmented by the gift of further population groups. Following a campaign in 1218–19, for example, by Jochi against the "Forest Peoples" (*hoi-yin irgen*) such as the Oyirad (Oirat) and the Kirghiz, they too were granted to Jochi.[29]

These grants were not, of course, territorial in the strict sense. Yet the requirements of a pastoral society dictated the allocation to the

(*T'oung Pao*, 38, supplément. Leiden, 1945), p. 64; *YS*, chap. 108, ed. and tr. Louis Hambis, *Le Chapitre CVIII du Yuan Che* (Monographies du *T'oung Pao*, III. Leiden, 1954, vol. I only), p. 110. But this lies rather too far south of the steppe to be adjacent to his original *yurt*, and in the absence of further evidence the question must remain open.

[24] B.Ia. Vladimirtsov, *Le régime social des Mongols*, tr. M. Carsow (Paris, 1948), pp. 124 ff., translates *ulus* as "peuple-patrimoine."

[25] *SH*, § 203, tr. Cleaves, p. 143, and tr. De Rachewiltz, chap. 8, *PFEH*, 21 (March 1980), 27; for the anachronism, see De Rachewiltz's note *ibid.*, p. 49.

[26] *Ibid.*, § 242, tr. Cleaves, p. 175, and tr. De Rachewiltz, chap. 10, *PFEH*, 26 (Sept. 1982), 46. The troops of Jochi Qasar, with whom Chinggis Khan fell out, were subsequently reduced to 1,400: Ratchnevsky, *Genghis Khan*, pp. 99–100 and 248 n. 35.

[27] Rashīd al-Dīn, *JT*, I/2, in *TVOIRAO*, 15 (1888), 220–1 (tr. Smirnova, *SL*, I/2, 276).

[28] Juwaynī, I, 29–30 (tr. Boyle, *HWC*, pp. 40–1).

[29] *SH*, § 239, tr. Cleaves, pp. 173–4, and tr. De Rachewiltz, chap. 10, in *PFEH*, 26 (Sept. 1982), 44–5: see De Rachewiltz's note at pp. 64–5, on the conflation of two distinct campaigns in the *SH* tradition; but for a different view, see the editorial note in Ratchnevsky, *Genghis Khan*, pp. 254–5.

princes, princesses and commanders (*noyans*) of specified grazing-grounds for the various seasons of the year. According to Rubruck, each commander was familiar with his allotted pasturelands;[30] and a few years later Juwaynī tells us that every one of Chinggis Khan's descendants had his/her own station (*maqām*) and grazing-ground (*yurt*).[31] By *maqām* Juwaynī presumably means *orda*: just how many such camps there were, potentially, emerges from the statement of the papal envoy Carpini (1247) that a prince's camp was never dismantled on his death but continued in existence and was run by one of his wives.[32] This meant that in the Mongolian homeland the *ordas* of long-dead princes whose principal appanage had lain elsewhere still receive mention under Qubilai's reign.[33]

Juwaynī's account of the territorial dispositions made by Chinggis Khan suggests that they occurred later than the first distribution of peoples; and we shall be reviewing his testimony below. As time progressed, and the Mongols encroached upon areas of sedentary culture, the fresh distributions of property came to involve more than merely pastoralist or forest-dwelling groups. Rubruck, passing through the Pontic steppe, notices that "the great lords" owned villages to the south.[34] After Chinggis Khan's death in 1227, Yesüi Khatun, one of his wives, was given a large part of the Tangut people in the recently subjugated kingdom of Hsi-Hsia.[35] The possessions of a prince might embrace settled districts adjoining his particular *yurt* or grazing-grounds. Thus Jochi, for instance, was in 1221 given the city of Ürgench in Khwārazm, which lay on the fringes of the steppe territory under his authority;[36] and if we may believe a

[30] Rubruck, II, 1, ed. Van den Wyngaert, p. 172 (tr. Jackson and Morgan, p. 72).

[31] Juwaynī, I, 32 (tr. Boyle, *HWC*, p. 43).

[32] John of Plano Carpini, "Ystoria Mongalorum quos nos Tartaros appellamus," IX, 25, ed. Van den Wyngaert, *SF*, I, 115, and ed. Enrico Menestò *et al.*, *Storia dei Mongoli*, Centro italiano di studi sull'alto medioeveo (Spoleto, 1989), p. 315; tr. by a nun of Stanbrook Abbey in Christopher Dawson (ed.), *The Mongol Mission: Narratives and Letters of the Franciscan Missionaries in Mongolia and China in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries* (London and New York, 1955), p. 60.

[33] Rashīd al-Dīn, *JT*, II, 396, 399, 438–9, 566–7 (tr. Boyle, *SGK*, pp. 254–5, 256, 267, 312).

[34] Rubruck, V, 1, ed. Van den Wyngaert, p. 179 (tr. Jackson and Morgan, p. 84).

[35] *SH*, § 268, tr. Cleaves, p. 209, and tr. De Rachewiltz, chap. 12, in *PFEH*, 31 (March 1985), 25.

[36] Muḥammad b. Aḥmad b. 'Alī al-Nasawī, *Sīrat al-Sulṭān Jalāl al-Dīn*, ed. and tr. Octave Houdas (Paris, 1891–5), text p. 93, tr. p. 154; also tr. Z.M. Buniiatov,

fourteenth-century author writing in the Mamlūk empire, Chinggis Khan also gave Jochi the regions of Arrān, Tabrīz, Hamadān and Marāgha, south of the Caucasus.[37]

Sometimes we find a prince enjoying lordship over specific groups among the conquered sedentary peoples, notably craftsmen and skilled artisans. When Samarqand fell in 1220, craftsmen to the number of 30,000 were distributed by Chinggis Khan among his sons and relatives.[38] These workers might well be tied to a particular workshop or arsenal, referred to in the Persian sources by the term *kārkhāna*: we are not told what happened to the Samarqand prisoners, but many of them would have been transported to some distant location in the steppes of Mongolia.[39] This fate in any event befell the most famous among such enslaved craftsmen, the Germans captured in Hungary who were the principal reason for Rubruck's mission. They had belonged to the Chaghatayid prince Büri and had been settled at Talas, but following his execution in 1251/2 they were handed over to the qa'an Möngke and moved to Bolad, some hundreds of miles to the east, where they were employed in mining and manufacturing weapons.[40] At Möngke's headquarters Rubruck met the Parisian goldsmith Guillaume Buchier, the creator of a magnificent mechanical silver fountain which spurted forth a different kind of alcoholic beverage from each pipe. Buchier had been carried off from Hungary in 1241–2 by one of Möngke's half-brothers and presented to the future qa'an's mother Sorqaqtani, passing on her death into the hands of her youngest son, Arigh Böke.[41]

Zhizneopisanie Sultana Dzhalal ad-Dina Mankburny (Baku, 1973), p. 137; 13th-century Persian trans. ed. Mujtabā Mīnuwī (Tehran, 1344 Sh./1965), p. 62. Jochi appointed Chin Temür as Mongol resident (*basqaq*) there: Juwaynī, II, 218 (tr. Boyle, *HWC*, p. 482).

[37] Ibn Faḍl-Allāh al-'Umarī, *Masālik al-Abṣār fī Mamālik al-Amṣār*, partial ed. and tr. Klaus Lech, *Das mongolische Weltreich: al-'Umarī's Darstellung der mongolischen Reiche in seinem Werk...* (AF, 22. Wiesbaden, 1968), Arabic text p. 15, German tr. p. 100; *cf.* also text p. 17, tr. p. 102, for Hamadān. But *cf.* below and n. 73.

[38] Juwaynī, I, 95 (tr. Boyle, *HWC*, p. 122).

[39] For evidence of this kind of transportation, see Paul Pelliot, "Une ville musulmane dans la Chine du nord sous les Mongols," *JA*, 211 (1927), 266; Louis Hambis, "Notes sur Kām nom de l'Yénissei supérieur," *JA*, 244 (1956), 291.

[40] Rubruck, XXIII, 2–3, ed. Van den Wyngaert, pp. 224–5 (tr. Jackson and Morgan, pp. 144–6); and *cf.* Peter Jackson, "William of Rubruck: a review article," *JRAS* (1987), 95–6. On the workshops, see I.P. Petrushevsky, "The Socio-economic Condition of Iran under the Īl-khāns," in J.A. Boyle (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Iran*, vol. V. *The Saljuq and Mongol Periods* (Cambridge, 1968), pp. 512–13.

[41] Rubruck, XXXII, 5, ed. Van den Wyngaert, p. 287 (tr. Jackson and Morgan, pp. 223–4). For Buchier, see Leonardo Olschki, *Guillaume Boucher, a French Artist at the Court of the Khans* (Baltimore, 1946).

In addition to pasturelands and subject peoples, members of the imperial family received shares in the booty and revenues of those conquered sedentary territories—such as China, Persia and Transoxiana—which overall were retained by the qa'an as part of the growing "*ulus* of the centre." These regions were governed from c. 1241 onwards by officials at the head of large satellite administrations answerable to the qa'an himself; but individuals among the *ulus*-holders and other Chinggisids nevertheless had their representatives in the bureaucracy and were further granted rights within the region (the extent to which they enjoyed direct access to their revenues, or were simply dependent on the qa'an's officials to transmit to them what they were due, varied).[42] Princes were naturally alert for opportunities to extend their own appanages at the expense of the centre, and sometimes succeeded: when Chaghatai treated part of neighbouring Transoxiana as his own property, Ögödei benignly overlooked the offence and even granted him the territory in question.[43]

Occasionally the sources reveal a prince in possession of some city or fortress that he had captured in person, but which might well be far removed from his customary habitat. On his way back across the Caucasus, Rubruck came across an Alan fortress just north of Darband, which was the personal property of the qa'an Möngke, since it was he who had reduced the region in c. 1239 during Batu's invasion of eastern Europe.[44] There is evidence for this kind of arrangement in China also. In 1213 Chaghatai, accompanying his father on campaign against the Chin, received the plunder from the city of T'ai-yüan-fu.[45] This clearly gave him a more lasting proprietary association with the city, for when in 1236 the qa'an Ögödei

[42] Buell, "Tribe, *qan* and *ulus*," pp. 121–6, 149–52, 164–9. For restrictions on princely appanage-holders after Möngke's accession, see Allsen, *Mongol Imperialism*, pp. 80–1, 86–8; Elizabeth Endicott-West, *Mongolian Rule in China* (Cambridge, Mass., 1989), pp. 90–103.

[43] Rashīd al-Dīn, *JT*, II, 196 (tr. Boyle, *SGK*, p. 156). The context of this episode is discussed by Paul Buell, "Sino-Khitan Administration in Mongol Bukhara," *Journal of Asian History*, 13 (1979), 143–6.

[44] Rubruck, XXXVII, 17, ed. Van den Wyngaert, p. 318 (tr. Jackson and Morgan, p. 260).

[45] Rashīd al-Dīn, *JT*, II, 181 (tr. Boyle, *SGK*, p. 146). This is Marco Polo's "Taianfu." For the date, see *YS*, chap. 1, tr. F.E.A. Krause, *Cingis Han: die Geschichte seines Lebens nach den chinesischen Reichsannalen* (Heidelberg, 1922), p. 32.

divided up the populations of the recently subjugated Chin empire among his kindred, the inhabitants of T'ai-yüan-fu fell to Chaghatai's share.[46] Tolui had received the booty from Cheng-ting-fu, and it was presumably on these grounds that in the same distribution of 1236 the Qa'an gave Tolui's widow Sorqoqtani the town as an appanage (*fen-ti*).[47]

But the distribution of spoils from a conquered territory was by no means confined to those who had taken part in the original campaign of conquest; it extended also to those who had not. This practice must surely be connected with the representative character of the armies sent to garrison newly conquered territories, or to reduce new territories, which has been illuminated by M. Jean Aubin. The prince in command of an expedition would be accompanied by contingents representing, or perhaps led by, princes from each of the other Chinggisid lines. The system is found in operation as early as Chinggis Khan's great expedition against the Khwārazmshāh.[48] It applied also when Ögödei's son, the qa'an Güyüg, sent the general Eljigidei to Persia in 1247 and in Hülegü's expedition of 1254–60.[49] Whether the principle of representative contingents obtained from the very outset in the Chinese campaigns, we do not know; though Juwaynī expressly informs us that the army with which Qubilai was sent against Yün-nan in 1252 was made up on this basis.[50]

In this fashion Tolui, according to Rashīd al-Dīn, acquired rights over plunder and income not merely in northern China but also in the Qipchaq steppe—where he never fought in person—and elsewhere, and these rights were inherited by his offspring.[51] And the

[46] *YS*, chap. 2, tr. Waltraut Abramowski, "Die chinesischen Annalen von Ögödei und Güyük," *Zentralasiatische Studien*, 10 (1976), 132.

[47] Rossabi, *Khubilai Khan*, p. 14. For the grant to Tolui, see Rashīd al-Dīn, *JT*, II, 216 (tr. Boyle, *SGK*, p. 165). This is Polo's "Acbalec": Pelliot, *Notes on Marco Polo*, pp. 8–9. On the appanages in China, see Paul Ratchnevsky, "Zum Ausdruck 'T'ou-hsia' in der Mongolenzeit," in Walther Heissig (ed.), *Collectanea Mongolica. Festschrift für Professor Dr. Rintchen zum 60. Geburtstag* (AF, 17. Wiesbaden, 1966), 173–91; Endicott-West, pp. 89 ff.

[48] Juwaynī, I, 66–7, 113, 117 (tr. Boyle, *HWC*, pp. 86, 143, 151). See generally Jean Aubin, "L'ethnogénèse des Qaraunas," *Turcica*, 1 (1969), 65–94. Barthold, *Turkestan*, 464–5, seems to have been the first scholar to draw attention to this.

[49] Juwaynī, I, 211–12 (tr. Boyle, *HWC*, p. 256). Rashīd al-Dīn, *JT*, III, ed. A.A. Alizade and tr. A.K. Arends, *Dzhami-at-tavarikh*, III (Baku, 1957), text p. 22, tr. p. 21.

[50] Juwaynī, III, 90 (tr. Boyle, *HWC*, p. 607).

[51] Rashīd al-Dīn, *JT*, II, 216–17 (tr. Boyle, *SGK*, p. 165).

same author describes the progeny of Kölgen as owning a *kārkhāna* in Tabrīz even in his own day.[52] Outlining the situation in Persia in Ögödei's reign, the Delhi chronicler Jūzjānī wrote that Batu had his allotted share of every province in the country that had come under Mongol control, and that this share was duly taken away by his agents.[53] An early fourteenth-century chronicler of Herat furnishes precious corroboration of this when he describes the requisitions (transport animals, tents and an annual sum of 300 fine *dīnārs*) made upon the city on Batu's behalf by a local Mongol commander.[54]

Territorial Appanages

It is necessary now to examine the location of some of the first appanages. Juwaynī describes the enormous tracts allotted to Chinggis Khan's three elder sons, lying at an increasing distance from the Mongols' original homeland according to seniority. Hence Jochi received the lands stretching from Qayaligh and Khwārazm as far as Saqsīn and Bulghār and "from that side as far as the hooves of the Mongol horses had penetrated"; Chaghatai was given the land from the frontiers of the Uighur principality as far as Samarqand and Bukhārā, and resided in the vicinity of Almaligh on the Ili river; while Ögödei occupied the valleys of the Emil and the Qobuq. These lastnamed regions, of course, were Ögödei's personal appanage: when he was elected qa'an in 1229 (and consequently took over the *qol-un ulus*, "*ulus* of the centre"), two years after his father's death, he transmitted them to his eldest son Güyüg.[55] We are not given specific information about the *qol-un ulus* which, according to the *Secret History*,

[52] *Ibid.*, I/2, in *TVOIRAO*, 13 (1868), 135, and 15 (1888), 221 (tr. Smirnova, *SL*, I/2, table facing 72, and 276). Rashīd al-Dīn, *S[hu'ab-i] P[arjgāna]*, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi, Istanbul, MS. III Ahmet 2937, fol. 106b.

[53] Minhāj-i Sirāj Jūzjānī, *Ṭabaqāt-i Nāṣirī*, British Library MS. Add. 26189, fol. 255b: *wa-har wilāyat dar Īrān ki dar ḍabṭ-i mughal āmada būd ūrā az ān diyār naṣīb mu'ayyan būd wa-gumāshtagān-i ū dar ān miqdār ki qism-i ū būd naṣīb mīburdand.* I have used this early 14th-century MS. in preference to the printed edition of 'Abd al-Ḥayy Ḥabībī (2nd ed., Kabul, 1342–3 Sh./1963–4), II, 176, which reads *naṣab būdand* for *naṣīb mīburdand; cf.* the translation by H.G. Raverty, *Ṭabaḳāt-i Nāṣirī* (Bibliotheca Indica. London, 1873–81), p. 1172.

[54] Sayf b. Muḥammad b. Ya'qūb Harawī (Sayfī), *Ta'rīkh-Nāma-yi Harāt*, ed. Muḥammad Zubayr aṣ-Ṣiddīqī (Calcutta, 1944), pp. 228–9.

[55] Juwaynī, I, 31, 191–2 (tr. Boyle, *HWC*, pp. 42–3, 236). See J.A. Boyle, "The Seasonal Residences of the Great Khan Ögedei," in Georg Hazai and Peter Zieme (eds.), *Sprache, Geschichte und Kultur der altaischen Völker: Protokolband der XII. Tagung der*

was solemnly handed over to Ögödei.[56] But it evidently included Qaraqorum, which appears as the nucleus of Ögödei's seasonal migrations and of which Rubruck says that the Mongols regarded it as their "royal demesne."[57] The pasturelands of Chinggis Khan's fourth son Tolui will be considered below.

These territorial dispositions are problematic. Let us examine the description of the lands conferred on Jochi. Rashīd al-Dīn for the most part cites the conqueror's commission to his eldest son strictly in terms of the later territory of the Golden Horde, but at one point he supplies a different version. According to this, the prince was entrusted with all the territory and people (*ulus*) in the confines of the Irtysh river and the Altai mountains, and his pasturage (*yurt*) was on the Irtysh.[58] These territories lay, of course, further east—i.e. nearer the homeland—than those bestowed on the third brother, Ögödei; and the "Forest Peoples" conferred on Jochi in 1218 (above) dwelt further east still. If Juwaynī is correct, Rashīd al-Dīn's details concerning the Irtysh and the Altai must surely refer to an earlier arrangement, and the edict (*yarligh*) authorizing Jochi to take possession of the "Northern Countries" (enumerated as Ibir-Sibir, Bular/Bulghār, the Qipchaq steppe, and the lands of the Bashgird/Bashkir, Rus' and Cherkes/Circassians as far as Darband)[59] would have been promulgated later, doubtless in the wake of the expedition against the Khwārazmshāh. (It is naturally quite possible that this passage represents a hindsight, for the decision to attack the Volga Bulgars, the Alans and the Rus', at least, does not appear to have been taken until Ögödei's reign, when Jochi's place had devolved upon his sons.[60] Nevertheless, Jochi's forces are found quartered in the "Qipchaq steppe"—presumably the grazing-grounds of the Qangli—around the

Permanent International Altaistic Conference 1969 zu Berlin (Schriften zur Geschichte und Kultur des alten Orients, 5. Berlin, 1974), pp. 145–51; repr. in Boyle, *The Mongol world-empire 1206–1370* (London, 1977). For Chaghadai, see also Juwaynī, I, 226 (tr. *HWC*, p. 271), and Thomas T. Allsen, "The Yüan Dynasty and the Uighurs of Turfan in the 13th century," in Morris Rossabi (ed.), *China among Equals: the Middle Kingdom and its Neighbours, 10th–14th Centuries* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1983), pp. 248–9.

[56] *SH*, § 269, tr. Cleaves, p. 209, and tr. De Rachewiltz, chap. 12, in *PFEH*, 31 (March 1985), 26 (and commentary at pp. 57–8).

[57] Boyle, "The Seasonal Residences"; Rubruck, XVII, 6, ed. Van den Wyngaert, p. 208 (*habent pro regali*; tr. Jackson and Morgan, p. 125).

[58] Rashīd al-Dīn, II, 131 (tr. Boyle, *SGK*, p. 117).

[59] *Ibid.*, p. 107 (tr. Boyle, *SGK*, p. 107); *cf.* also pp. 131, 132 (tr. *SGK*, pp. 117, 118).

[60] Juwaynī, I, 224 (tr. Boyle, *HWC*, pp. 268–9). Morgan, *The Mongols*, pp. 136–7.

time of Chinggis Khan's homeward departure from Transoxiana in 1222–3).[61]

In all probability, therefore, the details furnished by Juwaynī are misleading. They imply that the allocation of pasturelands to Jochi occurred at a single instant, when in fact it seems, rather, that Jochi's territory shifted over the years. There is nothing especially surprising about this. Not only is it conceivable that the grants took place at different stages as the respective sons came of age, but—if Juwaynī's indications that distance was related to seniority are trustworthy—the portion of the eldest son would have moved westwards, or at least outwards, as the empire expanded, in order to accommodate the grants of territory to his younger brothers.[62] Chinggis Khan and his sons may even have envisaged that the centre of gravity of each primary appanage (i.e. those created in the conqueror's lifetime) would move away from the heartlands of the empire as the Mongol conquests continued to grow in future generations.[63] This is perhaps the significance of a remark by the ill-fated prince Büri, the owner of the German slaves who were the object of Rubruck's quest. According to the friar's informant, Büri had one day (while drunk) asked querulously why he should not move his livestock to the Volga and pasture there as Batu did: the remark subsequently cost him his life.[64] Büri may possibly have been articulating the belief that the conquests of Jochi's family on the empire's distant western frontiers made a transfer of their eastern grazing-grounds to their Chaghatayid neighbours somewhat overdue. But this must remain in the realm

[61] Juwaynī, I, 110–11, 116 (tr. Boyle, *HWC*, pp. 139–40, 149); *cf.* also I, 70 (tr. *HWC*, p. 90), where Jochi moves to the Qara Qum steppe, north of the Aral Sea (see Boyle, p. 89 n. 9 *ibid.*). Jūzjānī, II, 150 (tr. Raverty, p. 1101). A variant of Carpini's report, the so-called "Tartar Relation," § 20, enshrines a vague recollection of Jochi's operations here: Alf Önnerfors (ed.), *Hystoria Tartarorum C. de Bridia monachi* (Kleine Texte für Vorlesungen und Übungen, 186. Berlin, 1967), p. 15. See generally Thomas T. Allsen, "Prelude to the Western Campaigns: Mongol Military Operations in the Volga-Ural Region, 1217–1237," *AEMA*, 3 (1983), 11–14.

[62] See further the discussion in Lech, *Das mongolische Weltreich*, pp. 209–10, n. 74, which is based, however, on the testimony of late and (for this purpose) unreliable Mongolian sources such as the *Altan Tobchi*. W. Barthold, *Zwölf Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Türken Mittelasiens*, ed. and tr. Th. Menzel (Berlin, 1935; repr. Hildesheim, 1962), 164; *idem*, *Four Studies*, I, 112–13.

[63] The notion appears plausible at least as far as concerns the West. In the eastern reaches of the empire, there was perhaps less scope; though Temüge was able to develop a suitably predatory relationship with the client kingdom of Koryŏ: W.E. Henthorn, *Korea. The Mongol Invasions* (Leiden, 1963), pp. 24, 28, 195, 202.

[64] Rubruck, XXIII, 2, ed. Van den Wyngaert, p. 224 (tr. Jackson and Morgan, pp. 144–5).

of surmise; *in vino veritas* is hardly the most reliable compass for the historian adrift in the Mongol empire. At any rate the Chaghatayids were to come off badly as a result of the territorial changes of the next decade or so, and to find themselves hemmed in by their kinsfolk, with little or no room for expansion. After the foundation of the Ilkhanate and the rise of Qaidu, we find the head of Chaghatai's *ulus*, Baraq (1266–1271), expressing a sense of constriction and ill-usage.[65]

What of the pasturelands held by the descendants of the fourth son, Tolui? Juwaynī is remarkably unhelpful on this score, because what he actually seems to say is that during Chinggis Khan's lifetime Tolui remained at his side.[66] The sources emphasize that according to Turkish and Mongol custom the youngest son (by the chief wife), known as the *ot-chigin* ("hearth-child" or "-prince"), inherited the original *yurt* of the father and, incidentally, the mother.[67] We can observe this principle at work in the case of Tolui's own youngest son, Arigh Böke, whom Rubruck in 1254 found occupying the *orda* of his mother Sorqaqtani and who inherited the major part of her property, including, as we saw, the most widely talked-about Parisian goldsmith of the Middle Ages.[68] Now it seems that on Chinggis Khan's death Tolui, as "hearth-prince," inherited the Mongol homelands—the site of his father's residence (*takhtgāh*) and "the great *ordas*"—in the valleys of the Onon and Kerülen rivers.[69] In so far

[65] Rashīd al-Dīn, *JT*, III, text p. 110, tr. p. 72.

[66] Juwaynī, I, 31–2: *Tūlī nīz muttaṣil-u mujāwir-i ū būd.* Boyle, *HWC*, 43, rendered this as: "Toli's territory, likewise, lay adjacent thereto." The word *ū* however, refers not to Ögödei or his son Güyüg, who have just been mentioned, but back to Chinggis Khan, so that the translation should read: "Toli in turn was near him and at his side." This interpretation is confirmed by Rashīd al-Dīn, *JT*, I/2, in *TVOIRAO*, 13 (1868), 126 (tr. Smirnova, *SL*, I/2, 69). It is noteworthy that the corresponding phrase used by al-'Umarī (Lech, *Das mongolische Weltreich*, text pp. 14–15), who in this passage simply translated Juwaynī into Arabic, is *kāna waladuhu Tūlī muttaṣil*[en] *bihi*, and Lech, like Boyle, was misled (tr. p. 100: "An dieses Gebiet grenzte auch das des ... Tūlī").

[67] Juwaynī, III, 3 (tr. Boyle, *HWC*, p. 549). Rubruck, VII, 4, ed. Van den Wyngaert, p. 185 (tr. Jackson and Morgan, p. 92). Rashīd al-Dīn, *JT*, I/1, ed. A.A. Romaskevich *et al.* (Moscow, 1965), p. 550, and tr. A.A. Khetagurov, *SL*, I/1 (Moscow and Leningrad, 1952), 193; I/2, in *TVOIRAO*, 13 (1868), 47, 97 (tr. Smirnova, *SL*, I/2, 55; sentence omitted at 30); II, 2, 16, 213, 277 (tr. Boyle, *SGK*, pp. 17, 30–1, 163, 202).

[68] Rubruck, XXXII, 4 and 5, ed. Van den Wyngaert, p. 287 (tr. Jackson and Morgan, pp. 223, 224). See also Juwaynī, II, 256 (tr. Boyle, *HWC*, p. 519).

[69] Rashīd al-Dīn, *JT*, II, 218 (tr. Boyle, *SGK*, p. 166). The site of "the great *ordas*" is discussed by Pelliot, *Notes on Marco Polo*, pp. 330–53.

as we have any evidence, however, concerning the patrimony of Tolui's offspring, it relates to a quite different region altogether. We should have expected the "hearth-child" of Tolui and Sorqaqtani to have inherited the Onon-Kerülen region from his father. Yet Rashīd al-Dīn says that Arigh Böke had his summer-quarters in the Altai and wintered on the Ürünggü, and adds that Sorqaqtani too had lived there.[70] On the other hand, Rubruck's testimony indicates that Arigh Böke, and Sorqaqtani before him, had a *yurt* rather closer to Qaraqorum.[71] Nor, of course, can we discount the possibility that in both cases the grazing-grounds ascribed to Arigh Böke had been acquired only since the downfall of Ögödei's line in 1251. In the present state of our knowledge the question must remain open. I can do no more here than draw attention to the problem posed by inconsistent data; and it is impossible to discuss matters of this kind without remembering that it was Tolui's line which seized upon the imperial dignity in 1251 and that our vision of developments in the thirteenth-century empire is refracted, as it were, through the Toluid lens of our principal sources.[72]

To recapitulate, then, the grazing-grounds conferred on Chinggis Khan's four senior sons do not represent the only grants of territory and peoples made to his family; nor do they prove quite as simple to define as we have sometimes assumed. The general effect of the principles I have described was to make an *ulus* more than just an assemblage of peoples and pasturelands: the *ulus* of a particular prince might be dispersed, in fact, over a far wider geographical area than just the territorial base—be it steppe or steppe-and-forest or steppe and steppe-agrarian frontier zone—which he occupied at the time. Throughout the empire there had arisen an extremely

[70] Rashīd al-Dīn, *JT*, II, 560–1 (tr. Boyle, *SGK*, p. 310). This passage, which is corrupted in Blochet's edition, is amended by Pelliot, *Notes on Marco Polo*, pp. 341–2: for the correct readings, see the translation by Iu.P. Verkhovskii, *SL*, II (Moscow and Leningrad, 1960), 201.

[71] Rubruck, XXXII, 6–7, ed. Van den Wyngaert, p. 288 (tr. Jackson and Morgan, p. 224).

[72] See, on Juwaynī for instance, David Ayalon, "The Great *Yāsa* of Chingiz Khān. A Re-examination. Part B," *Studia Islamica*, 34 (1971), 151–66; repr. in his *Outsiders in the Lands of Islam* (London, 1988). On the later doctoring of the *SH* by the Toluids, Allsen, *Mongol Imperialism*, pp. 36–42; Igor de Rachewiltz, "Some remarks on the dating of the *Secret History of the Mongols*," *MS*, 24 (1965), 197–201, believes the entire section on Ögödei's reign was composed under Qubilai. The number of troops under Tolui's authority according to Rashīd al-Dīn presents a further problem: see Appendix.

complex pattern of rights over tribal elements, colonies of enslaved subject peoples, and grazing-grounds, with perhaps the addition of nearby cities and their agricultural hinterlands with entitlement to urban commodities and revenues from further afield. These rights, transmitted by Chinggis Khan's sons and brothers to their descendants, were gravely undermined by the events of the mid-to-late thirteenth century.

The Emergence of the Khanates in Western and Central Asia

Möngke's accession and the overthrow of the lines of Ögödei and Chaghatai must be viewed as the first stage in this process. In Western Asia after 1251, resources appear to have been divided between Tolui's family and their Jochid allies. The great army sent westwards under Hülegü in 1253 was made up of representative contingents, as had been the pattern hitherto, but significantly no commanders are mentioned as representing Ögödei's family. Edicts of the new qa'an superseded previous territorial arrangements. The Mamlūk author al-ʿUmarī, for example, mentions at one juncture that Möngke allocated Tabrīz and Marāgha to Batu's brother and successor, Berke; and the later rulers of the Golden Horde seem to have based their claims to the Transcaucasus on Möngke's *yarligh*.[73] In Tibet, the influence of Ögödei's son Ködön (Köten), which had hitherto been paramount, underwent something of an eclipse, and new appanages were created for other princes, notably Hülegü.[74] Evidence from the period when the Mongol world erupted in civil war ten years later provides a similar picture. At that time the revenues of the land west of the Oxus were divided into three parts. The

[73] Jamāl al-Dīn ʿAbd-Allāh b. ʿAlī Qāshānī [Kāshānī], *Taʾrīkh-i Ūljāytū Sulṭān*, ed. Mahin Hambly (Tehran, 1348 Sh./1969), p. 146. al-ʿUmarī, ed. Lech, *Das mongolische Weltreich*, text pp. 20, 78, German tr. pp. 104, 143–4: this evidence was overlooked in Jackson, "The Dissolution of the Mongol Empire," pp. 208–9, 219–20.

[74] Luciano Petech, *Central Tibet and the Mongols* (Rome, 1990), pp. 10–12, 89–90. Turrell V. Wylie, "The First Mongol Conquest of Tibet Reinterpreted," *HJAS*, 37 (1977), 117. The date of Ködön's death varies in the sources, and it is unclear whether he died in 1251 or was still alive in 1260: see János Szerb, "Glosses on the Oeuvre of Bla-ma 'Phags-pa: II. Some notes on the events of the years 1251–1254," *Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae*, 34 (1980), 264 n. 7, 269 n. 22, 277. Juwaynī, I, 201 (tr. Boyle, *HWC*, p. 245), has him die as early as the reign of Güyüg (1246–1248).

details vary: in one account, two-fifths went to the qa'an, two-fifths to the army (the Mongol forces operating in Persia, presumably) and one-fifth to the house of Batu; in the other version, the three shares appear as equal thirds.[75] In Bukhārā at the same date, the skilled artisans belonged either to Batu's family, to Sorqaqtani (who was by now dead and must have been succeeded by Arigh Böke) or to the *dalāī-yi buzurg* (i.e. the *ulus* of the centre).[76] Apropos of all three regions the implications are clear: the shares of the two middle Chinggisid branches have largely been eliminated.

Qubilai and Hülegü were charged with particular tasks: the continuation of the war against the independent Sung dynasty in the one case, the overthrow of the Ismāʿīlīs of northern Persia (the "Assassins") and perhaps also of the ʿAbbasid Caliph on the other. What Möngke's longer-term aims were, we cannot know. There does appear to be evidence that Qubilai was regarded as a subordinate khan (*il-khan*) in China, on a par with his kinsmen who headed the other *ulus*es. Regarding Hülegü the evidence is more tortuous. Rashīd al-Dīn claims that Möngke ostensibly made the commission a temporary one by ordering his brother to return to his original *yurt* in Mongolia once his task was accomplished, even though he privately intended Hülegü and his heirs to rule over Persia, just as they later in fact did. This looks rather like an attempt by the Ilkhanid historian to rationalize what had happened.[77] At any rate, there is no certain testimony that Hülegü assumed the title *il-khan* earlier than 1260.[78]

[75] Quṭb al-Dīn Mūsā b. Muḥammad al-Yūnīnī, *al-Dhayl ʿalā' Mirʾāt al-Zamān* (Hyderabad, A.P., 1374–80/1954–61, 4 vols. only published), I, 498, and II, 161: his source was the lost portion of the biography of the Mamlūk Sultan Baybars by Ibn Shaddād (d. 684/1285). Qirṭāy al-ʿIzzī al-Khazāndārī, *Taʾrīkh Majmūʿ al-Nawādir*, Gotha Forschungsbibliothek MS. (Pertsch, no. 1655), fol. 79a; extract (wrongly attributed to Ibn Wāṣil) tr. in V.G. Frhr. von Tiesenhausen, *Sbornik materialov otnosiashchikhsia k istorii Zolotoi Ordy*, I (St. Petersburg, 1884), text p. 71, tr. p. 73.

[76] Waṣṣāf (Shihāb al-Dīn ʿAbd-Allāh b. ʿIzz al-Dīn Faḍl-Allāh Shīrāzī), *Tajziyat al-Amṣār wa-Tazjiyat al-Aʿṣār*, lithograph edn. (Bombay, 1269/1853), p. 51: this evidence is discussed in Barthold, *Turkestan*, pp. 516–17 n. 225; *cf.* also Buell, "Kalmyk Tanggaci people," p. 53 n. 24.

[77] Allsen, *Mongol Imperialism*, pp. 47–9: he assumes that Qubilai and Hülegü enjoyed the same status. Rashīd al-Dīn, *JT*, III, text p. 24, tr. p. 22. Jackson, "The Dissolution of the Mongol Empire," pp. 221–2; but *cf.* Morgan, *The Mongols*, pp. 148–9.

[78] Reuven Amitai-Preiss, "Evidence for the Early Use of the Title *ilkhan* among the Mongols," *JRAS*, 3rd series, 1 (1991), 353–61. Allsen, "Changing Forms of Legitimation," p. 227.

The events following Möngke's death in 1259 and the outbreak of civil war between the brothers Qubilai and Arigh Böke produced a still more drastic simplification than that effected by the coup of 1251. The Jochids, headed now by Berke, were Arigh Böke's most powerful supporters. In Persia, Hülegü arrested and executed the leading Jochid princes and generals who had accompanied his expedition, and massacred their troops: the survivors fled eastwards to join the Jochid commander Negüder in present-day Afghanistan, where they came to form the independent Negüderis (or Qaraunas).[79] Alughu, switching his support to Qubilai from Arigh Böke, slaughtered the artisans in Bukhārā who belonged to the Jochids. Hülegü, Qubilai and Alughu were all successful in bringing under their control the bureaucracies which had been set up for their respective territories some twenty years previously and which had been designed to function on behalf of the "*ulus* of the centre." In Alughu's case, it is quite clear that Chaghatayid authority was extended not only over some former Jochid possessions but over the cities of Transoxiana, which had hitherto been directly subject to the qa'an. Both Hülegü and Alughu received patents of legitimation from Qubilai, who needed their support in his own struggle with his brother's party.[80] But in Mongolia, at the same time, Arigh Böke seems to have appropriated the encampments of Hülegü's wives and sons, which are subsequently found in the hands of his offspring.[81]

Despite these profound changes, distribution of revenue continued in some measure, and certain of the assignments survived for a considerable time. With the conquest of Sung China in 1279, a fresh apportionment occurred, for Rashīd al-Dīn refers to Qubilai dividing "the provinces of Nangiyas" among the princes.[82] Chinggisid princes resident in Western Asia were still entitled to produce in kind from China, or to the revenues of certain districts there, in the fourteenth century;[83] though we are better informed about the transmission of goods and incomes to Persia, with whose Toluid rulers

[79] Aubin, "L'ethnogénèse," pp. 79–81. Jackson, "The dissolution of the Mongol Empire," pp. 239, 242–3.

[80] Barfield, *Perilous Frontier*, p. 218. For Alughu, see Rashīd al-Dīn, *JT*, II, 419–20 (tr. Boyle, *SGK*, pp. 260–1).

[81] *Ibid.*, pp. 566–7 (tr. Boyle, *SGK*, p. 312).

[82] *Ibid.*, p. 453 (tr. Boyle, *SGK*, p. 273). For Nangiyas (*nan-chia*, "people of the south"), see Pelliot, *Notes on Marco Polo*, p. 275.

[83] The evidence is summarized by Emil Bretschneider, *Mediaeval Researches from Eastern Asiatic Sources* (London, 1888, 2 vols.), II, pp. 11–14.

the qa'an was on consistently friendly terms. In 1298–9, when an embassy was sent by the Ilkhan Ghazan to the qa'an's court at Khanbaligh, it was noticed that the share owed to Hülegü's line had not been paid since Möngke's reign, and its equivalent in silk and fine garments was duly despatched back with the envoys.[84] Fourteen years later, Ghazan's brother and successor, Öljeitü, sent another mission, with instructions to collect the revenue that should have accrued in the interim.[85] The qa'an continued, of course, to demand his share of the plunder and revenue from Persia, and in the eyes of a European observer, at least, this drain on the Ilkhan's resources provided, interestingly enough (but probably wrongly), one reason for his desire for auxiliary troops from the Latin West.[86] But in some cases the arrangements for the transfer of revenue were sabotaged. Thus the Ilkhans were accused of witholding from the Jochids the revenue due to them from workshops (*kārkhānahā*) in Tabrīz and elsewhere.[87] And if Marco Polo is to be believed, one of the causes underlying the bitter conflict between Qubilai and his enemy Qaidu was the qa'an's refusal to send Qaidu what was his due from China.[88]

The *ulus*es or khanates of the later thirteenth century were not the *ulus*es of the first generation. They represented, by and large, an administrative rationalization, a consolidation and concentration of resources in the hands of fewer princes. Control of agrarian and urban wealth by the rulers of the newly emergent *ulus*es in Persia and China, especially, may well have furnished them with a valuable leverage against their external enemies or a means of putting pressure on doubtful allies. The forfeiture of income and enslaved craftsmen in areas of sedentary culture, by princes who dwelt a considerable distance away and whose claims were hardly enforceable, reveals nomadic rulers at perhaps their most vulnerable, some decades

[84] Waṣṣāf, p. 506.

[85] *Ibid.*, p. 504.

[86] Hugues Revel, Master of the Hospitallers, to Edward I of England, 30 Sept. 1275, in Ch. Kohler and C.V. Langlois (eds.), "Lettres inédites concernant les croisades (1275–1307)," *Bibliothèque de l'École des Chartes*, 52 (1891), 54 (*au grant Cham ... qui voleit aveir conte de ce que Alahaou, son pere d'Abaga, aveit gahagnié en Perse et a Baudac et au Cayre et a Halape*). The insertion of Cairo (which the editors incorrectly take to signify *Carrae* = Ḥarrān) is an obvious slip.

[87] Al-'Umarī, ed. Lech, *Das mongolische Weltreich*, text pp. 78–9, German tr. pp. 143–4.

[88] Marco Polo, *Le divisament dou monde*, ed. and tr. A.C. Moule and Paul Pelliot, *The Description of the World* (London, 1938, 2 vols.), II, 447–8; and tr. A. Ricci, *The Travels of Marco Polo* (London, 1931), pp. 359–60.

before Mongol khans began to court a different kind of insecurity by abandoning the steppe to reside in nearby towns.

Ulus and Khanate in the Far East

The rationalization and consolidation of resources I have alluded to occurred for the most part in Central and Western Asia. In the east, however, a parallel process is discernible slightly later. Qubilai's failure to destroy Qaidu and his confederates in Turkestan was offset by a major triumph at the expense of his relatives in eastern Mongolia and Manchuria. One of the flaws in the traditional view of the partition of the Mongol empire, as we saw, is that it takes no account of the branches of the imperial dynasty descended from Chinggis Khan's brothers. The distant location of their princely domains has condemned them to an obscurity which is only fitfully pierced by brief and occasional references in the Persian sources. In the account of Chinggis Khan's distribution of troops found in the *Secret History*, Temüge and his mother Hö'elün jointly received ten "thousands"; Rashīd al-Dīn supplies separate figures of five "thousands" for Temüge and three for his mother.[89] Whichever number we choose to trust, it is clear that the conqueror's youngest brother was at this time granted a larger number of subjects than any other member of the dynasty. An envoy from Sung China writing in c. 1221 singles out Temüge for special mention, noting that for the most part he commanded his own forces and perhaps thereby stressing his autonomy.[90] The Taoist patriarch Ch'ang Ch'un, who visited Temüge in the course of his journey from China to Chinggis Khan's headquarters in Afghanistan, was highly impressed by his encampment, which contained thousands of tents.[91] Clearly this was no minor princeling.

Temüge was for a considerable time Chinggis Khan's favourite brother and enjoyed a higher rank than the rest.[92] He appears in

[89] Rashīd al-Dīn, *JT*, I/2, in *TVOIRAO*, 13 (1868), 98, and 15 (1888), 221, 223 (tr. Smirnova, *SL*, I/2, 55, 277). *SH*, § 243, tr. Cleaves, p. 176, and tr. De Rachewiltz, chap. 10, *PFEH*, 26 (Sept. 1982), 47. Barfield, *Perilous Frontier*, p. 195, suggests that the discrepancy in the figures can be explained by two separate allocations of troops.

[90] Chao Hung, *Meng-ta pei-lu*, tr. Olbricht and Pinks, p. 24.

[91] Li Chih-ch'ang, *Hsi-yü chi*, tr. Arthur Waley, *The Travels of an Alchemist* (Broadway Travellers. London, 1931), pp. 64–5.

[92] Rashīd al-Dīn, *JT*, I/2, in *TVOIRAO*, 13 (1868), 98 (tr. Smirnova, *SL*, I/2, 55).

the *Yüan Shih* with the loftier title *kuo-wang* ("regional king," "viceroy"),[93] and when Chinggis Khan set out from Mongolia on his seven-year campaign to Western Asia in 1218 Temüge was left in charge of "the residence (*khāna*) and the *ordas*."[94] On the conqueror's return in 1225, however, Temüge seems to have fallen from favour;[95] and thereafter his career went rapidly downhill. Following the death of Ögödei in 1241, he made a bid for the vacant imperial throne, but was foiled by the empress-regent Töregene; and on Güyüg's accession in 1246 he was arrested, tried and put to death.[96] His political miscalculation may have affected the position of his offspring. Garbled rumours which reached independent Delhi suggest that during the uncertain years after Ögödei's death some of Temüge's sons had fled to China;[97] and this branch of the family does in fact appear to have been demoted, since Rashīd al-Dīn asserts that in more recent times precedence among the descendants of Chinggis Khan's brothers had belonged not to Temüge's line but to the posterity of Jochi Qasar.[98] Possibly the reversal of status can be traced partly to the great services performed for Qubilai during the civil war of 1260–4 by Qasar's son Yesüngge.[99]

Whatever the ranking of the progeny of Chinggis Khan's brothers, there is no doubt that they all grew disaffected late in Qubilai's reign. In 1287 these princes rose under the leadership of Temüge's descendant Nayan, who has been immortalized by Marco Polo; and with the support of, among others, Kölgen's grandson Ebügen and the family of Ögödei's son Ködön, they made common cause with Qaidu against the Qa'an.[100] Qubilai was victorious in the field, and

[93] Hambis, *Le Chapitre CVII*, p. 23; and *cf.* also p. 150.

[94] Rashīd al-Dīn, *JT*, I/2, in *TVOIRAO*, 15 (1888), 222 (tr. Smirnova, *SL*, I/2, 277).

[95] *Ibid.*, p. 142 (tr. Smirnova, *SL*, I/2, 230).

[96] *Ibid.*, II, 236–7 (tr. Boyle, *SGK*, p. 178), for a slightly fuller version than that of Juwaynī, I, 199, 203, 210 (tr. Boyle, *HWC*, pp. 244, 248, 255). *Cf.* also Carpini, V, 18, ed. Van den Wyngaert, p. 64, and ed. Menestò *et al.*, p. 264 (tr. in Dawson, *The Mongol Mission*, p. 25).

[97] Jūzjānī, II, 166 (tr. Raverty, pp. 1143–4).

[98] Rashīd al-Dīn, *JT*, I/2, in *TVOIRAO*, 13 (1868), 87 (tr. Smirnova, *SL*, I/2, 51). For the demotion of Jochi Qasar and his line by Chinggis Khan, see n. 26 above.

[99] Rashīd al-Dīn, *JT*, I/2, in *TVOIRAO*, 13 (1868), 88 (tr. Smirnova, *SL*, I/2, 52); II, 389, 392–3, 398 (tr. Boyle, *SGK*, pp. 252, 253, 255). For his career, see Igor de Rachewiltz, "Some Remarks on the Stele of Yisüngge," in Walther Heissig *et al.* (eds.), *Tractata Altaica Denis Sinor sexagenario . . . dedicata* (Wiesbaden, 1976), pp. 493–5.

[100] Rashīd al-Dīn, *JT*, I/2, in *TVOIRAO*, 13 (1868), 99–100 (tr. Smirnova, *SL*,

Nayan headed those who were executed by the time-honoured method of being wrapped in a carpet and beaten to death. According to Rashīd al-Dīn, the princes' troops were taken from them and redistributed among the imperial family.[101] We know from Chinese sources that Qubilai went on to suppress the agents (*darughachis*) appointed by these princes to superintend their assignments in China.[102]

What was the reason for this relatively sudden and highly formidable opposition to the qa'an in the north-east? It is easy, perhaps, to understand the attitude of Ködön's line, whose position in the empire appears to have deteriorated steadily since the coup of 1251. Ködön himself had lost out in the course of events following Ögödei's death. At one time envisaged by Chinggis Khan himself as the next in line for the imperial throne after Ögödei,[103] he had first seen his brother Güyüg elected in his place and had then, as we noticed earlier, been obliged to relinquish his authority in Tibet after Möngke's accession. His sons, whose appanage lay in the Tangut region, may have nursed further grievances. Rashīd al-Dīn is noticeably coy on the subject, mentioning their participation in the 1287 revolt only once and everwhere else stressing the ties of friendship that bound Ködön's line to the qa'ans Qubilai and Temür Öljeitü.[104] It may well be that this branch of the dynasty felt threatened by the creation

I/2, 56); II, 533–5 (tr. Boyle, *SGK*, p. 298). Marco Polo, tr. Moule and Pelliot, II, 192–201; tr. Ricci, pp. 103–9. For the chronology and other data from Chinese sources, see Pelliot, *Notes on Marco Polo*, pp. 788–9; for a full narrative, Rossabi, *Khubilai Khan*, pp. 222–4. Nayan's descent as given in Berezin's text of *JT* is in error: *cf.* the correct version in *SP*, fols. 103b–104a; also Paul Pelliot and Louis Hambis (eds.), *Cheng-wou Ts'in-tcheng lou. Histoire des campagnes de Gengis Khan* (Leiden, 1951, vol. I only), pp. 178–9.

[101] Rashīd al-Dīn, *JT*, I/2, in *TVOIRAO*, 13 (1868), 90, 97 (tr. Smirnova, *SL*, I/2, 53, 55).

[102] *YS*, chap. 14, cited in Hambis, *Le Chapitre CVIII*, p. 112. The allegation by Rashīd al-Dīn, *JT*, I/2, in *TVOIRAO*, 13 (1868), 100 (tr. Smirnova, *SL*, I/2, 56), that nobody of Temüge's line remained alive, should be treated with caution, since at least one of Temüge's descendants, Toqta, prince of Leao, is found holding an appanage in the 14th century: Hambis, *Le Chapitre CVIII*, p. 42. His precise ancestry is uncertain: Hambis, *Le Chapitre CVII*, pp. 35, 46 n. 31; Rashīd al-Dīn, *JT*, II, 503 (tr. Boyle, *SGK*, p. 286). For the resettlement of (some of?) Nayan's surviving dependants, see Herbert Franke, *Beiträge zur Kulturgeschichte Chinas unter der Mongolenherrschaft. Das Shan-kü sin-hua des Yang Yü* (Abhandlungen für die Kunde des Morgenlandes, XXXII/2. Wiesbaden, 1956), p. 82.

[103] Juwaynī, I, 206 (tr. Boyle, *HWC*, p. 251); a more definite assertion in Rashīd al-Dīn, *JT*, II, 243 (tr. Boyle, *SGK*, p. 181).

[104] *Ibid.*, I/2, in *TVOIRAO*, 15 (1888), 219, 226 (tr. Smirnova, *SL*, I/2, 276, 278); II, 6, 226 (tr. Boyle, *SGK*, pp. 21, 170).

in 1272 of a new principality at Ngan-si (Si-ngan) in Shan-si, ruled successively by Qubilai's son Manggala and grandson Ananda;[105] and certainly their survival is difficult to reconcile with the considerable sub-kingdom in Tangut over which Ananda clearly presided by the turn of the century.[106] As for Nayan, Chinese sources reveal a steady encroachment on his autonomy from 1284 as the Liao-tung region was brought more immediately under Qubilai's control.[107] This seems to be referred to only by Rashīd al-Dīn. When listing the major descendants of Chinggis Khan's brothers, he mentions three times censuses instituted on Qubilai's orders with a view to counting the members of these branches of the imperial dynasty. The context is actually the great number of princes and princesses which emerged from the inquiry.[108] But the census was the mechanism with which the Mongols traditionally prefaced the imposition of taxation upon the subject peoples, and its application here, in remote parts of Mongolia, would indicate some greater degree of centralization on the part of the qa'an, involving an end to the fiscal exemptions enjoyed by his kinsfolk.[109]

Conclusion

I have tried to demonstrate that the *ulus* comprised more discrete elements than we have generally supposed. Nor was it static: the arrangements made for Chinggis Khan's eldest son Jochi, at least, appear to have changed over time. I have also argued that a greater number of major appanages existed than we have tended to believe. We occupy no vantage-point that enables us to discern which *ulus*-holders were intended to have pre-eminence: it is only hindsight that has elevated the appanages of Chinggis Khan's four senior sons to the status of official divisions of the Mongol empire at an early date.

[105] Hambis, *Le Chapitre CVIII*, p. 88: Ananda received the title in 1282.

[106] Rashīd al-Dīn, *JT*, II, 362, 593, 595, 597 (tr. Boyle, *SGK*, pp. 243, 322, 323).

[107] E.P.J. Mullie, *De mongoolse prins Nayan* (Mededelingen van de Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie voor Wetenschappen Letteren en Schone Kunsten van België, Klasse der Letteren, XXVI/3. Brussels, 1964), pp. 9–11.

[108] Rashīd al-Dīn, *JT*, I/2, in *TVOIRAO*, 13 (1868), 97, 99, 102 (tr. Smirnova, *SL*, I/2, 55, 56, 57).

[109] For Qubilai's gradual build-up of imperial authority in other parts of Mongolia, see Dardess, "From Mongol Empire to Yüan Dynasty," pp. 132 ff.

In particular, the domains of Chinggis Khan's brothers have hitherto been left out of the reckoning, and I suggest that they should be viewed as *uluses* until the débâcle of 1287 and their absorption into Qubilai's Chinese realm. And lastly, whatever Chinggis Khan's intentions were for the future development of his empire, the events of the mid-thirteenth century constituted a disruptive twist, creating powerful new *uluses* and perhaps even in some measure fossilizing the organic growth that had been present in the system as a whole. We must not be mesmerized by these developments into assuming that they represented a natural progression from Chinggis Khan's own allocations of territory. The making of the Mongol states was almost as bloody and as tortuous a business as was the expansion of the empire itself for those powers and peoples that were its victims.


Appendix

Rashīd al-Dīn claims that Tolui received all the troops and peoples who remained after the distribution to the rest of his kindred.[110] At one juncture they are said to have totalled 101,000 men, as against the 4,000 allotted to each of Tolui's older brothers.[111] This testimony, which is accepted by modern authors,[112] nevertheless places a heavy strain on our credulity. How was Ögödei supposed to govern his empire when the vast majority of his forces even nominally belonged first to his youngest brother and then, after Tolui's death, to his widow Sorqaqtani and her sons? Rashīd al-Dīn offers a somewhat feeble explanation—Chinggis Khan foresaw that Tolui's line would eventually attain the imperial dignity, and so deliberately made them more powerful from the outset[113]—which amounts to no more than an attempt to justify the Toluid coup of 1251–2. Professor Allsen has drawn attention to the way in which the *Secret History*, for instance, first composed in 1228 or 1240, underwent revisions in the wake of that coup.[114] It may well be significant that even here Rashīd

[110] Rashīd al-Dīn, *JT*, I/2, in *TVOIRAO*, 15 (1888), 224, 228 (tr. Smirnova, *SL*, I/2, 278, 279); II, 213–14 (tr. Boyle, *SGK*, pp. 163, 164).
[111] *Ibid.*, I/2, in *TVOIRAO*, 15 (1888), 194–5 (tr. Smirnova, *SL*, I/2, 266); *cf.* also p. 215 (tr. p. 274).
[112] E.g., Fletcher, "The Mongols," p. 36; Allsen, *Mongol Imperialism*, pp. 60–1; Barfield, *Perilous Frontier*, p. 195.
[113] Rashīd al-Dīn, *JT*, II, 214 (tr. Boyle, *SGK*, p. 164).
[114] Allsen, *Mongol Imperialism*, pp. 39–42.

al-Dīn finds no corroboration; instead, the *Secret History* says plainly that Tolui was given four "thousands" just as was each of his older brothers.[115] Rashīd al-Dīn's information looks as if it was the product of still later doctoring of the facts. If his testimony regarding the 101,000 troops has any basis in reality, it can only refer to the army of the centre (*qol*), which would have been under Tolui's command during the interregnum preceding Ögödei's election in 1229 and then handed over to the new qa'an. And possibly a faint echo of this is to be found elsewhere in the *Jāmi' al-Tawārīkh*, where Rashīd al-Dīn seems to admit that Tolui's forces were subordinate to "whoever rules the great *yurt* and station" (i.e. the qa'an).[116]

[115] *SH*, § 242, tr. Cleaves, p. 175, and tr. de Rachewiltz, chap. 10, *PFEH*, 26 (March 1982), 46.
[116] Rashīd al-Dīn, *JT*, I/2, in *TVOIRAO*, 15 (1888), 228 (tr. Smirnova, *SL*, I/2, 279). An anecdote designed to illustrate Sorqaqtani's loyalty may also be linked. The qa'an Ögödei arbitrarily transferred some "thousands" (the details vary in the two different versions found in the *JT*) which belonged to Sorqaqtani and her sons to his own son Ködön. Some *noyans* in the service of the Toluids protested vigorously to Sorqaqtani, who conceded that they were right but pointed out that all of them, including herself and her sons, belonged to the qa'an and it was his prerogative to do as he saw fit: *ibid.*, pp. 224–6 (tr. Smirnova, *SL*, I/2, 278); II, 223–4 (tr. Boyle, *SGK*, pp. 169–70). The troops in question may have been part of the *qol* over which Tolui as regent had briefly wielded authority.



THE MONGOL IMPERIAL DYNASTY
(Qaghans in block capitals)

MONGOL NOMADISM AND MIDDLE EASTERN GEOGRAPHY: QĪSHLĀQS AND TŪMENS

JOHN MASSON SMITH, JR.

> I can tell you that in summer all the armies of the Tartars of the Levant are stationed in [Greater Armenia], because it has the best summer pasturage for beasts. So the Tartars spend the summer here with their beasts; but they do not winter here, because of the intense cold of the snow, which falls in these regions in prodigious quantities, so that the beasts could not survive it. So the Tartars depart with the onset of winter and withdraw to a warmer region, where they find plenty of grass and good pasturage for their beasts.
>
> Marco Polo[1]

By 1256, the build-up of Mongol forces in the Middle East was complete. Hülegü had arrived with a large army, and to it were attached the units already there. Hülegü then employed all these forces in the invasion of Iraq that ended with the taking of Baghdād and destruction of the Caliph and Caliphate. By examination of this campaign it has been possible with reasonable approximation to establish the size of Hülegü's army. The officers named in the sources as commanding units of the army number fifteen when Hülegü himself is included (as commander, no doubt, of a personal guard force, *keshig*, of 10,000 men). On the assumption that these officers commanded *tümens*, units of ten thousand men, the whole army numbered, in principle, 150,000 men.[2] When the campaign was over, the army's

[1] *The Travels of Marco Polo*, tr. R. Latham (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1958; reprint of 1980 [n.b. pagination varies among reprints]), p. 48.

[2] J.M. Smith, Jr., "Mongol manpower and Persian population", *JESHO*, 18/3 (1975). Scholarly opinion differs on the correspondence between the nominal and the actual strengths of Mongol *tümens*. I have argued that it was high, by analogy to the nomad forces of the Akkoyunlu, which were kept almost up to, and in one case somewhat over, nominal strength in several plausible reports: see "'Ayn Jālūt: Mamlūk Success or Mongol Failure?", *HJAS*, 44/2 (December 1984), 310, n. 5. Thomas Allsen argues (in *Mongol Imperialism* [Berkeley, 1987], pp. 193–94 and 206, citing Ch'i-ch'ing Hsiao, *The Military Establishment of the Yuan Dynasty* [Cambridge,

units retired to their assigned territories, for this was a nomad army, and, as William of Rubruck tells us, ". . . every commander, according to whether he has a greater or smaller number of men under him, is familiar with the limits of his pasturelands and where he ought to graze in summer and winter, in spring and autumn. For in the winter they move down southwards to the warmer regions, and in the summer they move up northwards to the colder ones."[3] To what extent may we, too, become familiar with these pastures and their limits?

The Mongol troops sent to the Middle East were accompanied by their families and herds.[4] Since the families may be conservatively estimated as including 5–6 persons, the human population implied by the 150,000 soldiers numbered between 750,000 and 900,000—a population similar in size to that of Outer Mongolia itself in those days. The attached animal population, at a guess, included,

MA, 1978], pp. 170–71 [note 27 to p. 72]) that the actual numbers were well below the nominal, judging by the classification of *tümens* into three categories: those with at least 7,000 soldiers, those with at least 5,000, and those with at least 3,000—note that these figures are minima. A likely case in point is provided by B. Manz, The Rise and Rule of Tamerlane (Cambridge, 1989), p. 34: the *hazāra* (Thousand) of Khulm was known as the Seven Hundred (*Dulan Jawun/dolughan ja'un*). I believe that of these categories, only the first, and perhaps the second, apply to nomads. In any community of ten thousand nomad families, a certain number would, as a result of bad luck or bad management, be undercapitalized in animals—possessing fewer than 100 sheep-equivalents—and thus most likely lacking also in the horses and equipment needed for military service. In the Narobanchin Temple community of Mongol nomads studied by H.H. Vreeland, such marginal nomads amounted to about 25%: see *Mongol Community and Kinship Structure* (New Haven, 1954), p. 31, counting half of Group 6 and all of Group 7, who owned fewer than 100 sheep. Thus a normal *tümen* could include ten thousand men (and their families and herds), but could not reliably and predictably be expected to field more than 70% of them. The *tümens* providing five thousand men I imagine to have been either marginally-capitalized nomads, like the Iranian Basseri, whose families, on average, own somewhat under 100 sheep, and who thus would be unlikely to be able to field more than half of their men equipped and mounted to Mongol specifications; or nomads like the Iranian Bakhtiyari depicted in the documentary film, "Grass," (1925) by M.C. Cooper and E.B. Shoedsack (and in Cooper's book of the same title [New York, 1925]), whose migration was so difficult as to require the presence of many of the men. The 3,000-man *tümens* were probably drawn from settled, mixed-farming populations like that of the Manchus, who could field only one man in three: see M. Rossabi, *China and Inner Asia* (London, 1975), pp. 86–87. From their conventional sedentary subjects the Mongols usually conscripted only one man in ten.

[3] *The Mission of Friar William of Rubruck*, tr. P. Jackson; ed. P. Jackson and D. Morgan (London, 1990), p. 72.

[4] As we can tell from the slowness of Hülegü's journey from Mongolia to the Middle East: his pace was set by the sheep and goats of his men and their families; these small animals can only travel 3–4 miles a day.

per family, 100 sheep (or their equivalent) for subsistence, and 10 horses providing transport (and *qumis*) for the family and mounts for the man of the family when on active military duty. This is perhaps an underestimation: Inner Asian nomads, on average, seem to have had more than 100 sheep-equivalents (s–e) per family, and a herd of 10 horses might not have met a family's need for draft, riding, milking and breeding stock in addition to the 5 combat mounts (geldings), and perhaps 3 horses to serve as food on campaign. In any case, on this calculation each family would have possessed the equivalent of 150 sheep (taking the horse as having the value of 5 sheep); the whole army would have had 22,500,000 sheep-equivalents,[5] and each *tümen* 1,500,000 s–e.

In general terms, the Mongol forces were distributed through three regions, Anatolia, Ādharbāyjān and "Khurāsān," which were, respectively, considered as the Right Wing, Center, and Left Wing of the army for organizational purposes. "Khurāsān" (including roughly northeastern Iran, Afghanistan and Turkmenia to the Oxus), had been colonized by Mongol nomad units following the conquest of the Khwārazmian empire in 1219–22.[6] In 1230, "thirty thousand horsemen" arrived under Chormaghun's command to reduce and occupy Ādharbāyjān and gain control of adjacent territories.[7] And finally, when Hülegü arrived, he sent the army in Ādharbāyjān, now commanded by Baiju, further west into Anatolia, and replaced it with troops which had come with him to the Middle East; some of these may also have augmented the forces in Khurāsān and Anatolia. Each nomad unit was assigned its own pastures, on which it migrated

[5] The animal population of Outer Mongolia has been about 25 million in recent years (and was close to that on the eve of the catastrophic collectivization program inflicted on it starting in 1929). In 1990 about 14 million were sheep, 5 million goats, 3 million cattle, 2 million horses and 0.6 million camels (see *The Mongolia Society Newsletter* of July 1991); these would amount to about 47 million sheep-equivalents.

[6] For a detailed discussion, see J. Aubin, "L'ethnogénèse des Qaraunas," *Turcica*, I (1969), 65–94. Aubin deals with three commanders, Dayir [Tayir], Möngedü and Negüder, which would imply three *tümens*, but he also mentions that another commander, Oqotur, was associated with Möngedü, and that Möngedü is said to have led two *tümens*; the occupying army thus seems to have included four *tümens*.

[7] 'Alā al-Dīn 'Aṭa-Mālik Juwaynī, *The History of the World-Conqueror*, J.A. Boyle trans. (Manchester, 1958), I, p. 190. Rashīd al-Dīn, *The Successors of Genghis Khan* [RaD, *Successors*], J.A. Boyle trans. (New York, 1971), p. 33. Other sources, as for instance the *Georgian Chronicle* (in M.F. Brosset, *Histoire de la Georgie*, I [St. Petersburg, 1849], p. 511), speak of a larger force, perhaps the product of local conscription.

according to plan and necessity, subject to occasional reassignment or temporary displacement in accordance with the migratory whims of the rulers, military necessities, or ecological desiderata.

Pasture assignments to individual commanders or units are seldom mentioned; the details were probably military secrets. But the assignments were apparently made by *tümen*, as we see in the case of a *Qarāūnās tümen* given a *qīshlāq*, winter pasture, in Baghdād and *yāylāq*, summer pasture, in the Siyāhkūh.[8] Moreover, the Middle Eastern Mongol rulers, I believe, like those elsewhere, moved and camped with a large following (*ordu*) that included the individual establishments of the royal women, and the royal guard (*keshig*), a unit of 10,000 men—with, of course, their families and herds. Accordingly, the list of the pastures used by the Mongol rulers should reveal many of the *tümen*-sized grazing grounds of their Middle Eastern empire. And since the Mongol rulers, like nomad tribal chiefs in general, had access at will to whatever *yāylāq* or *qīshlāq* they wished, and made use of many different ones, the list of the ones they used at one time or another should indicate many of the pastures and routes ordinarily occupied by the *tümens* of ordinary Mongol nomads.

The pastures in Ādharbāyjān and western Khurāsān are for the most part named, along with the routes connecting them and the dates on which they were used, in the notices by Rashīd al-Dīn, Kāshānī and others, of the migratory movements of the rulers of the Mongol Middle East.[9] But few rulers visited central or western Anatolia, to say nothing of the more easterly parts of "Khurāsān," so that the pastures in those regions receive only incidental mention, if any, and resort must therefore be made to less well-informed or later works such as Āqsarāyī and Shikārī for Anatolia, and the histories of Tamerlane for Eastern Khurāsān. As an example of a detailed notice, take the movements of Geikhatu from the summer of 1292 to the summer of 1294.[10] His *yāylāq* in 1292 was in the Alātāq, mountains north of Lake Van in eastern Anatolia (effectively part of Ādharbāyjān for Mongol pastoral and administrative pur-

[8] Rashīd al-Dīn, *Ta'rīkh-i Mubārak-i Ghāzānī*, partial ed. by K. Jahn, *Geschichte der Ilḫāne Abāġā bis Gaiḫātū (1265–1295)* [RaD/A] ('s-Gravenhage, 1957), p. 48.

[9] The migrations of Öljeitü, known primarily from Kāshānī, have been investigated by Charles Melville, "The Itineraries of Sultan Öljeitü, 1304–16," *Iran*, 28 (1990).

[10] RaD/A, pp. 85–86.

poses).[11] He left for the *qīshlāq* of Arrān, in the angle formed by the confluence of the Aras and Kura rivers, at the end of Rajab 691 (17 July), arriving no later than 18 November (6 Dhū-l-Ḥijjah 691). On 24 May 1293 (16 Jumādā al-ākhira 692), he left Arrān for Tabrīz and Marāgha, which latter he departed on 18 June (12 Rajab) for the Siyāhkūh (see below). He was camped at Ashkamar at the end of Sha'bān (4 August); on 16 August (12 Ramaḍān) he proceeded to Awjān, on 23 August (19 Ramaḍān) to Hashtrūd, and thence via Marāgha to Arrān, where he spent the winter. In the spring, he left the *qīshlāq* in Jumādā al-ākhira 693 (30 March–28 April 1294) for Alātāq, arriving no later than 12 June (16 Rajab).

Charles Melville has concluded that "No . . . obvious pattern emerges from the dates given for Öljeitü's seasonal migrations, either in terms of arrival or departure . . ."[12] and the same may be said for the movements of the earlier Mongol courts. One year the court, or at least the ruler, left Tabrīz for Arrān on 17 October;[13] another year they (or he) departed on 17 November.[14] Since the journey covered approximately 200 miles, the movement of the whole royal establishment, including its sheep and goats travelling at some 3 miles per day (mpd), would have taken some 67 days, putting the arrival around 23 December after a start on 14 October, and around 23 January (!) from a start on 17 November. The preferred royal *yāylāq* in the Alātāq was occupied on an apparently even more irregular schedule, with arrivals recorded at various times between 12 June and 7 October (!),[15] and departures from 17 July[16] to as late as 5 November (!).[17] Moving sheep and goats the 260-odd miles from Alātāq to Arrān along the relatively-protected Aras valley via Nakhichevān, would have taken some 87 days: until 31 January (!) from a start on 5 November. It seems likely that on some occasions the women and children, sheep and goats were sent to the *qīshlāq* earlier in the

[11] Ḥamdullāh Mustawī Qazwīnī, *Nuzhat al-Qulūb*, G. Le Strange trans. (Leyden and London, 1919), p. 100, locates Alātāq in Greater Armenia, and that, in turn, in Iran. The (usually royal) forces summering in the Alātāq were also part of the Center.

[12] Melville, "Itineraries," p. 59.

[13] Rashīd al-Dīn, *Ta'rīkh-i Mubārak-i Ghāzānī*, partial trans. by K. Jahn, *Geschichte Ġāzān-Ḫān's* [RaD/G] (London, 1940), p. 87.

[14] RaD/A, p. 67.

[15] 12 June: RaD/A, p. 86. 7 October: RaD/G, p. 135.

[16] RaD/A, p. 85.

[17] RaD/G, p. 135.

season, and that the ruler and his men, with their horses, lingered in higher country while the fine fall weather lasted, and then hastened away.[18] At a grazed horse's pace of 15 mpd the trip to Arrān from Tabrīz would have taken only about two weeks, and from Alātāq about 18 days.[19]

The routes between the summer and winter pastures, often different, because of the "off-road" capacity of nomads, from the traditional commercial roads, can probably be ascertained, as Jean Aubin has done for western Khurāsān, although I have not attempted to do so here.[20] And with the determination of the routes, the interesting question concerning their difficulty may also be answerable. In Mongolia and much of Inner Asia (although not in Chaghatai's realm) the Mongols could practice "horizontal nomadism," movement—often exiguous and generally easy—from one pasture to another, not under climatic duress, although often northwards in summer and to the south in winter, but in search of optimal grazing and comfortable living conditions. However, movement between highland summer pastures and lowland winter pastures, forced upon the nomads by snow and heat in the Middle East and Central Asia—"vertical nomadism"—involves passage through mountain ranges and can be very difficult.[21] The Mongols doubtless monopolized the easy routes for their own people, relegating the Türkmen, *Yürüks*, and various Iranian nomads to the hard ones, but there are indications that even the Mongol rulers in the Middle East found migrating somewhat more demanding than did their counterparts in other regions. Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, for instance, makes frequent mention of the use of wagons

[18] I drove from Tehran to Istanbul in November, 1961, and all through Ādharbāyjān the weather was sunny and warm, encouraging alfresco lunches beside the car; it grew cooler in E. Turkey to Erzurum, and rain and sleet fell between Erzurum and Erzinjan.

[19] Movement by the ruler and his men apart from their families and sheep and goats must account for the relatively rapid pace of most of Öljeitü's migrations, as discussed and tabulated by Melville.

[20] Jean Aubin, "Réseau pastoral et réseau caravanier. Les grand'routes du Khurassan a l'époque mongole," *Le Monde Iranien et L'Islam*, I (Geneva, 1971).

[21] As for instance in the case (cited above, n. 1) of the Bakhtiyari nomads in the film, "Grass" by Cooper and Shoedsack, and the Turkish nomads described by D.G. Bates, *Nomads and Farmers: a Study of the Yörük of Southeastern Turkey* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Museum of Anthropology Anthropological Papers, No. 52, 1973). Thomas J. Barfield opines, based on his field work on nomads in Afghanistan, sometimes in places formerly used by the Mongols (Bādghīs, Gurziwān, Qūndūz and Bāghlān) that the vertical migrations in the Middle East are for the most part much easier than that of the Bakhtiyari in "Grass" (personal communication).

by the Mongols of the Golden Horde, but says nothing at all about wagons when describing the migration of Sulṭān Abū Sa'īd from Baghdād to Tabrīz.[22] (The Middle Eastern Mongols may have had to use pack animals instead of wagons because of the prevalence of terrain that wagons could not negotiate. More difficult migrations would have meant more hardship for the animals, and a need for more human labor—especially "male manpower"—in overcoming obstacles. These difficulties would in turn have affected the Mongol army adversely, reducing the availability of soldiery and the fitness of their horses, and degrading *tümens* from the capacity to field at least 7000 troops to the second-rate, 5000-man category. It was to cope with these problems, perhaps, that Ghazan took 13 half-strength *tümens* on campaign against the Mamluks in 1299,[23] made special measures for provisioning the army from agricultural proceeds, and eventually decided to reintroduce *iqṭā'* grants that were, *inter alia*, to enable soldiers to keep two or three horses at all times fat and ready for service).[24]

Turning to the *qīshlāq*s and *yāylāq*s themselves, we know best those of Ādharbāyjān. The most important *qīshlāq*s were those of Arrān, the triangular district between the Kura and Aras rivers and the mountains of Qarābāgh;[25] Mūghān (details below);[26] the valley of the Zarīneh Rūd/Jaghatu that flows into the southern end of Lake Urmīye;[27] the valley of the Safīd Rūd/Qizil Uzūn/Hülen Müren, which flows into the Caspian;[28] the district of Baghdād;[29] and the

[22] Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, *The Travels of Ibn Baṭṭūṭa*, tr. H.A.R. Gibb (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Hakluyt Society publications, second series, No. CXVII, 1959), vol. II, 342–44, 472–73, 482, 485–86.

[23] Smith, "'Ayn Jālūt," p. 329.

[24] RaD/G, p. 302. I was made aware of these fat horses—as of many other Mongol matters—by Ann K.S. Lambton's most informative book, *Continuity and Change in Medieval Persia* (Albany, NY, 1988), p. 126.


[25] RaD/A, *passim*, e.g. p. 11; RaD/G, *passim*, e.g. p. 87.

[26] RaD/G, p. 95.

[27] RaD/A, p. 11. I am indebted to John Boyle's work in Chapter 4 of *The Cambridge History of Iran*, vol. *V, The Saljuq and Mongol Periods* (Cambridge, 1968) for the locations of this and many other places.

[28] RaD/G, p. 151.

[29] RaD/A, pp. 41, 48; RaD/G, pp. 105, 120. Ibn Baṭṭūṭā's eyewitness account (*Travels*, II, 343) of the departure from Baghdād of Sūlṭān Abū Sa'īd, accompanied by "the great amirs [of Thousands?], who number about fifty," as well as "the sultan's mamluks," makes it sound as if all of the units of the Center, except for the Diyārbakr command, had wintered around Baghdād. Besides the Baghdād *qīshlāq*, there were others around Ḥilla and in northern Iraq: Daqūq, Irbīl and Mosul are



Map 1. Pastures of "Ādharbāyjān"

region, with at least one *tümen* stationed in it, of Diyārbakr[30] (considered by the Mongols, administratively and ecologically, as part of Ādharbāyjān, like the Alātāq). The *yāylāq*s were in the Alātāq, north of Lake Van;[31] at Sughūrlūk ("Marmot Meadows") around Takht-i Sulaymān and the Qirk Būlāgh mountains;[32] on the Siyāhkūh, the watershed range between the Zarīneh Rūd and Safīd Rūd rivers;[33] and on the Qongqur Öleng ("Brown Meadow")—the plain of Sulṭāniyya.[34] In addition to these, there were doubtless pastures in Transcaucasia, used by the important commanders and units assigned to Georgia, as for instance Qutlughshāh, sent with an "army," presumably at least a *tümen*, by Ghazan in 701.[35]

The assumption that royal *qīshlāq*s were selected to accommodate the rulers' *tümen*-sized entourage may be tested in one Ādharbāyjān case. Thanks to the work of Vladimir Minorsky,[36] the *qīshlāq* of Mūghān, the favorite of the early Mongol occupants of Ādharbāyjān from Chormaghun through Hülegü, may be roughly appraised. According to Minorsky's calculations, the Mūghān steppe consisted of some 5000 sq km in the (former Soviet) Republic of Azerbaijan, plus an area 50–70 km by 50 km in Iran; all this comes to something like 2 million acres. Applying Soviet agronomists' average figure of 534 lbs of grass per acre (600 kg/hectare) from good Inner Asian steppe,[37] the Mūghān steppe should produce some 534,000 tons of

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mentioned by Bar Hebraeus, *Chronography*, tr. E.A.W. Budge (London, 1932), I, 480, 486, 497. This suggests that a good part of the Iraqi lowland adjacent to the Zagros served the Mongols as winter pastures. The small pockets of "Türkmen" population still present in Irbīl, Kirkuk and elsewhere in the hills edging these lowlands may be remnants of those "Mongols."

[30] Presumably in the "high-steppe" but only slightly snowy (10–20 days of snow-cover), country extending along the Tigris around and below modern Diyarbekir city, although possibly further south, on the extensive "plains steppe" along the Turko-Syrian border. The transfer of a Qarāūnās *tümen* from its *qīshlāq* around Baghdād to one around Diyārbakr is mentioned in RaD/A, pp. 48–49. Diyārbakr is frequently mentioned by Rashīd al-Dīn and others as one of the major regional commands.

[31] RaD/A, *passim*, e.g., p. 11. RaD/G, *passim*, e.g., p. 135.

[32] RaD/A, pp. 66, 73.

[33] RaD/A, pp. 11, 48.

[34] RaD/A, p. 73. There were summer pastures also at Ṣāyin, between Sarāb and Ardabīl, presumably on the meadows of Mt. Sabalān (RaD/A, p. 66), and around Awjān, a bit southeast of Tabrīz, by Mt. Sahand (RaD/G, p. 120), but these seem to have served only for short-term encampments.

[35] RaD/G, p. 140.

[36] "Mūḳān," *EI*[1].

[37] I.V. Larin, *Pasture Economy and Meadow Cultivation* (Jerusalem, 1962), p. 263 and *passim*. The best pastures of Outer Mongolia yield 540 kg/ha, or 481 lbs/acre:

grass annually.[38] Data on the nutritional values of straw of various kinds, and information on the nutritional needs of sheep and horses—ponies—of the Mongolian type, indicate that a sheep requires about 4 lbs of straw (or dry grass) a day: three-quarters of a ton a year, and a pony about 9 lbs a day or 1.64 tons a year.[39] On the assumption, discussed above, that the average Mongol family kept 100 sheep (or the equivalent) and 10 horses, its animals would have needed some 490 lbs of straw or dry grass each day; nearly 30 tons for a four-month stay on the *qīshlāq*.[40] 534,000 tons of grass should therefore support almost 18,000 families. This calculation suggests that Mūghān could comfortably support a *tümen* in *qīshlāq*, as well as the establishments of the royal wives and ministers, the total of which doubtless considerably exceeded 10,000 families.[41] The Mongol rulers after Hülegü probably preferred Arrān to Mūghān because it could accommodate an even larger entourage.[42] The other *qīshlāq*s cannot be so conveniently delimited, but with the aid of large-scale maps, data on vegetation, and perhaps satellite photographs, it should eventually be possible to work out their size, productivity and pastoral carrying-capacity in considerable detail.

In Anatolia, the first Mongols we have to account for are the three *tümen*s originally sent to the Middle East under Chormaghun

I.Kh. Ovdiyenko, *Economic-Geographical Sketch of the Mongolian People's Republic*, Mongolia Society Occasional Papers, No. 3 (Bloomington, 1965), p. 59.

[38] Since the Mongols occupied Mūghān in winter, after the grass would have lost its seed, this tonnage (which is based on data for hay) overestimates the amount available—but I do not know by how much (wheat hay has about 25% more calories than wheat straw). I assume that the Mongols reserved the grass growing on the *qīshlāq*s for winter use only, so that, on arrival, their animals would not be grazing only on the leftovers of herds that had made use of the region in other seasons.

[39] M.E. Ensminger, *Sheep and Wool Science*, 3rd ed. (Danville, IL: Interstate, 1964), 193; H. Epstein, *Domestic Animals of China* (Farnham Royal, 1969), pp. 34, 100; I.V. Larin, *Pasture Rotation* (Jerusalem, 1962), p. 110; J.W. Evans, *et al.*, *The Horse* (San Francisco, 1977), pp. 324–29.

[40] The modern Shahseven nomads, however, remain in their Mūghān *qīshlāq* for some six months, leaving in May and returning in October, according to R. Tapper, *Pasture and Politics: Economics, Conflict and Ritual among the Shahsevan Nomads of Northwestern Iran* (London, 1979), p. 24.

[41] This calculation is supported by the evidence of later nomad practice. Around the beginning of the nineteenth century, Shahseven nomads to the estimated number of ten thousand families wintered on the Mūghān steppe: see Tapper, p. 18.

[42] Abū Sa'īd's mobile court included about 50 "great amirs"; the "sultan's mamluks"; several of his wives, each with her own establishment and, at the end of the day's march, separate camp; another establishment for the bureaucrats; and one each for the amirs: see Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, II, 343.

by Ögödei[43] and moved from Ādharbāyjān to Anatolia, now under the leadership of Baiju, by Hülegü on his arrival.[44] The troops moved in to stay, bringing their families and flocks,[45] and seem to have remained, subject to generational change and some replacement of personnel or units lost during invasions, local wars and rebellions, throughout the Mongol period: Tamerlane found 30–40,000 families of "Qarā Tātārs" to take away with him from Anatolia at the beginning of the fifteenth century.[46]

The *qīshlāq*s of the Anatolian army were located, for the most part, in the region of low precipitation, 5–15 inches annually, and of "high-plateau steppe" that extends northeastward from around Qonya (modern Turkish Konya) to the upper reaches of the Qizil Irmāq (Kızılırmak).[47] They included pastures around Āqsarāy (Aksaray),[48] Āqshehir (Akşehir),[49] Qīrshehir (Kırşehir),[50] and Nigde (Niğde).[51] Others, still within the central high-plateau steppe zone, but in a separate region of only lowish (10–15 inch) rainfall, were around Delīje (Delice), east of Ankara,[52] and along the (upper, presumably) Sakarya river, west of Ankara.[53] Anatolian *yāylāq*s included those of Beyshehir (Beyşehir) by the lake of the same name west of Qonya, and Ilgin (Ilgın), east of Āqshehir, recorded by the late, but apparently well-informed chronicler Shikārī.[54] These summer pastures were presumably occupied in seasonal alternation with the *qīshlāq*s nearby

[43] Juwaynī, I, 190; RaD, *Successors*, p. 33.

[44] Brosset, *Georgie*, p. 539.

[45] Ḥusayn b. Muḥammad Ibn Bībī, *Al-Awāmir al-'Alā'iyya fi'l-Umūr al-'Alā'iyya*, Turkish trans. by N. Lugal and A.S. Erzi, *El-Evāmirül-'Alā'iyye fi'l-umüri'l-'Alā'iyye* (Ankara, 1957), p. 256.

[46] Manz, *Tamerlane*, p. 102.

[47] *Oxford Regional Economic Atlas: The Middle East and North Africa* (London: Oxford University Press, 1960), 22–23 ("Vegetation") and 26–27 ("Rainfall"). *Cf.* A. Tanoğlu, S. Erinç and E. Tümertekin, *Türkiye Atlası* (Istanbul, [1961]), maps #40 ("Snow-cover") and #51 ("Vegetation").

[48] Karīm al-Dīn Maḥmūd Āqsarāyī, *Musāmarat al-Akbār*, Turkish trans. by M.N. Gençosman; ed. F.N. Uzluk, *Selçukî Devletleri Tarihi* (Ankara, 1943), pp. 137, 138, 224.

[49] Ibn Bībī, p. 267; Āqsarāyī, p. 342. Anon. *Ta'rīkh-i Āl-i Seljūq*, facsimile and Turkish trans. by F.N. Uzluk, *Anadolu Selçukluları Devleti Tarihi, III* (Ankara, 1952), p. 55.


[50] Āqsarāyī, p. 191. Qīrshehir served also as a *yāylāq*: Āqsarāyī, 170.

[51] Āqsarāyī p. 191.

[52] Āqsarāyī, 187, 254. I presume that the winter pastures were located along the Delīje river.

[53] Āqsarāyī, 344.

[54] *Şikâri'nin Karaman Oğulları Tarihi*, tr. Mes'ud Koman (Konya, 1946), p. 27.



Map 2. Pastures of Anatolia

around Āqshehir (mentioned above); the movements were doubtless managed by the Mongol generals headquartered, according to Shikārī, at the towns of Beyshehir and Ilgin, as well as at Āqshehir.[55] Shikārī also has a Mongol commander stationed at Isḥaqlī (Isḥaklı), between Āqshehir and Afyon,[56] whose troops, families and herds would also have wintered around Āqshehir and found summer pastures in the mountains to the west (where there were still nomads, in the round frame tents of Inner Asia, when I drove southwest from Āqshehir in the spring of 1966). I imagine that the officer at Āqshehir was a *tümen* commander, and that those at Beyshehir, Ilgin and Isḥaqli were his subordinates, commanders of Thousands. The commander placed by Shikārī at Nigde[57] must have supervised not only the local *qīshlāq*, but also the important one nearby at Āqsarāy and the adjacent *yāylāq*s in the Melendiz mountains and the Āla Dāgh.[58] And the officer at Qayṣeri[59] would have coordinated movements by his command between the upland meadows of Mt. Erjiyas and other mountains to the south and east,[60] and the winter pastures around Qīrshehir (which also had its own *yāylāq*), and possibly Delīje.[61] The Mongol commander at Ankara,[62] probably subordinated to Qayṣeri, doubtless used local summer pastures in conjunction with the Sakarya and perhaps Delīje *qīshlāq*s.

Mention is also made of a *yāylāq* in Tōqāt (Tokat)[63] and a *qīshlāq* in Niksār,[64] and of some sort of Mongol presence in Amāsya. Some of the "Qarā Tātārs" taken away by Tamerlane were associated with Amāsya,[65] and dried remains of several persons said to be Mongols, including one Ishbugha Noyan, have been found in Amāsya under the Burmalı Minare Mosque, and are now displayed in the Sultan

[55] *Ibid.*, pp. 34, 45, 74 (Beyshehir and Ilgin); p. 45 (Āqshehir).
[56] *Ibid.*, pp. 34, 74, 118.
[57] *Ibid.*, pp. 34, 45, 118.
[58] Part of the Taurus range; not the Alātāq (Alādāgh) north of Lake Van.
[59] *Ibid.*, pp. 31, 45.
[60] Some modern nomads summer around Pınarbaşı, east of Qayseri, although they winter in Hatay (Alexandretta) province (which was held by the Mamluks in the Mongol period (after 1268), and most likely cut off from Anatolia as well by the Cilician Armenians occupying the routes necessary for migration): see Bates, *Nomads and Farmers*.
[61] Āqsarāyī, pp. 170, 191.
[62] Shikārī, pp. 44, 51.
[63] Āqsarāyī, p. 254.
[64] *Ibid.*, p. 340.
[65] H. Roemer, "Timur in Iran," Ch. 2 of *The Cambridge History of Iran*, vol. *VI, The Timurid and Safavid Periods* (London, 1986), p. 56.

Mes'ut Türbe. These pastures are unlikely to have supported large Mongol units. The vegetation is mixed trees, bushes and grass rather than pure steppe. Erzinjān (Erzincan) is said to have provided both *yāylāq* and *qīshlāq*,[66] and there are small pockets of steppe around Erzinjān that, on rough estimation, seem about half the size of Mūghān's pastures, and might have sufficed for either a summer's or a winter's stay (but not both) by a *tümen*.[67]

The carrying capacity of the Anatolian *qīshlāq*s is suggested in some cases. In (perhaps) the fall of 1260, "Alinjak" (Alinaq?) Noyan was sent to maintain the Mongol interests in Anatolia, with "countless troops," (probably intending a *tümen*) which he established, presumably in *qīshlāq*, at Āqsarāy.[68] During the 1270's Prince Qonghurtai and two generals, Tuqu and Tudun, spent one winter at Delīje, presumably with two *tümens*, possibly three, depending on the size of the prince's command.[69] Tuqu and Tudun were in *qīshlāq* around Qīrshehir when the Mamluks under Baybars invaded Anatolia in the spring of 1277, and another Mongol commander, Baiju, according to Āqsarāyī, perhaps with another *tümen*, was at Nigde (he did not join Tuqu and Tudun in time to help them in their unsuccessful defense against Baybars).[70] In the winter of 685/1286–87, Prince Geikhatu arrived at Āqsarāy with 20,000 "armored horsemen."[71] It would appear from these notices that the central Anatolian pastures were more than large enough to accommodate the Mongol units stationed there, and that at first these units made use of different ones in different years. It would appear from Shikārī's account, however, that by the mid-fourteenth century the assignment of pastures to units had crystallized, although some of the units best remembered in his time, presumably from their proximity to Qarāmān (Karaman) may only have been Thousands, since there were so many of them.

In western Khurāsān, the principal *qīshlāq* was in "Māzandarān"—which actually meant the lowlands along the lower courses of the

[66] Āqsarāyī, p. 223.


[67] See the vegetation map in *Türkiye Atlası*, #51. The winter climate in these places is worse too than that in the central zone, although Erzinjān is in the same class as Nigde: see *Türkiye Atlası*, map #40 ("Snow-cover").

[68] Āqsarāyī, p. 157.

[69] Āqsarāyī, p. 187; he speaks (p. 185) of the "countless troops" of their army. Rashīd al-Dīn (RaD/A, p. 31) specifies that Tuqu and Tudun—along with Tuqu's brother, Arqatu, whom he says was with them—commanded *tümens*.

[70] Āqsarāyī, p. 191. *Cf.* RaD/A, p. 31.

[71] Āqsarāyī, p. 224.



Map 3. Pastures of "Khurasan"

Gurgān and Atrak rivers.[72] Others, located around Merv and Abīward, and in Quhistān, were apparently also major, *tümen*-sized winter pastures.[73] The western *yāylāq*s lay around Demāvend, Esrān (between Firūzkūh and Simnān), Rādkān, Kālpūsh, Shuturkūh, and Khabūshān.[74] Eastern Khurāsān (Afghanistan) had *qīshlāq*s around Herāt, Qūndūz, and Andkhūd,[75] and *yāylāq*s in Bādghīs and Jūwayn (complementing the Herāt *qīshlāq*), Bāghlān (for Qūndūz), and Gurziwān (for Andkhūd).[76] Furthermore, the Qarāūnās *tümen* of the insubordinate and


[72] For much of the following information on the pastures of "western" Khurāsān, I am indebted to Aubin's "Réseau pastoral." The Māzandarān *qīshlāq* is mentioned, for example, in RaD/A, pp. 6, 10 and *passim* (Abaqa); and RaD/G, p. 41 (Ghazan). "Māzandarān" probably included the *qīshlāq*s of Sulṭān Duwīn of Astarābād, Qarātughān near Sulṭān Duwīn, and Sarāy-i Jūmah in Gurgān that are sometimes separately specified.

[73] Merv: RaD/G, pp. 15–16. Abīward: RaD/G, p. 23. Quhistān: RaD/G, p. 26. "Abīward" probably stands for a larger zone, the Atak (T. etek, skirt), the lower slopes of the Kopet Dagh that separates the northeastern Iranian highlands from the Turkmenian lowlands; see J.M. Smith, Jr., *The History of the Sarbadar Dynasty, 1336–1381 A.D., and Its Sources* (The Hague, 1970), p. 94. A lingering indication of the Quhistān pastures, and a residual trace of its *tümen* may occur on the Soviet map of "The Peoples of Hither [Perednei] Asia" (Moscow: Academy of Science Ethnography Institute, 1960), which shows, extending south from Turbat-i Ḥaydarī about half way to Qāyin (which was in Qazwīnī's Quhistān), a Turkic-speaking people labelled as "Karai" (perhaps Keraits?). Still other *qīshlāq*s are infrequently mentioned and were probably only occasionally used; those near Nīshāpūr, on the northeastern Iranian plateau, turned out to be dangerously unsuitable: RaD/G, p. 23.

[74] Demāvend: RaD/G, pp. 10, 41. Esrān: RaD/G, p. 32. Rādkān: RaD/G, p. 23. Kālpūsh: Smith, *Sarbadar Dynasty*, p. 93. Shuturkūh (location uncertain): RaD/G, pp. 22, 23, 36. Khabūshān: RaD/G, p. 23. There were two Rādkāns, both *yāylāq*s, one near Astarābād, the other between Ṭūs and Khabūshān. Ṭūs, Abīward, and Sarakhs are mentioned in RaD/G, p. 140 as places that Prince Kharbanda (Öljeitü) visited or administered one summer, but they should not therefore be considered *yāylāq*s; Ṭūs might have served as administrative center for nearby Rādkān.

[75] Herāt: RaD/G, pp. 16, 26. Qūndūz and Andkhūd: Manz, *Tamerlane*, pp. 25, 159–60.

[76] Manz, *loc. cit.* Much pertinent information is also to be found in Aubin, "L'ethnogénèse," although it lacks the specificity about *yāylāq*s and *qīshlāq*s of his "Réseau pastoral." I have differentiated western and eastern Khurāsān not only because of the modern difference between Iran and Afghanistan, but because these regions diverged politically during the period of Mongol rule in the Middle East. Manz, pp. 25, 155, 159–60, discusses the transfer of loyalty of the Arlat *tümen* of Andkhūd-Gurziwān and the Qarāūnās *tümen* of Qūndūz-Bāghlān from the Hülegüids to the Chaghatayids, and it appears that by ca. 1320 all the units of eastern Khurāsān had switched allegiance. In response, Ghazan and Öljeitü seems to have reinforced their remaining Khurāsānian territories, raising non-Mongol units and adding to the Mongol forces a *tümen* fugitive from the Golden Horde, subsequently led by Taghaytimur: see Smith, *Sarbadār Dynasty*, pp. 93–94. The putative non-Mongol units may have constituted the Jauni Qorban, which, following Minorsky (in "Ṭūs," *EI*[1]), I take to mean *je'uni ghurban*, the "Three [*Tümens*] of the Left"; cf. Aubin, "L'ethnogénèse," pp. 75–76.



Map 4. Mongol Winter Pastures in the Middle East

infamous Negüderis wintered around Ghazna and summered in Ghūr and Gharchistān.[77] In Aḥmad's time one *tümen* was based in Māzandarān, and two along the banks of the Oxus (these latter were probably in Andkhūd and Qūndūz).[78] Arghun had units, surely *tümens*, commanded by Qutlughshah, Kunjuk, and Mulay, called up from, respectively, Herāt, Māzandarān, and Quhistān.[79] Another *tümen*, fugitive from the Golden Horde, was additionally stationed in Māzandarān and on Kālpūsh *yāylāq* by Öljeitü.[80] The Herāt-Bādghīs-Jūwayn pastures, and those of Qūndūz-Bāghlān, were occupied by Qarāūnās *tümens*, and Andkhūd-Gurziwān (by the mid-fourteenth century) by the Arlat *tümen*.[81]

Finally, the number of important *qīshlāq*s seems to coincide with the number of *tümens* in the Mongol army of the Middle East. We may therefore locate the army—at least in the wintertime. Six *tümens* of the Center wintered at Arrān, Mūghān, Zarīneh Rūd, Safīd Rūd, Baghdād and Diyārbakr.[82] Three of the Right had *qīshlāq*s in Āqshehir, Āqsarāy-Nigde, and Qīrshehir-Delīje. The Left included eight *tümens*, with winter pastures in Māzandarān, Abīward, Merv and Quhistān and, farther east, in Herāt, Qūndūz, Andkhūd, and Ghazna. The seventeen *qīshlāq*s would have accommodated not only the fifteen *tümens* of the Baghdad campaign, but the seventeen *tümens* that can be counted in other ways, and that correspond to the apparently standard number of *tümens* in the armies of the other *ulus*es.[83]

[77] RaD/*Successors*, 142; Boyle describes Ghūr as east and southeast of Herāt, and Gharchistān as the modern Fīrūzkūh in northwest Afghanistan. Manz, *Tamerlane*, p. 160, and Aubin, "L'ethnogénèse," pp. 74, 88, locate these Qarāūnās more imprecisely in "Sīstān."

[78] RaD/A, p. 49. These *tümens* on the Oxus are probably the forces of the Chaghataids with Āmūya *qīshlāq*s mentioned in RaD/G, p. 26.

[79] RaD/G, p. 26.

[80] Smith, *Sarbadār Dynasty*, pp. 93–94; see n. 76 above.

[81] Manz, *Tamerlane*, pp. 25, 28, 155, and 159–60.

[82] I consider Diyārbakr to have belonged, administratively, to the Center, and geographically, to what I have been calling "Ādharbāyjān," like Alātāq, although, like Alātāq, it is located in modern Turkey; its *yāylāq*, as mentioned in RaD/A, p. 48, was in the Siyāhkūh.

[83] See Smith, "Mongol Manpower."

MONGOL IMPERIAL IDEOLOGY AND THE ILKHANID WAR AGAINST THE MAMLUKS*

REUVEN AMITAI-PREISS

The war between the Ilkhanid Mongols rulers of Iran and the Mamluk Sultans of Egypt and Syria commenced with the battle of ʿAyn Jālūt in A.D. 1260 and continued in various forms well into the second decade of the 14th century. These hostilities were marked by several large-scale Mongol invasions of Syria, many raids and expeditions over both sides of the border, espionage, diplomatic maneuvers and efforts by both sides to arm themselves with ideological and propaganda weapons. Only around 1320 did negotiations commence in earnest which culminated in the end of the conflict.

The basic responsibility for this sixty year-long struggle can be laid at the feet of the Mongols. It was they who opened hostilities with the invasion of Syria in 1260 and their belligerent letter to the Mamluks, then based solely in Egypt. Subsequently, they launched many expeditions and raids into Syria, and attempted numerous times to interest the Christian West in a joint campaign against the Mamluks. With one apparent exception, until 1320 the Ilkhans refused to accept the legitimacy of the Mamluk sultans, let alone agreeing to the latter's claims to Syria.[1] This is not to assert that the Mamluks themselves were blameless for the continuation of the war. In order to forestall Mongol incursions against their own territory they developed an aggressive defense, comprising raids and expeditions over the border, along with clandestine activities in Ilkhanid territory. Yet the very success of these actions may have had an unexpected, adverse effect from a Mamluk point of view, by contributing to a Mongol desire for retaliation and revenge, and fuelling a spiral of aggression and counter-aggression.

In order to understand Mongol strategy towards Syria and its Mamluk rulers, the following two questions can be asked: First, what

* I am grateful to Professor T. Allsen, Professor M. Cook and Dr. D. Morgan for reading earlier drafts of this paper and making valuable comments.

[1] The one ostensible exception would be Aḥmad Tegüder's attempt to end the hostilities with the Mamluks. But see below.

were Mongol aims, and second, what motivated this policy? It must be kept in mind that both these matters may have changed during the course of the 60 year war. In other words, what the Ilkhans thought in the 1260s was not necessarily what they thought some 40 or 50 years later, particularly in the aftermath of their conversion to Islam.[2] Thus any attempt to understand the aims and motivations of Ilkhanid policy towards the Mamluks must be traced over time.

The first indication of Mongol aims is given by their own offensives into the country. Besides the ill-fated campaign of 1260, the Mongols launched five other large-scale offensives into Syria: 1281, 1299, 1300, 1303 and 1312. The size of the invading armies shows that these were more than mere forays for booty or punitive raids. On the two occasions when the Mongols were successful in temporarily occupying Syria, in 1260 and 1299, they set up the rudiments of an administrative system, clearly indicative of long-term plans to incorporate the country into their empire.[3]

Another telling sign of Ilkhanid intentions to wrest Syria from Mamluk rule is the numerous missions sent to the Christian West in order to form a military alliance against the Mamluks. Already Hülegü, perhaps chastised by the defeats at ʿAyn Jālūt and the first battle of Homs, the latter also in 1260, and disconcerted by the growing rift with the Golden Horde, turned to the West in 1262. This mission, although evidently aborted, was a harbinger of things to come. Hülegü's son Abagha dispatched four or five missions, most notably the mission to the second Council of Lyons in 1274. Arghun sent off four embassies, including that under the Nestorian Prelate Rabban Ṣāwmā in 1287. Ghazan had contact with the King of Cyprus before his campaign of 1299, and subsequently twice corresponded with the Pope in 1300 and 1302, and also with the kings of England and France in 1302 and 1303 respectively. Finally, there were Öljeitü's embassies to the West, the first sent to the Pope and the Kings of England and France in 1305. Professor J.R.S. Phillips has recently uncovered evidence that in the aftermath of his failed offensive into Syria of 1312, Öljeitü tried again to interest the English monarch in a joint campaign. Generally, these missions, some 15 (c

[2] See the comment to this effect by Peter Jackson, in his review of P. Edbury (ed.), *Crusade and Mission* (Cardiff, 1985), in *BSOAS*, 50 (1987), 552.

[3] Some information on Mongol administration in Syria is given in B. Spuler, *Die Mongolen in Iran: Verwaltung und Kultur der Ilchanzeit 1220–1350* (4th ed., Leiden, 1985), pp. 296–7.

altogether, attempted to draw the Western leaders into a joint campaign against the Mamluks. In return, the Christians were offered control of the Holy Land; additional incentives were the expressions of sympathy for Christianity and the mentioning of the good treatment of Christians in the Ilkhanid kingdom.[4] The efforts exerted in these numerous missions is a most instructive sign of Mongol intentions towards Syria and the Mamluks. Were the Mongol goal anything less than the conquest of Syria, it is difficult to understand why they would have troubled themselves over so many years to engage the Latin rulers in a joint military operation.

The conquest of Syria was actually only a minimal goal of the Ilkhans. An examination of Mongol statements to successive Mamluk sultans shows that the Ilkhans also aspired to subjugate the Mamluks and conquer Egypt. Explicitly truculent messages were sent by Hülegü to Quṭuz in 1260, by Abagha to Baybars in 1268 and 1277, by Geikhatu to Sultan al-Ashraf Khalīl b. Qalāwūn in 1293, and by Ghazan to the boy-sultan al-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qalāwūn in 1300 and 1302.[5]

These letters called on the Mamluks to submit or face forceful subjugation with all its unpleasant consequences. It is thus clear that Ilkhanid goals were not limited to merely conquering Syria, but rather extended to gaining the submission of the Mamluks and thus winning control over Egypt. The Mongols had their sights on Egypt early on: numerous times before his invasion of Syria, Hülegü had expressed his aim of continuing on to Egypt.[6] Similar sentiments were articulated by Ghazan in his proclamation (*farmān*) issued to the people of Damascus in 1300 upon his withdrawal from the city:

[4] For surveys of Ilkhanid-European relations, see: J.A. Boyle, "The Il-khans of Persia and the Princes of Europe," *CAJ*, 20 (1976), 25–40; D. Sinor, "The Mongols and Western Europe," in K.M. Setton (general ed.), *A History of the Crusades*, vol. III, ed. H.W. Hazard (Madison, 1975), pp. 513–44; K.-E. Lupprian, *Die Beziehungen der Päpste zu islamischen und mongolischen Herrschern in 13. Jahrhundert anhand ihres Briefwechsels* (Vatican City, 1981), pp. 67–82, 216–76. For Hülegü's letter of 1262, see P. Meyvaert, "An Unknown Letter of Hulagu, Il-khan of Persia, to King Louis IX of France," *Viator*, 11 (1980), 245–59. Prof. Phillips has spoken on Öljeitü's last mission in a paper titled "The Mongols and Europe: the Long View," which he delivered at the conference held at the School of Oriental and African Studies in March 1991 (the basis for the present volume). As far as I know, this paper has not yet been published.

[5] Some of these letters will be discussed below in more detail.

[6] Rashīd al-Dīn, *Jāmiʿ al-tawārīkh*, vol. III, ed. ʿA. ʿAlīzādah (Baku, 1957), pp. 39, 58, 65, 68; Ibn Bībī, *Histoire des Seldjoucides d'Asie Mineur*, ed. Th. Houtsma (Leiden, 1902), p. 294.

"We will return in the autumn to this country and we intend to go on to Egypt."[7]

The Mamluk sultans certainly understood the seriousness of the threat facing them. They knew that the Ilkhans wanted to destroy their rule and gain possession of their kingdom. The Mamluks responded accordingly, by strengthening their army, improving fortifications, creating a wide-spread espionage system, erecting a rapid communications network to keep the sultan informed of any Mongol incursion, and not least, by establishing diplomatic relations with the Jochid khans of the Golden Horde.[8] In passing, it might be added that the Mamluk response was generally effective in thwarting the Mongol danger.

To summarize so far: The goal of the Ilkhans toward Syria was more than just raiding and plundering the country. The more immediate goal was to conquer Syria, while the long-term aim was to subjugate the Mamluks and gain control of Egypt.[9] What motivated the Ilkhans to adopt these goals and to devote themselves, at times quite assiduously, to their realization? The answer is not a simple one, not least because the Ilkhans, along with those who recorded their history, have left us little explicit evidence on the subject.

It has been suggested that a primary motive of Ilkhanid strategy *vis-à-vis* Syria was the desire for a direct outlet to the Mediterranean.[10] The importance attributed to this cause, however, is much exaggerated, because the Ilkhanid state already had access to the sea via Lesser Armenia and Seljuk Rum, both Mongol client-states. It would seem that the preferred route from Europe to Ādharbāyjān, the center of Ilkhanid rule, was via Anatolia. One indication of the adequacy of this route is that Pegolotti, writing in the late 1330s in the aftermath of the Mamluk-Ilkhanid peace, describes Ayas and Anatolia as the route taken by Italian merchants to reach Tabriz. Had it been preferable to travel to Tabriz via the Syrian coast, Italian traders would surely have done so, and it seems likely that such a route would have been recorded by Pegolotti.[11]

[7] K.V. Zetterstéen (ed.), *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Mamlūkensultane* (Leiden, 1919), p. 75; al-Dhahabī, *Ta'rīkh al-islām*, MS. British Museum Or. 1540, fol. 129b (translated in J. Somogyi, "Adh-Dhahabi's Record of the Destruction of Damascus by the Mongol in 699–700/1299–1300," in S. Lowinger and J. Somogyi, *Ignace Goldziher Memoiral Volume*, vol. I [Budapest, 1948], 376).

[8] The measures adopted by Baybars to meet the Mongol danger are discussed in R. Amitai-Preiss, *Mongols and Mamluks: The Mamluk-Īlkhānid War, 1260–1281* (Cambridge, 1995), chs. 3–6. For Mamluk espionage, see R. Amitai, "Mamlūk Espionage among Mongols and Franks," *Asian and African Studies* (Haifa), 22 (1988), 173–81.

[9] Cf. D. Morgan, "The Mongols and the Eastern Mediterranean," in B. Arbel, B. Hamilton, D. Jacoby (eds.), *Latins and Greeks in the Eastern Mediterranean after 1204* (London, 1989), p. 198; this volume also appeared as *Mediterranean Historical Review*, 4, no. 1 (1989).

[10] Spuler, *Iran*, p. 54; see also S.Y. Labib, *Handelsgeschichte Ägypten im Spätmittelalter (1171–1517)* (Wiesbaden, 1965), p. 71; cf. Morgan, "The Mongols and the Eastern Mediterranean," p. 198.

More persuasive causes present themselves. First, there is some evidence that at times the Ilkhans were motivated by the desire to avenge their earlier losses or to seek retribution for Mamluk depredations across the border. The importance of this motive, however, has been exaggerated in recent scholarship.[12] Second, the Ilkhans may have conceived of their campaigns as a method to obtain booty, perhaps even for the running of the state.[13] There is information that Ghazan's desire for booty, which he planned to distribute to his officers and troops, was a motive for his campaigns into Syria.[14] Third, the raids and campaigns may have been envisaged as a way to keep the Mongol tribesmen busy and to indulge their appetite for booty and adventure.[15] A fourth possibility, suggested by the work of both anthropologists and historians, is the importance of expansion in binding together the disparate elements of a nomadic state and providing its ruler with legitimacy.[16] Fifth, the Ilkhans may have sought to weaken the Mamluk enemy.[17] The Mongols surely understood that the Mamluk sultans had become the *de facto* leaders of

[11] H. Yule, *Cathay and the Way Thither*, 2nd ed. revised by H. Cordier, vol. II ("Works Issued by the Hakluyt Society," NS, no. 33), (London, 1913), pp. 159–64. For trade along the Ayas-Anatolia-Tabriz route during the Mamluk-Ilkhanid war, see E. Ashtor, *A Social and Economic History of the Near East in the Middle Ages* (Berkeley, 1976), pp. 264–5; C. Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*, tr. J. Jones-William (London, 1968), pp. 321–2; B.G. Lippard, *The Mongols and Byzantium, 1243–1341* (Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana University, 1983), pp. 36–49.

[12] See below for a discussion of this matter.

[13] Morgan, "The Mongols and the Eastern Mediterranean," p. 198, mentions the importance of plunder in propelling the Mongols towards Syria.

[14] A.P. Martinez, "Some Notes on the Il-Xānid Army," *AEMA*, 6 (1986 [1988]), 202–5.

[15] This has been suggested to me by Dr. David Morgan.

[16] A.M. Khazanov, *Nomads and the Outside World*, tr. J. Crookenden (Cambridge, 1984), pp. 161, 228–300; J.M. Smith, Jr., "Turanian Nomadism and Iranian Politics," *Iranian Studies*, 11 (1978), 63–4; J.F. Fletcher, "The Mongols: Ecological and Social Perspectives," *HJAS*, 46 (1986), 19–20; D. Morgan, *The Mongols* (Oxford, 1986), pp. 38–9.

[17] Morgan, "The Mongols and the Eastern Mediterranean," p. 198.

the Muslim world and had resurrected the 'Abbāsid Caliphate. The leadership of the Ilkhanid state may have feared the impact on their own Muslim subjects of a strong Muslim state which was outside their control and offered resistance. Likewise, the Ilkhans may have dreaded the prospects of a joint Mamluk-Golden Horde offensive. In order to preempt this potential danger, the Ilkhans may have sought to disrupt the border, to weaken the Mamluks by taking Syria, and if possible to destroy them.[18] Finally, and this concerns Mongol strategy towards Egypt in particular, the Ilkhans must have comprehended that in order to guarantee the conquest of Syria, Egypt also would have to be subjugated.[19]

None of the above reasons contradict each other, and it is possible that more than one inspired Ilkhanid strategy at a given time. Most, however, are somewhat speculative, and there is little if any documentation that the Ilkhanid leadership actually thought in such terms. Only for the first two suggestions is some evidence found, but even this is spotty and must be applied to the entire Mamluk-Ilkhanid war with care. There is, however, one motive which is well-attested in the sources, both pro-Ilkhanid and Mamluk, for the entire period of the war. This is the traditional belief of the Mongols in their heaven-given mandate to conquer the world and to place it under the rule of the descendants of Chinggis Khan: those who submit (*il*) are loyal and are spared, while those who are "unsubmitted" (*bulgha*) and resist are considered to be in rebellion, and will be destroyed. The existence of this belief, which can be called the Mongol imperial ideal or ideology, in the immediate post-Chinggisid period has been well-documented in several studies.[20] Professor Allsen's recent

[18] These possible Ilkhanid perceptions of the Mamluk danger were kindly suggested to me by the late Professor D. Ayalon.

[19] This point was made by Spuler, *Iran*, pp. 54–55. I might add that the leaders of the Crusading movement and the Frankish states of the Levant had come to a similar conclusion that the key to holding Syria was the subjugation of Egypt.

[20] See E. Voeglin, "The Mongol Orders of Submission to European Powers, 1245–1255," *Byzantion*, 15 (1940–41), 378–413; I. de Rachewiltz, "Some Remarks on the Ideological Foundations of Chingis Khan's Empire," *PFEH*, 7 (1973), 21–36; K. Sagaster, "Herrshaftsideologie und Friedensgedanke bei den Mongolen," *CAJ*, 17 (1973), 223–42; H. Franke, *From Tribal Chieftain to Universal Emperor and God: The Legitimation of the Yüan Dynasty* (Munich, 1978), pp. 14–25. See also the recent summary in the introduction to P. Jackson with D. Morgan, *The Mission of Friar William of Rubruck: His Journey to the Court of the Great Khan Mongke 1253–1255* (London, 1990), pp. 25–6. Morgan, *The Mongols*, pp. 13–4, questions how developed was the imperial ideology in Chinggis Khan's lifetime, but cf. J.M. Smith, Jr., "The Mongols and World Conquest," *Mongolica*, 5 [26] (1994), 206–14.

book has shown that Mongol imperial ideology also played an important role in Möngke's dispatch of his brother Hülegü to the Islamic world in the early 1250s.[21] Whatever Hülegü's exact brief, a subject of some discussion among scholars,[22] it is clear that one of his missions was to lead Mongol troops in the ongoing project of conquering the world. It would seem that Hülegü himself conceived his mission in this light, for in his letter to the Mamluk sultan Quṭuz, from the year 1260, he wrote: "You have heard that we have conquered the country, cleansed the earth of corruption and killed most of the people. You have to flee, while we have to pursue.... He who looks to fight us will regret, while he who seeks our protection is safe."[23]

I would suggest that this imperial ideology continued to help propel the Ilkhans into Syria.[24] There can be no doubt that these ideals had taken a beating since the high-water mark of Hülegü's conquest of Syria in 1260. First, a Mongol army had been defeated at 'Ayn Jālūt, and the Mongols continued to be worsted in the border war. Secondly, Mongol unity was shattered in the civil wars after Möngke's death and the Ilkhanid-Golden Horde war.[25] Finally, the tone of the letters to the Western Christian rulers was increasingly conciliatory: in order to woo the Franks, Mongol claims to world domination had to be abandoned, at least publicly.

There are, however, clear indications that to some extent at least the Mongol imperial ideal remained the official ideology of the Ilkhanid state. Thus we find, in Abagha's letter to Baybars in 1268,

[21] Th. Allsen, *Mongol Imperialism* (Berkeley, 1987), pp. 42–3, 77–8.

[22] P. Jackson, "The Dissolution of the Mongol Empire," *CAJ*, 32 (1978), 208–235; Allsen, *Mongol Imperialism*, pp. 47–9; Morgan, *The Mongols*, pp. 148–89; *idem*, *Medieval Persia* (London, 1988), pp. 58–60; R. Amitai-Preiss, "Evidence for the Early Use of the Title *īlkhān* among the Mongols," *JRAS*, N.S., 1 (1991), 353–1; *idem*, *Mongols and Mamluks*, pp. 11–15; D. Krawulsky, *Mongolen und Ilkhâne: Ideologie und Geschichte* (Beirut, 1989), ch. 3.

[23] Ibn al-Furāt, *Ta'rīkh al-duwal wa'l-mulūk*, MS. Vatican Ar. 726, fols. 243b–244a; al-Maqrīzī, *Kitāb al-sulūk li-ma'rifat duwal al-mulūk*, ed. M.M. Ziyāda and S.'A. 'Āshūr (Cairo, 1934–73), I, 427–8. This letter is based on a letter sent by Hülegü to al-Nāṣir Yūsuf, last Ayyūbid ruler of Syria; W. Brinner, "Some Ayyūbid and Mamlūk Documents from Non-archival Sources," *Israel Oriental Studies*, 2 (1972), 120–1. Cf. the letter from Hülegü to Quṭuz in Rashīd al-Dīn, III, 71, which is shorter and in Persian, but conveys the same message. Unlike the above-cited Arabic letter, the Persian version is totally free of Islamic imagery and contains references to pre-Islamic Iranian figures.

[24] Cf. A.K.S. Lambton, "Concepts of Authority in Persia: Eleventh to Nineteenth Centuries A.D.," *Iran*, 26 (1988), 100.

[25] Jackson, "The Dissolution of the Mongol Empire," pp. 220–44.

the following message: Abagha understood that the Mamluks wanted to submit (*yaṣīrū[na] īl*). Previously, there had been a conflict between the Mongols, and this is the reason why he had not been able to ride against the Mamluks. But now, all Mongol princes are agreed that the *farmān* (order[s]) and *yasa* (law[s] or legislation) of the Qa'an should not be changed. According to the order and *yasas* of Chinggis Khan and the present Qa'an, all who surrender will not be punished for the crimes of their predecessors (i.e. refusing to accept Mongol suzerainty). Abagha concludes the letter by alluding to Baybars's fate if he is not true to his word and acts rebelliously (*yağı*, i.e. not submitting to the Mongols).[26]

Even more unequivocal is the message conveyed verbally by the envoys who brought this letter: "When King Abagha set out from the East, he conquered all the world. Whoever opposed him was killed. If you go up to the sky or down into the ground, you will not be saved from us. The best policy is that you will make peace (*ṣulḥ*) between us." For good measure the envoys added: "You are a mamlūk who was bought in Sīwās. How do you rebel against the kings of the earth?"[27]

The use of the word *ṣulḥ* here is interesting and instructive. It shows that in the Ilkhanid lexicon, the word meant submission or surrender. The only way to peace was complete capitulation to the Mongols. It now becomes clear what were Abagha's intentions in his less belligerent messages to the Mamluks, as in 1265–6, when

[26] Ibn 'Abd al-Ẓāhir, *al-Rawḍ al-ẓāhir fī sīrat al-malik al-ẓāhir*, ed. 'A-'A al-Khuwayṭir (Riyāḍ, 1396/1976), pp. 339–41; Ibn al-Furāt, *Ta'rīkh al-duwal wa'l-mulūk*, MS. Austrian National Library, Flügel no. 814, fols. 152b–153b; al-'Ayni, *'Iqd al-jumān fī ta'rīkh ahl al-zamān*, MS. Topkapı Sarayı, Ahmet III 2912, fol. 99a. This letter was first translated by al-Khuwayṭir (A.A. Khowaiter, *A Critical Edition of an Unknown Arabic Source for the Life of al-Malik al-Ẓāhir Baybars*, Ph.D. diss., University of London, 1960, II, 698–700), and summarized by him in his book *Baibars the First: His Endeavours and Achievements* (London, 1978), 58–9; much of the letter, however, was not understood by him. For the terms *īl* and *yağı* (a word of Turkish origin, meaning literally "enemy," used as a synonym to *bulgha*, although their literal meanings are different), see G. Doerfer, *Mongolische und türkische Elemente in Neupersischen* (Wiesbaden, 1963–75), II, 94–201. A full translation and discussion of this letter and the accompanying verbal message, as well as Baybars's reponse is found in R. Amitai-Preiss, "An Exchange of Letters in Arabic between Abaya Īlkhān and Sultan Baybars (A.H. 667/A.D. 1268–69)," *CAJ*, 38 (1994), 11–33.

[27] Al-Yūnīnī, *Dhayl mir'āt al-zamān* (Hyderabad, 1954–61), II, 407; Ibn Kathīr, *al-Bidāya wa'l-nihāya fī al-ta'rīkh* (rpt., Beirut, 1977), XIII, 254; Ibn al-Dawādārī, *Kanz al-durar wa-jāmi' al-ghurar*, vol. VIII, ed. U. Haarmann (Freiburg-Cairo, 1971), 139–40; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *al-Nujūm al-ẓāhira fī ta'rīkh miṣr wa'l-qāhira* (rpt., n.d., of Cairo, 1930–56), VII, 144–5; al-Maqrīzī, I, 573–4.

Mongol envoys arrived in the Mamluk court and called for *ṣulḥ*.[28] Here too, Baybars was called upon, albeit in an indirect fashion, to submit to Abagha.

A later letter from Abagha, written in the aftermath of the Mongol defeat at Abulustayn (in south-east Anatolia) in 1277, explicitly expresses the Mongol imperial ideal. According to Rashīd al-Dīn, this threatening and disparaging letter to Baybars stated *inter alia* that God had given the earth to Chinggis Khan and his descendants.[29]

After Abagha's death in 1282, the Ilkhanid-Mamluk war abated somewhat. Abagha's brother and successor, Tegüder, adopted Islam and the name Aḥmad. Evidently motivated by his new religion, he attempted a reconciliation with the Mamluks. Yet even he did not abandon completely the Mongol imperial ideal, although it was not as blatantly expressed. Dr. Adel Allouche has recently shown that imbedded in Aḥmad Tegüder's apparently conciliatory letter and its Islamic imagery was a caveat to submit or face the consequences. Dr. Allouche also showed that Aḥmad Tegüder's letter was written in a traditional form of threatening letters, common to Islamic chanceries of the period.[30] As has been seen, demands to submit were also firmly in the tradition of Mongol diplomatic usage.

Following Aḥmad Tegüder's demise in 1284, his nephew and successor Arghun adopted a more forthright strategy against the Mamluks. Arghun (1284–91), however, had apparently learnt well the lessons of his predecessors' defeats, and therefore sought the assistance of the Western Christian powers. At the same time, there are no records of any diplomatic missions from him to the Mamluk sultan. It would seem that he did not bother to engage in empty diplomatic skirmishing with the Mamluks; perhaps he was waiting until he was in more of a position to launch an offensive. His successor, Geikhatu,

[28] Ibn al-Furāt, MS. Vienna, fol. 110b; al-Maqrīzī, 1:553; cf. the version in Qirṭāy al-Khaznadārī, *Ta'rīkh al-nawādir mimmā jāra li'l-awā'il wa'l-awākhir*, MS. Gotha 1655, fols. 87a–88a.

[29] Rashīd al-Dīn, III, 145; cf. the version of this letter in Ibn Bībī, p. 319, where this particular line is not found. This letter is not mentioned in the Mamluk sources, which may indicate that it never arrived at its destination.

[30] A. Allouche, "Tegüder's Ultimatum to Qalawun," *IJMES*, 22 (1990), 437–46. The letter is found in Baybars al-Manṣūrī, *Zubda al-fikra fī ta'rīkh al-hijra*, MS. British Library Add. 23345, fols. 131a–133b, and was published as an appendix in al-Maqrīzī, I, 977–980. It is also found in Mufaḍḍal Ibn Abī 'l-Faḍā'il, *al-Nahj al-sadīd*, in E. Blochet (ed. and tr.), "Histoire des sultans mamlouks," *Patrologia Orientalis*, pt. 2, 14 (1920), 336–46 (of continuous pagination).

was less inhibited and sent a truculent missive to Sultan al-Ashraf Khalīl b. Qalawun in 1293. His message was short and to the point: "The Khān wants to take up residence in Aleppo, since it had been conquered by his grandfather Hülegü. If the Sultan does not permit him to do so he will come and conquer it on his own."[31] Geikhatu's plans were never realized, not least because within two years he was dead.

The accession of Ghazan to the throne in 1295 ushered in a new era in Ilkhanid history. Not only had the Ilkhan himself become a Muslim, but evidently the Mongol elite and many of the rank-and-file converted to Islam, although the exact nature of their commitment and understanding of their new faith is still a moot point.[32] We have already seen that Ghazan's Islam did not lead to the abandonment of the traditional Mongol policy towards Syria and the Mamluks. In fact, Ghazan devoted more efforts to the Syrian front than any of his predecessors. On the other hand, the form and tone of his letters to the Mamluk sultan is different from those of earlier Ilkhans. Unlike Aḥmad Tegüder, Ghazan does not always make an effort to cloak his threats in diplomatic niceties. Yet in contrast to his non-Muslim predecessors, Ghazan uses Islamic rationale to justify his offensive into Syria. Thus he writes in his letter of 700/1301 to Sultan al-Nāṣir Muḥammad ibn Qalāwūn, after the Mongol victory at Wādī al-Khaznadār, the Mongol occupation of Damascus and their subsequent withdrawal from the country: The reason for his invasion was the Mamluk raid in the environs of Mārdīn during Ramaḍān 698 (1299).[33] As a Muslim ruler, he was obligated to respond by invading Syria. Allah gave the Mongols victory in the resulting battle. Ghazan then gives a selective account of subsequent events. He is about to send another army to Syria, but first he dispatched envoys who have brought the present letter. The sultan is called upon to send gifts to Ghazan (a sign of submission to the Khān). If the warning is not heeded then the lives and property of the Muslims (i.e. the Sultan's subjects) will be forfeited. This was

[31] Al-Maqrīzī, I, 786.

[32] See Morgan, *The Mongols*, 160–3, and the important article: Ch. Melville, "*Pādshāh-i Islām*: The Conversion of Sultan Maḥmūd Ghāzān Khān," *Pembroke Papers*, 1 (1990), 159–177. See also R. Amitai-Preiss, "Ghazan, Islam and Mongol Tradition: A View from the Mamluk Sultanate," *BSOAS*, 59 (1996), 1–10.

[33] On this raid, see Abū 'l-Fidā', *al-Mukhtaṣar fī ta'rīkh al-bashar* (Istanbul, 1286/1869–70), IV, 44; Spuler, *Iran*, 84; D. Krawulsky, *Īrān—Das Reich der Īlḫāne. Eine topographisch-historische Studie* (Wiesbaden, 1978), pp. 444–5.

indeed, in Dr. Thomas Raff's words, "an obliquely phrased demand to surrender."[34]

We have here, albeit it in a subtle form, the traditional Mongol demand for submission, but now justified with Islamic rationale. Were this letter examined by itself, only the Islamic arguments might be discerned. But when taken together with both previous Ilkhanid letters and other documents from Ghazan, a clear line emerges, that is, the demand for total Mamluk submission. I would suggest that at least part of the inspiration of this demand in the present letter, as in earlier letters, is the Mongol imperial ideal of their right to world conquest.

Any doubts about Ghazan's ultimate agenda can be dispelled by his second embassy to al-Nāṣir Muḥammad sent in 1302. According to Waṣṣāf, here Ghazan dispensed with Islamic rhetoric and stated his demands unabashedly: The Mamluks were to send tribute, to enter Ghazan's name in the weekly sermon and to strike his name on coins. If they refused, they were threatened with war and destruction.[35]

Expressions of the Mongol imperial ideal are found not only in communications with the Sultan. Such expressions, again couched in Islamic imagery, are found in the proclamations issued by Ghazan

[34] There are two versions for this letter, with significant differences between them. Version A, from which the above summary is taken, appears in Baybars al-Manṣūrī, fols. 223b–224b (published as an appendix to al-Maqrīzī, I, 1016–8). It is also found, *inter alia*, in al-Qalqashandī, *Ṣubḥ al-a'shā fī ṣinā'at al-inshā'*, (Cairo, 1913–9), 8:69–71. Version B appears in Ibn al-Dawadārī, vol. 8, ed. H. Roemer (Freiburg-Cairo, 1960), 53–6; Zetterstéen, 93–4; Ibn Abī 'l-Faḍā'il, pt. 3, *Patrologia Orientalis*, 20 (1928), 549–54 (with translation). H. Horst, "Eine Gesandschaft des Mamlūken al-Malik an-Nāṣir im Īlhān-Hof in Persien," in W. Hoenerbach (ed.), *Der Orient in der Forschung. Festchrift für Otto Spies* (Wiesbaden, 1967), pp. 369–70, examined the reasons for the existence of the two versions, and suggests that possibly the two versions were written down separately by two different authors who heard the letter. Horst adds that perhaps version A, being more detailed and appearing in an official book, was the more authentic. Th. Raff, *Remarks on an Anti-Mongol Fatwa by Ibn Taimīya* (privately printed, Leiden, 1973), pp. 33–5 (quote on p. 34), suggests that version B was a deliberate forgery by the Mamluk authorities, in order to downplay Ghazan's aggressive and haughty tone and to emphasize his desire for peace.

[35] Waṣṣāf, *Ta'rīkh-i waṣṣāf al-ḥaḍra dar aḥwal-i salāṭīn-i mughūl* (= *Tajziyat al-amṣār wa-tazjiyat al-a'ṣār*) (rpt., Tehran, 1338 S./1959, of Bombay, 1269 H./1852–3), 297 (= Āyatī, *Taḥrīr-i ta'rīkh-i waṣṣāf* [Tehran, 1346S./1967], 239–40); cf. the version in Mīrkhwānd, *Rawḍat al-ṣafā*, (Tehran, 1960), V, 411–2. For this mission, and its chronology, see Horst, "Eine Gesandschaft," p. 367; Spuler, *Iran*, pp. 85–7; J.A. Boyle, "Dynastic and Political History of the Īl-khāns," *Cambridge History of Iran*, vol. V (Cambridge, 1968), 392. Mamluk sources do not relate this message, but some writers report the arrival of envoys at this time: Ibn Kathīr, XIV, 21; Baybars al-Manṣūrī, fol. 233b; al-Maqrīzī, I, 927.

during his brief occupation of Damascus in 1300. The Mongol motifs of these documents, have been analyzed at length by Dr. Raff. Here too, the contradistinction is made between loyalty, i.e. submission to the Mongols, and rebellion, refusal to submit.[36]

How can we be sure that Ghazan was still inspired by Mongol ideology, and not by a desire to become the leader of the Islamic world, or other motivations? One indication is that Ghazan apparently remained faithful to other Mongol ideals. The mid-14th century Mamluk writer, Khalīl b. Aybeg al-Ṣafadī provides evidence that Ghazan, in spite of his becoming a Muslim, continued to adhere to the *yasa* (here referring to the corpus of laws attributed to Chinggis Khan) and to enforce among the Mongols its provisions (whatever they might have been) among the Mongols.[37] While this information might be viewed as a Mamluk writer merely attempting to cast aspersions on Ghazan's Islam, Rashīd al-Dīn gives corroborating evidence: he cites *in extenso* Ghazan's *yarligh* (order) distributing *iqṭā'āt* (loosely "grants of land") to the Mongol soldiery, which opens with praise for Chinggis Khan's *yasa*, to which Ghazan attributes his forefathers's success in conquering the world.[38] Rashīd al-Dīn also reports that in 1300 Ghazan proudly recited before the notables of Damascus his Mongol genealogy back to Chinggis Khan as the source of his authority.[39] Ghazan, then, in spite of his new conversion to Islam, maintained a belief in such Mongol institutions as the *yasa* and Chinggisid legitimacy, and he mentioned with approval Chinggis Khan's conquest of the world. It appears, then, that Ghazan himself preserved some faith in the Mongol ideal of world conquest, and this was one of the motives of his attacks against Syria. His belligerent statements in various documents and the unequivocal demands for surrender can serve only to strengthen this suggestion. Unfortunately for Ghazan, his rhetoric was not matched by the performance of his

[36] Raff, *Remarks*, pp. 28–30.

[37] Al-Ṣafadī, *al-Wāfī bi'l-wafayāt*, MS. Topkapı Sarayı, Ahmet III 2920/25, fol. 61a; a parallel version is found in *idem*, *A'yān al-'aṣr wa-a'wān al-naṣr*, MS. Aya Sofya (Süleymaniye) 2968, fols. 3b–4b. See Amitai-Preiss, "Ghazan, Islam and Mongol Tradition," for a further discussion of this passage, as well as Raff, *Remarks*, pp. 44–55, for an analysis of the polemical attack by Ibn Taymiyya on the Islam of Ghazan and his followers, who continued to uphold Mongol beliefs and customs, in spite of their conversion.

[38] Rashīd al-Dīn, III, 511, cited in D. Morgan, "The 'Great Yāsā of Chingiz Khān' and Mongol Law in the Īlkhānate," *BSOAS*, 49 (1986), 172.

[39] Rashīd al-Dīn, III, 336.

commanders on the battlefield. His third offensive to Syria, in 1303, ended in the complete defeat of the Mongols at Marj al-Ṣuffar, south of Damascus.

Ghazan's brother and successor, Öljeitü—also known as Khudābandah—actually sent a conciliatory letter to the Mamluks in 1305, soon after his accession to the throne (1304).[40] This, however, appears to have been only a ploy to gain time, while the Ilkhan attempted to put together an alliance with Western rulers. Persian sources allude to Öljeitü's long-term goal of conquering Syria and Egypt.[41] Professor Sinor has suggested that Öljeitü's use of the expression "*talu dalai*" in his letter of 1305 to Philip the Fair is also indicative of a continued belief in the Mongol imperial ideology, if indeed this Talu Sea alludes to the limits of the inhabited world.[42] Öljeitü was eventually frustrated in his aim of obtaining European cooperation, and thus in 1312 launched the large but unsuccessful campaign into Syria, which floundered early on at the siege of the border fortress of al-Raḥba. It was in the aftermath of this unimpressive showing by the Mongols that Öljeitü sent again a mission to the West; this was apparently the last Ilkhanid embassy to Europe to suggest a joint campaign or anything else.[43]

The above examples shows that for over 50 years there was a more-or-less constant motive behind Ilkhanid strategy towards Syria and the Mamluks. This was the continued belief in the Mongol imperial mission, an ideology originally inaugurated in the period of the united Mongol empire. It should be clear, however, that it is not being claimed here that this ideology was the only, or even the main

[40] Ibn al-Dawādārī, IX, 127–8; Horst, "Eine Gesandschaft," pp. 360–1.

[41] Kāshānī [Qāshānī], *Ta'rīkh-i uljāytū*, ed. M. Hambly (Tehran, 1348 S./1969), p. 55; Ḥāfiẓ-i Abrū, *Dhayl-i jāmi' al-tawārīkh*, ed. Kh. Bayānī (Tehran, 1938), p. 10 (cf. translation in Ḥāfiẓ-i Abrū, *Chronique des rois mongols*, vol. I [Paris, 1936], 8). Boyle, "Il-khans," p. 399, writes that "Öljeitü, in fact, as the Persian authorities explicitly state, had every intention of continuing the anti-Mamluk policy of his predecessors." As far as I can tell, Waṣṣāf (p. 472 [= Āyatī, p. 276]), does not mention Öljeitü's long-term aggressive plans, but only his conciliatory letter to al-Nāṣir Muḥammad.

[42] A. Mostaert and F.W. Cleaves, *Les lettres de 1289 et 1305 des ilkhan Aryun et Öljeitü à Philippe le Bel* (Cambridge, MA, 1962), pp. 56–7; D. Sinor, "The Mysterious 'Talu Sea' in Öljeitü's Letter to Philip the Fair of France," in *Analecta Mogholia dedicated to Owan Lattimore* ("Mongolia Society Occasional Papers," no. 8), (Bloomington, 1972), pp. 115–21, rpt. in D. Sinor, *Inner Asia and its Contacts with Medieval Europe* (London, 1977), art. no. XIV.

[43] See note 4 above.

factor behind Ilkhanid attempts at expansion to the west.[44] It is just the best documented, and thus cannot be ignored. Any or even all of the various suggestions raised previously could have combined with this belief at any given time to have propelled the Mongols against Mamluk Syria.

It has been suggested by Dr. D. Krawulsky that the primary reason for Mongol campaigns into Syria was that the Ilkhans, particularly Ghazan, were provoked by Mamluk expeditions across the frontier into Ilkhanid territory.[45] Some *prima facie* corroborating evidence for this thesis may exist. The Armenian historian Het'um wrote in the early 14th century: "The Tatars do not wage war against the sultan of Egypt desiring to get lands and cities—since the whole of Asia is already subject to them—but because the sultan is their principal enemy who has done them more harm and damage than anyone than anyone else, especially when he has fought against their neighbors."[46]

Before discussing Dr. Krawulsky's thesis, Het'um's statement will first be examined. Much of Het'um's work is a tendentious account of the history of the Mongols and their relations with the Armenian rulers of Cilicia. Het'um's aim was to encourage the Pope and other European leaders to join the Mongols in a joint campaign against the Mamluks.[47] Here too he might perhaps be accused of the same charge. On one hand, Het'um has repressed any mention of the aspirations of the Mongols to conquer the world, since this would do little to encourage European cooperation with them. On the other hand, Het'um emphasizes the so-called concern of the Mongols for their neighbors. Doubtless Het'um had in mind one particular neighbor located in Cilicia.[48] It seems therefore that Het'um's evidence is far from objective and cannot be taken to support Dr. Krawulsky's thesis.

[44] Fletcher, "The Mongols," p. 32, suggested, albeit for an earlier period, that ideology was not the most important factor behind Mongol expansion.

[45] Krawulsky, *Irān*, p. 586, referring specifically to the Mamluk raid to Mārdīn and its environs in 698/1299.

[46] Het'um (Hethoum), "La Flor des estories de la Terre d'Orient," in *Recueil des historiens des croisades, documents arméniens*, vol. II (Paris, 1906), p. 245; = G. Burger (ed.), *A Lytell Chronycle: Richard Pynson's Translation (c. 1520) of La Fleur des histoires de la terre d'Orient (c. 1307)* (Toronto, 1988), p. 80, 197; cf. the translation in Sinor, "The Mongols and Western Europe," p. 539.

[47] See P. Jackson, "The Crisis in the Holy Land in 1260," *English Historical Review*, 95 (1980), 484–6.

[48] Actually, the Ilkhans had a fairly poor record of coming to the aid of Lesser Armenia whenever the Mamluks attacked the country; see Amitai-Preiss, *Mongols and Mamluks*, ch. 5.

As for the thesis itself, it is clear that it over emphasizes the role played by Mamluk attacks in provoking the Ilkhans to launch campaigns into Syria. While Mamluk incursions and other forms of action may have vexed and angered the Ilkhans, it is certainly an exaggeration in the light of the above discussion to see them as the major reason for the Syrian policy of the Ilkhans. Firstly, these Mamluk actions were responses to an ongoing belligerent policy adopted by the Mongols. It was the Mongols who had opened the war with their invasion of Syria in 1260, and it was they who began the border war in the aftermath of 'Ayn Jālūt, with raids into Syria and along the frontier. And secondly, the Ilkhans had many other compelling reasons—including their imperial ideology—to attack Mamluk Syria, even without the Mamluk attacks. To isolate a single Mamluk raid into Ilkhanid territory from the context of the on-going border war, let alone the larger struggle, and then to see this as the cause of Ghazan's campaign of 1299 is to misconstrue the whole nature of the Ilkhanid-Mamluk war.

Yet there is no denying that these Mamluk attacks provided the Ilkhans, or rather those writers who served them, with useful propaganda material.[49] In addition, the Mamluk offensives and raids may have influenced the timing of a particular campaign, and led to the escalation of the tension between the two states. Finally, Mamluk attacks might have contributed to the desire for revenge which the Mongols had been nursing since the battle of 'Ayn Jālūt; it was bad enough being defeated in Syria, but the general impunity with which Mamluk troops breached the frontier was perhaps an even greater affront.

I would like to touch upon one more matter: is ideology a motive for political and military policy, or does it provide legitimation for it? In the case of the Mongol imperial ideal during the Ilkhanid period, the answer is probably yes to both questions. The Mongol imperial ideal may have originally been an attempt to provide legitimation for traditional nomadic aggression combined with the attempts of Chinggisid family to weld a nomadic state out of disparate tribal

[49] E.g., Rashīd al-Dīn, III, 162, writes that the reason behind Abagha's offensive of 680/1281 into Syria, was the Ilkhan's desire to exact revenge for Baybars invasion of Rum (675/1277), and other disorders that the Mamluks had perpetrated.

elements. Once introduced, however, it became a potent force in its own right, motivating the Mongols even when their united empire had dissolved and much of their initial impetus had been lost. There is no reason to doubt that the Ilkhans continued honestly to believe in this ideal. At the same time, it is certainly possible, and not unlikely, that the Ilkhans consciously exploited this belief to legitimize their actions. The conscious exploitation of this ideal, however, does not necessarily mean that it was not deeply held.

The continued presence of expressions of the traditional heaven-inspired manifest destiny on Ilkhanid official documents indicates that the Ilkhans at least maintained some belief in this ideology. Whether this belief percolated down to the Mongol ranks is unclear, although I would hazard that it did, at least among the higher echelons. And it was the Mongol elite, together with the Ilkhan, who made the decisions.

Old ideals of imperial glory were surely hard to discard. The yearning for expansion continued to be felt by the Mongol leadership, even if in reality it was no longer viable. Vestigial expansionist ideology combined with the desire for revenge felt against the Mamluks after ʿAyn Jālūt and other defeats, not to mention outright provocations. At the same time, Mongol raids and offensives into Syria, motivated at least in part by ideology, helped keep alive the embers of the Mongol dream. It was to take the Mongols some sixty years after ʿAyn Jālūt to realize that they could not defeat the Mamluks and to abandon finally the ideal of Mongol imperial destiny.

THE ĪLKHĀN ÖLJEITÜ'S CONQUEST OF GĪLĀN (1307): RUMOUR AND REALITY*

CHARLES MELVILLE

The problems confronting the study of mediaeval Persian history from the narrative sources available have recently been thoughtfully aired by Stephen Humphreys.[1] Any attempt to interpret the events of the remote past is faced with the question of decoupling the events concerned from the way they are recorded. What we know is what our sources tell us, and it is only rarely that some independent checks are available, which might allow us to discern, however dimly, to what extent crude reality has been refined by the historiographical process through which it has passed.

The Mongol period presents better opportunities than most, even if we restrict ourselves to the evidence of the court chroniclers. On the one hand, Persian historiography flourished under the Īl-khāns to a degree not previously seen; on the other, this coincided with an extraordinarily rich period of Arabic historiography in Mamlūk Egypt and Syria.[2] Many of the Arabic annalists of the time, inheriting the pan-Islamic vision of earlier historians, provide a considerable amount of information about events in Persia, formally severed from the Dār al-Islām by the destruction of the Baghdād caliphate, while the military and ideological rivalry between the Mamlūk and Īl-khānid regimes gives a sharp edge to their interest in Mongol affairs. Information contained in the Arabic chronicles can throw light on important episodes in Īl-khānid history, and at the same time reveal

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[1] R. Stephen Humphreys, *Islamic History. A Framework for Enquiry* (London, 1991), ch. 5.

[2] For the Mongols, see D.O. Morgan, "Persian Historians and the Mongols," in *Medieval Historical Writing in the Christian and Islamic Worlds*, ed. *idem* (London, 1982), pp. 109–24; for the Mamlūks, D.P. Little, *An Introduction to Mamlūk Historiography* (Wiesbaden, 1970).

the difficulties under which the Persian court historians laboured when faced with reporting awkward or unpalatable facts.[3]

One such awkward fact was the difficulty experienced by the Mongols in subjugating the province of Gīlān at the beginning of the reign of Öljeitü (1304–16). Thanks to the Persian sources, the attempt is generally presented as a success, although certainly a costly one; J.A. Boyle correctly recognised it as "at most a Pyrrhic victory".[4] So in what ways could the Gīlān war be considered a triumph, or have the Persian historians simply claimed a victory for what was in fact a defeat? We might expect the Mamlūk chroniclers to provide an alternative view which, even if biased by hostility to the Mongols, would allow us an independent perspective on the subject.

The primary objective of this paper is to reexamine the Gīlān war in the light of the evidence provided by all the available sources, including Arabic chronicles hitherto neglected in secondary studies. My additional aim is to use the war to explore the problems inherent in the different narrative materials at our disposal, and in attempting to reconcile or resolve conflicting information.

In the event, we find only relatively unimportant disagreement over points of factual detail. The Arabic sources do provide material—some of it highly dubious—which clarifies certain aspects of the Gīlān campaign and helps to explain how a more or less satisfactory outcome was salvaged from military disaster. Their main contribution, however, is to put forward a chronological framework for the sequence of events that is essentially at odds with the Persian presentation. This forces and enables us to look more critically at the Persian sources, and opens up new choices for ordering the available evidence.

Review of the Sources

There are two substantial Persian accounts of the Gīlān campaign. The first, in Abū'l-Qāsim Kāshānī's History of Öljeitü, is contained

[3] C. Melville, "Abū Sa'īd and the Revolt of the Amirs in 1319," in *L'Iran face à la domination mongole*, ed. D. Aigle (Tehran, 1997), pp. 89–120.

[4] J.A. Boyle, "Dynastic and Political History of the Il-Khans", *Cambridge History of Iran*, V (Cambridge, 1968), p. 401. D.O. Morgan, *Medieval Persia, 1040–1797* (London, 1988), p. 77, presents it as one of the achievements of Öljeitü's reign. See also B. Spuler, *Die Mongolen in Iran* (Berlin, 1955), pp. 108–9.

entirely within his annal for 706/July 1306–July 1307 and gives a detailed coverage of the expedition, preceded by a valuable description of Gīlān.[5] Kāshānī reports the despatch of four separate forces and the fate of each. The movements of the column led by the sultan himself are dated very precisely, from which it appears that Öljeitü spent about six weeks at the end of 706 away from his base at Sulṭāniyya.[6] By narrating the sultan's expedition first, Kāshānī produces an account that is hard to follow; the chronology and sequence of the other three expeditions, while seemingly simultaneous with Öljeitü's, are far from clear. Furthermore, Kāshānī records the death of Shaykh Barāq as a final element in the story, apparently as an afterthought, though his role in events was probably not insignificant, as we shall see.

Kāshānī's chronicle is characterised by a remarkable profusion of dates, resembling almost a diary. Despite frequent inaccuracies and inconsistencies in individual dates, Öljeitü's campaign and the others with which it is associated are anchored in a very specific chronological framework. The context of the war and the details of Öljeitü's movements in general are reported in such a way as to allow little scope for radical alternatives. A preference for conflicting information about the war might have serious implications for the timing of numerous other precisely recorded events surrounding this period.

The second Persian account is by Ḥamdallāh Mustawfī, writing shortly before the death of Öljeitü's son, Abū Sa'īd. The *Ẓafar-nāma*, a verse chronicle completed in 1335, is an important source for the late Īl-khānid period, but one largely neglected by modern historians.[7] Mustawfī's account, assembled from "truthful reports (*az gufta-yi*

[5] Kāshānī, *Tārīkh-i Ūljāytū*, ed. M. Hambly (Tehran, 1348/1969), pp. 55–73. The description of Gīlān was previously published by H.L. Rabino, "Deux descriptions du Gīlān du temps des Mongols," *JA*, 238 (1950), 325–33, with a summary translation in his "Les dynasties locales du Gīlān et du Daylam", *JA*, 237 (1949), 303–5. These accounts of Gīlān unfortunately leave many points to be resolved, despite the preliminary efforts of D. Krawulsky, *Īrān. Das Reich der Ilḫāne: eine topographisch-historische Studie* (Wiesbaden, 1974), pp. 373–83. See also V. Minorsky (tr.), *Ḥudūd al-'ālam*, 2nd ed. C.E. Bosworth (London, 1970), esp. pp. 384–91; text ed. M. Sutūda (Tehran, 1340/1961), pp. 148–50.

[6] C. Melville, "The Itineraries of Sultan Öljeitü, 1304–16," *Irān*, 28 (1990), 55–70; some improvements are offered here.

[7] *Ẓafar-nāma*, MS. British Library Or. 2833, see fols. 712vo–717ro. The work has been translated by L.J. Ward, *The Ẓafarnāmah of Ḥamd Allāh Mustawfī and the Il-khan Dynasty of Iran*, unpub. Ph.D. thesis (Manchester, 1983), see III, 567–87. Although this is helpful in a general sense, it is unfortunately too unreliable to be used with confidence. For recent reappraisals of the *Ẓafar-nāma*, see A. Soudavar,

rāstān)," follows a description of the building of Sulṭāniyya. No chronological information is provided except that Öljeitü's departure for Gīlān is put in Dhū'l-Qa'da 706/May 1307, as in Kāshānī. His work is episodic in style and not cluttered up with the minutiae of unconnected events that are characteristic of Kāshānī's rigid annalistic format. Mustawfī's version of events is essentially the same as Kāshānī's in many points of detail, but differs principally in presenting the information in a more logical order. In particular, Öljeitü's expedition is described after the other three, and appears indeed to have followed them, though this is not made explicit. Mustawfī makes no reference at all to Shaykh Barāq.

The details of Mustawfī's account are familiar from the work of the Timurid historian, Ḥāfiẓ-i Abrū, whose continuation of Rashīd al-Dīn's *Jāmi' al-tawārīkh* is based almost entirely on the *Ẓafar-nāma* for the events of this period.[8] Another version of the *Dhayl* intersperses the account taken from Mustawfī with a few excerpts from Kāshānī's chronicle, in such a way as to harmonise the two versions and thereby rationalise Kāshānī's narrative. Ḥāfiẓ-i Abrū does, however, omit one or two details given by Mustawfī, and he occasionally adds material not found in either the *Ẓafar-nāma* or Kāshānī. This is the basis for the account by D'Ohsson, duly followed by Howorth and so by later authors, which therefore does not take sufficient notice of Kāshānī's detailed narrative.[9]

These accounts claim the Gīlān campaign as a triumph. Kāshānī, writing in Öljeitü's reign, despite detailing a series of disasters, follows his account of the death of Barāq with the words, "In short,

"Ẓafar-nāma va Shāh-nāma-yi Mustawfī," *Iranshenasi*, 7/iv (1996), 752–61 and C. Melville, "Ḥamd Allāh Mustawfī's *Ẓafarnāmah* and the Historiography of the Late Ilkhanid period," in *Iran and Iranian Studies: Essays in Honor of Iraj Afshar*, ed. Kambiz Eslami (Princeton, 1997), pp. 1–12.

[8] See Ḥāfiẓ-i Abrū, *Dhayl-i Jāmi' al-tawārīkh*, ed. K. Bayānī (Tehran, 1350/1972), 69–77.

[9] Ḥāfiẓ-i Abrū, *Dhayl*, MS. British Library Or. 2885, fols. 368ro–371vo; *cf.* Baron C. D'Ohsson, *Histoire des Mongols de la Perse* (Paris, 1834–5), IV, 488–97. H.H. Howorth, *History of the Mongols* (London, 1876–88), III, 539–42, adds the interesting account in the History of Georgia, see below. Ḥāfiẓ-i Abrū's text was printed by B. Dorn, *Muhammedanische Quellen zur Geschichte der sudlichen Küstenländer des kaspichen Meeres* (St. Petersburg, 1858), pp. 138–53, who calls this source Rashīd al-Dīn (p. 10). Blochet seems to consider 'Alī Yazdī to be the author of this continuation, see Muṣaḍḍal, p. 135 n. 3 [ref. in n. 26]. The sanitised summary given by Mīrkhwānd, *Rawḍat al-ṣafā*, ed. 'A. Zaryāb (Tehran, 1373/1994), VI, 951–2, is evidently taken from Ḥāfiẓ-i Abrū.

[. . .] the wind of vanity and self-deception of the ignorant Gīlānīs was suddenly extinguished and the heads of disloyalty were returned to the collars of humility." His evidence hardly supports this conclusion, nor does his description of the *yarghu* (trial) that followed Öljeitü's return to Sulṭāniyya in A.H. 707, to investigate the failings of the amirs on campaign. Even so, Kāshānī ends by returning to the triumphalist theme: "the inhabitants of the country and forests of Gīlān were biting dogs; [. . .] necessarily, the wind of their arrogant pride and vain self-deceit was stilled by one onslaught of the victorious army."[10]

Mustawfī's message is essentially the same, but at least more plausibly follows news of a victory, albeit a costly one. After the *yarghu*, the settlement of Gīlān's affairs also appears favourable to the Mongols.[11] In his *Tārīkh-i guzīda*, written in 1330, Mustawfī gives a very brief notice of the campaign, which he describes as a victory, imposing a tax paid in silk, though Qutlughshāh and various other amirs were killed.[12]

The only other extended Persian treatment of the war is provided by Aḥmad-i Tabrīzī, whose verse chronicle was completed in 1338. It is effectively a paraphrase of Kāshānī's account but differs in one or two respects, particularly concerning the role of amir Sevinch (see below). The campaigns are all treated together, and Shaykh Barāq is associated with Qutlughshāh's expedition. The war is not dated, but follows a few lines on the building of Sulṭāniyya in 704 and the sultan's return there after wintering in Gāvbārī that year.[13]

The remaining Īl-khānid sources deal with the Gīlān expedition so briefly that they avoid committing themselves to a view, though the view is obvious from reading between the lines. Banākatī, writing c. 1318, simply reports the deaths in Gīlān of Qutlughshāh in A.H. 706 and of Shaykh Barāq in 707, an interesting separation of events that is unique in the Persian sources.[14] As far as I can see,

[10] Kāshānī, pp. 69, 73.

[11] *Ẓafar-nāma*, fols. 716vo–717ro. See below, p. 116.

[12] Mustawfī, *Tārīkh-i guzīda*, ed. 'A. Nawā'ī (Tehran, 1362/1983), p. 607. He says Öljeitü set off in Dhū'l-Ḥijja (*sic*) 706, as does Ḥāfiẓ-i Abrū, p. 73.

[13] Tabrīzī, *Shāhanshāh-nāma*, MS. British Library Or. 2780, fol. 116ro–vo. These details suggest the year 705 and winter of 1305–6, *cf.* Kāshānī, pp. 48–9, but the following year is preferable.

[14] Banākatī, *Tārīkh*, ed. J. Shi'ār (Tehran, 1348/1969), p. 475; he is the earliest writer after Kāshānī. He seems to be the source for Faṣīḥ Khwāfī, *Mujmal-i Faṣīḥī*, ed. M. Farrukh (Mashhad, 1961), III, 15–16.

Waṣṣāf does not mention the expedition at all: a remarkable omission.[15] Shabānkāra'ī says Öljeitü captured towns in Gīlān and Māzandarān that had never been subjugated by previous kings, but also notes the death of Qutlughshāh. His account is not dated.[16] By the time Ahrī was writing (c. 1360), the expedition was viewed in its dimmest light: Öljeitü set out for Gīlān. Qutlughshāh and Shaykh Barāq were killed there, and the Sultan returned. This is put in 704, following the foundation of Sulṭāniyya.[17] In view of their lack of detail, the discrepancies in dating in these sources are not significant; they are concerned with the general order of events, not with chronological precision.

Beside the Persian sources, various independent accounts exist of the Gīlān campaign. The first, in the history of Georgia, is easily reconciled with the Persian version of events. Four expeditions were sent out. The Georgian Wakhtang III accompanied Öljeitü's forces and experienced the tribulations suffered also by the Sultan. The picture is one of defeat followed by withdrawal. The campaign is not dated.[18]

A second independent tradition is found in Arabic historiography and consists of two main strands. It is immediately apparent that one set of sources presents material on the Gīlān campaign in two separate annals. The earliest author, Baybars al-Manṣūrī (d. 725/1325), puts the death of Qutlughshāh in A.H. 705. The details are rather sparse: Qutlughshāh, who had been made *nā'ib* (sc. senior amir) by Ghāzān, perished in the mountains of Gīlān, where he had been sent to fight the Kurds.[19] They defeated and killed him.[20] According

[15] Ward mentions Waṣṣāf's account more than once, though never giving a page reference (see his notes 11, 23, 25); but the campaign is certainly not in Āyatī's invaluable *Taḥrīr*, and I have searched in vain in Waṣṣāf.

[16] Shabānkāra'ī, *Majmaʿ al-ansāb*, ed. Mīr Hāshim Muḥaddith (Tehran, 1363/1984), p. 270.

[17] Ahrī, *Tārīkh-i Shaykh Uways*, ed. and tr. J.B. van Loon (The Hague, 1954), p. 148, tr. p. 50.

[18] *Histoire de la Géorgie, pt. 1, Histoire ancienne, jusqu'en 1469 de J.C.*, tr. M. Brosset (St. Petersburg, 1849), pp. 635–8; *cf.* Howorth, pp. 542–3. This is a relatively late compilation from a variety of unknown sources.

[19] This designation here implies a tribal way of life rather than a racial group, see e.g. al-ʿUmarī, tr. Quatremère, p. 302 [ref. in n. 36 below]. Āmulī, *Nafāʾis al-funūn*, II, ed. I. Miyānjī (Tehran, 1379/1959), p. 257, says Öljeitü reduced the "Arab tribes" of Gīlān to obedience.

[20] Baybars al-Manṣūrī, *Zubdat al-fikra*, MS. British Library Or. Add. 23,325, fol. 246vo; *idem*, *al-Tuḥfa al-mulūkiyya*, ed. ʿA.S. Ḥamdān (Cairo, 1987), p. 178. He is

to Abū 'l-Fidā', Qutlughshāh went there because the people of Gīlān had revolted.[21] Baybars ends by saying that the profession of unity was raised up and the unbelievers (i.e. the Mongols) were dispersed, thus displaying the most obvious source of bias in the Mamlūk accounts. Although the Mongols had officially converted to Islam over a decade before, they are still depicted in their pagan and anti-Islamic colours by the contemporary Arabic chroniclers, no doubt reflecting popular perceptions.

From this first group of authors, it thus appears that Qutlughshāh's expedition and death in Gīlān occurred a year earlier than is stated by Kāshānī. Though this is not necessarily accurate, it underlines the observation that the sequence of events as reported by the Persian sources is not completely clear.

Further details are given by other Mamlūk authors under A.H. 707, i.e. the year *after* the date given by Kāshānī. The earliest and most useful of this group is al-Yūnīnī (d. 726/1326), who reports the arrival in Damascus in mid-Ṣafar/mid-August 1307 of Fatḥ al-Dīn b. Ṣubra the Mihmāndār, who had been captured by the Mongols during the campaign in Cilicia in 705.[22] He owed his release "to the defeat of the Tatars at the hands of the Gīlānīs", that is, the defeat and death of Qutlughshāh, of which he goes on to give an account. The battle itself is said to have occurred on 1 Muḥarram 707/3 July 1307. A few months later, in Rabīʿ II/October, further news arrived that Öljeitü had sent Shaykh Barāq as an envoy to Gīlān, where he had been killed. Enraged, Öljeitü despatched a large punitive force and himself moved into neighbouring Māzandarān.[23] This also extends the period over which the war took place,

followed by al-Nuwayrī, *Nihāyat al-arab fī funūn al-adab*, XXVII, ed. S. ʿĀshūr (Cairo, 1985), p. 417. [In the section on the Mamlūks, he makes no reference to these events, MS. Leiden, Or. 2–o]. For the relationship of al-Nuwayrī to Baybars al-Manṣūrī, see Little, pp. 24–32.

[21] Abū 'l-Fidā', *al-Mukhtaṣar*, tr. P.M. Holt, *The Memoirs of a Syrian Prince* (Wiesbaden, 1983), p. 45.

[22] For details, see Little's analysis of annals for 705 in his *Introduction*. Ibn Ṣubra was an amir of Aleppo.

[23] Al-Yūnīnī, *Dhayl mirʾāt al-zamān*, MS. Topkapı Library, Ahmet III, MS. 2907/E4, fol. 137ro–vo. I am grateful to Reuven Amitai-Preiss for the loan of his microfilm of this MS. Al-Yūnīnī quotes al-Birzālī's version of Ibn Ṣubra's narrative, probably taken from the *Ḥawādith al-zamān* of al-Jazarī, see Little, pp. 57–61. The source of the second piece of news is unknown: al-Yūnīnī concludes with the formula, "God knows the truth of the matter." This second report also contains news of the execution of "Būlāy", which raises another problem, see below.

taking it well beyond its conclusion in all the Persian sources except Banākatī.

An otherwise similar account by Ibn al-Dawādārī seems to provide a slightly different chronological picture. Essentially, Ibn al-Dawādārī implies that the news of Qutlughshāh's defeat, Barāq's death and the departure of Öljeitü's punitive expedition (though separate in time), was *all* brought by Ibn Ṣubra, who got away while the army was still on campaign.[24] Although Ibn al-Dawādārī cites a different authority for his account, it is merely a slightly reworded version of al-Yūnīnī's, and the two must be regarded as one.[25] Even if the timing of the events themselves is not explicit, al-Yūnīnī's statement about when and how the news arrived is clear and precise. The same story appears under A.H. 707 in several later works that make no reference to the origin of the information.[26]

Regardless of the chronological data deducible from Ibn Ṣubra's variously reported evidence, the important point remains that he apparently left Persia before the conclusion of Öljeitü's final campaign, and cannot have known of its outcome, which is equally unknown to this group of sources.

Nevertheless in a second reference to Gīlān, in his annal for 707, Baybars al-Manṣūrī cites Ibn Ṣubra for an oral report of the sultan's final victory: Öljeitü raided Gīlān and plundered the Persians and Kurds; he killed a countless number of them and captured their women and children, whom he sold in Tabrīz. This was in revenge for their previous defeat of his army and killing of Qutlughshāh.[27]

[24] Ibn al-Dawādārī, *Kanz al-durar*, IX, ed. H.R. Roemer (Cairo, 1960), pp. 149–50.

[25] Ibn al-Dawādārī got the story in 710 A.H. from al-Malik al-Kāmil, an Ayyubid amir resident in Damascus, who died in 727/1327; see al-Nuwayrī, *Nihāyat*, Leiden MS. 19–B, ff. 130vo–131ro. I am grateful for Prof. P.M. Holt's assistance here. The last sentence, "at the time of Ibn Ṣubra's departure, [Öljeitü] had left [the army] in that situation [i.e. in Gīlān]", is not found in al-Yūnīnī and its exact significance is unclear. The implication that he brought the news of Bulay's execution in Rabīʿ II is inconsistent with al-Yūnīnī's statement that Ibn Ṣubra arrived in Damascus in Ṣafar.

[26] E.g. Mufaḍḍal b. Abī 'l-Faḍā'il, *al-Nahj al-sadīd*, ed. E. Blochet, *Patrologia Orientalis*, 20 (Paris, 1929), 135–7; Ibn Ḥabīb, *Tadhkirat al-nabīh*, ed. M.M. Amīn (Cairo, 1976), I, 282; Ibn Kathir, *al-Bidāya wa'l-nihāya* (Cairo, 1932–9), XIV, 44–5. Mufaḍḍal's version closely paraphrases al-Yūnīnī (rather than Ibn al-Dawādārī), or their ultimate source (al-Jazarī), see Haarmann's introduction to vol. VIII of Ibn al-Dawādārī, pp. 25–8; *cf.* Little, p. 59.

[27] Baybars al-Manṣūrī, *Zubda*, fol. 253vo. In the *Tuḥfa*, p. 183, he mentions the return of Ibn Ṣubra in 707, but not his story, *cf.* al-Maqrīzī, *Kitāb al-sulūk li-maʿrifat duwal al-mulūk*, II/1, ed. M.M. Ziada (Cairo, 1941), p. 36. Al-ʿAynī, IV, 422, 449, puts his return in 706 A.H., and again (citing Baybars) in 707 [ref. in n. 31 below].

This is followed by al-Nuwayrī, in his section on Mongol history.[28] It is of interest that this version makes no reference at all to Shaykh Barāq; also, it records a successful conclusion to the war. There is a faint echo of the Persian account: Kāshānī mentions the captive women and children of the Gīlānīs, but says they were ransomed and returned home.[29] This material is not in the second group of sources.

It is surprising that the same authority is quoted by both sets of Mamlūk historians for substantially different information. Perhaps Ibn Ṣubra told one story in Damascus and another in Cairo, having learned additional information on the way.[30] However, we might surmise that Ibn Ṣubra is the underlying source for the death of Qutlughshāh in Baybars's annal for A.H. 705, misplaced in that year (when Ibn Ṣubra was captured) in error for 707, and that the news of Öljeitü's subsequent victory reached Cairo from some other source. Another possibility is discussed below.

These problems come to a head in the chronicle by Badr al-Dīn al-ʿAynī, who attempts to reconcile the chronology borrowed from Baybars al-Manṣūrī (whom he cites verbatim) with the narrative derived from the Syrian group of sources going back to al-Jazarī. It is the extraordinary length and detail of his account, spread over the two annals for A.H. 705 and 707, that has prompted this reconsideration of the Gīlān war.[31] The bulk of his narrative is probably lifted entirely from the history of al-Malik al-Nāṣir by al-Yūsufī (d. 759/1358).[32] When appropriate, therefore, this author will be

[28] Al-Nuwayrī, XXVII, 417–18, but with no reference to Ibn Ṣubra as the source. In the Mamlūk section of his history, MS. Leiden Or. 2–o, fol. 35vo, he merely mentions the return of Ibn Ṣubra in 707, but not his story.

[29] Kāshānī, p. 71; *cf.* below, p. 116. Perhaps these accounts can be reconciled by suggesting that the captives were taken to Tabrīz and sold back to their fellow-countrymen.

[30] Al-Yūnīnī mentions that Ibn Ṣubra went to Cairo to give his news to the Sultan, fol. 137ro.

[31] This portion of al-ʿAynī's massive chronicle has recently been printed, *ʿIqd al-jumān*, ed. M.M. Amīn, IV (Cairo 1992), pp. 385–406, 449–58; several lacunae have made it necessary to refer also to another manuscript, MS. Topkapı Library, Ahmed III, 2912/4; I am much indebted to Caroline Finkel for extracting a microfilm of this MS. from Istanbul.

[32] *Cf.* Little, *Introduction*, pp. 81, 86. On al-Yūsufī, see also *idem*, "The Recovery of a Lost Source for Baḥrī Mamlūk History: al-Yūsufī's *Nuzhat al-nāẓir fī sīrat al-Malik al-Nāṣir*", *JAOS*, 94 (1974), 42–54, reprinted in *idem*, *History and Historiography of the Mamlūks* (London, 1986), no. II. In fact, al-ʿAynī prefixes his account with *qultu* ("I said"), rather than his usually scrupulous reference to an earlier authority, so the attribution to al-Yūsufī is not certain, despite the clear indications of his style.

referred to as al-Yūsufī rather than al-ʿAynī. Although al-Yūsufī does not follow Baybars in reporting the Gīlān campaign as a victory for Öljeitü, he shows how a successful outcome was negotiated, and his long narrative shares basic structural elements with other earlier Mamlūk accounts, particularly in presenting the war in two halves, separated by the death of Shaykh Barāq. Elements of his account, however, do raise serious difficulties. His efforts at synthesis produce a chronological muddle that allows the date A.H. 705 to be rejected; but his timing of Öljeitü's expedition is fundamentally incompatible with al-Yūnīnī's and exaggerates the differences between the Arabic and Persian versions.

The hallmarks of al-Yūsufī's style have been identified by Little and are very much in evidence again here: the wealth of information not found elsewhere, supplied with the names of actual persons and conversations to lend authenticity, the popular narrative techniques, all of which have led Little to dismiss much of his material as "probably a complete fabrication."[33] On the other hand, al-Yūsufī appears to be a major source for the later years of al-Nāṣir Muḥammad (d. 1341) and his information, when reduced and edited by his less exuberant successors, was evidently considered reliable.[34] Here, we are concerned not with later authors abridging his material, but with earlier ones who perhaps had access to, but did not use, the information al-Yūsufī chose to include. If his source is the same Ibn Ṣubra, used sparingly by contemporary historians but quoted in full by al-Yūsufī, this would colour our view of his evidence, but perhaps it was the later author who expanded and embellished his material. Thus there is a fundamental problem with al-Yūsufī's account: if it is not to be rejected entirely, how to determine what is reliable and what is not? And as the Arabic versions all appear to be related, does the discrediting of al-Yūsufī discredit the rest? The answer can only be based on a comparison with the Persian texts.

To sum up: Persian sources, despite some ambiguity over the sequence of events, appear to concentrate the various campaigns of

[33] D.P. Little, "The Founding of Sulṭāniyya: a Mamlūk Version," *Iran*, 16 (1978), 172, 175 and *idem*, "A Lost Source," pp. 53–4. For comments on this trend in Mamlūk historiography, see U. Haarmann, "Auflösung und Bewahrung der klassischen Formen arabischer Geschichtsschreibung in der Zeit der Mamlūken," *ZDMG*, 121 (1971), esp. pp. 55–8.

[34] See Little, "An Analysis of the Relationship between Four Mamlūk Chronicles for 737–45", *JSS*, 19 (1974), 252–68, in *History and Historiography*, no. III.

the Gīlān war into a short period at the end of 706/early summer 1307, including the mysterious death of Shaykh Barāq. The most significant aspect of the Arabic accounts is that they report two distinct phases in the Gīlān war, first the defeat of Qutlughshāh and then the retaliatory expedition of Öljeitü, separated by the mission and death of Barāq. Furthermore, if the year 705 is discarded, the Arabic sources concentrate the main actions of the war in 707/July 1307–June 1308. This represents a fundamental difference between the two historiographical traditions, both in the sequence of events and their timing, a problem compounded by the additional material in al-Yūsufī's narrative.

Otherwise, we cannot detect the sort of bias we might have anticipated in the Mamlūk accounts, which do not reveal that what the Persians claim as a victory was in fact a defeat. As for the Persian historians, the evidence they present does not suggest a victory, but it is not simply a case of saying, "behold the moon and the pleiades."[35] Although they round off their accounts with pure panegyric, the successful outcome of the war seems to be confirmed by their Mamlūk counterparts.

One further Arabic source must be mentioned, namely al-ʿUmarī. His account of Qutlughshāh's expedition is contained in the geographical section of the *Masālik al-abṣār*, on Gīlān. His authority is named as the Sharīf Muḥammad b. Aḥmad al-Jīlī.[36] This does not contribute much to our knowledge of the war itself, though al-ʿUmarī provides some useful information about Gīlān at the time he was writing (c. 1340).

Finally, incidental references are to be found in the obituaries of Qutlughshāh and Barāq in the Arabic biographical dictionaries, which tend to put their deaths together.

With such a range of sources, we can attempt to get closer to the course of the Gīlān war, even if not to resolve all the conflicting points of detail. The following account of the campaign concentrates on the new evidence found in the Arabic texts and on the problems of reconciling the two different sets of sources.

[35] *Cf.* Saʿdi, *Gulistān*, ed. M.A. Furūghī, *Kulliyāt-i Saʿdī* (Tehran, 1363/1984), p. 64.

[36] The Arabic text remains unpublished. The section on Gīlān was translated by E. Quatremère, "Notice de l'ouvrage qui a pour titre Masalek alabsar fi mamalek alamsar," *Notices et extraits des manuscrits de la Bibliothèque du Roi*, 13 (1838), 292–300. I have not identified the informant.

The Causes of the War

There seems little doubt that Öljeitü intended, once settled on the throne, to renew the war with the Mamlūks that had been interrupted by the death of his brother Ghāzān in 1304.[37] Despite an embassy to Cairo, which allegedly spoke of Öljeitü's desire for peace in rather remarkable terms,[38] correspondence with the Christian West renewed the old day-dream of concerted action against the Mamlūks. This followed a series of embassies from various parts of the Mongol empire, reaffirming their unity. The Mamlūk-Mongol war forms an important background context for the Gīlān expedition, and explains the particular interest of the Mamlūk chroniclers in events in Persia at this period.

According to Mustawfī, Öljeitü felt he could not embark on the Syrian campaign until he had secured the submission of Gīlān, a region that had never been conquered by the Mongols and which, due to its inaccessibility, they had left undisturbed.[39] This is not much of a motive for war: there is no reason to disturb sleeping dogs, let alone biting ones. Kāshānī indicates that Öljeitü was stung by a gibe made by the Chaghatay prince Du'ā: he and his amirs used to jest that the sultan was unable to conquer the small kingdom of Gīlān in the heart of his realm, or to come up with a plan to subdue it. How then could he hope to conquer Syria and Egypt? This taunt so enraged Öljeitü that he sent messengers to frighten, threaten and exhort the Gīlānīs to submit, but in vain, whereupon he ordered armies to assemble for the conquest of the country.[40] Mustawfī confirms that Öljeitü was advised by his vizier to try negotiations first.[41] After an initial success, which we will return to below, the sultan prepared for war.

Leaving aside for now the timing of this goad to action, Mustawfī gives another motive besides acquiring renown and gaining access to the wealth of the country: namely to open up a quicker route to

[37] Boyle, p. 399.
[38] Al-Yūnīnī, fol. 37ro; Ibn al-Dawādārī, IX, 127.
[39] *Ẓafar-nāma*, fol. 712vo; Aḥmad-i Tabrīzī, *Shāhanshāh-nāma*, fol. 116ro.
[40] Kāshānī, pp. 55–6, whence Ḥāfiẓ-i Abrū, fol. 368ro. This seems quite plausible.
[41] *Ẓafar-nāma*, fol. 712vo; Ḥāfiẓ-i Abrū, p. 69. In al-Yūsufī's account, following the failure of the initial overtures, Rashīd al-Dīn tried in vain to dissuade Öljeitü from going to war, correctly predicting it would weaken his armies and leave him with an enemy in the heart of his kingdom, al-'Aynī, p. 387.

Khurāsān.[42] This is also mentioned by Mamlūk sources, who say the Gīlānīs resisted all efforts to allow the Mongols passage through their territory, protesting that they paid their taxes and that merchants came there (freely).[43] On the face of it, this seems a reasonable cause for war, though it is not clear why it was an issue. Neither the pastoral nor caravan routes from Sulṭāniyya went anywhere near Gīlān,[44] but it is possible that coming from Mūghān and the northwest, where their main seasonal pastures were situated, the Mongols would have preferred a more direct route despite the difficulty of the terrain. Although rapid communications with Khurāsān were desirable, and were to become more so in view of the renewed breakdown of Mongol unity in the Chaghatay khanate, the need for open access to Gīlān cannot have been very pressing for strategic purposes.

Though not mentioned as a motive, the main aim of the war probably emerges from its outcome, namely the levy of tax on the Gīlānīs and more specifically payments in silk. Access to the silk might be behind the aim to "open up the road to Khurāsān". The desire for tribute shows either that the Mongols were looking for new sources of revenue to equip armies for a fresh assault on the Mamlūks, or that they were seeking a resumption of payments that the Gīlānīs had perhaps ceased (despite their protestations noted above). We will return to this point later.

An entirely different motive for war is advanced by al-Yūsufī. Shaykh Barāq, in whom Öljeitü had great confidence,[45] told the sultan that the Gīlānīs were not true Muslims. They adhered to the teachings of Ibn Taymiyya in Damascus, who had attracted the disapproval of the Muslims, and were known as corporealists (*mujassimūn*) without religion. Öljeitü summoned the Gīlānīs to Tabrīz to answer these charges. Encouraged by their leader, Naw Pādshāh,[46]

[42] *Ẓafar-nāma*, fol. 713ro; Ḥāfiẓ-i Abrū, p. 70.
[43] Al-Yūnīnī, fol. 137ro, without reference to Khurāsān; Ibn al-Dawādārī, p. 149; Mufaḍḍal, p. 135; Ibn Kathīr, p. 44.
[44] *Cf.* Jean Aubin, "Réseau pastorale et réseau caravanier; les grand'routes du Khurassan à l'époque mongole," *Le Monde Iranien et l'Islam*, I (1971), 105–30; a more northerly route, through Māzandarān, could skirt Gīlān to the east.
[45] For Barāq, see H. Algar, "Barāq Bābā," in *EIr*, III, 754–5, and A.T. Karamustafa, "Early Sufism in Eastern Anatolia," in L. Lewisohn (ed.), *Classical Persian Sufism: from its Origins to Rumi* (London and New York, 1993), esp. pp. 193–6, with references.
[46] In al-Yūsufī, "Naw Barshāh", which suggests an oral source. He was ruler of Lāhījān and the most significant of the petty Gīlānī rulers, *Ẓafar-nāma*, fol. 713ro; Kāshānī, p. 60.

they decided that they would be killed without a hearing and elected instead to send a letter setting out their beliefs, denying the allegations against them and retorting incidentally that the Mongols' *fuqahā'* were hardly fit to judge on such matters. When the sultan's envoy returned with the letter, having divulged to the Gīlānīs that Barāq was the source of these allegations, Öljeitü was furious and sent another message summoning them. This time, they sent the envoy packing, with the words, "What do you Mongols know of religious matters? If your intention is to ruin the country, then try it." The envoy departed with the threat that Öljeitü would come in person with the whole Mongol army to wreak a bloody vengeance. The sultan was so enraged at this news, that he called his *nā'ib* Qutlughshāh to prepare for war.[47]

This is not quite as mad as it seems. However unlikely the accusation against the Gīlānīs,[48] nothing would have been too far-fetched for Shaykh Barāq, who, whatever else his spiritual qualifications, was hardly a jurist. That Barāq strongly influenced Öljeitü (as he is supposed to have impressed Ghāzān before him), is attested by the fact he was buried by the sultan's mausoleum at Sulṭāniyya.[49] He may have heard of Ibn Taymiyya's detention in Cairo in Ramaḍān 705/March 1306, and of the earlier charges against him of *tajsīm* (belief in the corporeality of God).[50] Barāq himself was in Damascus in Jumādā I, 706/November 1306, at a time when Ibn Taymiyya was still in prison, and would have had ample opportunity to become informed of these events. If at large, Ibn Taymiyya would doubtless have been as outspokenly hostile towards Barāq as he had been the previous year to the Aḥmadiyya-Rifā'iyya dervishes in Syria, and even from prison might have influenced the sultan's refusal to allow Barāq to come to Cairo to complete his mission.[51]

[47] Al-'Aynī, IV, 385–7, under 705 A.H.

[48] According to al-'Umarī, pp. 294, 298, however, all the inhabitants of Gīlān were indeed Ḥanbalīs (most open to the taunt of being *mujassim*), except the ruling family of Fūman, who were Shāfi'īs, and 'Alids in the east; *cf.* Kāshānī, p. 56.

[49] Banākatī, p. 475; Kāshānī, p. 70; *cf.* S. Blair, "The Mongol Capital of Sulṭāniyya, 'the Imperial'," *Iran*, 24 (1986), 142. He is far more prominent in Arabic than Persian sources, see D.P. Little, "Religion under the Mamlūks," *The Muslim World*, 73 (1983), 175–6 (repr. in *History and Historiography of the Mamlūks*, no. X).

[50] *Idem*, "The Historical and Historiographical Significance of the Detention of Ibn Taymiyya," *IJMES*, 4 (1973), esp. pp. 312, 323 (repr. in *History and Historiography of the Mamlūks*, no. VII).

[51] *Idem*, "Religion," pp. 176–8.

Whether or not sectarian differences were an adequate cause for war, they are scarcely less improbable than the other motives mentioned, given Öljeitü's own religious ambivalence. Meanwhile, it gives al-Yūsufī the opportunity to present the campaign as an unjustified assault by the pagan Mongols on the good Muslim Gīlānīs, a powerful story-line for domestic consumption, and in addition makes a connection (which might be entirely spurious) between events in Persia and matters of contemporary interest in Mamlūk territory. For the moment, it is sufficient to note first, that even if fictitious, this story explains Barāq's mysterious involvement in Kāshānī's account, and secondly that al-Yūsufī's report of the coming and going of envoys, and their rejection by the Gīlānīs, is consistent with both al-Yūnīnī's and Kāshānī's account of the preliminaries to war.

Our first chronological problem arises here, however. As noted earlier, Kāshānī says that Öljeitü was provoked into war by the report of a jibe made by Du'ā. This was related by Oiratāy Ghāzān son of Arghūn Āqā, probably at the time of his visit to the *ordu* in Gāvbārī on 25 December 1306 with the news of Du'ā's death.[52] Barāq was still in Syria at this time. If he did influence events in the way al-Yūsufī suggests, it must have been before he went to Syria, in which case Du'ā's jest was a secondary factor; but it should, more plausibly, have been after his return, by which time Öljeitü was already set on war. The disagreement is thus not just on the motive, but about the timing of the motive, a point that will be pursued more fully later.

Before discussing the course of the campaign, one further element of the preliminaries must be mentioned. According to Mustawfī, when Öljeitü agreed first to try diplomacy, one of the rulers of Gīlān, Amīra Dubbāj, agreed to come to court. However, after distributing gifts to the viziers and amirs, he began to regret having come and left on the pretext of some illness (*dar āward ranjūrī*), without seeking the sultan's permission.[53] Amīra Dubbāj was ruler of Fūman,

[52] *Cf.* above, n. 40. Kāshānī, p. 53, puts the death of Du'ā in September 1306. Ḥāfiẓ-i Abrū, fol. 367vo, has the wrong date, and calls Oiratāy "Ordāy", as does Waṣṣāf, *Tajziyat al-amṣār wa tazjiyat al-a'ṣār* (lith. Bombay, 1269/1852), p. 342, who puts Du'ā's death at the end of 706 (p. 518), which is too late; see Melville, "The Chinese Uighur Animal Calendar in Persian Historiography of the Mongol period," *Iran*, 32 (1994), 89, for the date.

[53] *Ẓafar-nāma*, fol. 713ro; slightly expanded in Ḥāfiẓ-i Abrū, p. 69. For a recent note on Amīra Dubbāj, see A. Soudavar, "Do nokta dar tārīkh-i moghūl," *Iranshenasi*, 8/i (1996), 88–90.

and he plays an important part in the rest of the story. As Öljeitü then prepared for war, he was advised by a certain Girāy (Kerei)[54] of the situation in Gīlān, and the names of the various rulers. These are found in both Mustawfī and Kāshānī, and provide a useful guide to the complicated political geography of the region.[55] Girāy had often been to Gīlān in the company of the vizier Ṣadr al-Dīn Khālidī, and was a former governor (*shaḥna*) of Ṭārum.

There is an echo of this sequence also in al-Yūsufī's account, but at a later stage in the proceedings. Following the initial disaster of Qutlughshāh's expedition and the flight of some Gīlānī hostages, Öljeitü prepared to march out himself and sought the advice of Zanbūr, who was knowledgeable about Gīlān, and sent him off to reconnoitre the position.[56] Regardless of whether or not Girāy was the same person as Zanbūr, from the point of view of the narrative structure, they fulfil the same role. This again indicates a chronological dislocation between al-Yūsufī and the Persian version of events.

As mentioned above, once war is declared, Öljeitü launches various expeditions: one led by Chūpān, one by Qutlughshāh and one by the amirs Ṭūghān and Mu'min. According to al-Yūnīnī, Chūpān was given 20,000 troops and Qutlughshāh 40,000.[57] Al-Yūsufī correctly has Chūpān in Darband, whence he was ordered to proceed straight to Gīlān. The sultan mustered 70,000 troops and was ready to move, when his officers told him there was no need to go in person, because the Gīlānīs were just a Persian rabble without an army, and the sultan should leave the expedition to his generals.[58] Qutlughshāh was put in command, although Öljeitü voiced the fear

[54] Possibly the *īldūchī* (swordbearer) who had been on Ghāzān's Syrian campaign of 699 A.H., Waṣṣāf, pp. 374, 456; *cf.* Kāshānī, p. 12, who calls him an *ūdchī* (doorman).

[55] *Ẓafar-nāma*, fol. 713ro; Kāshānī, pp. 56–61, but with several disagreements. These are not resolved by Rabino's "Dynasties du Gīlān," partly because of the considerable differences between his own text of Kāshānī and the one established by Hambly. Many of Rabino's readings appear preferable, and it is a pity Hambly was apparently unaware of them. Unfortunately, I have not been able to consult the Istanbul MS. The text was also printed by M. Sutūda, *Az Āstārā tā Astārābād*, II (Tehran, 1351/1972), pp. 423–9, comparing Hambly's edition with microfilms in Tehran, which provides only slight clarifications. See also the comments on Mustawfī's list of rulers by Soudavar, "Do nokta," p. 89 and notes.

[56] Al-'Aynī, p. 453. For Zanbūr or Ranbū, see Melville, "The Revolt of the Amirs."

[57] Al-Yūnīnī, fol. 137ro; Ibn al-Dawādārī, p. 149; Mufaḍḍal, p. 135; Ibn Kathīr, p. 44.

[58] In the Persian accounts, Öljeitü mocks this advice: *Ẓafar-nāma*, fol. 713ro; Ḥāfiẓ-i Abrū, p. 70.

that the outcome would be another Marj al-Ṣuffār—another story-telling element with a blatantly Mamlūk colouration.[59]

Chūpān's Expedition

On the whole, Arabic sources pay little attention to Chūpān, and al-Yūsufī otherwise mentions him only in the later stages of the confrontation. It is possible that in fact, Chūpān was involved in two separate expeditions, the first of which was the opening campaign of the war.

The Persian accounts confirm that Chūpān approached Gīlān from the northwest (Fig. 1), and are similar but distinct. According to Kāshānī, he set out from Mūghān shortly after Öljeitü's departure in Shawwāl 706/April 1307 and penetrated the territory of Khālū, previously named as ruler of Gaskar, who was defeated and fled. The Mongols suffered only three casualties.[60] Kāshānī does not mention Chūpān again. According to Mustawfī, he entered Gīlān from Ardabīl and Āstārā and so to the territory of Iṣpahbud Rukn al-Dīn Aḥmad, who submitted.[61] Chūpān then advanced towards Gaskar, killing and looting on the way. The ruler, here named as Sharaf al-Dawla, also submitted.[62] Crowned with success, Chūpān now withdrew the way he had come, and returned to Öljeitü in Sulṭāniyya, at the place to which the sultan had advanced.[63] Ḥāfiẓ-i Abrū takes this to mean that Chūpān rejoined Öljeitü on his way to Lāhījān.[64] However, Mustawfī also gives Chūpān no further role in the war,

[59] Al-'Aynī, pp. 387–8. The Mamlūk victory at Marj al-Ṣuffār in Ramaḍān 702/April 1303 marked the end of Ghāzān's third Syrian campaign; Qutlughshāh was commander in chief of the Mongol forces. See e.g. Abū 'l-Fidā', tr. Holt, pp. 41–2.


[60] Kāshānī, pp. 61, 69; Aḥmad-i Tabrīzī, fol. 116ro l. 30, 116vo ll. 4–5. The *History of Georgia*, p. 638, says Chūpān defeated Rustam Malik (?), who withdrew and was not pursued further.

[61] Both Kāshānī, p. 61 and Mustawfī, *Nuzhat al-qulūb*, ed. and tr. G. Le Strange (London, 1915, 1919), p. 162/tr. 158, list Iṣpahbud as a place, but it was in fact the title of the local ruler, see e.g. Ibn-i Bazzāz, *Ṣafwat al-ṣafā*, ed. Gh. Ṭabāṭabā'ī Majd (Tabrīz, 1373/1994), pp. 149, 210. Rabino, "Dynasties," p. 305, and "Deux descriptions," p. 333, suggests Āstārā for the region's name.

[62] *Ẓafar-nāma*, fol. 713ro ll. 11, 14, says Sharaf al-Dawla, ruler of Gaskar, had recently acquired Rasht. Ḥāfiẓ-i Abrū, p. 71, calls him Sharaf al-Dawla Shāh am ābā [Shārim Abīh ?], *cf.* MS. fol. 368vo. Kāshānī, pp. 60–1, puts Khālū's brother Sharaf al-Dawla in the districts west of Gaskar, so the two versions can be reconciled.

[63] *Ẓafar-nāma*, fol. 713vo ll. 3–23.

[64] Ḥāfiẓ-i Abrū, p. 71.



Map 1. The campaigns of Chūpan, who returned from Gaskar by the route he entered, and of Qutlughshāh, who was defeated by a combined force of Gīlānīs between Fūman and Tūlīm. The names in brackets denote the local Gīlānī chiefs. Shaded areas are land over 2,000 metres. For some additional details, see Map 3 and for scale, see Map 2.

though his expedition clearly preceded Öljeitü's.[65] This is compatible with the sparse details provided by the Arabic sources.

Al-Yūnīnī merely states that Chūpān was not in the area where Qutlughshāh was defeated, and his forces were able to flee, perhaps a gratuitous anti-Mongol gloss on events.[66] The Arabic chronicles are more interested in the fate of Qutlughshāh's expedition, which is undoubtedly the main action of the war. Before turning to that, however, we will refer to the fortunes of the other force, which is not mentioned at all by the Arabic chroniclers and only briefly by the Persian ones.[67]

Ṭūghān and Mu'min's Expedition

To complete the pincer movement on Gīlān, a force was sent to the eastern province of Gurjiyān under the command of Ṭūghān son of Tūghū and Mu'min the *bāvurchī* (cook).[68] Kāshānī discusses this last, i.e. after Chūpān's expedition but before an action that Mustawfī more plausibly associates with Öljeitü's campaign. Mustawfī discusses it third. Their accounts differ quite markedly.

According to Kāshānī, Ṭūghān and Mu'min took control of Gurjiyān, which marked the eastern limits of Gīlān at that time (Map 2).[69] The local ruler, Sayyid Muḥammad Kiyā son of Ḥaidar Kiyā,


[65] Kāshānī obscures this by describing his campaign after both Öljeitü's and Qutlughshāh's expeditions, as does the *History of Georgia*; Mustawfī deals with it first.

[66] Al-Yūnīnī, fol. 137ro, followed by Mufaḍḍal, p. 136; *cf.* Ibn al-Dawādārī, p. 149. This puts as unfavourable a light on Chūpān's withdrawal as possible, but is perhaps a useful corrective to the Persian versions, which may have been reluctant to record any failure by the new senior amir. However, Chūpān certainly emerged from the war with honour.

[67] Aḥmad-i Tabrīzī, fol. 116ro l. 30, assigns the third force to Sevinch; the *History of Georgia*, p. 636, assigns it to Ḥusayn Jalāyir. Both accompanied Öljeitü's own expedition, see below.

[68] Ṭūghān (grand)son of Tūghū; perhaps the *noyan* listed by Kāshānī, p. 9. Tūghū was killed at the battle of Abulustayn in 675/1277, Rashīd al-Dīn, *Jāmiʿ al-tawārikh*, ed. M. Rawshan and M. Mūsawī (Tehran, 1373/1994), II, 1101; his son Shādī married a daughter of Aḥmad Tegūder, *ibid.*, p. 1123. Mustawfī calls Mu'min an *īdāchī* (army provisioner); he later served as the Mongol *shaḥna* in Māzandarān, see Awliyā-Allāh Āmulī, *Tārīkh-i Rūyān*, ed. M. Sutūda (Tehran, 1348/1969), pp. 171–2, 198–9.

[69] Kāshānī, p. 60, "Kūchiyān"; the reading Gurjiyān in Rabino, "Deux descriptions," p. 331, is preferable. Kalāja (Kūh) was evidently also in this area. The territory was later disputed with the neighbouring rulers of Rūyān; see Āmulī, p. 171.



Map 2. The expedition of Ṭūghān and Mu'min, showing their probable route from Qazwīn up the Shāh-rūd and Alamūt-rūd. An alternative route via Rayy and the Chālūs-rūs is given by Ḥāfiẓ-i Abrū, see text. The names of the rulers of Tamījān and Gurjiyān differ in the sources.

remained hidden, but the amirs ravaged the land and captured the fortress of Kalāja.[70]

Mustawfī mentions that the force was sent "to Gurjī" via Qazwīn, Garmrūd and Rustamdār, i.e western Māzandarān; the route is uncertain.[71] The local ruler of Gurjiyān, here named as Hindūshāh, submitted after the Mongol army had brought death and destruction to the district. After resting for a week, the victorious amirs returned to Öljeitü in Sulṭāniyya with their booty, taking the ruler, Hindūshāh, with them.[72] Given the area in which this campaign took place, it is remarkable that the contemporary history of Rūyān ignores it, though reporting other conflicts with the Mongols in western Māzandarān later in Öljeitü's reign.

While Mustawfī's account suggests that this expedition preceded Öljeitü's, its timing is uncertain. To conform with Kāshānī's chronology the victors must have returned to Sulṭāniyya during the week before Öljeitü himself left for Gīlān, unless they set off together, separating somewhere north of Qazwīn; in which case, Ṭūghān and Mu'min came back to find the sultan after his return. This is made more likely by the fact that neither leader appears to have played any part in Öljeitü's expedition, as might be expected had they reached Sulṭāniyya before he left.

Thus two of the Mongol expeditions were successful and returned to Sulṭāniyya in triumph. The main force under the senior amir, Qutlughshāh, met a very different fate.

Qutlughshāh's Expedition

The Persian accounts of Qutlughshāh's expedition complement each other and confirm the report of al-Yūnīnī, which has Qutlughshāh trapped in a waterlogged swamp and his army annihilated; he also advances the novel view that Öljeitü rejoiced at Qutlughshāh's death.[73]

[70] Kāshānī, p. 69. The subject of the next sentence is not clear: it seems the inhabitants again rose up against the invaders and were killed, and their families sent to Māzandarān.

[71] *Ẓafar-nāma*, ff. 713ro, 714vo. Ḥāfiẓ-i Abrū adds Rayy and Kalārdasht, p. 70 and Chālūs, fol. 368vo, a far more circuitous route (up the Karaj-rūd ?) that is, nevertheless, consistent with Rustamdār. Mustawfī seems rather to indicate that the expedition followed the Shāh-rūd and crossed the passes on the west flank of Takht-i Sulaymān.

[72] *Ẓafar-nāma*, ff. 714vo–715ro; *cf.* Ḥāfiẓ-i Abrū, p. 73, somewhat abbreviated.

[73] Al-Yūnīnī, fol. 137ro; Ibn al-Dawādārī, p. 149, says this was due to Qutlughshāh's

Qutlughshāh advanced via Khalkhāl (Map 1), where he ignored the advice of Sharaf al-Dīn to proceed with caution. He marched on Fūman, the territory of Amīra Dubbāj (who had previously submitted to Öljeitü but then absconded from court, as noted above), probably via the Māsūla-rūd. Qutlughshāh's advance guard, under Pūlād Qiyā and Burṭās,[74] caused much destruction in this region and took many prisoners, including the family of Dubbāj, who was reduced to impotence. Qutlughshāh's forces also clashed with the troops of Rikābzan, ruler of Tūlīm.[75]

According to Mustawfī, after three hard clashes, Amīra Dubbāj and his fellow princes sued for peace. Pūlād Qiyā advised Qutlughshāh to accept, but he was dissuaded from doing so by his son, Shibā'uchī, who was appointed leader of the expedition in Pūlād Qiyā's place. The Mongols advanced on the town of Fūman, and the Gīlānīs saw no option but to fight to the death. Troops from Tūlīm, Rasht and Shaft joined the resistance, and after a bloody battle, Shibā'uchī's troops turned and fled, becoming bogged down in mud and being decimated by the Gīlānīs.[76]

Kāshānī, who omits most of the previous details, says that Qutlughshāh invaded Rikābzan's territory on 11 Dhu'l-Ḥijja (706)/13 June 1307 and walked into a trap; the Gīlānīs inundated the roads and plains with water and inflicted a crushing defeat on Shibā'uchī's forces. This turned into a general rout. Qutlughshāh attempted to rally his troops in vain, and both he and many leading commanders were killed.[77] The few survivors straggled back to Sulṭāniyya (only

dominance over him. See also Ibn Ḥajar, *Durar al-kāmina*, ed. Jād al-Ḥaqq (Cairo, 1966), III, 339, who puts Qutlughshāh's death in early 707, and Ibn Kathīr, p. 45, who says the amir was plotting to kill Öljeitü. Mufaḍḍal, p. 136, omits the reference to Öljeitü's pleasure. Kāshānī discusses this expedition after Öljeitü's, as does the *History of Georgia*; Mustawfī after Chūpān's.

[74] Mustawfī mentions only Pūlād Qiyā. Burṭās had accompanied Ghāzān on the Syrian campaign of 699 A.H., see Waṣṣāf, pp. 374, 378. For Pūlād Qiyā, see Kāshānī, pp. 9, 12; he survived into Abū Sa'īd's reign.

[75] Kāshānī, p. 67, who earlier (p. 61) gives him other districts (including "Kāshum"? = *Kilāshum) which were taken over by Dubbāj. For previous rulers in the area, see Kāshānī, p. 58, *cf.* Rabino, "Dynasties," p. 329. Mustawfī, fol. 713ro l. 12, confirms he was chief of Tūlīm: he spells his name Rikāba (zan).

[76] *Ẓafar-nāma*, fol. 714ro–vo; Ḥāfiẓ-i Abrū, p. 72. Aḥmad-i Tabrīzī, fol. 116ro l. 32–116vo l. 3, says Dubbāj surrendered Fūman to Qutlughshāh and tried to deter him from further conquests, but he advanced on Tūlīm and met his fate in the ensuing battle.

[77] Mustawfī, fol. 714 l. 5, says Qutlughshāh killed some of his own men who

two in ten finding safety, according to Mustawfī).[78] All the booty taken from Dubbāj was recaptured by Rikābzan and the Gīlānīs.[79]

The Georgian account says Ercabazn (*sic*) was the chief opponent of Öljeitü's force, which was accompanied by King Wakhtang (see below). Qutlughshāh's expedition was trapped by Ushish (or Ubash: probably meaning Dubbāj) and he was killed by an arrow, whereupon his son Shibā'uchī fled, but was slaughtered with his troops in an inundated rice field.[80]

Persian sources also state that Qutlughshāh was struck by an arrow and killed, while standing almost alone on the deserted battlefield. However, Kāshānī mentions another story (*rawāyat*) whereby Qutlughshāh was wounded and taken prisoner. According to this, Rikābzan intended to return Qutlughshāh to Öljeitü once he had recovered from his wounds, but instead, following a dream, killed him in retaliation for the death of Nawrūz, which, he said, had gone unavenged.[81]

This alternative version of the capture of Qutlughshāh gives some credence to the long story related by al-Yūsufī, still under A.H. 705, which contains too many details corroborating the Persian accounts to be dismissed out of hand. Al-Yūsufī correctly identifies the three main leaders among the Gīlānīs, Naw Pādshāh, Dubbāj and Rikābzan.[82] After sending out spies and confirming the might of the invading forces, they feel unable to resist. Dubbāj, recalling a long-standing friendship with Qutlughshāh, sends his son to ask for peace in return for their submission. The Mongol, however, merely laughs and sends back the head of Dubbāj's son with another member of the party (who happens to be a *faqīh*), with a message that they must all come and submit.

were fleeing, *cf.* Ḥāfiẓ-i Abrū, p. 72; perhaps echoed in Ibn al-Dawādārī's remark, p. 149, that the Mongols started killing each other in their confusion.

[78] See also below, p. 110. For the use of "two in ten" in the opposite sense, see R. Amitai-Preiss, *Mongols and Mamlūks. The Mamlūk-Īlkhānid War, 1260–1281* (Cambridge, 1995), p. 15.

[79] Kāshānī, pp. 67–8; *cf.* Ḥāfiẓ-i Abrū, fol. 369ro. Mustawfī also reports that the defeat of Shibā'uchī entailed that of the main army, but he mentions no further names. Ḥāfiẓ-i Abrū, p. 72, omits the detail that the army straggled back to Sulṭāniyya.

[80] *History of Georgia*, pp. 637–8; *cf.* Howorth, pp. 542–3.

[81] Kāshānī, p. 68; *cf.* Ḥāfiẓ-i Abrū, fol. 369ro, without the argument that Nawrūz was a proper Muslim whereas Qutlughshāh was a hypocrite. For Qutlughshāh's execution of Nawrūz, see e.g. Boyle, pp. 383–4.

[82] The Arabic text (see pp. 388 ff.) has ZKĀYZN; the Istanbul MS. has RKĀBZN.

Most of the Gīlānīs, feeling powerless before an enemy against whom the sultan of Egypt and his army are impotent,[83] decide to submit, but Dubbāj and Rikābzan determine upon resistance, to defend their faith against unbelief. Naw Pādshāh, however, hands himself and his family over to Qutlughshāh.[84]

Thus far the story, while different in detail from Mustawfī's account, could perhaps be equated with the Gīlānīs' request for an *amān* from Pūlād Qiyā, rejected by Qutlughshāh, even though no fighting has yet been reported. Certainly, the determination to resist follows in both versions. Dubbāj is reinforced by the arrival of his pugnacious brother, Jawānshīr,[85] and the Gīlānīs are joined by the Lezgian leader, Ḥājj b. Nājī.[86] A chief called Tokel (? Tawakkul) is detailed to guard the pass through which Qutlughshāh will come, while Ḥājj b. Nājī will move in behind the Mongols and block their route out, once they have entered Gīlān. On Qutlughshāh's appearance, Tokel gives battle at the pass with the Mongol commanders, Damandār and Ramaḍān Noyan.[87] After a torrid engagement against greatly inferior numbers (20,000 vs 600!), the Mongols retire. Jawānshīr arrives to reinforce Tokel, and another fierce battle ensues the next day, once Qutlughshāh has arrived with the main force. According to plan, the Gīlānīs withdraw through the pass as night falls; the Mongols, believing themselves victorious, spend the night at the entrance to the pass.[88]

The following morning, the Mongols descend into Gīlān and see its wealth, abandoned to their gaze. Despite the misgivings of Qutlughshāh, which are brushed aside by Damandār, the Mongols spread out to pillage and plunder. Jawānshīr waits for them to reach

[83] This observation is hardly true, but again reveals the orientation of the source.
[84] Al-'Aynī, p. 390. In the Persian sources, Naw Pādshāh (the ruler of Lāhījān) submits to Öljeitü, at what should logically be, in the Arabic account, a much later stage, see below.
[85] Not mentioned elsewhere and so far unidentified.
[86] Not identified; there was apparently a treaty of mutual assistance between the "Jabal Lakziyya and Qaydiyya (?)" against the Mongols.
[87] For Ramaḍān, see Rashīd al-Dīn, p. 1202, Kāshānī, p. 11 and Waṣṣāf, pp. 456, 468, and perhaps 511, involved in affairs in Herat, along with Girāy and others, after the Gīlān war, as he had been earlier. *Cf.* Sayf Harawī, *Tarīkh-nāma-yi Harāt*, ed. M.Z. al-Ṣiddiqī (Calcutta, 1944), p. 437 and again less gloriously later, pp. 606–9. Damandār is perhaps to be identified as Taramtāz, though Mustawfī puts him in Öljeitü's force, *Ẓafar-nāma*, fol. 715ro l. 13.
[88] Al-Yūsufī cites "someone who was present at this battle" for details of Jawānshīr's prowess; al-'Aynī, p. 395.

the Marj al-Jāmūs ("buffalo meadow"), shadowing the movements of the troops remaining with Qutlughshāh. Seemingly unexpectedly, Jawānshīr is joined by 4,000 men with Nashāwūr al-Shushtarī, ruler of Māzandarān.[89] They attack the Mongols in the early morning; after some vicious fighting, Qutlughshāh realises he is lost, and turns in flight, but finds the exit through the pass barred. He then turns back and a great battle takes place. Dubbāj, Jawānshīr and Rikābzan come up. Jawānshīr strikes Qutlughshāh's helmet and splits it in two, cutting off his ear.[90] Qutlughshāh pleads for his life and is taken prisoner. Nashāwūr captures Damandār and Dubbāj captures the fleeing Shibā'uchī. With their leaders gone, and hemmed in by the Lezgians, the Mongols are massacred, as the Gīlānīs flood the ground and emerge from the surrounding thickets. The slaughter continues for three days, and prisoners continue to be brought in and killed, leaving altogether 40,000 (!) Mongols dead, and 70 amirs.[91]

Dubbāj takes his vengeance on the Mongol prisoners, who are mutilated by Jewish bloodletters and paraded round his capital[92] on mules. They are then impaled on stakes, as is Qutlughshāh, though not before he has blubbered for mercy.

There is thus some doubt whether Qutlughshāh was defeated first and the army then perished in the mud, as narrated by the Georgian chronicle and al-Yūsufī, or the defeat of Shibā'uchī in the mud led to the defeat of the whole army, as narrated by the Persian sources. Inasmuch as the latter probably wished to glorify the role of the dead general, their version might have been embroidered a little. The rumour of Qutlughshāh's capture might have a foundation in fact; on the other hand, it is obviously preferable for al-Yūsufī's narrative to have him captured and killed by Dubbāj, in revenge for his son. Al-Yūnīnī confirms the Persian sources in reporting that

[89] Neither the place nor the ruler identified.
[90] According to al-'Umarī, p. 296, the ruler of Tūlīm (i.e. Rikābzan) tricked Qutlughshāh by feigning submission, then killed him and cut off his ears together with their pendants; *cf.* H.L. Rabino, "Les provinces Caspiennes de la Perse. Le Guilân," *Revue du Monde Musulman*, 32 (1915–16), 395; his account otherwise follows the standard Persian version.
[91] Al-'Aynī, pp. 398–9; lacunae on p. 399 filled by MS. fols. 240vo l. 13–241ro l. 3. At fols. 240vo l. 16, the "narrator" (*al-rāwī*) is cited: either the returning Ibn Ṣubra or the eyewitness referred to above. Al-Yūnīnī, fol. 137ro and Ibn al-Dawādārī, p. 149, say the Gīlānīs set fire to the thickets surrounding the swamp, a detail not found in al-Yūsufī's version.
[92] Called Dhamāhī (?), al-'Aynī, p. 400; MS. fol. 241ro l. 5, reads Damāhī. It was supposed to be on the coast, but Fūman's territory did not reach that far.

Qutlughshāh was killed by an arrow;[93] it will be recalled that he dates the battle 1 Muḥarram 707/3 July 1307, i.e. only two-three weeks later than Kāshānī. According to Banākatī, Qutlughshāh's body was taken to Tabrīz and buried there.[94] Al-Yūsufī's story leaves other loose ends: although it is implied that Shibā'uchī perished, this is not the case (see below).

Meanwhile, according to al-Yūsufī, Öljeitü was waiting at Sulṭāniyya for news. When the survivors bring details of their defeat, Öljeitü sends spies to discover the fate of Qutlughshāh and goes himself to Tabrīz.[95] When confirmation comes of the death of Qutlughshāh and the other amirs, the sultan is beside himself with rage; a fanciful conversation with Chūpān ensues, to which we will return later.

So much for the fate of Qutlughshāh's expedition, on the whole reported in recognisably similar terms by the Persian and Arabic sources, though with much more dramatic colour and a wealth of dialogue in the version of al-Yūsufī. The principal differences are in matters of detail, such as the names of Qutlughshāh's two generals and the leading role of Jawānshīr, rather than in outline. However, crucially, Kāshānī puts this at the same time as Öljeitü's expedition, whereas the Arabic sources separate them.[96] The problem of reconciling these approaches is compounded by the question of where the fate of Shaykh Barāq fits into the sequence of events.

The Death of Shaykh Barāq

It will be recalled that al-Yūnīnī includes the death of Barāq among news reaching Damascus in Rabī' II, 707/October 1307. Following Qutlughshāh's defeat, Barāq—who had been to Syria the previous year (706)—was sent to Gīlān, where he was killed. This triggered Öljeitü's personal intervention in the war.[97]

[93] Al-Yūnīnī, fol. 137ro; Mufaḍḍal, p. 136; Ibn Ḥabīb, p. 282 (not in Ibn al-Dawādārī), rather undermining al-Yūsufī's story.

[94] Banākatī, p. 475.

[95] Öljeitü could have been in the Sulṭāniyya area, though based in Ūjān, at the end of 705, and left for Tabrīz on 21 Ṣafar 706/1 September 1306, *cf.* Melville, "Itineraries," p. 64. On the other hand, though Mustawfī speaks of the stragglers returning to Sulṭāniyya, he does not, this time, say Öljeitü was there. *Cf.* below, p. 100.

[96] There is an intriguing rumour, brought by "Baghdādī merchants," that Öljeitü *did* take part in this campaign and was captured, but managed to escape, see al-Yūnīnī, fol. 137ro; Ibn al-Dawādārī, p. 149; Mufaḍḍal, p. 136; *cf.* below, p. 121.

[97] Al-Yūnīnī, fol. 137vo. As mentioned above, n. 25, Ibn al-Dawādārī, p. 150, includes this in the news brought by the returning Ibn Ṣubra, but interposes a report of Būlāy's execution in Rabī' II, evidently confusing the date of the report for the date of the event. There is no connection between the two cases, though there is a strong implication that Barāq died well into 707. See also Mufaḍḍal, p. 137, Ibn Kathīr, p. 45.

This is enormously amplified by al-Yūsufī: Shaykh Barāq, who was responsible for the whole affair, is present when the news of Qutlughshāh's defeat is confirmed. There were strong ties of affection between him and Qutlughshāh, and he volunteers to go into Gīlān to bring him back, apparently believing him to be still alive. Barāq is intercepted by the Lezgians and brought to Dubbāj, where he demands the release of Qutlughshāh and the other amirs, the payment of taxes owed, and that the Gīlānīs should abandon the *madhhab* of *mujassima* and become Ash'arīs! After Dubbāj has scorned his friendship with Qutlughshāh as incompatible with proper Islamic faith, Barāq is taken to see Qutlughshāh impaled on a stake, stone dead, and is duly impaled himself along with all but one of his followers, who is mutilated and sent back to tell his tale. Öljeitü is predictably horrified and announces the preparation of a new campaign of revenge, which is to last three years[98] and would see either the annihilation of the Mongols or the destruction of Gīlān.[99]

However, though reporting all this in 705, al-'Aynī interrupts the narrative to acknowledge that Barāq's death (obviously) happened later, after he had returned from his mission to Syria in 706, which is covered in the following annal.[100] Barāq's death is then left floating (not being mentioned again in its proper place), but the implication is that Qutlughshāh's defeat must also have occurred *after* Barāq's return from Syria in late 706/spring 1307.[101]

This reading of events would at least support the year 706 for the start of the war, as found in Persian sources, and if nothing else, the apparent inconsistency in al-'Aynī's chronology serves to discredit 705 as the year of Qutlughshāh's defeat and death, and therefore as the year in which Barāq made his first accusations against the

[98] The three years are evidently 705/6/7, but this seems to be purely a product of the annalistic straitjacket in which this account is trapped.

[99] Al-'Aynī, pp. 401–4.

[100] *Cf.* Little, *Introduction*, p. 86. Barāq ostensibly went to the Mamlūks on a peace mission, al-'Aynī, p. 424, citing al-Yūsufī. Perhaps he went to stall for time if the Gīlān war was already contemplated or under way before he left.

[101] Al-Yūnīnī, fol. 122vo and Ibn Kathīr, p. 41, say Barāq stayed in Syria till the end of Ramaḍān/early April 1307; see also al-'Aynī, p. 422, who earlier quotes al-Yūsufī [this time by name] as saying that many of his followers did not observe the fast, p. 406.

Gīlānīs. This is supported by other considerations. First, al-ʿAynī is following Baybars al-Manṣūrī for the year 705 and, as mentioned above, neither he nor the other sources in this group mention Barāq at all,[102] thus avoiding the evident anachronism of linking him to Qutlughshāh that year. Secondly, al-Yūsufī, in trying to account for Barāq's death, perhaps invented his responsibility for the war with Gīlān, doing so in terms that were possibly convincing to a Mamlūk audience, but hardly from a Persian perspective, and which anyway make better sense as a *consequence* of Barāq's notorious appearance in Syria, before which he was an unknown quantity. Finally, though there is nothing in Persian sources to show that Qutlughshāh could not have been killed in the final months of 705, he was certainly still alive in Shawwāl of that year/May 1306, conducting an investigation into allegations against the two viziers.[103] Furthermore, Öljeitü himself was in Mūghān for almost the whole of 705, and could not therefore have played the role assigned to him in Sulṭāniyya at least until the very end of that year.[104]

Condensed statements in later Mamlūk biographical dictionaries appear to link Barāq's death more closely with that of Qutlughshāh, and put both in 707; Ibn Ḥajar reduces the story to the essential point that Barāq's association with the Mongol general put him beyond the pale of Islam. In his version, however, Barāq is boiled to death in a cauldron.[105]

Thus many of the discrepancies disappear if we bring al-Yūsufī into line with earlier Mamlūk sources and transpose his account from 705 to the annal for 707; all his information about the formative period of the crisis, up to the despatch of Qutlughshāh's expedition, is thus a "flashback" to 706. Barāq's death clearly has to happen after his return from Syria, and remains fixed as the final

[102] See above, p. 81. Conversely, in the Mamlūk section of his chronicle, al-Nuwayrī, fol. 33ro, records Barāq's visit to Syria in 706, but neither Qutlughshāh's death nor Öljeitü's campaign.

[103] Waṣṣāf, pp. 480–1; Ḥāfiẓ-i Abrū, fol. 367vo.

[104] See above, n. 95.

[105] Ibn Ḥajar, II, 6, says Ghāzān (*sic*) sent him to Gīlān with Qutlughshāh, but puts Barāq's death in 707; *cf.* n. 73. He was certainly aware of al-Yūsufī's chronicle, see Little, "Recovery of a lost source." Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Manhal al-ṣāfī*, ed. M.M. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz, III (Cairo, 1985), pp. 247–9, follows Ibn Ḥajar. Al-Ṣafadī, *al-Wāfī bi'l-wafayāt*, X, ed. A. Amara and J. Sublet (Wiesbaden, 1980), pp. 106–7, puts Barāq's visit to Syria in 705, and briefly notes his death "together with Qutlughshāh."

insult that drew Öljeitü further into the Gīlān war. This has the merit of suggesting an order and reason for events that are hard to disentangle in Kāshānī's account, except that it flatly contradicts his chronology.

Kāshānī has Barāq in Gīlān, together with Rashīd al-Dīn, about a month *after* Öljeitü set off on campaign.[106] On 10 Dhū'l-Ḥijja (706)/12 June 1307, Barāq left Kilīshum[107] for Lāhījān, to find Öljeitü. Barāq was seized by the Gīlānīs, who had prayed for God to bring him there so they could kill him for blessing and good luck, considering his death their best recompense and highest reward.[108] Ḥāfiẓ-i Abrū takes this to mean that they wanted his tomb (*marqad*) in their territory for the sanctity it would bring: a motive that would justify Barāq's bizarre view of the Gīlānīs' religion. However, the murder would make sense if it were in revenge for Barāq's role in inciting Öljeitü to war or voicing some unacceptable demands. Thus al-Yūsufī's story does help explain Kāshānī's account of Barāq's death, the significance of which is otherwise unclear. Indeed, as with the defeat of Qutlughshāh, the two versions are fundamentally similar, apart from the problem of timing. As noted previously, Mustawfī does not refer to Barāq at all and is thus unable to clarify the issue. Aḥmad-i Tabrīzī, however, also closely links Barāq's death to Qutlughshāh's.[109]

Some further evidence has to be considered before these alternative chronologies can be explored. According to al-Yūsufī, the death of Barāq is not the only incident to occur between the defeat of Qutlughshāh and Öljeitü's expedition. He provides a considerable

[106] Kāshānī, pp. 236–7, indicates that Rashīd al-Dīn stayed behind with the *ordu* when Öljeitü left, with orders to follow. The incident Kāshānī next describes is said to have been after Öljeitü left Sulṭāniyya, but it is obvious both from the date and the direction taken by his messenger, that it occurred while he was still on his way from Mūghān, via Ardabīl and Zanjān. Melville, "Itineraries," n. 101, needs altering, though the passage does raise other questions about Öljeitü's movements.

[107] Kāshānī, pp. 58–9, mentions an area between Rasht and Fūman, variously spelled "Kālīshum" and "Kilāshum" and probably the same as "Kāshum", territory of Rikābzan, *ibid.*, p. 61. If Barāq was in this area, it would strengthen the possibility that he entered Gīlān with Qutlughshāh's forces, which foundered in this very region. However, there is also a locality called Kilīshum in the ʿAmarlū district of Gīlān, between Daylamān and the Shāh-rūd, see Krawulsky, p. 378. This area is mentioned again later (see below and Kāshānī, p. 69); Barāq and Rashīd al-Dīn were evidently taking the route from the Shāh-rūd up into Daylamān (see map 3).

[108] Kāshānī, p. 70, text somewhat obscure; Ḥāfiẓ-i Abrū, fol. 370vo. They refer to Barāq as the Shaykh-i Tatar or Shaykh-i Mughūlān; he claims to be returning from the *ḥajj*, i.e. presumably his visit to Damascus and Jerusalem.

[109] Aḥmad-i Tabrīzi, fol. 116vo ll. 3–4, calls him "Barāq-i *jahāndīda*".

amount of additional information that is not found elsewhere, some of it highly questionable, some at least echoing material in the Persian sources.

The Preamble to Öljeitü's Campaign

On receiving confirmation in Tabrīz of the defeat and death of Qutlughshāh and the other amirs, Öljeitü refused to ride out (*inqaṭa'a 'an al-rukūb*) for a week, which alarmed the Mongols. Chūpān, here described as the *nā'ib* of Abū Sa'īd (*sic*), was delegated to go and counsel him. He warned him not to display weakness, which would only encourage his enemies to covet the kingdom.[110] As for the loss of the army, that could be made good in a single night, if all the Mongols slept with their wives! Finally, Chūpān persuaded Öljeitü to go out hunting and show himself.[111] The advice seems to have been taken to heart, for the sultan ordered anyone whose brother or relative had been killed to marry their widow; widows of those who died without a brother or relative should be married to the most senior of his *ghulāms*.[112]

This can be dismissed as fiction, though it remains interesting as an insight into popular Mamlūk perceptions of the Mongols. The description of Chūpān as Abū Sa'īd's senior amir reveals the story to be a later product, which cannot be associated with the news that originally reached Mamlūk territory. Chūpān's prominence in this and subsequent episodes of al-Yūsufī's story is also faintly anachronistic, reflecting his later renown in Mamlūk historiography and the familiarity of his name by the time the story was confined to writing.[113] By contrast, it is perhaps surprising that Persian sources do not give Chūpān any further involvement in the war after the completion of his own expedition to Gaskar.

Al-Yūsufī's story is now continued in the annal for A.H. 707. A number of the Gīlānī leaders who had originally submitted to

[110] Specifically, al-Malik al-Nāṣir of Egypt, who in 706 was a puppet in the hands of the duumvirate of Baybars and Sālār, see R. Irwin, *The Middle East in the Middle Ages. The Early Mamlūk Sultanate 1250–1382* (London, 1986), p. 85. Al-Yūsufī here anticipates future rivalries.

[111] Al-'Aynī, p. 402. *Cf.* Ketbugha's words on the brink of defeat at 'Ayn Jālūt, reported by Rashīd al-Dīn, p. 1032.

[112] Al-'Aynī, p. 450.

[113] In a sense, his promotion to senior amir after the war marks the start of his fame.

Qutlughshāh and been sent to Öljeitü (see above), regretted having done so once the news of Qutlughshāh's defeat came through. They decided to return home, and absconded from a feast prepared for them in Tabrīz. Chūpān was sent in pursuit and after a desperate fight the Gīlānīs were all killed, including their leader, Naw Pādshāh.[114] Öljeitü was so pleased that he promoted Chūpān to Qutlughshāh's position as senior amir.

Though narrated in al-Yūsufī's usual style, these details cannot be rejected out of hand. Chūpān's promotion is generally assigned to the *yarghu* that followed the war (see below), but there is some support for the earlier timing.[115] More problematically, the leader of the Gīlānīs both here, and earlier (see above, p. 96), is named as Naw Pādshāh. According to the Persian sources, Naw Pādshāh did not come to Sulṭāniyya until the end of the war; furthermore, he was not killed but was reinstated as ruler of Lāhījān and chief prince of Gīlān.[116]

If al-Yūsufī's material has any foundation in fact, there are two possible explanations for these discrepancies, unless—in some obscure way—they suggest that Qutlughshāh's and Öljeitü's expeditions did indeed go ahead more or less simultaneously. Qutlughshāh's expedition did not reach Lāhījān and this region was not yet involved in the fighting; there was no reason why Naw Pādshāh should have submitted at this stage. On the other hand, Chūpān's expedition had undoubtedly returned with prisoners, and conceivably it was they who were killed trying to escape (though from Sulṭāniyya, not Tabrīz).

Alternatively, al-Yūsufī's story is perhaps an echo of the flight of Amīra Dubbāj, feigning sickness, once he had regretted coming to court. Mustawfī puts this episode right at the beginning where, given his role in later events, it makes most sense. Mustawfī follows this with the advice given by Girāy on the situation in Gīlān; in al-Yūsufī's version, Öljeitü seeks information from Zanbūr as he prepares for war, as noted earlier. Thus al-Yūsufī might be misplacing the whole episode. However, Amīra Dubbāj was not killed either, but remained

[114] Al-'Aynī, pp. 450–2; Naw Pādshāh killed his killer, Bektemür, in his death throes, *ibid.*, fol. 246vo l. 26.

[115] Only al-Nuwayrī, p. 417, says Chūpān was promoted in 705 after Qutlughshāh's death. This could merely be taken to confirm the Persian accounts but under the wrong year (see below, n. 158), but al-Nuwayrī's independence of the other Mamlūk historians is interesting. Al-Yūnīnī, fol. 137ro, says Öljeitü appointed a deputy (*nā'ib*) to prepare a new expedition, not specifying that it was Chūpān.

[116] Kāshānī, pp. 72–3.

in his territory after the war was over. Most likely, al-Yūsufī has fabricated this story, or embroidered details omitted by both the Arabic and Persian sources.

After these events, Öljeitü retired for the winter to Mūghān. With this simple and seemingly authentic detail, al-Yūsufī provides the key to the chronology for his version of events that has so far been elusive. He must intend the winter of (mid) 707/1307–8, which thus confirms the timing of Qutlughshāh's ill-fated expedition in the summer of 1307, *after* Barāq's return from Syria. Barāq must then have gone to Gīlān and met his end by the autumn, for news of his death reached Damascus in October 1307, as we have seen.

So far al-Yūsufī's account is compatible with the earlier Arabic sources and up to this point it is essentially an embellishment of the report found in al-Yūnīnī, resting on the narration of Ibn Ṣubra and some other informant, who evidently left Sulṭāniyya at this juncture. Despite a number of dubious elements, it is entirely plausible in its general outline and confirms the Persian account at many points.

However, news of Öljeitü's departure on campaign to Māzandarān also reached Damascus at the same time. If this refers in fact to his withdrawal to winter quarters, the Arabic versions remain consistent. If, however, news of Öljeitü's departure for Māzandarān is accurate, al-Yūsufī is at variance with the rest. Either way, he goes on to provide information not found in the earlier Mamlūk chronicles, whose knowledge of the Gīlān war ends at this point, but for the brief notice of Öljeitü's final victory. Al-Yūsufī says Öljeitü returned from Mūghān to Tabrīz in the spring of 1308 (late A.H. 707), when he mobilised his army and proceeded to Sulṭāniyya. According to Kāshānī, however, Öljeitü left Mūghān in spring 1307 and went via Khalkhāl, which is incompatible with a stop in Tabrīz, and makes it highly probable that Qutlughshāh accompanied the sultan to this point, where he turned off towards Fūman, while Öljeitü continued to Sulṭāniyya.[117]

The chronological dislocations between the two main versions of the war thus become even more acute, not least in the fact that whereas they broadly agree over the date of Qutlughshāh's death (summer 1307), they are up to a year apart on the date of Öljeitü's expedition. Whereas Kāshānī restricts the war to the period May–June 1307, al-Yūnīnī extends it at least to autumn 1307 and al-Yūsufī to the following spring.

[117] Al-'Aynī, p. 452; Kāshānī, p. 61.

In the section that follows, I will present the Persian version of Öljeitü's campaign, before turning to the long and problematical narrative provided by al-Yūsufī.

Öljeitü's Expedition

As noted earlier, though Kāshānī describes Öljeitü's campaign first and Mustawfī puts it last, both say it was at approximately the same time as the other three expeditions. The campaign was made up of several separate actions, involving different sections of the royal army. Mustawfī gives a list of the amirs who accompanied Öljeitü, on the left and right wings and in the centre. This helps to correlate actions reported by Mustawfī with those placed in a different order by Kāshānī, especially the Tamījān campaign (see below).[118] Kāshānī provides several dates for the progress of the royal expedition, and although many of these are inaccurate they show Öljeitü to have been away from mid Dhū'l-Qa'da to the end of Dhū'l-Ḥijja 706/May–June 1307, a chronological framework that seems essentially reliable.[119]

Leaving his family behind with Būlād Ch'eng-Hsiang and Rashīd al-Dīn,[120] Öljeitü advanced via Kūrāndasht and Lawshān on the Shāhrūd, entering Daylamān and the regions bordering Naw Pādshāh's territory of Lāhījān, plundering and killing as they went (Fig. 3).[121] In Daylamān the Mongols encountered heavy resistance from the local chief, Shīrū, who plundered the baggage train, which had been held up by the difficult terrain.[122]


[118] Mustawfī, fol. 715ro, ll. 12–17, *cf.* Ḥāfiẓ-i Abrū, p. 73. There is good agreement on the names mentioned, but overall Kāshānī provides more.

[119] See Melville, "Itineraries," pp. 64–5 for his route and *idem*, "Chinese Uighur Calendar," esp. pp. 90–1 for some of the dating. Aḥmad-i Tabrīzi, fol. 116vo l. 7, says the campaign lasted "40 days."

[120] Kāshānī, p. 236; *Ẓafar-nāma*, fol. 715ro. *Cf.* above, n. 106: the *ordus* evidently reached Sulṭāniyya by the time he left.

[121] Mustawfī says Öljeitü's route was through Tārum, past Kūh-i Darfak (Dalfak) and into Jashījān—a district associated with Raḥmatābād (in Rūdbār, between the Safīd-rūd and Mt. Dalfak) that was counted as part of Kūtum, see Sutūda, *Az Āstārā*, I (Tehran, 1349/1970), pp. 243, 462, 487. Jashījān seems to have lain both sides of the river, see below, n. 139. *Cf.* Ḥāfiẓ-i Abrū, p. 73; *idem*, fol. 369ro, adds that Öljeitü advanced along the [right bank of the] Safīd-rūd.

[122] Kāshānī, p. 62. The Mongol rearguard was composed of Armenian and Georgian troops, whose presence in the army is confirmed by al-Yūsufī and the



Map 3. Oljeitü's expedition in Gīlān (double line). From Lāhījān, he despatched Sutai east to Tamījān; between Kūchasfān and Kūtum (Kūhdum), he despatched two forces under (a) Sandāwar Bahādur, defeated near Rasht, and (b) Ḥusayn Guregen, Sevinch and others, which has various engagements between Fūman, Kūtum and Mūsā-ābād. For some additional details, see Maps 1 and 2.

Öljeitü continued his advance on Lāhījān, while the amirs Esen Qutlugh and Sutai plundered the capital (*muqarr-i sarīr wa afsar*), called Chahār Tāq.[123] Öljeitü summoned Naw Pādshāh to submit, which he did on the advice of his vizier, Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad Shāh. Naw Pādshāh was brought before Öljeitü by Esen Qutlugh and Saʿd al-Dīn Sāwajī.[124] His submission was accepted and Öljeitü then entered Lāhījān, where he spent the feast of the sacrifice (10 Dhū'l-Ḥijja/12 June 1307).[125] (The same day, Shaykh Barāq left Rashīd al-Dīn, who had evidently set out after Öljeitü, and headed towards Lāhījān, never to arrive).[126]

The following day, Öljeitü crossed over the Safīd-rūd into Kūchasfān, the territory of Sālūk or Saʿlūk, who promptly submitted through the mediation of Amīr Ḥusayn Güregen the Jalayirid.[127] A week later, on 19 Dhū'l-Ḥijja/21 June (*sic* ?), the sultan set up camp above the Safīd-rūd, i.e. evidently in Kūtum, see below.[128]

Meanwhile, an expedition east to Tamījān (or Tīmajān) was despatched under the command of Sutai, Mīr ʿAlī Qūshchī and others

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History of Georgia. This was a hard fight, with heavy casualties on both sides; *cf.* Ḥāfiẓ-i Abrū, fol. 369vo. Mustawfī, fol. 715ro, says the baggage was stolen secretly at night. This is omitted in Ḥāfiẓ-i Abrū, p. 73. The Tālishī chief Shīrū has not been identified.

[123] Kāshānī, p. 63. Chahār Tāq was probably Naw Pādshāh's palace outside Lāhījān.

[124] Esen Qutlugh was attached to Öljeitü's centre, together with Saʿd al-Dīn the vizier; Sutai was on the right wing, *Ẓafar-nāma*, fol. 715ro; Ḥāfiẓ-i Abrū, p. 73. D'Ohsson, p. 493 and Howorth, p. 541, say Rashīd al-Dīn interceded for Naw Pādshāh, as in Ḥāfiẓ-i Abrū, fol. 369vo, but *cf.* Kāshānī, p. 65.

[125] Kāshānī, pp. 64–5; *Ẓafar-nāma*, fol. 715ro–vo, *cf.* Ḥāfiẓ-i Abrū, pp. 73–4, calling the ruler Shāh-i Naw.

[126] Kāshānī, p. 70, see above.

[127] Kāshānī, pp. 65–6; Ḥāfiẓ-i Abrū, fol. 369vo ll. 13–16, reads Amīr Ḥasan. Ḥusayn was part of the left wing, see *Ẓafar-nāma*, fol. 715ro, and took part in a later action, see below.

This episode is not found in Mustawfī, who does however agree that the ruler of Kūchasfān was Saʿlūk (*sic*, fol. 713ro l. 12). Unfortunately, elsewhere (p. 60) Kāshānī says Kūchasfān was a bone of contention between Sayyid Muḥammad Kiyā and the Sāsān clan, and names Sālūk b. Sālār as ruler of Kūtum, the neighbouring territory to the south. A certain Sālūk the Mad was governor of TBYSYĀY, which Rabino reads as Lashtinshāh. Furthermore, another Sālūk, nephew of Naw Pādshāh, is named as ruler of Tamījān. It seems unlikely that these are all one individual and it is not clear how to equate these details with the information in Mustawfī, who says (*loc. cit.* ll. 13–14) the ruler of Kūtum was Muḥammad b. Sālār (Sālūk's brother) and the ruler of Tamījān was Amīr Muḥammad of the Sāsān clan.

[128] Kāshānī, p. 65; the date is omitted by Ḥāfiẓ-i Abrū, fol. 369vo, who says the sultan now twisted his reins (south) via (towards) Kūtum and the Safīd-rūd, having given orders for Sutai and the rest to march on Tamījān.

comprising the left wing of the army.[129] As they advanced, the local ruler, Amīr(a) Muḥammad,[130] wished to avoid fighting and sent an envoy. The Mongols were favourable to the idea of peace, but one of their number, called Māmishqī, had been excited by reports of the wealth of the region, and urged the amirs to reject the peace overtures. Faced with no alternative but to fight, the Gīlānīs put up a stiff resistance and defeated the Mongols. The amir Toqtemür was killed and the rest fled back via Qazwīn to Sulṭāniyya where, according to Mustawfī, they came shame-facedly into Öljeitü's presence—if so, presumably only once he had returned from Gīlān.[131]

Kāshānī's account is rather different. Sutai and Taramtāz were in the vanguard of the expedition and passed through Tamījān in safety, without encountering resistance. Amīr ʿAlī Kajkāmūd (? i.e. Qūshchī) killed a number of the "rebels" and left via Kilīshum. However, Sayyid Qāsim Kiyā, who had taken control of parts of the Tālish region bordering Gīlān, supported by Sālūk the chief of Tamījān (*sic*), attacked the forces of Toqtemür and defeated them. Māmishqī, seeing the battle from a distance, made no effort to come to Toqtemür's assistance, leaving him and the rest of his forces to be killed after a fierce fight.[132] Ḥāfiẓ-i Abrū adds that Amīra Muḥammad then sent seeking pardon from Öljeitü, saying he had desired to make peace, but been forced to fight against his will.[133]

At the same time, a further reverse was in progress. According to Mustawfī, it was only at this time that Öljeitü learnt of the death of Qutlughshāh at the hands of Rikābzan.[134] The sultan organised a mixed force including Kurds, Lurs, Georgians and Khurāsānis under the leadership of Sandāwar Bahādur, Shaykh Buhlūl, Abū Bakr Ṭūsī

[129] Mustawfī, fol. 715vo, Ḥāfiẓ-i Abrū, pp. 74–5. Kāshānī, pp. 69–70, mentions this campaign last of all, and is followed in this by Ḥāfiẓ-i Abrū, fol. 370ro l. 10, though he does refer to its despatch earlier, see previous note.

[130] *Cf.* above, n. 127.

[131] *Ẓafar-nāma*, fol. 716ro ll. 9–10; *cf.* Ḥāfiẓ-i Abrū, p. 75, who omits this detail and correctly goes back to Öljeitü around Kūtum for the next episode of the war.

[132] Kāshānī, pp. 69–70, *cf.* Ḥāfiẓ-i Abrū, fol. 370ro. For Sālūk and Kilīshum, see above, nn. 107, 127. Sayyid Qāsim Kiyā was promoting the Zaydī *madhhab* in the area. Toqtemür was an *īdāchī* (army provisioner).

[133] Ḥāfiẓ-i Abrū, fol. 370ro ll. 19–21.

[134] *Ẓafar-nāma*, fol. 716 ll. 9–12, appears to put Öljeitü in Sulṭāniyya, but he must in fact still have been somewhere between Kūchasfān and Kūtum, see n. 128. Aḥmad-i Tabrīzi, fol. 116vo l.6, also says Öljeitü was distressed at Qutlughshāh's fate and resolved to leave Gīlān via a campaign of revenge in that area. Kāshānī puts Qutlughshāh's death on 11 Dhū'l-Ḥijja/13 June; see above.

and two or three others to proceed towards Rasht, Fūman and Tūlīm to seek revenge. They were met by a combined force of the Gīlānī chiefs, including Sharaf al-Dawla (of Gaskar) and Muḥammad b. Sālār (the brother of Sālūk). The battle took place near Rasht, probably on 16 Dhū'l-Ḥijja/18 June.[135] The Mongols were totally defeated in a bloody encounter and Sandāwar Bahādur and Abū Bakr were killed. Shaykh Buhlūl was wounded but escaped; according to Mustawfī, he was sent to Öljeitü to seek reinforcements.[136]

Öljeitü, who seems to have been on his way to Kūtum,[137] detailed additional forces to march on Fūman, under the command of amirs Ḥusayn Güregen, Sevinch, Irenjin, Uighurtāy and others, who rode off on Tuesday 18 Dhū'l-Ḥijja/20 June.[138] They raided as far as the plain of Kūtum. Two days later, Sevinch and some of his comrades encountered a force of Gīlānīs between Rasht and Mūsā-ābād, and engaged them in a battle that lasted from noon to the following day. The Gīlānīs were led by Rikābzan, Sharaf al-Dawla, Muḥammad b. Sālār and the brother of Dubbāj (i.e. perhaps Jawānshīr). The battle was again keenly contested, and there were heavy Mongol casualties. Sevinch held firm, however, and when Ḥusain and Irenjin appeared with their forces at Manjīl the Gīlānīs withdrew in defeat. The same day, Friday 21 Dhū'l-Ḥijja/23 June, the Mongol armies also began to withdraw, Öljeitü turning for home content with this victory, via Kūtum, the Safīd-rūd and Mūsā-ābād.[139]

[135] Kāshānī has Sunday (*sic*) 11 Dhū'l-Ḥijja (Tues. 13 June), the same day that Öljeitü left for Kūchasfān. The following genuine Sunday seems preferable, as adjusted by Ḥāfiẓ-i Abrū, fol. 369 l. 19. For Muḥammad b. Sālār, ruler of Kūtum, see n. 127 above; possibly the same as Kāshānī's Amīr Muḥammad, whom he calls ruler of TYSA (p. 60; the text here is defective, *cf.* Rabino, "Deux descriptions," p. 332, who reads TYSYĀ).

[136] Kāshānī, p. 66; *Ẓafar-nāma*, fol. 716ro. Ḥāfiẓ-i Abrū, p. 75, elaborates on this with a passage saying that the amirs were hard-pressed and agreed to send Buhlūl to Öljeitü for help.

[137] Mustawfī says that on hearing the news of Qutlughshāh, he set off towards Kūtum (? from Kūchasfān); *cf.* Ḥāfiẓ-i Abrū, fol. 369vo: he set off via Kūtum and the Safīd-rūd. See n. 128 above. Kūtum is to be equated with Kuhdum, *cf.* Minorsky, *Ḥudūd al-ʿālam*, p. 390; its location is clearly defined by Kāshānī, pp. 57, 58. Krawulsky, pp. 379–80, however, prefers to identify it with Husum, Tamījān and Rūdsar; *cf.* Sutuda, II, 216–19. Whatever the merits of this, Öljeitü clearly did not leave Gīlān that way.

[138] Kāshānī, p. 66; Mustawfī, fol. 716ro l. 24: his "Bahādur Ghāzān" is to be equated with Kāshānī's Uighurtāy Ghāzān; *cf.* Kāshānī, p. 54, Waṣṣāf, p. 511. Mustawfī does not mention Irenjin here, but both he and Khan Temür were part of Öljeitü's left wing; Sevinch was on the right.

[139] Kāshānī, pp. 66–7. Mūsā-ābād was in the foothills of southern Kūtum, on

Mustawfī's acount of this action is far less detailed, but he names Rikābzan as the leader of the Gīlānīs and emphasises the fortitude of Sevinch.[140] A large number of Gīlānīs were killed (half their troops). Following the battle, Sevinch devastated all the region round Fūman, Rasht and Tūlīm (i.e. perhaps the raids carried out a few days earlier with Ḥusayn Güregen, see above). News of the victory was sent to Öljeitü, who now seems to be back in Sulṭāniyya; overjoyed, he comes out towards Kūtum (again !) to greet the returning troops and their Gīlānī prisoners.[141]

This is clearly a far more positive assessment of the campaign than Kāshānī's account, which indicates that this last engagement was again uncomfortably evenly matched. The *History of Georgia* is certainly referring to these actions when it reports first that Öljeitü's column, with king Wakhtang in the vanguard, engaged in a hand-to-hand fight with the forces of Rikābzan ("Ericabazn"), in which only two-tenths of the Mongols escaped, and there were heavy Georgian casualties. Seeing how fiercely the country was defended, Öljeitü decided to retire. Ḥusayn Güregen, with a contingent of Ossetes, fought an indecisive battle, after which both armies withdrew.[142] From the route of Öljeitü's withdrawal, which passed the localities mentioned in these last encounters (Kūtum and Mūsā-ābād), it is evident that the army was in fact having to fight its way out.

Neither was Öljeitü in Sulṭāniyya waiting to greet the return of his forces. Although Kāshānī states that the king's campaign was sufficient to reduce the Gīlānīs to obedience, so that they came up with presents and tribute, he also mentions that Öljeitü now decided to leave the country because of the pestilential climate and the continuous depressing rain. He thus left Gīlān on 27 Dhū'l-Ḥijja/29 June, and reached Sulṭāniyya a week later.[143]

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the left bank of the Safīd-rūd opposite Tūkabun (= Tūtkābun); see Ẓahīr al-Dīn Mar'ashī, *Tārīkh-i Gīlān wa Daylamistān*, ed. M. Sutūda (Tehran, 1347/1969), esp. pp. 344–6, 410–11, 434–5. It was located in Jashījān (see above, n. 121). This was evidently a running battle, as Sevinch's forces retreated south; Amīr Ḥusayn's troops had evidently gone on ahead, and then turned back from Manjīl to help.

[140] Aḥmad-i Tabrīzi, fol. 116ro l. 30, fol. 116vo l. 5, makes him leader of the fourth army; his target is said to be Gil shahr, perhaps Shahr-i Gil (?) by Fūman, see Kāshānī, p. 61.

[141] *Ẓafar-nāma*, fol. 716ro–vo; a greatly reduced version, without loss of the essentials, in Ḥāfiẓ-i Abrū, pp. 75–6, who again omits the rather confusing remarks about Öljeitü's whereabouts.

[142] *History of Georgia*, p. 637; Howorth, pp. 542–3.

[143] Kāshānī, pp. 70–1; the text is not entirely clear.

Despite one or two inaccurate dates and some uncertainty over Öljeitü's precise movements and whereabouts, these Persian accounts do provide a coherent picture of his expedition. A sequence of engagements, in which the Mongols generally came off worst, seems to have been concluded with at least the appearance of a final victory, as the army returned with booty and prisoners, as well as several of the Gīlānī chiefs.[144] This is essentially the outcome reported also by Baybars al-Manṣūrī and al-Nuwayrī. We must now turn to the Arabic account of al-Yūsufī to seek some independent light on these events.

Al-Yūsufī's Report on Öljeitü's Campaign

Al-Yūsufī's account in fact bears almost no relation to the Persian ones, unlike his report on Qutlughshāh's expedition, and if for no other reason needs to be treated with caution.

We left Öljeitü in Tabrīz, mustering Kurdish amirs and troops in the spring of 1308. When he came to Sulṭāniyya, he summoned the amir Zanbūr, who was knowledgeable about Gīlān, to go and reconnoitre the ground.[145] Meanwhile, the Gīlānīs had heard of the new expedition through their spies, and Jawānshīr was ready to intercept Zanbūr's party. After a brief struggle, Zanbūr was given a safe conduct and was questioned about Öljeitü's plans. He and the other prisoners were then escorted into Gīlān by a warrior called Mankalī (Mengli).

Jawānshīr now carried out a daring raid on the sultan's horses (*dashārāt*)[146] corralled in the camp at Sulṭāniyya, and drove off 7,000 horses during the night. Woken with news of the raid, Öljeitü rode round with Chūpān, Rashīd al-Dīn and Sa'd al-Dīn to assess the losses, which were confined to Öljeitü's household (*khāṣṣ*) and the *dashārāt* of the amirs. Chūpān undertook to retrieve them, and left with the warnings of Öljeitü in his ears, anxious about the failure of Zanbūr to return.[147]

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[144] *Ibid.*, p. 71, mentions Naw Pādshāh, Sālūk "the Mad" and Jalāl al-Dīn, younger brother of Dubbāj (i.e. perhaps not Jawānshīr after all, *cf.* above).

[145] See above, n. 56.

[146] For this term, which in the Mamlūk sultanate seems to have the basic connotation of breeding stock, see D. Ayalon, "The System of Payment in Mamlūk Military Society", *JESHO*, 1/i & iii (1958), 266–8.

[147] Al-'Aynī, pp. 453–6.

On regaining the pass into Gīlān, Jawānshīr was met by Dubbāj, who had been worried about the wisdom of the raid. In the morning, the dust of Chūpān's pursuing forces was seen and the two chiefs prepared an ambush of a familiar type.[148] After an encounter with Jawānshīr, who retreated through the pass, Chūpān charged into the trap laid by Dubbāj. He was able to extricate himself, and by nightfall gathered together the defeated survivors who had fled back past him out of the pass. They returned in bad shape to Öljeitü, full of fear at Jawānshīr's prowess. Öljeitü reproached Chūpān for not heeding his warnings, and vowed to destroy Gīlān or perish in the attempt.[149] He gave orders for the army to march out.

The royal expedition proceeded to a place called ABRFAMYS (?), rich in water and reed beds, before entering the plain[150] between there and Gīlān, where they stayed three days. On the fourth, a terrific storm broke out. The horses became bogged down in mud, lightning struck the *dihlīz* of Öljeitü's pavilion where the treasury was stored and ten mamluks were killed. The land became like a sea. In the morning, when Öljeitü saw the state of his troops, he became doubtful of the wisdom of proceeding. Rashīd al-Dīn, Sa'd al-Dīn and Chūpān counselled the king to turn back. Öljeitü concurred, but naturally wondered how to save his face. Rashīd al-Dīn (evidently with Öljeitü from the start) promised to secure the Gīlānīs' obedience (*ṭā'a*) and their agreement to pay the *jizya* (*sic* !) as before, by going to treat with them. Öljeitü asked how this could be, in the light of what had happened to Barāq (i.e. confirming the nature of Barāq's mission), to which Rashīd al-Dīn replied that Barāq was a hypocrite and a schismatic (*min ahl al-shaqāq*)—a sentiment that would commend itself to the Mamlūks but is rather unlikely on the tongue of Rashīd al-Dīn. Öljeitü approved of his advice, whereupon the vizier set off for Gīlān, having alerted the chiefs of his approach.

Rashīd al-Dīn was well received and given a hearing. He pointed out that the Mongols had a mighty army[151] and were effectively

[148] *Ibid.*, pp. 456–7. There follows a long lacuna in the printed text, for which see MS. fols. 247vo l.18–248ro l. 20.

[149] Despite the taunt that Chūpān was one of the first to flee, Mamlūk respect for him and his leadership qualities are visible in this account. For all the ignoring of warnings artfully sprinkled throughout al-Yūsufī's narrative, it is strange that the Mongols should repeatedly fall for the same trick, especially since the feigned retreat was a hallmark of their own tactics; too extraordinary, perhaps, to be credible.

[150] Reading *mafāza* (desert) for *ma'āza* (?) at fol. 247vo l. 31.

[151] 20 or 30,000 strong—relatively modest compared with the figure of 100,000

blockading Gīlān so that no merchants or travellers could go in or out, which was bad for everyone. He urged the Gīlānīs to return to their former obedience and to bring the taxes (*māl*) that they used to bring. They agreed, on condition that no-one should harass them or enter their territory. When this agreement was reached, they brought horses, cloths, mamluks and slave girls and accompanied Rashīd al-Dīn to the pass.[152] Together they went to find Öljeitü, who was very pleased with this outcome. After distributing robes of honour among the Gīlānī chiefs, he sent them back to their own country and returned to Sulṭāniyya (which he found wrecked by an earthquake).[153]

Öljeitü stayed only three days in Sulṭāniyya, before moving to Tabrīz, where he called a great assembly to discuss resuming the war with Syria, now that he was secure both from Gīlān and Khurāsān.[154] Rashīd al-Dīn, however, advised the sultan to give up any thought of war, for the army was weakened and had just spent three years (*sic*) on campaign. The amirs agreed with him, and the Mongols turned to other matters.[155]

Thus al-Yūsufī ends his account of the Gīlān war, again tying it in with the larger question of the Mamlūk-Mongol conflict. Unlike

given by al-Yūnīnī, fol. 137vo; Ibn al-Dawādārī, p. 150; Mufaḍḍal, p. 137. "You have heard what he did to the army of Egypt and Syria"—actually hardly a threat, in view of the poor showing of the Mongols in Syria, but an indirect compliment to the Mamlūk audience.

[152] The printed text resumes at this point, p. 457. Note that no mention is made of silk here.

[153] The shock destroyed most of the houses, three towers of the citadel (*qal'a*) and two salients (*badana*). This earthquake is not mentioned by Persian sources and may simply be included by al-'Aynī for narrative colour to rub in Öljeitü's miseries (or passed over by Kāshānī, to spare them). Mamlūk interest in earthquakes would have been heightened by the powerful tremor felt throughout Egypt in Dhū'l-Ḥijja 702/August 1303, which also destroyed *badana* of the walls of Alexandria, see N.N. Ambraseys, C.P. Melville and R.D. Adams, *The Seismicity of Egypt, Arabia and the Red Sea: a Historical Review* (Cambridge, 1994), pp. 42–4. Kāshānī, p. 41, does mention a damaging earthquake in Tabrīz two years earlier, in Rabī' II, 704/November 1304, accompanied by a terrible storm. It is tempting to equate these events with the final drama of the Gīlān campaign. On the other hand, he also records a fatal thunderstorm that affected Öljeitü's camp at Gulistān near Ardabīl in late 705/June 1306 (p. 51), and unless his chronology is very seriously inaccurate, these must all be taken as separate events.

[154] Thanks to a short-lived harmony restored at the outset of his reign. The Mamlūk chronicler shows some awareness of the importance of peace in the east as a precondition for Mongol intervention in the west; *cf.* Amitai-Preiss, esp. pp. 87–9, 234–5.

[155] Al-'Aynī, pp. 457–8.

Baybars al-Manṣūrī, he does not report a military victory and he has no information about the actions of the sultan's army in Gīlān, describing only some skirmishing by Chūpān, to which no reference is made in the Persian sources. The only real point of convergence between his narrative and the Persian accounts examined above is the severe weather mentioned at the end, which prompted Öljeitü's withdrawal from Gīlān. Linking this to Rashīd al-Dīn's negotiations also provides some clarification of what happened during the period between the last of the fighting (however differently reported in the two accounts) and Öljeitü's final departure for home. Kāshānī puts the last battle on 21 Dhū'l-Ḥijja, after which the "*pādshāh* twisted the reins of return"; the Gīlānīs came forward submissively with gifts and then, in view of the weather, he set off home on 27 Dhū'l-Ḥijja. Evidently during this week some deal was struck, and here al-Yūsufī's version of events seems to throw useful light on the outcome of the war.

In other respects, al-Yūsufī is totally at odds with the Persian sources, not only in dating Öljeitü's expedition a year later but in describing an entirely different set of actions. Before finally facing up to this dilemma, we must briefly describe the aftermath and results of Öljeitü's campaign.

Aftermath

As noted above, al-Yūsufī says that Öljeitü returned to Tabrīz and held a meeting to discuss a Syrian offensive. He makes no (other ?) reference to the disciplinary hearing (*yarghu*) to establish who was to blame for the army's poor performance in the war. Kāshānī says this was held in Sulṭāniyya, where Öljeitü returned early in Muḥarram 707/July 1307. He mentions the punishments meted out to various amirs, none of whom is referred to in the course of the campaign.[156] Three of Qutlughshāh's *nökers* were executed and his son Shibā'uchī was removed from his command.[157] According to Mustawfī, his life was spared out of respect for his father, but his *tümen* was entrusted

[156] Among them, Mūlāy brother of Bughdāy the *akhtāchī* was executed; his nephew, Māntū the *akhtāchī*, was one of the leaders in the battle of Rasht, in which Sandāwar Bahādur and Abū Bakr Ṭūsī were killed; Kāshānī, p. 66.

[157] *Ibid.*, p. 73. Shabānkāra'ī, p. 325, says Qutlughshāh's *tümen* was given to his son, Shibān Qutlugh (*sic*), though he notes Chūpān's promotion after the war, pp. 270, 280.

to Chūpān. This is echoed by the Georgian chronicler, who locates the *yarghu* in Ūjān not Sulṭāniyya, and says that Chūpān was now promoted to senior amir. Mustawfī does not mention by name the other officers disciplined by Öljeitü, but he does report the interrogation and execution of Māmishqī, who was responsible for the disaster in Tamījān.[158] Kāshānī keeps Öljeitü in Sulṭāniyya a couple of months, before he left for Tabrīz via Hamadān.[159]

The Georgian author also mentions that Wakhtang and his warriors were thanked and rewarded for their efforts, which had evidently been very costly. It is interesting to note the presence of Georgians serving as auxiliaries, confirmed by all the sources. They and other mountain fighters, designated as Kurds by al-Yūsufī, could perhaps have been expected to put up a better showing against the Gīlānīs. Despite Chūpān's alleged remark about the easy replacement of Mongol warriors (which anyway took rather a long-term view of the situation), it is likely that the Mongols were already facing manpower problems. This is not the place to consider whether or why the Mongols had become less militarily effective. Doubtless the individual faults punished at the *yarghu*, together with rash and overconfident generalship, contributed to the Mongol defeats, but the underlying difficulty was the terrain. The Mongol cavalry was largely useless and they were frequently obliged to dismount and fight on foot.[160] The mountain passes, swamps and jungles of Gīlān were perfect for defensive guerrilla actions, and the result mirrors the fate of more recent interventions in Afghanistan. Although the wild disparity of numbers cited throughout al-Yūsufī's heroic narrative is certainly exaggerated (as are his figures for the size of the Mongol armies), the Gīlānīs must have realised that they could not win the war outright and that it was prudent to reach an agreement.

Öljeitü then made arrangements for the future government of Gīlān and Daylamān, which he bestowed on Naw Pādshāh, who was fêted and given a robe of honour, a patent and *paiza* and a

[158] *History of Georgia*, p. 638; *Ẓafar-nāma*, fols. 716vo–717ro; Ḥāfiẓ-i Abrū, p. 76; *idem*, fol. 370vo ll. 14–20, combines Kāshānī's information with Mustawfī's. Al-Nuwayrī and al-Yūsufī say Chūpān was made senior amir earlier, see above. Fāsīḥ Khwāfī, III, 18, says he was promoted only in A.H. 710.

[159] Kāshānī, pp. 73–4. Aḥmad-i Tabrīzī, fol. 116vo l. 8, says the *yārghū* lasted 2 or 3 days and the Shah left for Tabrīz, ostensibly supporting al-Yūsufī's narrative, but his account is obviously a telescoped version of Kāshānī.

[160] E.g. in the final encounter, which was fought round Sevinch's parasol (*chatr*). *Cf.* Amitai-Preiss, pp. 173, 198, 223. See also A.P. Martinez, "Some Notes on the Il-Xānid Army," *AEMA*, 6 (1986), 149–50.

beautiful Mongol bride. He was allowed to return home, reaching Lāhījān in Rabīʿ I, 707/September 1307, entrusted with completing the reduction of the whole of Gīlān—a sure sign that the war had failed to achieve this. Sālūk, who had also submitted willingly, was similarly favoured and sent back with the others. Dubbāj did not present himself at court, but sent the required amount of tribute (*māl*).[161] Mustawfī echoes these arrangements, but specifies that a levy (*kharāj*) was imposed on Gīlān's silk. The province came under Öljeitü's control and each year the Gīlānī chiefs presented themselves at court. "In this way, roads to everywhere were kept open, thanks to the good fortune of the warmongering king".[162]

These arrangements seem to have remained in place; Mustawfī later (c. 1340) refers to an annual revenue of 20,000 dīnārs to the Mongol treasury, every man in Gīlān paying a tax to his local amir. For administrative purposes, all the districts were considered to be dependencies of the two largest places, namely Lāhījān and Fūman,[163] that is, the governorships of Naw Pādshāh and Dubbāj.

Al-ʿUmarī, contemporary with Mustawfī, affirms that the Mongols [illegible] into friendly relations (!) with the rulers of Fūman and Lāhījān, [illegible]hat the merchants could enter freely into these districts and export [illegible]ir silk, which was collected there in abundance. On the other [illegible]d, he states that the main chiefs were those of Fūman, Tūlīm, [illegible]skar and Rasht (i.e. all in Gīlān-i Biya-pas), to which the others, [illegible]luding the ruler of Lāhījān, were subservient. Of these, the ruler [illegible]Tūlīm (i.e. Rikābzan) was undoubtedly pre-eminent, thanks to his [illegible] in the defeat of Qutlughshāh.[164] His informant also states that

[161] Kāshānī, p. 73. Ḥāfiẓ-i Abrū, fol. 370vo, adds that he later did go to court, where he was always treated with honour; *cf.* above, p. 103. His younger brother had accompanied Öljeitü to Sulṭāniyya, see n. 144.

[162] *Ẓafar-nāma*, fol. 717ro l. 8; *cf.* Ḥāfiẓ-i Abrū, pp. 76–7.

[163] Mustawfī, *Nuzhat*, text p. 162, tr. p. 158. ʿAbd-Allāh b. Muḥammad b. Kiyā al-Māzandarānī, *Risāla-yi Falakiyya*, ed. W. Hinz (Wiesbaden, 1952), pp. 155–6, gives the provincial revenue as 1,220,000 dīnārs (122 tūmāns), and lists the places comprising the Gīlānāt, but it is not clear to what period this refers, see P. Remler, "New Light on Economic History from Ilkhanid Accounting Manuals," *Studia Iranica*, 14/ii (1985), 157–77. The figures, ostensibly dated 750/1349, may refer to an earlier period, perhaps the reign of Öljeitü, and thus mark the immediate benefits of the conquest of Gīlān.

[164] If Kāshānī's assertion (pp. 68–9) that Rikābzan died within a year of the slaughter of Qutlughshāh is correct, it may be his brother who benefited from his reputation. Ibn Nāẓir al-Jaysh, *Kitāb tathqīf al-taʿrīf bi'l-muṣṭalaḥ al-sharīf*, ed. R. Vesely (Cairo, 1987), pp. 18–20, provides some evidence of the situation c. 780/1378.

the Mongol rulers were not mentioned in the *khuṭba* or on the coinage, despite Mustawfī's specific statement to the contrary.[165]

It thus appears certain that the main result of the war with Gīlān was to establish at least a loose Mongol sovereignty over the province, but more particularly the opening up of the country and access to Gīlān's silk.

This outcome suggests that it was the chief Mongol objective in the first place, and that the other reasons for the war advanced in the sources were secondary or incidental. It is harder to discern whether Gīlān had indeed been independent up till this time and whether the Mongols had been unable to tax or trade in Gīlān's silk. Al-Yūsufī indicates that Rashīd al-Dīn's negotiations were based on a return to the *status quo ante*: they would resume paying the taxes they had previously paid. That they had indeed done so is implied in al-Yūnīnī's account of the exchanges that preceded the outbreak of war (see above). Gīlān is scarcely mentioned in the earlier chronicles of the Mongol period, but it seems likely that local chiefs formally submitted to Hülegü while he was dealing with the Ismaʿīlī castles, as was the case in neighbouring Māzandarān. Abaqa is reported to have had a very similar experience in Gīlān to Öljeitü's,[166] which perhaps provoked a later campaign to subdue "the only region that had not submitted and did not pay *kharāj*."[167] The neighbouring region of Rustamdār (Rūyān) in western Māzandarān seems also to have been the target of deep and destructive Mongol raids during Abaqa's reign.[168] Gīlān is usually mentioned only as a region to

[165] Al-ʿUmarī, pp. 295, 297, 298, 299; in the section on the Mongols, ed. K. Lech, *Das mongolische Weltreiche* (Wiesbaden, 1968), p. 86, al-ʿUmarī lists Gīlān as a territory subject to the Ilkhan. *Cf.* Mustawfi, *Guzīda*, p. 607. B. Spuler, "Fūman," in *EI*², II, 943, also notes the contradictions between al-ʿUmarī and Mustawfī's *Nuzhat*. As for the coinage, although several examples are known from the Lāhījān mint for the reign of Abū Saʿīd, it seems only one silver coin has been reported from Öljeitü's reign. Details of this are not currently to hand; I am grateful to Stephen Album for this information.

[166] Waṣṣāf, pp. 249–50; this incident is put by Howorth, p. 240, on Abaqa's return from fighting the Chaghatay Khan Barāq in Khurāsān in 669/1270. The atabeg Yūsufshāh's presence on this campaign is attested by Rashīd al-Dīn, p. 1085, who, however, mentions neither that Abaqa returned via Gīlān nor Yūsufshāh's assistance.

[167] *History of Georgia*, pp. 592–3. This unsuccessful expedition, not mentioned in the Persian sources, seems to be distinct from the assault on Alamūt in 674/1275, see Mustawfī, *Guzīda*, p. 592.

[168] Āmulī, pp. 166–7; the actual date he gives, 663/1265, appears unreliable.

which dissidents fled for refuge.[169] Against such a faint background, it is not possible to discern whether the Gīlānīs "revolted" in the early part of Öljeitü's reign, or were driven to do so by some unacceptable demands, or whether the war really was an attempt to bring the province under Īl-khānid control for the first time since Hülegü's appearance in Persia.[170]

Conclusions

The foregoing discussion of the Gīlān war shows it to be a richly documented episode in late Īl-khānid history, which deserves more attention than it has received. The losses suffered in Gīlān undoubtedly blunted Öljeitü's enthusiasm and capacity for further military adventures. It was five years before the war with the Mamlūks was, rather half-heartedly, resumed and quickly abandoned in favour of a more peaceful approach that culminated a decade later in a formal treaty (1323). One of the architects of this peace was Chūpān, who became the dominant force in the Il-khanate for the next twenty years following his successful part in the Gīlān war. His own conciliatory attitude was no doubt important, but so perhaps was the discrediting (and decimation) of the war party, whose mindless belligerence was exemplified by the conduct of Qutlughshāh and others in Gīlān. The recent failures of the Mongol army, combined with evidence of a nascent breakdown of discipline, may have led to the essentially defensive attitudes adopted by Öljeitü and his heir, Abū Sa'īd, towards their neighbours. At the same time, the Mongol amirs became increasingly prone to turn their aggressive instincts in upon themselves, as the events of Abū Sa'īd's reign show.

In chronicling the Gīlān war, the Persian sources, closest to events, are full of details of the names of the Mongol amirs and their Gīlānī

[169] Rashīd al-Dīn, pp. 1190, 1257, 1285. According to *ibid.*, ed. K. Jahn (London, 1940), p. 87, Ṣadr al-Dīn Zanjānī was welcomed there in 694/1295 by Amīra Dubbāj of Fūman, before throwing in his lot with Ghāzān at Fīrūzkūh; *cf.* Waṣṣāf, p. 321.

[170] Kāshānī, pp. 56–7, describes the situation in Gīlān at the time of Hūlegū's arrival; his informant, Aṣīl al-Dīn Zawzanī, was an associate of the last Isma'īlī leader, Khurshāh, see Rashīd al-Dīn, pp. 986–7. The ruler of Kūtum presented himself to Hülegü (as his forebear had done to Chinggis Khān; see Juwaynī, *Tārīkh-i Jahān-gushāy*, tr. J.A. Boyle (Manchester, 1958), II, 703, with reference also to Muḥammad Qazwīnī's useful notes on Kūtum) and was similarly well received.

opponents, sometimes disagreeing but generally complementing each other's narrative. The chronological framework is established by Kāshānī, even if his account is not always clear. He is preoccupied with the deeds of the sultan and makes little effort to mould the events he records into a coherent narrative. His chronicle probably reflects the confusion surrounding the different actions reported at the time and was not revised; though many of his dates are individually unreliable, they have the merit of appearing to have been recorded contemporaneously with events.

Mustawfī, writing 20 years later, has a much clearer sense of what happened and of the causal connection between events. The form of his chronicle, an epic poem on the model of Firdawsī's *Shāh-nāma*, is a more consciously literary production, but is factually remarkably full. Its weakness is the annalist's strength, for he provides only one date, and appears to be confused about the sultan's movements in the latter stages of the campaign. Though he does not refer to Shaykh Barāq, he makes a crucial contribution to the structure of the Persian version by clarifying the fact that Chūpān's expedition finished before Öljeitü's started, and that the sultan heard of Qutlughshāh's fate while he was himself in Gīlān, thus confirming Kāshānī's specific dates. Ḥāfiẓ-i Abrū a century later preferred Mustawfī's account, but borrowed some details from Kāshānī and fitted them into their proper place. To some extent, a similar exercise had already been performed by Aḥmad-i Tabrīzī, who additionally incorporated the death of Barāq into the narrative alongside Qutlughshāh's.

The Persian version can thus be summarised as follows. In the winter of 1306, Öljeitü determined on war in Gīlān. Following the breakdown of negotiations and the absconding of Dubbāj, the campaign began in early 1307. Chūpān left from Mūghān and Qutlughshāh from Khalkhāl, as Öljeitü proceeded to Sulṭāniyya. Having won a swift victory, Chūpān rejoined Öljeitü as the latter set out for Gīlān, despatching a further expedition from Qazwīn, which later returned in triumph. Despite some initial success, news of Qutlughshāh's defeat altered the situation and the sultan's efforts to avenge him foundered. Barāq, whose link with Qutlughshāh is attested, but whose role remains unclear, also perished at this time. After further inconclusive fighting, and the submission of some Gīlānī chiefs, Öljeitü withdrew.

The Persian sources do not hide the magnitude of the setbacks suffered by the Mongol army and there is no obvious sign of deliberate

distortion, beyond the normal lavish praise for the sultan. On the whole, the objectives of the war appear to have been met. However, there is clearly some reticence over Shaykh Barāq, whose presence is not explained and whose behaviour is discretely cloaked in silence—though if Kāshānī wished to spare Öljeitü's sensibilities, he would hardly have made his rather amusing comment that the bones brought back and buried by his disciples were not the Shaykh's.

So what can the Arabic sources contribute to this picture? In the first place, they can confirm much of the story: Chūpān's despatch from Mūghān; the manner of Qutlughshāh's defeat; the association between Qutlughshāh and Barāq and the latter's death at the hands of the Gīlānīs; the successful outcome of the war. Secondly, they supply some detail that supplements the Persian sources, such as Barāq's return from Syria in the spring of 1307 and his role as an envoy; the negotiated basis for the settlement of the war. Thirdly, they contain information perhaps more consciously suppressed by the Persians. How successful was Chūpān's expedition? Certainly, Sharaf al-Dawla did not remain cowed for long, as he later took part in the fighting against the Sultan's forces; maybe Öljeitü's horses really were raided while he was in Sulṭāniyya, by which time Chūpān was back and could have tried to recover them.

On the other hand, the earliest Arabic sources also present information that is incompatible with the Persian accounts. Some of this can confidently be discarded, such as placing the defeat of Qutlughshāh in 705/1305–6. The alternative date, 1 Muḥarram 707/3 July 1307, also disagrees with Kāshānī, by just enough to clash with his dates for Öljeitü's return to Sulṭāniyya. Although al-Yūnīnī's date has the air of precision, it does not greatly affect the veracity of his source of information if one prefers the Persian date, two-three weeks earlier. More problematic is the impression given that Barāq's death followed after a measurable interval. This seems to be supported by Banākatī's laconic report, but there is simply no room for such an interval in the other Persian accounts. Kāshānī links the simultaneous presence of Qutlughshāh, Barāq and Öljeitü in Gīlān with the dates 10–11 Dhū'l-Ḥijja, mentioned separately in connection with each.[171]

[171] Kāshānī, pp. 65, 67, 70. The only Arabic sources to mention *when* Barāq died also say it was with Qutlughshāh, see above n. 105, though any interval might have been lost in their reduction of the story.

The simplest way to resolve the problem is to recall that it is only the arrival of *news* of Barāq's death and Öljeitü's expedition that is reported in Damascus in Rabīʿ II, 707/October 1307. The events themselves could have occurred much earlier, indeed even at the same time as Qutlughshāh's debacle. This would merely imply that Ibn Ṣubra, the oral source for the early Mamlūk accounts, left Sulṭāniyya after the news of Qutlughshāh's defeat reached the Mongol capital and was either still unaware of Barāq's death, or attached no particular significance to it. Similarly, the fact that he apparently did not mention Öljeitü's expedition does not mean that it didn't take place at that time. If Kāshānī's dating is accurate, it might indeed have been Öljeitü's returning troops who brought the news of Qutlughshāh's death.

Two other considerations support this interpretation. First, there *are* hints of Öljeitü's presence in Gīlān at this time in the rumours brought by Baghdādī merchants that he had been captured and escaped.[172] This may be a false rumour, but it certainly reflects the perilous situation he faced and is understandably absent from the Persian sources. Secondly, there remains the problem of explaining why Ibn Ṣubra is cited in Damascus for the news of Qutlughshāh's death and in Egyptian sources for Öljeitü's "victory". Perhaps Ibn Ṣubra himself was as aware of Öljeitü's successful return to Sulṭāniyya as he was of Qutlughshāh's defeat, and the different historians simply picked out different aspects of his account. It remains odd that the Syrian authors did not report the outcome of the war, and contented themselves with noting the later news (or really, confirmation) of Barāq's death and Öljeitü's expedition. The Egyptian authors, Baybars al-Manṣūrī and al-Nuwayrī, did try to amalgamate the two different reports, but in doing so they introduced the chronological confusion of spreading the action over two distinct annals, which in turn obliged al-Yūsufī (or al-ʿAynī) to report the war as lasting three years.[173]

Even if, with some squeezing, it may be possible to reconcile al-Yūnīnī's dates with the Persian chronology, it is not clear whether

[172] See above, n. 96. Ibn al-Dawādārī, p. 150, confines the merchants' reports to a description of Gīlān.

[173] Ibn al-Dawādārī's implication (see above, n. 25) that Öljeitü had left Gīlān (or Māzandarān) ahead of his army, just as Ibn Ṣubra came away—apparently with the news of Barāq's death—may also be explained as an attempt to reconcile the available information.

this allows us to explain away the distinctive feature of the Mamlūk version, namely the sequence of events that makes Öljeitü's expedition follow and indeed depend on the death of Barāq. Not only is this intrinsically plausible, but it also gives a logical explanation of Barāq's involvement in the war. It is found in the earliest Arabic sources and is not just the invention of al-Yūsufī, although it finds its fullest elaboration in his narrative. But is this sequence of events independent of the way it is reported, or purely a product of the chronological structure of the Mamlūk accounts, i.e. with news arriving seriatim? In this context, we must note a further confusing factor.

We have seen that al-Yūnīnī and Ibn al-Dawādārī present the arrival of the news from Persia rather differently; both also include Öljeitü's execution of an amir called Bulay at around this time.[174] It is odd that no such news-worthy event is contained in Kāshānī's detailed annals, unless this refers to the execution of Bilārghū for his treacherous murder of the Armenian ruler, Leon IV, also reported in several other Mamlūk chronicles, without a precise date.[175] There is a strong presumption that the same person is intended; unfortunately, however, Bilārghū's execution cannot have been earlier than mid-November 1307, so arrival of this news in October is anachronistic.[176] A possible alternative might be to identify Bulay with the amir Mūlāy, executed at the *yarghu* in Muḥarram 707/July 1307.[177] If so, this again suggests that the "second" set of news refers to much earlier events, all concentrated around the same period, though implying that the *yarghu* preceded Öljeitü's own expedition (as implied also by al-Nuwayrī).

Either way, we have reasonable grounds for doubt about the quality and timing of the news reported by the Mamlūk authors, and we should hesitate to give such news the same weight as information presented by sources closer to the actual events. Of Öljeitü's campaign, the Mamlūk chronicles really have nothing but rumours, as is underlined by the problems inherent in al-Yūsufī's account, which at this point departs entirely from the earlier Arabic sources.

[174] See above, n. 23. The *terminus ante quem* is Rabī' II, 707/October 1307.

[175] See Kāshānī, pp. 77–81, who has an alternative spelling Būlārghay. He gives no dates, but it is clear that Bilārghū's execution was late in 707. Mamlūk authors have the alternative spelling Burulghū or Burulghay, e.g. Baybars al-Manṣūrī, *Zubda*, fols. 253ro–254vo; *Tuḥfa*, p. 183.

[176] Leon's murder occurred on 17 November; see Sirarpie Der Nersessian, "The Kingdom of Cilician Armenia," in R.L. Wolff and H.W. Hazard (eds.), *A History of the Crusades, II. The Later Crusades, 1189–1311* (Madison, 1969), p. 658 and C. Mustafian, *La Cilicie au carrefour des empires* (Paris, 1988), I, 466, and the numerous references cited.

[177] Kāshānī, p. 72, though he was hardly a major figure; *cf.* n. 156.

Al-Yūsufī presents a mass of information, some of which fits with the other evidence, some of which echoes episodes found in the Persian sources but at different points of the story, some of which is certainly fabricated. His story reads like an entertaining historical novel, with an undoubted foundation in fact. But no effort to amalgamate his material with the other evidence can resolve all the discrepancies. Episodes such as the submission of Naw Pādshāh, for example, are not just pieces of a jigsaw that can be fitted together at will. If some pieces are discarded or rearranged, the coherence of the whole puzzle and its chronological framework is undermined.

Nowhere is this more apparent than in his account of Öljeitü's campaign. It does not help to suggest that al-Yūsufī's spring of 1308/late 707 should really be the previous spring, as in Kāshānī, for that would necessarily place Qutlughshāh's defeat in the late summer of 1306/early 706, i.e. before Barāq had even gone to Syria. This interpretation actually has many attractive features. Du'ā's jibe about Mongol failures in Gīlān, reported in the winter of 1306/mid 706, would make more sense if it referred to Qutlughshāh's earlier defeat. Kāshānī, with his emphasis on Öljeitü's movements, might have telescoped his account of the war and failed to make it clear that Qutlughshāh's defeat occurred the previous summer. Barāq's mission to the Mamlūks and return in the spring fit here; there is even just about time for him then to have been killed in Gīlān, and the news to have reached Öljeitü before he set out from Sulṭāniyya. However, this is not al-Yūsufī's own version of events and furthermore it is quite incompatible with the earlier Mamlūk sources on which his account appears to be based. Moreover, it remains fundamentally at odds—if in a slightly different way—with the Persian accounts. Thus if al-Yūsufī's insertion of a winter between Qutlughshāh's and Öljeitü's campaigns is correct, it contradicts all other sources. If it is not correct, his details of Öljeitü's campaign are probably also spurious.

We could look instead to rewrite the Persian version in the light of the Arabic accounts, and in a sense the Mamlūk emphasis on a sequence of campaigns rather than a simultaneous assault by four separate expeditions has already encouraged us to seek (and find)

greater clarification of the development of the phases of the war in the Persian sources. But we should also query the justification for any further revision. What would be the point of their inventing Öljeitü's inglorious campaign of May 1307 only to ignore a later expedition in spring 1308? Is it just for convenience that they report Qutlughshāh's defeat together with Öljeitü's campaign, if they were actually separate?

What is at issue is not so much the facts, for the alternative versions of events are not startlingly different and do not greatly influence our interpretation of the war that is obtainable from the common pool of information. To that extent, the "truth" does not matter. Our examination of the different accounts does, however, highlight the various drawbacks of the narrative sources, particularly in matters of chronology, for the facts depend on dating if only for their sequential (not necessarily causal) relationship to each other.

Our investigation has clarified the relationships between the Persian sources of the period, and raised the possibility that their concentration of the separate campaigns into a brief timespan in 706/1307 is misleading: the war might have started earlier, or finished later, than they indicate. This is one potential drawback of reporting discrete events as a single episode within a given annal, though Kāshānī's prolific use of precise dates creates confidence in his temporal framework for the narrative. He does not seem either negligently or fraudulently to have misrepresented the details of the war. At the other extreme, al-Yūsufī's attempt to break out of the annalistic format and present the story as a coherent narrative has the unfortunate effect of obscuring the sequence of otherwise undated events, especially since many of these are not confirmed elsewhere. It is not clear whether these problems are created by al-ʿAynī's attempt to resolve two conflicting chronologies, or whether they are already present in al-Yūsufī's own account;[178] had his original text survived, it would probably have clarified the source of his information and therefore his connection with the earlier Mamlūk histories. Otherwise, our investigation has largely confirmed the views reached by earlier studies on the characteristics of the Mamlūk chronicles and their interrelationships.

[178] The fact that al-ʿAynī reports Ibn Ṣubra's return twice, in both 706 and 707, indicates that he was having difficulties reconciling his sources, see above, n. 27.

In this case, their report of events in the Il-khanate undoubtedly contains useful elements and when stripped of al-Yūsufī's extravagances, basically corroborates the Persian account of the war. There is no motive for invention, other than the desire to entertain, but their reliance on news of varying quality and uncertain provenance reduces their reliability. Though incorporated systematically and sometimes with the appearance of chronological precision, Mongol news is an extraneous element in the Mamlūk sources and can be largely free-floating, whereas it is of course integral to the Persian ones and anchored in a more precise context.

Perversely, the greatest contribution of the Mamlūk authors is to throw light on the one element of obscurity in the Persian accounts, namely the role of Shaykh Barāq: yet this remains the source of the greatest chronological confusion. If nothing else, we have seen that, thanks to the Arabic chronicles, choices do exist and there are grounds for reading our sources sceptically. In Anatole France's words, al-Yūsufī has "enriched the subject with a new uncertainty".

THE *ĀTHĀR WA AḤYĀ'* OF RASHĪD AL-DĪN FAḌL ALLĀH HAMADĀNĪ AND HIS CONTRIBUTION AS AN AGRONOMIST, ARBORICULTURIST AND HORTICULTURALIST

A.K.S. LAMBTON

My subject would appear at first glance to have little to do with the legacy of the Mongol empire. Agronomy was not a subject in which the Mongols took a close interest. Further, Rashīd al-Dīn Faḍl Allāh Hamadānī was not a Mongol but a Persian. However, he spent his life in the Ilkhanate; and it was Mongol rule, whatever its advantages or disadvantages, that made travel throughout the Ilkhanate possible, even if at times hazardous; and it was because of the relations between the Ilkhanate on the one hand and Central Asia and the Far East on the other that Rashīd al-Dīn was able to benefit from the experience of learned men, merchants and travellers from those areas, to import seeds and plants from beyond the confines of Persia, especially from India, and, as a minister at the court of Ghazan Khān (694–703/1295–1304) and Öljeitü (703–16/1304–16), to carry out experiments in crown lands in Tabrīz and Sulṭāniyya.

Rashīd al-Dīn was born in Hamadān in ca. A.D. 1248 and was executed in 1318. He was by origin a Jew and was converted to Islam at the age of thirty. He studied medicine and practised this craft at the court of Abaqa (663–80/1265–82). Not much is known about his early life. Aḥmad b. Ḥusayn b. ʿAlī Kātib states that he used to travel around the empire (*ṭawf-i mamālik mīkard*) at the beginning of his career and implies that his journeys were made in search of medical knowledge.[1] It seems that he spent some time in Yazd, where he was befriended by Sharaf al-Dīn ʿAlī b. Shams al-Dīn Raḍī, a well-known physician of the city. The latter had a library and gave Rashīd al-Dīn free run of this.[2] Rashīd al-Dīn developed then, or later, other links with the city and province of Yazd. Niẓām al-Dīn

[1] *Tārīkh-i jadīd-i Yazd*, ed. Iradj Afshar (Tehran AHS, 1345/1966), p. 134; and *cf.* Jaʿfar b. Muḥammad, *Tārīkh-i Yazd*, ed. Iradj Afshar (Tehran AHS, 1338/1960), p. 92.

[2] Aḥmad b. Ḥusayn, p. 134.

ʿAlī b. Maḥmūd b. Maḥfūẓ b. Niẓām, a prominent man of Yazd, was a close friend and one of Rashīd al-Dīn's daughters was married to Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Rukn al-Dīn b. Qawām al-Dīn b. Niẓām.[3] Muʿīn al-Dīn Natanzī goes so far as to allege that Yazd was under the protection of Rashīd al-Dīn and his son Ghiyāth al-Dīn Muḥammad (executed A.D. 1335 or 1336) from the beginning of the reign of Ghazan Khān and under Öljeitü and Abū Saʿīd (716–36/1316–35).[4]

In 1298 Rashīd al-Dīn was chosen by Ghazan Khān to succeed Ṣadr al-Dīn Zanjānī, who had been seized and executed, as wazir conjointly with Saʿd al-Dīn. After the death of Ghazan, Rashīd al-Dīn continued to serve as wazir to Öljeitü with Tāj al-Dīn ʿAlī Shāh as joint wazir. It was while he was wazir to Öljeitü that he was moved to repay his debt to Sharaf al-Dīn ʿAlī and sent him a *yarligh* giving him the title of *ṣadr* and *amīr*. By the time the *yarligh* arrived Shams al-Dīn had died, but his sons, Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn Ḥusayn and Majd al-Dīn Ḥasan, were still alive and the title *ṣadr* and *amīr* devolved upon the latter. They had carried out certain building works of a charitable nature, including the construction of a *ribāṭ*, and Rashīd al-Dīn asked them to undertake some buildings in Yazd on his behalf. Accordingly they laid out the Rashīdiyya *madrasa*, a *khānqāh*, a bazaar, which came to be known as the Kāghadhiyya Bazaar and was constituted into a *waqf* for the *madrasa*, and a minaret between the *madrasa* and the *khānqāh* and a caravansarai opposite the Wardānzūr *madrasa*. The buildings were finished in 715/1315–16 and many hamlets and fields (*mazāriʿ wa arāḍī*) and shares in *qanāts*, *khāns* and gardens were made into *waqf* for them.[5] Whether it was in connection with these foundations in particular, or with regard to some more general interest by Rashīd al-Dīn in Yazd, Majd al-Dīn ʿAlī Shāh Abarqūhī, when

[3] See further J. Aubin, "Le patronage culturel en Iran sous les Ilkhans: une grande famille de Yazd," *Le monde iranien et l'islam*, 3 (1975), 107–118.

[4] *Muntakhab al-tawārīkh*, ed. J. Aubin (Tehran, 1957), p. 34.

[5] Aḥmad b. Ḥusayn, pp. 134–5. Jaʿfar b. Muḥammad states that the buildings were not finished until 725/1325 (p. 93). It is possible that the accounts of Aḥmad b. Ḥusayn and Jaʿfar b. Muḥammad are somewhat confused. Iradj Afshar on the basis of the *Jāmiʿ al-khayrāt*, the *Tārīkh-i Yazd*, the *Tārīkh-i jadīd-i Yazd* and the *Jāmiʿ-i mufīdī* of Muḥammad Mufīd gives an abbreviated family tree of Sharaf al-Dīn ʿAlī's family, in which he shows him to have had two sons, Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn Ḥusayn and Shams al-Dīn Abū Bakr, and Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn to have had two sons, Majd al-Dīn Ḥusayn and Sharaf al-Dīn Ḥusayn (*Yādgārhā-yi Yazd*, vol. I, [Tehran, AHS 1348/1969], p. 387 n.).

in Sulṭāniyya in 711/1311, thanked Rashīd al-Dīn for what he had done for the inhabitants of Yazd and Abarqūh.[6]

Rashīd al-Dīn acquired considerable riches during his career, as had Shams al-Dīn Juwaynī, who had held the office of *ṣāḥib dīwān* in an earlier reign. From the *Waqf-nāma-i Rabʿ-i Rashīdī*[7] it appears that Rashīd al-Dīn owned property in Tabrīz, Sulṭāniyya, Ḥamadān, Marāgha, Shīrāz, Iṣfahān and Mawṣil as well as Yazd and Abarqūh. How and when he acquired these properties is not known, though he must have acquired them before 709/1309–10, the date of the *waqf-nāma*. His most important foundations were in Tabrīz but it is probable that his experience in Yazd was one of the major formative elements in his interest in agriculture. In any case, brought up in the traditional atmosphere of Persian society, very different as it was from the traditions of the Mongols whom he was later to serve, he realised more clearly than his masters the importance of agriculture, which had undergone a severe recession as a result of the Mongol invasions, for the wellbeing of the country. There is little doubt that it was partly under his influence that Ghazan tried to revive agriculture in order to solve the financial and economic crisis which was threatening the Ilkhanate by the time he came to the throne.

Rashīd al-Dīn was a man of great erudition and prodigious energy. His literary output was enormous. After he became a minister, most of his time must have been taken by affairs of state, but this did not keep him from pursuing his literary work; and in intervals between his ministerial duties he appears to have continued his agricultural experiments. He habitually rose at sunrise (*dar waqt-i saḥar*) and spent the early morning writing before affairs of state pressed upon him.[8] Quatremère states that Rashīd al-Dīn knew Persian, Arabic, Mongolian, Turkish and Hebrew and that he might have had some knowledge of Chinese also, though Quatremère thought this to be unlikely.[9] That he knew Turkish and Mongolian is likely. He could hardly have carried out his duties at court without a knowledge of these languages.[10]

[6] J. van Ess, *Der Wesir und seine Gelehrten* (Wiesbaden, 1981), p. 51.
[7] Ed. M. Minovi and Iradj Afshar (Tehran, 1977–8).
[8] *Cf. Laṭāʾif al-ḥaqāʾiq*, ed. Ghulām Riḍā Ṭāhir (Tehran, 1976), 2 vols., I, 4, 49, 61.
[9] Raschid Eldin, *Histoire des Mongols de la Perse*, ed. and tr. E. Quatremère (Paris, 1836), lix–lxi.
[10] According to Waṣṣāf, Saʿd al-Dawla, one of his predecessors in the office of *ṣāḥib dīwān*, knew Turkish and Mongolian (*Tārīkh-i Waṣṣāf*, ed. M.M. Iṣfahānī, lith., [Bombay, 1269/1852–3]), p. 236.

In 1905 Najm al-Dawla ʿAbd al-Ghaffār published four agricultural texts under the title *Majmūʿa-i ʿilm-i īrānī dar zirāʿat wa filāḥat wa bāghbānī wa ghayra mushtamil bar chahār kitāb* ("A collection of Persian works on the science of agriculture and horticulture, etc. consisting of four parts") in a lithograph edition. The first is entitled *ʿIlm-i filāḥat wa zirāʿat taʾlīf-i shakhsī ʿālim wa ʿāmil sayyāḥī dar ʿahd-i Ghazan* ("The science of agriculture written by a learned and practical man, a traveller in the time of Ghazan"). Dr. Iradj Afshar and Professor Manoochehr Sotoodeh identified this as part (*bāz mānda wa chakīda*) of an original work by Rashīd al-Dīn Faḍl Allāh Hamadānī, entitled *Āthār wa aḥyāʾ* and published a new edition with an introduction based on an 11th/17th century manuscript.[11]

The *Āthār wa aḥyāʾ* is attested in the *Waqf-nāma-i Rabʿ-i Rashīdī* on p. 240. It apparently consisted of, or was planned to contain, twenty-four chapters. The chapter headings are given in a manuscript of the *Jāmiʿ-i taṣānīf-i rashīdī: al-majmūʿa al-rashīdiyya* dated 710/1310–11[12] and were published by Quatremère in his introduction to his edition of Rashīd al-Dīn's *Jāmiʿ al-tawārīkh*.[13] This list is also given by Ghulām Riḍā Ṭāhir in his edition of Rashīd al-Dīn's *Laṭāʾif al-ḥaqāʾiq*[14] and is included in Dr. Afshar and Professor Sotoodeh's introduction to their edition of the *Āthār wa aḥyāʾ* (pp. xiii–xv).

The chapter headings read as follows:

Chapter I On the seasons; the climate of cold regions (*sardsīr*) and warm regions (*garmsīr*); signs which indicate wind and rain. 16 sections (*faṣl*).

Chapter II On water and soil in the *sardsīr* and *garmsīr* and their respective properties. 2 sections.

Chapter III On the preparation needed for all kinds of agricultural development, on the implements required, who must prepare them and whatever pertains thereto. 6 sections.

Chapter IV On the state, condition and circumstances of underground water conduits (*kārīz*) and springs (*chashmahā*); investigations and

[11] Rashīd al-Dīn Faḍl Allāh Hamadānī, *Āthār wa aḥyāʾ*, with a foreword by Dr. Mihdi Mohaghegh, Tehran AHS 1368/1989.
[12] MS. Bibliothèque Nationale (Paris), No. 2324.
[13] *Histoire des Mongols de la Perse*, pp. cxii–cxiv and clvi–clviii.
[14] Vol. II (Tehran, 1972), pp. 12–13.

discussions appropriate to them and whatever may concern them [to be found] in any branch of knowledge. 2 sections.

Chapter V On barrages and dams and the methods of constructing and excavating them; and whatever concerns these and such like matters. 7 sections.

Chapter VI On seeds and roots; on what must be sown and what planted. 2 sections.

Chapter VII On what grows from seed and what from roots and many discussions relevant thereto. 9 sections.

Chapter VIII On different kinds of fruit trees and other trees growing in plantations (*bīsha*) and gardens; what grows in these countries [i.e. in the Ilkhanate] and what grows in other countries. Many sections.

Chapter IX On grafting trees and the benefits therefrom. 2 sections.

Chapter X How to use manure; different kinds of manure and their properties. 2 sections.

Chapter XI On different kinds of melons, cucumbers and herbs. 1 section.

Chapter XII On the cultivation of wheat, barley and other cereals and the benefit to be derived from each. 1 section.

Chapter XIII On the cultivation of sugar cane, cotton, sesame, flax, jute, indigo and such like. 1 section.

Chapter XIV On warding off locusts, mice, ants, snakes, scorpions and the like. 1 section.

Chapter XV Concerning pigeons, hens and other domestic fowl and how to rear their progeny. 1 section.

Chapter XVI On different breeds of horses, oxen, donkeys and other domestic and wild animals. 1 section.

Chapter XVII On bees and their condition; different kinds of bees; different kinds of animal sugars and how to preserve them.

Chapter XVIII On the nature of pests which attack trees, fruit and sown crops and how to prevent them.

Chapter XIX How to store corn and different kinds of grain and how to preserve wine, dried grapes (*mawīz*) and such like.

Chapter XX On making roofed buildings in towns and charitable precincts and whatever concerns this.

Chapter XXI On boats, bridges and fords; how they are made and the benefits of each.

Chapter XXII On the benefits to be had from different kinds of animals.

Chapter XXIII On how to extract precious stones from mines and the provision of instruments for this.

Chapter XXIV On the benefits and peculiarities of precious stones and rocks and their condition.

The date of composition is not known and no complete copy of the *Āthār wa aḥyā'* exists, although Rashīd al-Dīn instructed the *mutawallī* of his foundation in the Rab'-i Rashīdī to have two copies, one in Persian and the other in Arabic, made of it every year.[15] The assumption is, therefore, than an original text from which copies were to be made was deposited in the Rab'-i Rashīdī, but whether Rashīd al-Dīn's instructions were carried out we do not know. The *waqf-nāma* is dated 709/1309–10. Rashīd al-Dīn was not executed until 718/1318. It would, therefore, have been possible for a number of copies to have been made during this interval, but if they were, they may have been lost when the Rab'-i Rashīdī was pillaged on Rashīd al-Dīn's death and many of its books burnt.

The status of the present work is uncertain. It opens after a short doxology with the following words, "These beneficial matters (*fawā'id*) will be quoted in a hasty way (*bar sabīl-i isti'jāl*) from the *Kitāb-i āthār wa akhbār*, so that men may obtain benefit therefrom. Such a proceeding, in short, will not be devoid of benefit in this world and the next."[16] The work certainly bears marks of having been compiled in haste, but no reason is given why this should have been so. If the work is a summary, there is no indication of who the summariser might be, though the possibility cannot be ruled out that Rashīd al-Dīn himself made an abbreviated version of a longer work which he had planned but not completed. If this is so, one of the reasons for its hasty production may have been the need for works to guide those who were to bring about the agricultural revival made necessary by the financial and economic crisis afflicting the Ilkhanate at the beginning of the 14th century. The Mongol invasions had resulted in a disastrous fall in population. If the Chinese experience is any guide, it may have been 40% or more.[17] By the reign of Ghazan there may have been, once more, an overall growth in population and associated with this a movement back to the towns. If this was

[15] *Waqf-nāma-i Rab'-i Rashīdī*, pp. 237, 245.
[16] *Āthār wa aḥyā'*, p. 1.
[17] See F.W. Mote, "Yüan and Ming," in K.C. Chang (ed.), *Food in Chinese Culture* (New Haven and London, 1977), p. 196.

the case, it would have been an added reason for Rashīd al-Dīn's concern to increase agricultural production and his wish that agricultural knowledge should be more widely disseminated. Further, if, as seems likely, there had been a reversion to grain farming as a result of the Mongol invasions, Rashīd al-Dīn may have wished to encourage diversification. This would have been another reason for haste in the production of the *Āthār wa aḥyā'*.[18] If, however, the present work is an abbreviated version of a longer work, planned but not executed, why did Rashīd al-Dīn not say so with reference to the copies which were to be made by the *mutawallī* of the Rabʿ-i Rashīdī?

Ḥamd Allāh Mustawfī refers to the work as the *Āthār wa akhbār-i rashīdī*.[19] In manuscripts of the *Majmūʿa-i rashīdī* it is called both *Āthār wa aḥyā'* and *Āthār wa akhbār*.[20] In the *Waqf-nāma-i Rabʿ-i Rashīdī* it is called the *Kītāb-i āthār wa aḥyā'*.[21] This would seem irrefutable evidence that this rather than *Āthār wa akhbār* was its original title.

Dr. Afshar and Professor Sotoodeh list in the introduction to their edition the passages which appear to be direct quotations from a work by Rashīd al-Dīn, starting with the words *īn ḍaʿīf, mīgū'īm* or *mīgūyam* or ending with the verb in the first person singular or plural.[22] The first occasion when *īn ḍaʿīf* is used is on p. 21 in the phrase *īn ḍaʿīf tajriba karda* in the sense "I have experimented [with regard to the planting of almond trees]". Thereafter the phrase *īn ḍaʿīf* is of frequent occurrence. As the editors point out in their introduction it is a phrase by which Rashīd al-Dīn repeatedly refers to himself in the *Laṭā'if al-ḥaqā'iq*, the *Waqf-nāma-i Rabʿ-i Rashīdī* and other works.[23] There are other phrases, such as *mā lā kalām*, which appear to be characteristic of Rashīd al-Dīn's style, while the somewhat unpolished style of the work as a whole is not unlike the style of other books by Rashīd al-Dīn. There are a number of passages introduced by phrases such as "The author of the *Kītāb-i āthār wa aḥyā'* states" followed by a verb in the first person; but such passages are inconclusive since they could be quotations from an original work

[18] See further A.K.S. Lambton, *Continuity and Change in Medieval Persia* (New York and London, 1988), pp. 19 ff., 175 ff.
[19] *Āthār wa aḥyā'*, p. xxiii, citing *Nuzhat al-qulūb*, lith. (Bombay, 1311/1893–4).
[20] *Āthār wa aḥyā'*, pp. xxiii, xxvi.
[21] P. 240.
[22] Pp. xvii–xx.
[23] *Ibid.*, pp. xviii–xix.

by a third party. The possibility that the existing text is a summary by a third party, a rearrangement of an already existing work, or an abbreviated version by Rashīd al-Dīn of a more extensive work which he had planned but never completed must remain open. The text as it stands has no chapter headings. It contains material which would have fallen within the scope of Chapters II and III and possibly also I, XIV, XV, XVII and XIX but material which was covered, or was intended to be covered, in Chapters IV, V, XVI, XX, XXI, XXII, XXIII and XXIV is lacking.

There are two references to Ghazan in the present text, the first on p. 103 and the second on p. 147. Unless a copyist has added the words "may God lighten his tomb" on p. 103 and the word "*saʿīd*" after "*salṭanat*" and before "Ghazan Khān" on p. 147, Ghazan must have been dead before the text was written. Whether it was in fact, written in the reign of Öljeitü or Ghazan, it represents the accumulated experience of many years and almost certainly belongs to the latter years of Rashīd al-Dīn's life.

It is a matter for regret that the full work and especially Chapters III, IV and V (assuming they were in fact written) are not extant. By the hand of such a keen observer as Rashīd al-Dīn they would have greatly increased our knowledge of Persian agricultural history and of irrigation practices and also of the life of those engaged in agriculture. Rashīd al-Dīn appears to have had great interest in *qanāts*. He had acquired over the years a large number of shares in many of the *qanāts* of the province of Yazd and must have been well aware of the techniques of making *qanāts* and of the work needed for their upkeep. 564 items, consisting mainly of shares in *qanāts* and also of parcels of land in the province of Yazd are mentioned in the *Waqf-nāma-i Rabʿ-i Rashīdī* as having been constituted into *waqf* by him. He is also known to have made *qanāts*, barrages and dams in Tabrīz and to have encouraged others to do the same.[24]

Rashīd al-Dīn's early training in medicine may have given him a special interest in herbs and this, in turn, may have led him to study agriculture. But there is no evidence in the *Āthār wa aḥya'* that this was the case. References to the medicinal use of plants are scattered and haphazard. He mentions, for example, that a medicine could be made from the jujube tree, the *zizyphus vulgaris* (*ʿunnāb*) and that

[24] *Cf.* Abū 'l-Qāsim b. 'Alī b. Muḥammad al-Qāshānī (Kāshānī), *Tārīkh-i Uljāytū*, ed. Mahin Hambly (Tehran AHS, 1348/1969), p. 116.

it was much used.[25] He also notes the medicinal uses of various plants grown in the Far East (see below).

The works of Muslim geographers were presumably available to Rashīd al-Dīn, but he does not refer to them in those parts of the *Āthār wa aḥyā'* that have come down to us. He may have mentioned them in the unabbreviated version (if such was ever completed). On one occasion he refers to, and refutes, the views of unnamed "writers of agricultural works" in the matter of grafting;[26] and on another occasion, also on the subject of grafting, he asks his readers to study ancient and modern agricultural works and compare what was written in them with what he had written.[27] It is possible that he may have been directly or indirectly influenced by Ibn Waḥshiyya's *al-Filāḥa al-nabāṭiyya* and other Arabic works on agriculture,[28] but there is no evidence of this in those parts of the *Āthār wa aḥyā'* which are extant.

Rashīd al-Dīn was keenly interested in the plants and agricultural practices of Central Asia, India, China and South-east Asia. He distinguishes between North China (Khitāy) and South China (Manzī). There is no record of his having visited these regions, but numerous visitors, merchants and others, came to Tabrīz and the Ilkhanid court from them and Rashīd al-Dīn himself was instrumental in bringing doctors and learned men from the Far East to the Ilkhanid court. Whether he had access to written works produced in China or knew of the official attention given to the rehabilitation of agriculture in China after its decline under the Mongol Yüan dynasty is not known.[29] The *Nung sang chi-yao* (*Essentials of agriculture and sericulture*), officially produced in 1270, is credited by Wu Han with having had a beneficial effect on government efforts to bring about rehabilitation. Various other works, some officially sponsored and others privately compiled, also date from the Yüan period.[30] Rashīd al-Dīn may have known something of their contents from oral sources, especially Bolad Ch'eng-Hsiang.[31] He also had some knowledge of agricultural

[25] *Āthār wa aḥyā'*, p. 40.
[26] *Ibid.*, pp. 123–124.
[27] *Ibid.*, p. 107.
[28] See Muṣṭafā al-Shihābī, "Filāḥa", *EI*².
[29] See Mote, "Yüan and Ming," p. 197.
[30] Wu Han, *Teng-hsia Chi* (Peking, 1960), pp. 11–13, quoted by Mote, "Yüan and Ming," p. 252, 3 n.
[31] T.T. Allsen, "Biography of a Cultural Broker, Bolad Ch'eng-Hsiang, in China and Iran," in J. Raby and T. Fitzherbert (eds.), *The Court of the Ilkhans 1290–1340* (Oxford, 1996), pp. 14–15.

practices in Egypt and may have obtained this from both written works and visitors from Egypt who came to the Ilkhanid court.[32]

Behind Rashīd al-Dīn's knowledge gained from written and oral sources there lay considerable practical experience. In addition to what he knew of agriculture in Yazd, Iṣfahān and Ādharbāyjān, he was familiar, either from hearsay or experience, with practices in Khurāsān, Khwārazm, Baghdād and Georgia. Some of his experience of foreign parts was probably gained when he accompanied Ghazan on his military expeditions. His primary concern in the *Āthār wa aḥyā'* is with practice. His interest in agriculture was not, however, solely practical. It had also, at least in part, an eschatological aspect. He states, "If anyone who builds a bridge, makes a *ribāṭ* or *kārīz*, plants trees or brings different kinds of trees and seeds to a province where they had not been found before, plants and sows then and teaches people how to do so and encourages them to cultivate such trees and seeds, many people will benefit from his efforts and guidance for years to come and reward (*ṣawāb*) will accrue to him in the next world."[33]

Rashīd al-Dīn does not have much to say about those who actually cultivated the land or about the relations between landlords and peasants. He may have written on these subjects in the chapters which have been lost, or have intended to write on them in chapters which were only planned. In the course of the *Āthār wa aḥyā'* he draws attention particularly to the skill and thrift (*ṣarfahā*) shown by the Yazdīs in different kinds of agricultural development and he states that the return which they got from the land was seldom equalled in other places. Their skill was especially noticeable in their cultivation of mulberry trees and in sericulture. He seems to attribute the development of these qualities in the Yazdīs to the fact that water and land were very scarce and very valuable in the Yazd district.[34]

There are also scattered comments on the qualities of workers in other places. The skill of the Iṣfahānīs in tending and pruning fruit trees in general is mentioned and their method of growing and pruning quince trees, a method which Rashīd al-Dīn alleges was not

[32] *Āthār wa aḥyā'*, p. 10 and *passim*.
[33] *Waqf-nāma-i Rabʿ-i Rashīdī*, p. 15.
[34] *Āthār wa aḥyā'*, pp. 32–4.

practised in any other province.[35] Apple trees grew especially well in the Iṣfahān province but they were susceptible to some sort of scale insect excreting honey dew which attacked the leaves of the tree in spring (or possibly a tent caterpillar producing a tent of silken web around the trunk) particularly in wet years. The local people, as soon as the insect appeared, rubbed the trunk of the tree with a piece of old cloth, cleaning off the honey dew (or the web) and the scale insect. In other districts, Rashīd al-Dīn alleges, when the grub appeared, it was left until the fruit of the tree was completely destroyed.[36]

The *Āthār wa aḥyā'* is distinguished by two main features. First there is the author's desire to order and classify plants and secondly, and perhaps more importantly, the practical and empirical nature of his work. Arboriculture appears to have been Rashīd al-Dīn's main interest. He claims to have planted many trees and apparently had tree nurseries.[37] He includes a special section on grafting and its benefits,[38] a subject which, he alleges, had not been dealt with adequately in books on agriculture as far as he was aware.[39] His purpose in writing about the art of grafting was not only for the benefit of the wise (*'uqalā'*) but also to encourage those in charge of agricultural development (*mi'mārān*), bailiffs (*sarkārān*) and peasants (*fallāḥān*) to learn and practise the art from which much public benefit was to be had.[40] He discusses the propagation, cultivation and diffusion of a great variety of plants and trees, some of which grew in China, India and South-east Asia and of which he cannot have had personal experience. He also includes incidental information on internal and external trade in some of the various products which he mentions. He gives details of some of his own experiments in transplanting various plants and trees from hot regions (*garmsīr*) to cold regions (*sardsīr*) and in introducing new species into regions where they had not grown before. He also describes which trees could be grown from seed, from cuttings or from suckers instead of cuttings, and by layering and which could be grafted and by what method, and includes information on the distribution of different trees and their fruits.

[35] *Ibid.*, p. 14.
[36] *Ibid.*, p. 12.
[37] *Ibid.*, pp. 2–3.
[38] *Ibid.*, pp. 107–24.
[39] *Ibid.*, p. 107.
[40] *Ibid.*, p. 109.

He states that he had planted figs with good results in Tabrīz where they had not been grown before, and describes how different kinds of figs could be obtained on one root stock.[41] Although people thought that the jujube tree or *'unnāb* (*zizyphus vulgaris*) would not grow in the *sardsīr*, he had planted many in Tabrīz and other cold regions and they had fruited. It grew in Gurgān and especially well in North China and Uighuristan.[42] He had brought cuttings of the sorbus tree from Shūshtar to Tabrīz and they had taken well.[43] He had also planted medlar trees (*zu'rūr, kundus*), which grew in Gīlān and Māzandarān, in Tabrīz.[44] For several years he had planted sour oranges in Tabrīz. In winter they had to be covered by a large dome-like basket plastered over with cow dung to protect them from the cold and a little horse dung spread round their roots.[45]

He had brought plane trees from different places in the last few years to Tabrīz, where they had not been known, and planted them. Some had grown but others had remained small. Cuttings could be taken with a joint of two or three years' old wood at their base. The timber of plane trees was valuable for building purposes because it did not rot and was immune from maggots.[46] He describes his method of planting plane trees, willows, and poplars in plantations.[47] There was a special kind of willow which grew in Iṣfahān and Quhrūd, from which spade handles were made. He had planted this willow in several towns.[48] He had also planted olive trees in various *sardsīr* districts, especially Tabrīz.[49]

He describes his experiences with regard to a variety of trees, including pomegranate trees,[50] apple trees,[51] pear trees,[52] different kinds of plum trees,[53] almond trees[54] and how their fruits were dried and preserved. Discussing his experiences in planting walnut trees,

[41] *Ibid.*, pp. 8–9.
[42] *Ibid.*, pp. 39–40.
[43] *Ibid.*, p. 41.
[44] *Ibid.*, pp. 47–8.
[45] *Ibid.*, pp. 52–3.
[46] *Ibid.*, pp. 55–6.
[47] *Ibid.*, pp. 56–7.
[48] *Ibid.*, p. 58.
[49] *Ibid.*, p. 69.
[50] *Ibid.*, pp. 10–11.
[51] *Ibid.*, pp. 11–13.
[52] *Ibid.*, p. 17.
[53] *Ibid.*, pp. 18–19.
[54] *Ibid.*, pp. 21–3.

he mentions that foxes would dig up the seed and devastate a whole plantation, as he himself had frequently witnessed, unless snares were laid for them and watchmen guarded the young trees.[55] Another tree which he states that he had planted was the *hindī* tree, which grew in Māzandarān. Its wood was strong and snares for birds were made from it.[56]

Rashīd al-Dīn mentions various trees found in Anatolia and Georgia, including the *ʿalī baʿlī* cherry tree. He states that its fruit ripened earlier than other fruits and for this reason it could be marketed profitably, but peasants did not realise this.[57] The sweet chestnut tree (*shāh balūṭ*), rare in most regions, was common in parts of Georgia.[58] The calligonum (*butū*), a small tree with small sour red berries grew in the hills near Tabrīz and also in the hills of Ganja and Georgia.[59] It was said to be common in Mongolia. When it ripened the berries were picked, softened, rolled together and spread out on stones in the sun until they dried like yeast. They were then rolled out on stones, paper thin like bread, and packed together. The product, if sucked, greatly relieved thirst and heat.[60] Rashīd al-Dīn is somewhat dismissive of the oak tree (*darakht-i balūṭ*). It was, he writes, a forest tree, though if planted in gardens it grew better. Acorns could be roasted and eaten, but there was not much profit in planting oak trees because neither their fruit nor their timber was well thought of, though in hilly and mountainous districts it was useful for firewood.[61]

In his discussion of black, white and red mulberry trees, Rashīd al-Dīn also touches upon sericulture.[62] A special kind of white mulberry was grown in Kamākh in Anatolia. Its fruit was dried and exported to other provinces.[63] In Samarqand, Khwārazm and Kāth mulberry trees were common and a syrup resembling grape syrup was made from their fruit.[64] Some mulberry trees were grown primarily for rearing silk-worms. The tree could be grown from seed

[55] *Ibid.*, pp. 25–6.
[56] *Ibid.*, p. 41. I have not been able to identify this tree.
[57] *Ibid.*, pp. 19–20.
[58] *Ibid.*, p. 42.
[59] *Ibid.*, pp. 48–9.
[60] *Ibid.*, p. 49.
[61] *Ibid.*, p. 43.
[62] *Ibid.*, pp. 30–9.
[63] *Ibid.*, p. 30.
[64] *Ibid.*, p. 31.

or from cuttings.[65] He had observed that in Yazd, where mulberry trees were well tended and of good quality, branches after they had been cut were planted instead of cuttings, a method of propagation not known in other provinces.[66] The leaves of trees which had been grafted were better for silk-worms than those from ungrafted trees. The production of silk from silk-worms living on the leaves of the mulberry tree was higher in Yazd than elsewhere. One *dirham* of silk-worms (whether Rashīd al-Dīn means silk-worms weighing one *dirham* or costing one *dirham* is not clear) would eat 500 *mans* of mulberry leaves and give 1 *man* of silk.[67] Mice and ants ate silk-worms and so to keep these pests away the buildings in which silk-worms were kept were smeared with lime.[68] Silk-worms were highly sensitive to extremes of heat and cold and required protection. If they were transported from the *garmsīr* to the *sardsīr* they would be put in a bag (*kharīṭa*), tied up in a sheepskin coat (*pūstīn*), and put in a box wrapped round with cotton wool so that the worms would be protected from both the cold and jolting during the journey.[69] In spring, when the weather was warm, the eggs of the silk-worm would be worn on the body for warmth to hatch them.[70]

In North and South China large mulberry trees abounded and much silk was produced.[71] Paper was for the most part manufactured from the bark of mulberry trees and also from the bark of other trees. It was used there more than elsewhere because of the excellence of its quality. One side only was written on whereas in other countries both sides were used. Utensils (*ālāt*) and bales of cloth (*aqmisha*) were wrapped up in paper. Most transactions in North and South China were carried out in *chao*, notes made from paper. By reason of the notes being passed from hand to hand, they became tatty. If anyone took an old note to the *dīwān* he would be given a new note without delay. Old notes were burnt. In North China paper was also made from silk, but it was rare and very special. The leaves of the black mulberry tree (*khartūt*) were also given to

[65] *Ibid.*
[66] *Ibid.*, pp. 31–34.
[67] *Ibid.*, p. 33. The *man* (of 600 *dirhams*) used to weigh silk in Tabrīz in A.D. 1335 weighed 1.912 kg (4.1 lbs) (see W. Hinz, *Islamische Masse und Gewichte* [Leiden, 1955], p. 19).
[68] *Ibid.*, p. 34.
[69] *Ibid.*, p. 36.
[70] *Ibid.*
[71] *Ibid.*

silk-worms in North China, but had to be given to them separately from the leaves of the white mulberry. If the leaves were mixed the silk-worms became diseased because they were not accustomed to such food. If they were fed on black mulberry leaves from the beginning, they became accustomed to them, but the silk they produced was of inferior quality.[72] Wine was also made in China from the black mulberry and if sugar or syrup was added it was beneficial and delicious.[73]

Rashīd al-Dīn mentions various other trees which grew in India, the East Indies and China. Among others, he describes the coconut palm (*jawz-i hindī*), its propagation, cultivation and uses and where it grew.[74] He himself had seen it in Hormuz.[75] Another tree which he discusses in some detail is the cinnamon tree. Cinnamon from China was more aromatic, peppery and sweeter than Indian cinnamon and was exported to India.[76] Camphor occurred in fissures in the wood of the cinnamon tree. It was brought from China to India for sale and thence to Persia.[77] A special kind of camphor came from one of the islands in the China seas. Merchants often brought it to Persia. Rashīd al-Dīn had seen it and possessed some of it. The timber of the cinnamon tree was used for junks, houses, doors and various instruments.[78] There was another kind of cinnamon which was considered more valuable. It was of two strains. One was known in Persia as *dārchīnī* and the other was called *qirfa*. It grew in some of the provinces of India and China. That which grew in China was the better. Its fruit was like the fruit of the clove and it was called in Persia *gul-i dārchīnī* (though it was not a flower). It was known as "special cinnamon" (*dārchīnī-i khāṣṣ*) and was used in antidotes for poison. Whereas formerly not much of this cinnamon had been brought to Persia, its import was increasing.[79]

Writing of the pepper plant, Rashīd al-Dīn describes how it climbs up the trunks of trees in the same way as vines.[80] Black pepper was exported from the provinces where it grew in India to other parts

[72] *Ibid.*, p. 37.
[73] *Ibid.*, p. 38.
[74] *Ibid.*, pp. 70–4.
[75] *Ibid.*, p. 74.
[76] *Ibid.*, p. 77.
[77] *Ibid.*, pp. 77–8.
[78] *Ibid.*, p. 78.
[79] *Ibid.*, pp. 78–9.
[80] *Ibid.*, p. 80.

of India, North and South China and Europe.[81] White pepper was sought after in Persia for medicinal purposes but was rare. It was found in South China and the neighbourhood but was not highly valued or much exported because it was very hot; black pepper was preferred and fetched a higher price. Consequently white pepper was rare. However, he states that he had often seen white pepper.[82] This was probably because of his experience as a physician.

Rashīd al-Dīn mentions different kinds of white sandal wood, which grew in Java, India and China, and trade in its timber.[83] Red sandal wood also grew in China and was an article of commerce in North China. It was used in idol temples and at weddings and funerals because of its perfume. In Ceylon, where it also grew, it was burnt as fuel. This kind of sandal wood was seldom brought to Persia. What was called sandal wood in Persia was used for the handles of maces, stools and trays. It was less highly priced than sandal wood from Ceylon but its price, when the cost of transport was added, was about the same.[84]

According to Rashīd al-Dīn's account pine trees (*ṣanawbar*) were common in Persia but did not grow in India. The kind which grew in China was very large and tall. Its wood was used for junks because it was light and was not rotted by sea-water; but the poop of the junks was made of wood from the cinnamon tree because it was hard and was not damaged by many people walking about on it. Gum was obtained from pine trees in China and Anatolia, but by different methods. Sometimes the tree would ignite itself. In Anatolia torches were made from these trees. The gum which the Chinese obtained from pine trees was used as oil for lamps. It was known in Persia as *nafṭ-i safīd*.[85]

Rashīd al-Dīn also describes the *khiyār chanbar* tree (*cassia festularis?*), which grew, he states, in South-east Asia, Java, Ceylon, China and Egypt,[86] and the Indian date palm, the fruit of which was known in Persia as *khurmā-yi hindī*, and which grew in Gujerat, Ceylon, South-east Asia and Java.[87] He mentions also the mango tree which grew

[81] *Ibid.*, pp. 80–1.
[82] *Ibid.*, p. 81.
[83] *Ibid.*, pp. 89–90.
[84] *Ibid.*, p. 91.
[85] *Ibid.*, pp. 91–2.
[86] *Ibid.*, pp. 74–5.
[87] *Ibid.*, pp. 75–6.

mainly in Malabar and Ceylon. Its fruit was much eaten in India. A conserve was made from its fruit which was exported especially to North and South China. Its timber was used for ships and to make chests.[88] He distinguishes between the betel palm-tree (*fūful*) and the betel vine (*tunbūl*). The former grew in Bengal, Mandalay, Java and South-east Asia. He had seen and used betel nuts brought by merchants. He alleges that if they were eaten fresh they made one giddy and even unconscious. Hindus ate them dried in lime (*āhak*) and with leaves of the betel vine and were addicted to them. The wood of the betel palm was used to make javelins.[89] The betel vine grew in India, Java, Ceylon and South China.[90]

Rashīd al-Dīn also includes information on the ebony tree, which was found in Ceylon and Java. He states that merchants travelling to and from China and India hired men to fell ebony trees, cut them up and put them in pools of sea water so that in five or six months any wood which was soft would rot leaving the good wood. They would pay someone to guard the wood during their absence and continue their journey. On their return, they would drag out the wood from the pools with nets, separate the hard wood from the rest, boil some gum (*lādan*) and rub it into the wood so that it would become black.[91]

The tea bush, called by physicians in Persia *shāh-i khalq* (?) and in Chinese *chā*, grew in South China and it was found in the *sardsīr* and the *garmsīr*. It grew all over the province of Qumju, in mountains, open country and woods. It was the size of the myrtle bush; its leaves were like pomegranate leaves but smaller and wholly green. They were picked, steamed, and laid out in the sun to dry. If no damp got at them they retained their strength for several years. Tea was a very profitable article of trade and was taken to all provinces of North and South China. Not a great deal of tea was consumed in India.[92]

In the province of Chin Chiu in North China there was a different kind of tea which came from a rather larger bush. The area where

[88] *Ibid.*, pp. 88–9.
[89] *Ibid.*, pp. 83–4.
[90] *Ibid.*, pp. 84–5.
[91] *Ibid.*, pp. 93–4. This was presumably because the wood under the bark is white until the heart is reached.
[92] *Ibid.*, pp. 86–7.

it grew was farmed out by the *dīwān* which fixed the amount which each person could take and the price of the contract.[93]

There were different grades of tea.[94] The best or special tea (*khāṣṣ*) was mixed with musk, camphor and other things. There was an official or *tamghaji* in charge of this tea. Its leaves were crushed in a mill, like henna, sieved and rolled up in paper and stamped with a seal or *tamgha*, without which it was illegal to sell tea. It was packed in paper and exported to all provinces and there was much trade in it. Ordinary tea also had a *tamgha* but it was not farmed and could be freely picked in the open country (*dar ṣaḥrā*). Qubilai Qa'an had ordered that the tea bush be brought to North China and planted in gardens. He had planted it in Chandu near Khānbaligh, which was in the *sardsīr*. This tea had a yellow flower the size of a nectarine flower. Its seed was the size of a pea and yellow in colour. Propagation was from seed or cuttings or by layering (?). If it was given water from bath-houses it would grow quickly. The district where special tea grew lay adjacent to a province where musk deer were found.[95]

Rashīd al-Dīn describes another bush, from which some kind of perfume was obtained, on the basis of information gained at Ghazan's court. The bush was called in Chinese *zih tiurank* (?). It grew on a mountain in the province of Kuchiu (?), seven or eight days' journey from the River Kibek Qamil (?) between North and South China (presumably the Hwang-ho or Yellow River). There were heavy snowfalls on the mountain every year. Musk deer found in that district grazed on the bush. Guards and contractors, who paid a tax to the *dīwān*, were continually at work collecting bits of the shrub which they sold to merchants. The plant had a small white flower with a yellow centre and had a sweet smell. Women boiled the leaves and flowers in oil and rubbed it on their hair. Rashīd al-Dīn notes that the belief in Persia that deer ate a kind of spikenard (*sunbul al-ṭīb*) was mistaken.

Musk was also obtained from a gland of the musk deer found on the mountain. The right to collect it was also farmed out on contract and no one could live on the mountain without a permit (*barāt*)

[93] *Ibid.*, p. 87.
[94] The text reads *az chā 'uṣāra'ī bi anwā' gīrand wa khāṣṣ wa miyāna wa kharjī (?)*, i.e. presumably tea of special, medium and ordinary quality. In writing of sugar he contrasts special (*khāṣṣ*) and ordinary (*kharjī*) sugar (p. 182).
[95] *Ibid.*, pp. 87–8.

from the *dīwān*. No hunting was allowed so that the deer might multiply. When it snowed heavily many of the deer died and the musk was collected from their carcases. The Qa'an had ordered a caravanserai and storehouse to be built there for the collection and storage of the musk. The price at which it was sold to merchants was fixed by a *yarligh* from the *dīwān*. Rashīd al-Dīn had seen this musk at Ghazan's court. There was much profit from musk. The only other place where it was found was, he states, Tibet.[96]

Horticulture was another of Rashīd al-Dīn's interests. He devotes a long section to the propagation, cultivation and grafting of various kinds of roses,[97] including the wild rose.[98] He states that rose-water was exported from Fārs, which was famed for the excellence of its roses, to all provinces and to Egypt and Syria. Scent was also made from a mixture of the essence of the *bīd mishk* (*salix aegyptiaca*) and rose-water. The *bīd mishk* of Iṣfahān and Abhar was well known for its excellence but it did not equal that of Naṣībīn.[99] The *zambaq* (a kind of lily?) had not formerly been found in Persia but grew in Egypt and Europe (Afranj). The ruler of Mārdīn had imported it and Rashīd al-Dīn had brought it from Mārdīn to Sulṭāniyya and Tabrīz. Its oil was highly beneficial. Its large, long flower, which grew on a short stem, was a pure white colour and sweet smelling. After it opened, it faded in a few days but did not shed its petals. Its root was like the root of garlic. It grew in the *garmsīr* and the *sardsīr*.[100]

Among other flowers which Rashīd al-Dīn describes are the pansy, the narcissus and the lily. In Gushtāspī a plant which resembled a lily grew in ponds and lakes (*na'ūrhā*); it was also found in North and South China. It had a small black seed, the size of a sebesten. The people of North China used it in necklaces; they also ate its kernel. Its flower was white, mauve or red, larger than a lily and sweet smelling. Its root was white and the size of a wrist (*band-i dast*). Khitans fried it and ate a great deal of it. It was propagated by planting its root or seed in the mud of ponds or lakes.[101]

[96] *Ibid.*, pp. 102–3.
[97] *Ibid.*, pp. 63–5.
[98] *Ibid.*, pp. 66–7.
[99] *Ibid.*, pp. 63–4.
[100] *Ibid.*, pp. 67, 206–7.
[101] *Ibid.*, pp. 98, 202–3. Rashīd al-Dīn states that it was called *link khu* (?). This is possibly a corruption of some derivative of *lien* (lotus).

Although Rashīd al-Dīn's main interest appears to have been arboriculture, he does not neglect tillage. He has a section on the preparation and use of different kinds of manure, and is insistent that manure should be used, especially in gardens. He deplores the practice of using the dung of oxen for fuel. He also describes methods by which the land could be prepared for cultivation if manure was not available.[102]

Plants belonging to various families, including *graminae, brassicas, leguminosae, chenopodiaceae, linum, gossypium*, and *cucurbitaceae*, are included in Rashīd al-Dīn's account. Discussing grain crops, he stresses the need for the proper preparation of the soil, whether for irrigated or unirrigated grain, care over the selection of good, clean seed, and, in the case of irrigated land, the use of good manure.[103] He notes fallow practices for the purpose of increasing soil fertility and states that in most provinces wheat land was left fallow in alternate years, otherwise, for example in districts where land was in short supply, a great deal of manure had to be used to maintain fertility.[104] If Rashīd al-Dīn is right about fallow practices, it seems that wheat land was not left fallow for as long as in modern times. That land was often left fallow for longer periods in modern times may possibly indicate a decline in fertility and in the demand for grain.

Among the experiments which Rashīd al-Dīn carried out was the introduction of plough-teams consisting of 16 or 20 oxen into crown lands (*khāṣṣa*) in Tabrīz and Sulṭāniyya. He claims that these cultivated in one day as much as five or six plough-teams of two oxen and that whereas one man was needed to drive a team of two oxen, five or six men could manage a team of 20. Further, he alleges, that better results were obtained, especially in the case of the ploughing out of permanent pasture. He had seen such plough-teams in Georgia and Armenia and describes how they turned the soil to a depth of 3 ft or more and cleaned the soil of weeds so that the land produced two or three times as much as when ploughed by an ordinary plough-team. It would seem from Rashīd al-Dīn's description that the plough used had a coulter, share and mould board. He

[102] *Ibid.*, pp. 124–8. According to Abū 'l-Qāsim Qāshānī, Rashīd al-Dīn brought nearly 300 strong oxen with their Yazdī drivers to Tabrīz to transport sewage from the city to the Faṭḥābād and Rashīdābād gardens and elsewhere (*Tārīkh-i Uljāytū*, p. 116).
[103] *Āthār wa aḥyā'*, p. 135.
[104] *Ibid.*, p. 139.

advocates the use of such plough-teams in all provinces, especially where the soil was poor.[105] His experiment in the *khāṣṣa* of Tabrīz and Sulṭāniyya does not appear to have been followed elsewhere. One reason may have been that the plough used in Persia was the nail plough which could be drawn easily by two, or at most four, oxen. As Rashīd al-Dīn himself points out, people were poor[106] and few would have had sufficient capital to purchase (and feed) a large number of oxen and would have been forced to run a plough-team of sixteen or twenty oxen as a co-operative venture, but, more importantly, Rashīd al-Dīn's advocacy of deep ploughing probably ran counter to local practice and experience, especially in poor land.

Rashīd al-Dīn discusses different kinds of wheat and barley and their cultivation in different regions. He remarks that unirrigated wheat, provided that rain came at the right time, was better and gave a heavier crop than irrigated wheat; and its flour made better bread. Spring wheat was usually poor but spring barley, provided the land was well prepared, was better. Barley was useful for both food and fodder. He mentions methods of storing grain and seed grain so that wastage by weevils and damage from damp might be prevented.[107] He also touches upon spelt (*khandarūs*) and the use of flour from spelt as a substitute for wheat flour. Ten *man* would give 20 *man* of bread, but it was unpleasant to the taste and glutinous.[108] Ten *man* of the best wheat flour gave only 18 or sometimes 20 *man* of bread.[109]

Like Ibn Waḥshiyya,[110] Rashīd al-Dīn distinguishes between sorghum (*gāwars*) and millet (*dhurrat*). He recognises that both were of many different strains according to climate and the nature of the soil, a fact which has, incidentally, confounded both historians and modern writers.[111] Confusion is added to because the terms *gāwars, arzan* and *dhurrat* are sometimes used indiscriminately. However, Rashīd al-Dīn seems to use *gāwars* for *sorghum vulgare, arzan* for certain specific

[105] *Ibid.*, pp. 139–41.
[106] *Ibid.*, p. 140.
[107] *Ibid.*, pp. 131–8.
[108] *Ibid.*, pp. 141–2.
[109] *Ibid.*, p. 134.
[110] See A.M. Watson, *Agricultural Innovation in the Early Islamic World* (Cambridge, 1983), p. 151.
[111] *Cf. ibid.*, pp. 9 ff. and H.H. Mann, *The Social Framework of Agriculture* (London, 1968), pp. 374 ff.

kinds of sorghum and *dhurrat* for the *panicum* millets.[112] European writers use the term millet to refer to both crops.

Rashīd al-Dīn states that sorghum was cultivated by irrigation or in mud flats (*kibs*) after the soil had dried out when wheat and barley had been harvested.[113] According to him, sorghum had many advantages: it required little seed and gave a prolific return; when lightly cooked it swelled; it kept for many years; mice did not attack it much; it was cheap and in famine years saved people's lives. It was the food of the poor. Different kinds of fermented drink were made from sorghum, such as *sorma, ṭarāsūn* and *būza.*[114]

One strain of sorghum which came from the Qipchaq steppe was called *tügi.* It had large milky grains (*ānrā dānahā-yi buzurg mībāshad wa dar ān charbī hast*) and for this reason was good. There was also a yellow kind.[115]

In Mongolia, according to Rashīd al-Dīn, there was a kind of sorghum (*gāwars*), seed grain of which soldiers would take with them when they went on campaigns to remote places where they might have to stay for one or two years and where food might not be available, whether by reason of the poverty of the land or lack of communications. Wherever they stopped on the way to fatten their cattle (*chahārpāyān*) they would sow that seed. It would ripen in forty days and they would use it as their food and sustenance (*qūt wa nafaqa*) until they reached their destination. Thus the army would be provisioned and the country held.[116] If Rashīd al-Dīn is right in

[112] *Āthār wa aḥyā'*, pp. 143–5, 150–4. *Panicum* millets were probably originally developed in eastern and central Asia (see Mann, *Social Framework*, p. 336). *Kaoliang* or sorghum first appears in the annals of Chinese agriculture in the 12th century (see F.W. Mote, "Yüan and Ming," p. 197). Millet was the poor man's staple in the 12th and 13th centuries (M. Freeman, "Sung" in Chang, *Food in Chinese Culture*, p. 151.
[113] *Āthār wa aḥyā'*, pp. 143–4.
[114] *Ibid.*, p. 144. On these terms see G. Doerfer, *Türkische und mongolische Elemente in Neupersischen* (Wiesbaden, 1963–75), III, 249–50; I, 326–7; II, 337–9. Mote ("Yüan and Ming," p. 202) states that the technology for the distillation of alcoholic beverages, which in China were principally distilled from sorghum, became known in China only in the 12th or 13th century.
[115] *Āthār wa aḥyā'*, p. 144. Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, who travelled through the Qipchaq steppe on his way to the court of Sulṭān Muḥammad Özbeg (reg. A.D. 1312–41) states that the Crimean Turks did not eat bread or any solid food, but prepared a dish made from a crop like millet, which they called *dugi* (*The Travels of Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, A.D. 1325–1354*, tr. H.A.R. Gibb, Hakluyt Series, Second Series CXVII, vol. II [London, 1962], p. 474). He also mentions a fermented drink made from *dugi* (*ibid.*, II, 475).
[116] *Āthār wa aḥyā'*, pp. 144–5. The term *chahārpāyān* (lit. quadrupeds) in this pas-

saying that the crop ripened in forty days, it may have been some mixed strain. Poor man's millet (*panicum frumentaceum*) under favourable conditions ripens in forty-five days, whereas the sorghum millets may take 80 to 100 days to mature.[117] Waṣṣāf has a somewhat similar account. He states that Qubilai Qa'an's army sowed a kind of sorghum (*arzan*), which was called *tügi*, as a catch crop in the desert with rain water. It was said to ripen in forty days and was used as food and fodder (*'ulūfāt wa 'alafāt*).[118]

Peasants, according to Rashīd al-Dīn, cultivated sorghum as an irrigated crop after harvesting the grain crop. If there was surplus water from the cotton crop or from vegetables or other crops which had been grown in trenches (*jālīz*) or in gardens, they used that water to cultivate sorghum and thus obtained two crops annually from the land. In places where there were many soldiers with their cattle, sorghum (*gāwars*) was grown. This was because cattle would not eat the variety known as *arzan*, whereas they would eat *gāwars* and *tügi* and these crops would fatten them. In North China cattle were for the most part given *tügi* in place of barley and it fattened them better. The Khitans brought *tügi* from North China to Marv and sowed it there. It was introduced into Persia by some Khitans who resided in Khwuy. They sowed it there and its cultivation spread to Tabrīz and other provinces. It was sown in the same way as other kinds of sorghum, but since the land was better tended and given manure a better and heavier crop resulted. Sparrows were very fond of it and if it was not protected flocks of sparrows and other birds would settle on it.[119]

Millet was of two kinds: one which ripened in forty days and the other, called *dhurrat-i sāl*, which ripened more slowly, and the heads (*khūsha*) of which were heavier. In cold regions (*sardsīr*) it was better to sow the early variety so that it ripened before the cold set in. Rashīd al-Dīn states that he had repeatedly cultivated millet in cold regions such as Tabrīz, Hamadān and Sulṭāniyya, where it had not been cultivated before, and that although it was a crop for the *garmsīr* it was now cultivated in the *sardsīr*. If the ground was properly prepared, it grew extremely well, whether the seed was of the early or

sage probably means primarily horses, but it may have included also camels, asses, oxen and sheep.

[117] See Mann, *Social Framework*, pp. 389, 384.

[118] *Tārīkh-i Waṣṣāf*, p. 67.

[119] *Āthār wa aḥyā'*, p. 145.

late variety. It had to be protected (like sorghum) from different kinds of birds and sparrows. The latter would peck and scratch at it before the grain was ripe and was still full of milk (*shīra*), so that the heads would not fill. For this reason there must always be someone with a sling to shoot stones at the birds and to drive away the sparrows especially before the grain had set. It was customary for peasants (*muzāri'ān*) to agree to cultivate millet in neighbouring plots so that they could share in watching over it. They would also put up scarecrows. When the millet heads were formed, they would be tied up in bags made of old *kirbās* (a kind of cloth) to prevent the birds getting at them. Millet, like sorghum, was a beneficial crop: little seed was needed and it gave a heavy crop.

The main regions where millet was cultivated were Kāshān, Iṣfahān and Yazd, where, it was alleged, 1 *man* of seed gave 300 or 400 *mans* of grain. The plant grew taller than a man. Its stalk was tougher than sugar cane and each head would weigh ½ *man* (c. 3½ lbs). Unless the ground was well prepared the crop would not ripen in 2 or 3 months. The ground must be dug with a long spade to a depth of 1 *gaz* (ca. 3 ft) and left for that year to bake in the sun. The following year seed must be sown in moist soil (*dar nam*) in spring. If the soil, because of rain or artificial irrigation, became hard when the crop began to grow, it must be broken up with a spade and a pointed instrument (*dahra*) five or six times before the heads became large, manured and given whatever water was available. Every five or six days it must be singled, one plant in ten being pulled up and given to cattle. By the time the cool weather came it would ripen. The stalk (*chūb*) would then be sweet so that it could be eaten like sugar cane. When the heads had been removed the stalk would be chopped up by a threshing machine (*chūn*) and given to cattle, which would be fattened by it. If the stalks with their heads were given to cattle in bad condition (*lāghir*) they would be fattened in 20 days. But cattle which had been fattened in this way must be put to work only gradually or they would quickly lose condition. When the stalk dried it was used as fuel instead of firewood. If it was desired to store millet against years of scarcity, it would come to no harm if it was stored with the grain still in the heads. Bread made with millet was, after wheat bread, better than bread made with barley or sorghum. It was nutritious (*khāṣṣiyyat dārad*), such that all the peasants of Iṣfahān, who were the most robust and healthy of people, alleged that they were healthier than others because they

ate millet bread, so much so that if anyone had wheat he would not eat it but exchange it for millet. Bread made with half millet flour and half wheaten flour was better than wheat bread and was a better colour, thinner and more digestible, more nutritious and tastier, and it did not quickly satiate the eater. If the husk was removed millet made good and tasty stews (*āsh*).[120]

Crops grown on land which had been under millet in the previous year gave a larger return. Melons, if grown after millet, grew very well, gave much fruit and were not much subject to pest. If millet was sown in gardens round trees which had been planted for one year, such trees, because the soil had been prepared, manured and watered for the millet, would thrive; and even if the millet plants overshadowed the fruit trees, the latter would come to no harm because the millet was shallow rooted. If the millet plants were singled, as described above, the remaining plants would be a spade's distance apart and small fruit trees would come to no harm in their shade, and would benefit from the preparation of the soil for the millet crop, especially in the second year if trenches (*jālīz*) were dug. They would grow large and strong and give much fruit; and if grafted they would take the graft better and their fruit would be better than that of trees grown in soil that had not been tended for millet.[121]

In places where intensive cultivation was desirable because of a shortage of water and land, when the millet plants grew and began to form heads, the millet could be undersown when the land was being dug and manured with spinach, lettuce, beetroot, *sipandān* (mustard nasturtian?) or the like. By the time the millet heads had filled out and ripened, those seeds would have grown a little and after the millet had been harvested they would ripen in the autumn.[122]

Normally millet required much water, but Rashīd al-Dīn notes an exception to this in the province of Diyār Bakr in the district of Buqʿ (?), the soil of which was extremely good and porous, such that rainwater would sink down 6–9 ft. "I have seen," he writes, "that much millet is sown there without water and that it is stronger than irrigated millet in other districts. But this is a rarity."[123]

In his discussion of rice Rashīd al-Dīn states that there were various kinds grown for different purposes, especially in India, North

[120] *Ibid.*, pp. 150–3.
[121] *Ibid.*, p. 153.
[122] *Ibid.*
[123] *Ibid.*, p. 154.

China (Khitāy) and South China (Machin), not known in Persia. He states that according to tradition rice was brought to Persia in the reign of Anūshīravān. Red rice was used, for example, for making a kind of wine (*ṭarāsūn*).[124] He states that "In the reign of Ghazan Khān we got seed from a small variety called *sana* (?) from India and planted it. Because it was planted in strong soil it grew tall but bent over and did not bear fruit. As an experiment we cooked [some of the seed grain] several times. It has a better taste and smell than ordinary rice and is more digestible."[125] Describing the various ways in which rice was planted in different regions, he notes that in Gīlān and Māzandarān it was transplanted from seed beds by hand and wherever this was done a better crop resulted. In Gushtāspī, Mughān and Wāsiṭ and many other districts, it was not transplanted.[126] If rice was not planted every year, yields would be high; 1 *man* of seed might give 400 *man* or more. However, in some districts of Māzandarān and in the neighbourhood of Gurgān and Astarābād rice could be cultivated every year without the land becoming exhausted. The best rice came from Gīlān and after that from Māzandarān. If rice was stored without being taken out of the heads (*khūsha*), it would keep many years. In Māzandarān and Gīlān the rice harvest was stooked in such a way that rain would not penetrate the stook.[127]

Rashīd al-Dīn describes the cultivation of sugar cane.[128] That grown in the neighbourhood of Shūshtar was very red but badly rated. He had, however, experimented with it and claimed that better results could be obtained if the sugar was boiled as it was in Baghdād and the red and white sugar separated.[129] Sugar was also grown in Māzandarān but was of inferior quality because of the damp climate. The sugar cane of Bam, Rīqān and Makrānāt was also of inferior quality.[130] Raw sugar was imported from India.[131]

Various dye plants are mentioned by Rashīd al-Dīn, including indigo, which was imported from India. He alleges that it had not been cultivated in Persia formerly.[132] This is not in fact the case, but

[124] *Ibid.*, pp. 146–7.
[125] *Ibid.*, p. 147.
[126] *Ibid.*
[127] *Ibid.*, p. 149.
[128] *Ibid.*, pp. 180–2.
[129] *Ibid.*, p. 182.
[130] *Ibid.*, p. 183.
[131] *Ibid.*, p. 182.
[132] *Ibid.*, p. 162.

by the time of Rashīd al-Dīn its cultivation had probably died out. He states, "at this time" (*dar īn muddat*) seed had been brought to Basra and the cultivation of indigo was gradually spreading to Wāsiṭ and Nu'māniyya. He had brought seed to Tabrīz and planted it with good results and states that if it was cultivated in Persia it would not be necessary to import it from India.[133] The best saffron came from Bīrjand in Quhistān; that from Qum, Hamadān, Rūdāvar and Nihāvand was the next best. Contrary to the general view, saffron would grow in both the *sardsīr* and the *garmsīr*, though it grew better in the former.[134] He had taken saffron roots to Tabrīz and Sulṭāniyya, where they grew better than in Hamadān. Saffron needed little manure and was a valuable crop.[135] He describes how peasants caught the mice which ate the roots of the saffron crop.[136]

Discussing lettuces, Rashīd al-Dīn states that he had cultivated a certain kind of lettuce in Sulṭāniyya, where it grew better than in Tabrīz or Baghdād; and it had spread to Hamadān, where it had not been known before. He recommends the cultivation of this lettuce in all provinces.[137]

Rashīd al-Dīn describes the cultivation of flax and the process of [illegible]ippling, scutching, water retting with lixivium (*shakhār*) and the spin[illegible]ing of the fibres into thread. He states that flax was cultivated in Persia and Anatolia. It was also widely grown in Baghdād, Ḥilla, Wāsiṭ, Egypt and Syria. Cloth was woven from flax and from a mix[illegible]ure of flax and silk. The latter was fine and delicate and in great [illegible]emand from merchants. Orders had been given that this kind of [illegible]loth should be woven in Tabrīz and the results had been excellent. [illegible]Whereas merchants had imported garments (*jāmahā*) formerly they [illegible]ow only imported thread (*rīsmān-i kattān*). Very fine flax was grown in Europe (Afranj) but little of it was brought to Persia, though some fine linen, which was rarely imported, sold at 6 *dīnārs* per yard (*gaz*). Rashīd al-Dīn states that he had brought flax seed from Qonya to Tabrīz and Sulṭāniyya and great efforts were being made to cultivate it there.[138]

[133] *Ibid.*
[134] *Ibid.*, p. 203.
[135] *Ibid.*, p. 205.
[136] *Ibid.*, pp. 204–5.
[137] *Ibid.*, p. 191.
[138] *Ibid.*, pp. 158–9. He states that what was called Russian flax (*kattān-i rūsī*) was not grown in Russia. When European merchants came to Constantinople and from there to Persia since most of them were fair-headed it was thought that they came from Russia and so the flax they brought was called Russian flax and the name had stuck.

He mentions that cotton was cultivated in Khurāsān, especially in Quhistān, Maybud, Ardakān, Bafrūya, Mawṣil (Mosul), Irbīl and in some of the villages of Iṣfahān,[139] but he does not record any extension of cotton cultivation in his time.

The section on melons is very detailed.[140] Oil was obtained from melon seeds in Bukhārā, Samarqand and Khwārazm. The process of extracting oil from melon seeds was unknown in Persia, where rape seed oil was used instead. In Transoxania, melon seeds were smoked in preparation for sowing, a practice which, Rashīd al-Dīn states, had now spread to Hamadān.[141]

A great deal of garlic was grown in Yazd, 'Aqdā and Haftādur and exported to Iṣfahān, Shīrāz and elsewhere. It was of better quality than garlic from other places.[142]

Rashīd al-Dīn was one of the great polymaths of his time. Immensely erudite, observant and widely travelled, the range of his knowledge and practical experience of agriculture, arboriculture and horticulture was probably unequalled in medieval Persia. He was no armchair writer; he knew about the daily routine of farming, the intricacies of irrigation systems, the propagation of plants and the ravages of pests, and also the joy of making successful grafts and transplants. In the foregoing pages I have touched upon some of the matters discussed by him in the *Āthār wa aḥyā'*. Inaccuracies, misunderstandings and shortcomings can doubtless be found in some of his descriptions of trees and plants, but the general impression given by the work is that he was an agronomist of no mean distinction. It is clear from the *Āthār wa aḥyā'* that he hoped by his knowledge to contribute to a revival of agriculture in the Ilkhanate and to stimulate others to follow his example in the cultivation of the land; and perhaps he hoped and planned for a time when Persian agriculture might be reconstructed after the recession brought about by the

[139] *Ibid.*, p. 163.
[140] *Ibid.*, pp. 169–78.
[141] *Ibid.*, pp. 177–8.
[142] *Ibid.*, p. 195.

Mongol invasions. It is not possible from the text of the *Āthār wa ahyā'* to assess the extent to which his efforts were successful. There can, however, be no question of the importance of the *Āthār wa ahyā'* for the history of agriculture in Persia and the diffusion of crops and plants in that country.

THE LETTERS OF RASHĪD AL-DĪN: ĪLKHĀNID FACT OR TIMURID FICTION?

A.H. Morton

The authenticity of the work known as the Letters of Rashīd al-Dīn was challenged by Reuben Levy in an article published in 1946.[1] Levy's case was considered and criticized by I.P. Petrushevsky in the following year.[2] It cannot be said that controversy has raged over the Letters in the subsequent decades. Many of those who have had occasion to use them have expressed no reservations. The nature of the Letters makes it easy to pick out a reference or two on a wide variety of subjects.[3] Others, and their numbers seem to have grown in recent years, have expressed doubts about the work, or even rejected it outright. This has typically been done in footnotes, before the writer proceeds to more profitable matters: once the Letters are taken to be false their value to the historian of Ilkhanid Iran is, to say the least, considerably reduced.[4] Otherwise, while objections have

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[1] "The Letters of Rashīd al-Dīn Faḍl-Allāh," *JRAS*, 1946, pp. 74–8.

[2] *"K voprosu o podlinnosti perepiski Rashīd al-Dīna," Vestnik Leningradskogo Universiteta*, 1948, No. 9, pp. 124–30. Professor A. Ivanov kindly provided a copy of the article, which appears not be available in British libraries, and I am most grateful to Mrs. Barbara Hoddinot who elucidated its contents for me. *Cf.* Petrushevsky, *Kishāwarzī wa Munāsibāt-i Arḍī dar Īrān-i 'Ahd-i Mughūl*, trans. Karīm Kishāwarz (Tehran, 1344), I, 26–8.

[3] For a specimen of this procedure see A.H. Morton, "The Ardabīl Shrine in the Reign of Shāh Ṭahmāsp I" [part 2], *Iran*, 13 (1975), 52.

[4] As an example the characteristically trenchant words of the late Professor Minovi may be translated: "In my humble opinion these letters are not from the pen of Rashīd al-Dīn or even written at his orders but forged in his name." (*Waqf nāma-yi Rab'-i Rashīdī*, printed ed., eds. Mujtabā Minovi and Īraj Afshār [Tehran Anno Shāhinshāhī 2537], introduction, p. 36 n.). The only attempt by a "rejectionist," other than Levy, to date the Letters seems to be that of S. Digby, who made use of data from them in a discussion of the external trade of the Dehli Sultanate and favoured a (late) fourteenth-century date. See *The Cambridge Economic History of India*, ed. Tapan Raychauduri and Irfan Habib (Cambridge, 1982), I, 139–40. Parwīz Adhkā'ī has recently defended the Letters relying on *ad hominem* arguments. He claims that the Jewish Levy expected Rashīd al-Dīn's Letters to show "Jewish stylistic peculiarities," which are not there. Of course no such argument appears in Levy's article. As for Minovi, his views simply echo those of the Jewish Levy. It is well known that, in spite of all his pretensions, he was sometimes led in to error by foreign influences, to the extent at times of being "more Catholic than the Pope." (*Tārīkhnigārān-i Īrān* [Tehran, 1373], p. 353.)

been raised to Levy's arguments,[5] no further examination of the Letters as a whole has been attempted on the chronological and historical lines suggested by his pioneering article. This is an obvious way to attempt to solve the question of authenticity and has been made much easier than when the matter was first raised by, in particular, the publication of much more of the Persian source material for the period. The negative nature of the enterprise of demonstrating inauthenticity is something of a deterrent. However, judgement has been pending on the question for a very long time, and it is desirable that it should, if possible, be cleared up one way or the other. Having some time ago come to the conclusion that the Letters are not genuine, the present writer here attempts to show why.

Levy produced a variety of arguments against the Letters. He drew attention to what he saw as the exaggerated and at the same time vague nature of the claims made in them. He maintained that they lacked the characteristic marks of Rashīd al-Dīn's style and language as found in the *Jāmiʿ al-Tawārīkh*. He pointed out that three of the few dates given were wrong. It may be objected here that dates and other figures are particularly susceptible to corruption. Levy's final paragraph certainly loses its clinching effect when one reflects how easily a scribe could have written *thamānīn* (80) by mistake for *thamān* (8).[6] He raised a number of chronological problems concerning individuals named in the Letters. As he was aware, it is often difficult to reach certainty on such points. His arguments that rich *ʿulamā* would not have been given gifts and that Rashīd al-Dīn, who was a Sunni, would not have given presents to Shiʿite figures are certainly questionable. Besides the erroneous dates he noted one major chronological problem, that of the account of Rashīd al-Dīn's supposed mission to India. Levy stated his case boldly and he seems to have regarded the falsity of the Letters as obvious, once pointed out. He proposed a fifteenth-century date for the composition of the

[5] Independent of Petrushevsky's article is the discussion, limited to questioning Levy's arguments, by M. Bina-Motlagh in *Scheich Safi von Ardabil* (Doctoral Dissertation, Göttingen, 1969), pp. 140–5.

[6] "The crowning effort of the inventor of these *munsha'āt*. . . . It was a cheap gift, for by that year [780] he [Rashīd al-Dīn] would have been dead himself sixty-two years and the intended beneficiaries, already elderly, far longer." Both editors (see n. 11 below) record the reading of the MSS. as *thamānīn* and emend to *thamān* without comment. (*Letters A/B*, pp. 261/238) Three other precise dates are given, all at the end of letters and all patently wrong. (*Letters A/B*, pp. 18/26, 43/55, 259/236). *Cf.* Petrushevsky, "*K voprosu*," p. 128.

Letters. His guess, to use his own term, that the Letters were produced in India has perhaps made it easier to ignore the strength of some of his other arguments. There is an Indian aspect to the Letters, as will be seen, but though the representation of the Ilkhanid world given in them is full of difficulties, it is hard to see that anyone in India could have given them the strong Ilkhanid and Persian colouring which they do have.

As for Petrushevsky's response, it included a passage attacking Levy, and others in passing, as hypercritical bourgeois scholars. Though not suprising in a Soviet study from the time of the beginning of the Cold War, the accusation may owe something to the writer's consciousness that his own knowledge of the text he was discussing was far from complete. He was in a poor position to even attempt to be hypercritical about it himself. Writing without the published edition of the Letters, Petrushevsky knew them almost entirely from the Leningrad (St. Petersburg) manuscript. The introduction and twenty (out of 54) of the pieces that compose the body of the work are missing from this, while twelve others have been more or less severely curtailed.[7] On the question of the style of the Letters Petrushevsky pointed to a number of the difficulties which stand in the way of judging such matters. He also suggested that they might in any case have been written by Rashīd al-Dīn's secretary. However, he did not have access (any more than Levy did) to the statements to the contrary in the introduction to the Letters. Largely ignoring the charge of exaggeration, he attempted to meet that of vagueness by saying that in writing to people well acquainted with his affairs Rashīd al-Dīn did not need to go into petty detail, and also that caution prompted him to write in a general and often indeterminate manner. What led Levy to use the word vague is not easy to explain briefly, but in fact one of the features of the Letters is precisely the amount of petty detail many of them contain (though of course most of this was not available to Petrushevsky at the time he was writing) and when events are narrated or instructions given the

[7] See Falina's introduction to her Russian translation of the Letters: Rashīd al-Dīn, *Perepiska* (Moscow, 1971), pp. 35–7. Petrushevsky knew the description of the contents of the superior Cambridge MS. which had been published by E.G. Browne. See *A Literary History of Persia*, III (Cambridge, 1928), pp. 80–6. He also mentions ("*K voprosu*," p. 125) that E. Bertels had once started to prepare the Leningrad MS. for publication but that he had been unable to obtain photographs of the MS. at Cambridge.

essential exposition is usually perfectly clear. Taking up the individual points raised by Levy, Petrushevsky in many cases was able to produce grounds for thinking his arguments unsound or, at least, inconclusive. He did accept that the dates that Levy had noted were wrong and himself pointed out the impossibility of the fourth, at the end of letter 43. He also accepted that there might be chronological problems concerning individuals appearing in the Letters. In conclusion, though thoroughly dismissive of Levy's efforts and rejecting his conclusion that the Letters were a complete fake, he accepted that they had not reached us in the form in which they were written. His own theory was that the compilation of the collection had probably taken place during the vizierate of Rashīd al-Dīn's son Ghīyāth al-Dīn (1327–1336). Most of the Letters lack dates and the incorrect ones could have been added in the editing at that stage. Insertions might also have been made to glorify Rashīd al-Dīn's reputation to the benefit of his descendants. Data on Rashīd al-Dīn's actual life would need therefore to be treated with caution. However, since this editing would have taken place not long after Rashīd al-Dīn's death it would not prevent the Letters from being a valuable historical source. The socio-economic situation had not changed by the time the edition was made and Rashīd al-Dīn's political ideas were shared by his sons and would therefore not have been distorted in the process of edition. It must have been gratifying when the part of the introduction which states that the work was compiled when Ghīyāth al-Dīn was vizier was published. However, in spite of this, Petrushevsky's theory remains pure speculation and has grave weaknesses. The question of the dates may seem trivial but still, if in a few cases it was decided to re-supply dates, and this is Petrushevsky's suggestion, why are they so badly wrong? Had Muḥammad Abarqūhī, supposedly both the editor and an old employee of Rashīd al-Dīn, forgotten in which century Sulṭāniyya had been built? It would only have been twenty or thirty years before. Much more seriously, once the theory of interpolation is accepted, there is no reason to think that it would have been so neatly limited as to leave unaffected the material on those aspects of history in which Petrushevsky was interested. It may not at first seem unreasonable that an editor should have made additions or alterations to glorify Rashīd al-Dīn's memory, but as the letters are there is no distinction between Rashīd al-Dīn's life and his public and economic activity. There are no criteria by which to distinguish the supposedly original from the supposedly

interpolated. Petrushevsky never seems to have provided any further guidance as to how the wheat is to be separated from the chaff.[8] On this shaky basis he later claimed that after the appearance of the edition the question of the authenticity of the Letters could be regarded as solved.[9] He made free use of their contents, not only for social and economic history, but also for Rashīd al-Dīn's political thinking, an area where an interpolator might well have been tempted to make improvements.[10]

Another scholar of the same period who did know the Letters very well and whose views have influenced subsequent appreciation of the work is Muḥammad Shafīʿ of Lahore, who published them in 1947 in that same city.[11] Muḥammad Shafīʿ had been interested in the Letters for some thirty years, having come across the Cambridge manuscript during the time he spent at Pembroke between 1915 and 1919. He had already prepared an abridged and annotated English

[8] In fact Petrushevsky was unable to maintain the pretence that Rashīd al-Dīn's political ideas were the same in the Letters and in the *Jāmiʿ al-Tawārīkh*. He later claimed that in the latter Rashīd al-Dīn presented his ideas in disguised form. But how could he tell which was the real Rashīd al-Dīn? Or be sure that the interpolator of the Letters had not been at work on political ideas? (See his article, "Rashīd al-Dīn's Conception of the State," *CAJ*, 14 [1970], 154.)

[9] See, for this phrase, Petrushevsky, *Kīshāwarzī*, p. 27.

[10] Ignorance of Russian has largely limited the writer's knowledge of Petrushevsky's works to ones which have appeared in English or Persian. In addition to those already referred to, mention should be made of his chapter, "The Socio-economic Conditions of Iran under the Īl-Khāns," *The Cambridge History of Iran*, V, ed. J.A. Boyle (Cambridge, 1968), pp. 483–537.

[11] *Mukātibāt-i Rashīdī*, ed. Muḥammad Shafīʿ (Lahore, 1947). The title-page bears the dates 1945/1364, which naturally appear as those of publication in many secondary sources. However, the actual dates of publication must be those appearing on the original paper covers: 1947/1367. 1947 is given in the bibliography of Muḥammad Shafīʿ's work in S.M. Abdullah (ed.), *Professor Muḥammad Shafīʿ Presentation Volume* (Lahore, 1955), 33. Muḥammad Shafīʿ, like Levy, relied on the manuscript in the E.G. Browne Collection at Cambridge which lacks its first folio and several more after the second. The full text of the introduction was first published by Fu'ād ʿAbd al-Muʿṭī al-Ṣayyād, in "*Tashīḥ-i Dībācha-yi Mukātibat-i Rashīdī*" (*Dānish*, year II, No. i, 1329/1950, pp. 158–67). Muḥammad Shafīʿ later supplied the text of the lacunae in the Cambridge MS., from al-Ṣayyād's article and other MSS. ("*Tatmīm wa taṣḥīh-i mukātibāt-i Khwāja Rashīd al-Dīn Faḍlallāh Ṭabīb*," *Oriental College Magazine*, Nov. 1951). The Russian translation also reproduces the text of the introduction, from al-Ṣayyād's article. The more recent edition (*Sawāniḥ al-Afkār-i Rashīdī*, ed. M.-T. Dānishpazhūh, [Tehran, 1358]) is based primarily on a MS. in the Malik Library, Tehran, dated 928/1522. This edition provides the complete text, and has much useful introductory material, but also exhibits a large number of what appear to be printer's errors. Page references below are given to both editions where possible, with Muḥammad Shafīʿ's edition cited as *Letters A* and Dānishpazhūh's as *Letters B*. The pagination of the *editio princeps* is provided by Dānishpazhūh.

translation at that period.[12] His careful edition of the Persian text is accompanied by detailed notes, a number of which draw attention to historical and other difficulties raised by points in particular letters. One has the impression that he was hoping that further investigation and thought would somehow solve the problems. Neither in the edition nor elsewhere did he express any doubts about the fundamental genuineness of the Letters.[13]

The Letters of Rashīd al-Dīn is a current title of convenience, corresponding to the Persian *Mukātibāt-i Rashīdī* or *Munsha'āt-i Rashīdī*, and going back to the period when the full text of the introduction was unknown. In this introduction the work is entitled the *Sawāniḥ al-Afkār-i Rashīdī*, meaning something like the *Pensées* or even *Obiter Dicta* of Rashīd al-Dīn.[14] Of the 54 pieces which constitute the body of the work, 47 are in the form of letters or other communications in Rashīd al-Dīn's name. 21 of these are addressed to Rashīd al-Dīn's own sons and one to a nephew. Other individuals addressed include agents, officials and *'ulamā'*; a few pieces are in the form of decrees to groups. Three of the remaining items are more obviously literary compositions said to be by Rashīd al-Dīn himself, three are letters addressed to him and one is a petition to him, presented in sections alternating with his answers. The content is varied. Much of it can be classified as moralizing, but what makes the Letters unusual is the interest shown in concrete detail. This is most conspicuous in the long lists of commodities, properties, tax schedules etc, but is also evident in, for example, the descriptions of civil engineering and construction projects. It is this "realistic" aspect of the work that makes it look like an unusually valuable source for social history in particular and helps to give it a *prima-facie* appearance of authenticity.

[12] See E.G. Browne, *Arabian Medicine* (Cambridge, 1921), p. 104, and Nicholson's note in E.G. Browne, *A Descriptive Catalogue of the Oriental MSS. Belonging to the Late E.G. Browne*, completed and edited by R.A. Nicholson (Cambridge, 1932), p. 147. The translation was listed among the forthcoming publications of the Gibb Memorial in 1921. See the list prefixed to R.A. Nicholson's edition of the *Fārsnāma* of Ibn al-Balkhī, which came out in that year.

[13] However, the query raises itself whether the failure to publish the English version of the Letters was not caused by the onset of doubts. It is mentioned as forthcoming in the notes to the text and still listed among Shafī''s unpublished drafts in the *Professor Muḥammad Shafī' Presentation Volume*, p. xxxix.

[14] *Letters B*, p. 3.

The introduction is written in the persona of Muḥammad Abarqūhī, seemingly unknown outside the Letters. Abarqūhī has at times been said to have been Rashīd al-Dīn's secretary; this is not in fact stated.[15] The introduction does say that he had been in Rashīd al-Dīn's service and that on the latter's advice he had frequented the *'ulamā'*. He had decided to compile a memorial to his master and included in it *all* the compositions which Rashīd al-Dīn had himself composed with his own pen in his, Abarqūhī's, presence, as well as *all* letters in which the Kings of the world and Princes of the time had acknowledged that Rashīd al-Dīn's fortune (*dawlat*) and felicity (*sa'ādat*) had been quite unparallelled by those of any other person. Two points need to be noted. Firstly, Abarqūhī would appear to have served Rashīd al-Dīn for a very long time, on the face of it from some time in the reign of Arghun (1284–1291) and, secondly and more importantly, it is firmly stated that the letters and other pieces represented as by Rashīd al-Dīn himself are his own personal compositions.[16] The latter point is confirmed near the end of the introduction,[17] which finally tells us that the work was compiled when Rashīd al-Dīn's son Ghiyāth al-Dīn Muḥammad was vizier. This

[15] In Letter 37 (*Letters A/B*, pp. 237–8/215) Mawlānā Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad Abarqūhī is mentioned as entrusted with the register of moneys which Rashīd al-Dīn has on deposit with merchants; earlier in the same letter (pp. 231/210) Mawlānā Qāḍī Muḥammad Abarqūhī is stated to be informed about Rashīd al-Dīn landholdings in the province of Awghān. In letter 51 provisions granted for a mourning banquet are to be supplied by means of a draft upon him. These references make it appear that his supposed role in Rashīd al-Dīn's service was mainly concerned with his master's financial interests.

It is often convenient to refer to the individual items, most of which are short. The enumeration of the Tehran edition has been followed. Owing to the absence of several pages in the Cambridge MS. the Lahore edition lacks the first item and part of the second; the existing portion of the latter naturally became number 1. The numbers assigned to the pieces are thus one less than those in the Tehran edition. The Russian translation filled part of the lacuna in the edition from the Leningrad manuscript which runs the first two pieces together as one item, so that the subsequent numbers correspond to those of the Lahore edition.

[16] *Letters B*, p. 3 and corrigenda on p. 348: *īn banda . . . har inshā'[i] ki ba-ḥuḍūr-i īn ḍa'īf ba-qalam-i guhar-bār wa kilk-i* (*recte* for *kumak*) *durar-nithār dar silk-i taḥrīr wa ḥayyiz-i taqrīr āward sar-daftar-i majmū'a-yi mutakallimān wa min-dhālik-i jarīda-yi mutarassilān mī-sākht, wa har maktūbī ki mulūk-i aṭrāf wa hukkām-i aknāf bar way mī-niwishtand dar īn jam' thabt mī-kard . . .* Before the complete introduction was known the argument that the compositions in the Letters in Rashīd al-Dīn's name might have been wholly or partly written by one or more secretaries would have been difficult to counter.

[17] *Letters B*, p. 4: *wa munsha'ātī ki ṣāḥib-i a'ẓam-i sa'īd . . . dar silk-i taḥrīr wa taqrīr āwarda ast īn ast.*

implies a date between 1327 and 1336, some time after Rashīd al-Dīn's death. There is no dedication to Ghiyāth al-Dīn. In the sentence describing the compilation of the book, at the end of the introduction and in the past tense, he is given a benediction appropriate to one already dead.[18]

A summary of Rashīd al-Dīn's career will make it easier to appreciate what follows.[19] The son of a family of Jewish physicians of Hamadān he was born in 647 or 648/1248–50.[20] He entered the service of the Ilkhanid dynasty in the reign of Abaqa (1265–1282), acting as a doctor and one of the boon companions (*nudamā*) of the King. For the reign of Aḥmad (1282–1284) there is no information. Under Abaqa's son Arghun (1284–1291) Rashīd al-Din was once again among the boon companions, was consulted by the *Umarā-yi Ulūs*, the highest-ranking Mongol Amirs, and, according to the *Durrat al-Akhbār*, began to play some part in governmental affairs (*tadbīr-i maṣāliḥ-i dawlat*). In the next reign, that of Geikhatu (1291–1295), the position of vizier was offered to him, and refused, but, according to the *Nasā'im al-Asḥār*, he made further progress as confidante and doctor and began at this stage to become involved in administration. This last point may support Fischel's suggestion that he is the Rashīd al-Dawla the Jew described by the continuator of Bar Hebraeus's History. If so, for some time he had the important responsibility of supplying the food of the court kitchens, but, as the financial crisis deepened towards the end of Geikhatu's reign, he abandoned the position and fled.[21] In the *Waqfnāma* he does not mention having served Geikhatu. Early in the reign of Ghazan he reappeared at court, Muslim, close to the king and influential, but without, so far as we know, a well-defined position in the administration.[22] Though in his own history of Ghazan's reign he does not mention it, other contemporary sources inform us that in 1298, after the fall of the minister Ṣadr al-Dīn Zanjānī, Rashīd al-Dīn, together with Sa'd al-Dīn Sāwajī, took his place.[23] The two remained in office on the accession of Öljeitü in 1304, and after Sa'd al-Dīn's fall and execution in 1312, his place as Rashīd al-Dīn's colleague was taken by Tāj al-Dīn 'Alī Shāh Gīlānī. Rashīd al-Dīn may have lost some of his influence towards the end of the reign of Öljeitü, but his partnership with Tāj al-Dīn lasted, if not always harmoniously, into the reign of Abū Sa'īd (1316–1335), until, by now old and ill, Rashīd al-Dīn fell victim to the intrigues of his colleague. Abu Sa'īd's formal enthronement took place in April 1317. In October of the same year Rashīd al-Dīn was dismissed and retired to Tabriz. His supporters began to move to return him to office but the opposing faction also acted. He was accused of responsibility for the death of Öljeitü, found guilty, and executed in July 1318.[24] This sketch provides the background into which the Letters must be fitted. Letters which refer, as many do, to Rashīd al-Dīn as in power can, if genuine, only realistically come from the reigns of Ghazan or Öljeitü or from the very beginning of that of Abū Sa'īd. Ghazan and Öljeitü are mentioned several times in the Letters. Abū Sa'īd is not. It should be borne in mind that Rashīd al-Dīn was never in sole charge of

[18] "*anāra Allāhu burhānahu.*" (*loc. cit.*)

[19] There is no thorough and up-to-date account of Rashīd al-Dīn. Still of some use is the introduction to the *Histoire des Mongols de la Perse*, ed. and trans. É. Quatremère (Paris, 1836). Two other important studies are Fu'ād 'Abd al-Mu'ṭī al-Ṣayyād, *Mu'arrikh al-Mughūl al-Kabīr Rashīd al-Dīn Faḍlallāh al-Ḥamadānī* (Cairo, 1967) and the article "Reşīd-üd-Din Tabîb" by Z.V. Togan in *İslâm Ansiklopedisi*. There is also much in J. Van Ess, *Der Wesir und seine Gelehrten* (Wiesbaden, 1981). The material for before the reign of Ghazan is particularly limited. Rashīd al-Dīn himself gives a very brief outline in the *Waqfnāma* of the Rab'-i Rashīdī (p. 242). Two parallel accounts of importance for the early period are those in Nāṣir al-Dīn Munshī Yazdī's *Durrat al-Akhbār wa Lum'at al-Anwār* (Tehran, 1318), pp. 110–14, and the anonymous *Nasā'im al-Asḥār min Laṭā'if al-Akhbār dar Tārīkh-i wuzarā*, ed. Jalāl al-Dīn Muḥaddith Urmawī (Tehran, 1338), pp. 112–14. The editor of the latter maintains on plausible, though not wholly decisive, stylistic grounds that it is another work of Nāṣir al-Dīn Munshī Yazdī. The vizier, "'Ādil by name," to whom it is dedicated (p. 118) is evidently Nuṣrat al-Dīn 'Ādil (earlier known as Rukn al-Dīn Ṣā'in), vizier of Abu Sa'īd, 1325–7.

[20] Van Ess, p. 40.

[21] Bar Hebraeus, *The Chronography of Bar Hebraeus*, I, trans. E.A. Wallis Budge (Oxford, 1932), p. 496. W.J. Fischel, *Jews in the Economic and Political Life of Mediaeval Islam* (London, 1937), p. 123. Fischel here suggests that Rashīd al-Dīn's conversion to Islam may have taken place during this period. The Letters shed no light on his Jewish origins.

[22] The first precise evidence for his association with Ghazan comes during Ghazan's visit to Baghdad early in 696, the winter of 1296–7. See *Al-Ḥawādith al-Jāmi'a wal-tajārib al-nāfi'a fil-mi'at al-sābi'a*, ed. Muṣṭafā Jawād (Baghdad, 1351), p. 492. This work was at first mistakenly, as the editor later established, attributed to Ibn al-Fuwaṭī.

[23] Ḥamdullāh Mustawfī, *Tārīkh-i Guzīda*, ed. 'Abd al-Ḥusayn Nawā'ī (2nd ed. Tehran, 1362), p. 604; Waṣṣāf, *Tārīkh* (Bombay, 1269), p. 346, where the date 699 has long been recognized as an error of transcription. *Cf.* Rashīd al-Dīn, *Jāmi' al-Tawārīkh*, III, ed. 'Abd al-Karīm 'Alīzāda (Baku, 1957), pp. 327–8, where only Sa'd al-Din's appointment is mentioned. The responsibilities of the two ministers are to some extent differentiated in the sources.

[24] *Tārīkh-i Guzīda*, pp. 612–3; Ḥāfiẓ Abrū, *Dhayl-i Jāmi' al-Tawārīkh-i Rashīdī*, ed. Khān Bābā Bayānī (Tehran, 1350), pp. 126–9; Ibn al-Ṣuqā'ī, *Tālī Kitāb Wafayāt al-A'yān*, ed. and trans. J. Sublet (Damascus, 1974), text pp. 183–4.

even the financial and bureaucratic, let alone the military, affairs of the Ilkhanid state.

Proceeding to examine a number of the individual letters, we may begin with two conspicuously problematic items, both concerned, in different ways, with Ilkhanid relations with India. Letter 53 is supposedly sent from the region of Qandahār to Rashīd al-Dīn's son Ibrāhīm, who is Governor (*ḥākim*) of Shīrāz.[25] The ruler who is also present is unnamed, but from letter 35, in which Ghazan is represented as intending an attack on India,[26] it might be assumed that he is meant. Rashīd al-Dīn is evidently in power. He has been under attack from jealous trouble-makers (opponents at court are no doubt intended), but they have fallen into their own trap and met with disaster. A campaign is in progress against ill-defined enemies. Rashīd al-Dīn's son Jalāl with the mighty armies of Rūm (Anatolia) has proceeded in the direction of Zābul and Kābul, conquered the great fortress of Lahore with little difficulty and advanced towards Sind with a group of the Mongol Amirs. The wretched foe plan to trap the advancing army but, recognising the warlike qualities of their opponents, prefer to retreat to the islands and thickets (of, as becomes clear, the Indus valley). The Mongols are diverted by plunder, but Jalāl, like a meteor chasing demons, pursues the foe to the islands of Bhakkar and Ūchch on the Indus, and as far as the lagoons (*diḥāl*) of Lāharī and Tatta (on the delta of the same river). All the notables and leaders of Hind and Sind come to grief. News of this success reaches the King, who tells Rashīd al-Dīn how much he admires Jalāl's conduct. His favour is assured, and the campaign has ended in complete success, with the depopulation of the borderlands of the enemy. In the letter Ibrāhīm is instructed to give thanks to God for his bounty and treat the people of Fārs with kindness and favour. Since the amirs, the royal soldiery and Rashīd al-Dīn's servants (*nawkarān* < *nöker*) and sons are constantly occupied in conquest arms are necessary. Inspection of the treasuries has revealed that the supply is running short. Messengers have been sent far and wide to seek them. The letter ends with instructions for Ibrāhīm to supply weaponry in accordance with a list which is appended.

[25] The authenticity of Letter 53 has already been called into question by P. Jackson in his article "The Mongols and the Delhi Sultanate in the Reign of Muḥammad b. Tughluq (1325–1351)," *CAJ*, 19 (1975), 129–30.

[26] *Letters A/B*, pp. 185/167.

Like many of the letters with a seemingly factual content, whether one takes them to be genuine or not, No. 53 lures one into involvement in matters of detail. Does this letter, for instance, give a correct picture of the mediaeval topography of the Indus region? This kind of investigation is not necessarily unprofitable. However, what needs to be stated here is that the events portrayed in this letter never happened. Ghazan never went on campaign in the region of southern Afghanistan and never attacked the Punjab and Sind. Nor did Öljeitü. Nor indeed did any of the Īlkhāns. Whatever their limitations, the sources are adequate to establish when military operations on such a scale were undertaken by the ruler.[27] The letter is therefore completely fictitious.

The question of the chronology of letter 30, which purports to describe Rashīd al-Dīn's experiences on a diplomatic mission to India, is the best known of the historical problems in the work. It was raised by Levy, discussed by Petrushevsky and more recently has received the attention of K.A. Nizami.[28] In the letter Rashīd al-Dīn is at Multan and relates to the addressee, Quṭb al-Dīn Shīrāzī, how he has been sent to India by the Īlkhān Arghun and reached the court of Sultan 'Alā' al-Dīn at "Dillī".[29] As already mentioned, Arghun reigned from 1284 to 1291; the Sultan of Dehli 'Alā' al-Dīn

[27] The main narrative account of the Īlkhāns up to the death of Ghazan is of course the *Jāmiʿ al-Tawārīkh* of Rashīd al-Dīn himself. The section on Ghazan appears in the edition of 'Alizāda, III, 246–619. See also K. Jahn's edition, *Tārīkh-i Mubārak-i Ghāzānī, Dāstān-i Ghāzān Khān* (London, 1940). The reign of Öljeitü is covered by Abu 'l-Qāsim Qāshānī's *Tārīkh-i Ūljāytū*, ed. Mahin Hambly (Tehran, 1348). Öljeitü's movements have been studied in detail in Charles Melville, "The Itineraries of Sultan Öljeitü," *Iran*, 28 (1990), 59–70. For Abū Saʿīd Mustawfī's *Tārīkh-i Guzīda* and Hafiz Abrū's *Dhayl* are of fundamental importance. The campaign is not known to the Eastern Persian chronicle of Sayf b. Muḥammad Harawī, the *Tārīkhnāma-yi Harāt*, (ed. Muḥammad Zuhayr al-Ṣiddīqī, [Calcutta, 1943]), the narrative of which is carried up to 721/1321. For modern general accounts see B. Spuler, *Die Mongolen in Iran* (3rd ed., Berlin, 1968) and *The Cambridge History of Iran*, V, ed. J.A. Boyle (Cambridge, 1968), chapter 4.

[28] Nizami, "Rashīd al-Dīn Fazl Allah and India," in H. Naṣr *et al.* (eds.), *Majmūʿa-yi Khuṭāba-hā-yi Taḥqīqī dar bāra-yi Rashīd al-Dīn Faḍlallāh Hamadānī* (Tehran, 1350), pp. 36–53. The point is dealt with again more briefly in *idem, Supplement to Elliot and Dowson's* History of India, III, *The Khaljis and the Tughluqs* (Dehli, 1981), pp. 37–8.

[29] The letter does not state that Rashīd al-Dīn was accredited solely to 'Alā' al-Dīn. His commission is described as a general one to the local rulers (*mulūk-i amṣār wa salāṭīn-i aqṭār*) of the lands of India (*bilād-i Hind*) and also to collect drugs. (For Ghazan's sending of envoys to collect seeds from India and elsewhere see the *Jāmiʿ al-Tawārīkh*, ed. 'Alīzāda, III, 415.)

Khaljī, who must be intended, did not win the throne until 1296.[30] (His reign lasted until January 1316.) The letter does not mention any particularly long delays in the course of the journey and, though Nizami does not make this point, the *Durrat al-Akhbār* and the *Nasā'im al-Asḥār* place Rashīd al-Dīn in Persia in the reign of Geikhatu, between Arghun's death and the accession of 'Alā' al-Dīn. The possibility that Rashīd al-Dīn's mission lasted six years or so can therefore be dismissed.[31] What Nizami pointed out was that in his History of India, completed no earlier than 703/1303–4, Rashīd al-Dīn mentions information obtained from travellers as one of his sources but makes no allusion to personal experience of India.[32] Indeed he states in the opening passage that there was nobody in the kingdom who had an adequate knowledge of Indian history, and as his own sources describes, in addition to information from various kinds of travellers, only Bīrūni's earlier book on India and material supplied orally by the Kashmiri Buddhist Kamāla Shrī.[33] The History of India even includes an account of 'Alā' al-Dīn Khaljī but this says nothing about any mission from Iran at all.[34] It may now be added that another

[30] In fact, as was noticed by Muḥammad Shafī', the letter seems to represent 'Alā' al-Dīn as already in control of Gujerat, which other sources say he did not conquer until two or three years after his accession. (See *Letters A*, pp. 163, 167.) The journey would therefore have had to have lasted even longer and been in progress at a time when Rashīd al-Dīn is known to have been with Ghazan. (See, for instance, note 22 above.)

[31] This was the explanation favoured by Muḥammad Shafī'. See his article "Letters of Rashīd al-Dīn Faḍlullāh relating to India," *Woolner Commemoration Volume*, ed. Mohammad Shafi (Lahore, 1940), p. 238, and *Letters A*, p. 163, n. 2. Petrushevsky's suggestion ("*K voprosu*," p. 126) was that Rashīd al-Dīn might have visited 'Alā' al-Dīn when the latter was a provincial governor before he actually became Sultan of Dehli. He argued that such a person could have been regarded as co-ruler and referred to as Sultan, as 'Alā' al-Dīn is in the letter. However, Petrushevsky was at that stage imperfectly informed of the contents of Letter 30, which is largely missing in the Leningrad manuscript. In fact the meeting between Rashīd al-Dīn and the Sultan is represented as taking place at Dehli.

[32] Nizami, *art. cit.*, pp. 47–8.

[33] *Die Indiengeschichte des Rašīd ad-Dīn*, ed. and trans. Karl Jahn (Vienna, 1980), pp. 9, 19, Plates 1, 43. The introductory passage appears to indicate that Kamāla Shrī was a source for the history of the later Sultans of Dehli as well as that of Kashmir and the life of the Buddha. *Cf.* Jahn's earlier publication, *Rashīd al-Dīn's History of India. Collected Essays with Facsimiles and Indices* (The Hague, 1965).

[34] *Die Indiengeschichte*, pp. 49–50, *cf.* 56. Several other Ilkhanid historians, Waṣṣāf, Qāshānī, and Banākatī, who were all acquainted with Rashīd al-Dīn, give accounts of Sultan 'Alā al-Dīn, but they say nothing of a mission by Rashīd al-Dīn. Waṣṣāf's is the only description of any diplomatic contact with the Dehli Sultanate in the relevant period. (See below.)

work of Rashīd al-Dīn, the recently published *Āthār wa Aḥyā'* extends the period during which, on this line of argument, Rashīd al-Dīn could not have been to India.[35] This work, which is on agriculture and agricultural products, was written after Ghazan's death, probably quite early in the reign of Öljeitü. A number of Indian plants are described, and though the author does occasionally note where he saw things he makes no personal observations on India. On the contrary, referring to the areca nut (*fūfil*), the chewing of which together with betel leaves has been widespread in India since the early centuries of the Christian era,[36] he notes that he had often seen it with its husk, that merchants had brought it for him and that he had employed it.[37] He had certainly not been to India at this stage.

Nizami's proposed solution is to assume that the name of the ruler in Letter 30 has been corrupted. Since Rashīd al-Dīn had not been to India before completing the History of India in 703 (and, we may now add, the *Āthār wa Aḥyā'* somewhat later) his mission must have occurred after that. He finds a *terminus ante quem* of 708 in letter 44. This is addressed to Rashīd al-Dīn's son Maḥmūd who is supposedly Governor of Kirman (a matter discussed below) and instructs him how to treat a certain Khwāja Maḥmūd Sāwajī, who has been despatched by Rashīd al-Dīn as his envoy to Sultan 'Alā' al-Dīn. Friendly relations and frequent diplomatic contacts with 'Alā' al-Dīn are referred to and Khwāja Maḥmūd is under instruction to take care of Rashīd's commercial operations (*mu'āmalāt*) and properties

[35] *Āthār wa Aḥyā'*, ed. Manūchihr Sutūda and Īraj Afshār (Tehran, 1368). The surviving manuscript is a fragment and has been to some extent interpolated but, as the editors show, is basically by Rashīd al-Dīn. The personal observations all appear to be his. [On this composition, see Prof. Lambton's contribution in this volume.—Ed.]

[36] See Henry Brownrigg, *Betel Cutters from the Samuel Eilenberg Collection* (Stuttgart 1991), p. 24 in particular.

[37] In the preface (p. 45) Afshār lists the references to Rashīd al-Dīn's travels in the *Āthār wa Aḥyā'* and gives one to India (text, p. 81), but there is a misunderstanding here. The passage merely says that Rashīd al-Dīn had frequently seen "white pepper" (*filfil-i sifīd*). He distinguishes this type of pepper, which was rare in Iran, from the usual black pepper of South India and says it came from China (*hudūd-i Chīn*). Thus there is no reference to India at all. In any case, as with the areca nut, no more is implied than that he had seen the imported substance. Afshār (*loc. cit.*) also refers to a passage in Ja'farī's *Tārīkh-i Yazd* (ed. Īraj Afshār [Tehran, 1343]) as alluding to Rashīd al-Dīn's journey to India. However, the passage seemingly referred to (p. 114) which does mention Rashīd al-Dīn's early travels says nothing about India, which is nowhere mentioned in the work.

(*amlāk*) in India and to collect the pensions (*idrārāt*) which have been bestowed on him by the rulers of those parts. This certainly might seem to imply a later date than that of letter 30, which describes favours, including property grants and a pension, bestowed by the Sultan upon Rashīd al-Dīn at what is clearly represented to be the beginning of their acquaintance. Maḥmūd is also instructed to arrange for a pension (*idrār*) in cash and kind to be assigned to Khwāja Maḥmūd and his descendants on the revenues of Kirman, to be paid from the next tax year, 708 (1308–9).[38] Thus Nizami assumes that in letter 30 instead of Arghun the name of Öljeitü should be read, and that Rashīd al-Dīn's journey to India must have taken place between 703 and 708.

While successfully meeting the difficulty raised by Arghun's appearance in the letter, the argument faces the insuperable objection that Rashīd al-Dīn did not visit India later either. During the period in which Nizami places the mission to India, he was acting as one of Öljeitü's chief ministers. His actual presence in Persia is mentioned every year during the period 703–708, and most other years of the reign, by Qāshānī [Kāshānī]. At the beginning of the period he was still engaged in completing the *Jāmiʿ al-Tawārīkh* and it was in 705 that he began composing his theological works, which provide abundant testimony to his presence in Persia, in the form of the dates of composition of the works, those of their sub-sections and other incidental references.[39] It was not an age of "shuttle diplomacy."

So far this discussion of letter 30 has followed earlier ones in concentrating on the chronology of Rashīd al-Dīn's life. Though adequate in itself to show that the letter is not authentic, the approach can be supplemented. A brief description of an embassy sent by Öljeitü to 'Alā' al-Dīn at Dehli in 710 is given by Waṣṣāf.[40] The initiative for its despatch came from Öljeitü, whose policy with regard to the Dehli Sultanate, as described here, was of a truculence reminiscent of classic early Mongol diplomacy. The ambassadors bore a despatch, or rather decree (*yarlīgh*), expressing Öljeitü's dissatisfaction with the fact that 'Alā' al-Dīn had not sent envoys earlier to acknowledge his accession. Previous kings of Dehli in the time of Chinggis and Ögedei had reported submissively to the Mongols, and

[38] Accepting, of course, the emendation of *thamānīn* to *thamān*.
[39] See Van Ess, *Der Wesir und seine Gelehrten, passim*.
[40] Waṣṣāf, p. 528.

'Alā' al-Dīn ought to have exerted himself to strengthen these old ties. It was suggested that one of the ladies of the Royal Family of Dehli should enter into a marriage (with Öljeitü himself presumably). As Waṣṣāf notes, Sultan 'Alā' al-Dīn was no weakling. He had no reason to submit to this bullying and his initial response was to put the envoys under arrest and have eighteen members of their retinue trampled to death by elephants. Nothing further seems to be known about the episode. Waṣṣāf simply concludes by pointing out that the treatment of the envoys contravened accepted diplomatic procedure.

Of interest here, and in itself a grave obstacle to Nizami's theory, is that the account implies that there had been no previous embassy from Öljeitü to 'Alā' al-Dīn. Indeed Waṣṣāf's notice, with its resort to precedent from the time of the Great Khan Ögedei, rather implies that he knew of no earlier independent diplomatic exchanges between the Īlkhāns and the Dehli Sultanate. The good relations supposedly established with the Sultanate by Rashīd al-Dīn's mission (and referred to in letters 44 and 48 as well) are pure fiction.

Rashīd al-Dīn never went to India.[41] Letter 30 raises a number of other problems, the identity of the addressee, for instance, or the fact that Rashīd al-Dīn, while represented as in control of Iran and envoy of (the Buddhist) Arghun, is regarded by the fiercely Muslim Sultan as the pattern of virtue.[42] However, further discussion of these matters here might distract attention from the main point: on clear historical evidence letter 30, like letter 53, cannot be genuine.

The reader often comes across particular items of information in one letter which seem to tally with those in others. At first these signs of consistency may be reassuring, but when the Letters come seriously under suspicion the opposite is true. The references to Indian matters in several letters seem to harmonize with letters 30 and 53, which we have seen to be false, and this point may be examined next. It has already been mentioned that the (non-existent) Indian campaign of letter 53 seems to be alluded to as planned by Ghazan

[41] The reality of the mission by Rashīd al-Dīn to the court of Quṭb al-Dīn Mubārak-Shāh (1316–1320), mentioned in the late *Āʾīn-i Akbarī*, must also be rejected on similar grounds. See Abū 'l-Faḍl b. Mubārak, *Āʾīn-i Akbarī*, ed. H. Blochmann (Calcutta, 1872–7), II, 206.
[42] The letter describes 'Alā' al-Dīn as asking Rashīd al-Dīn to send him one of his sons, so that he could put him in power in his kingdom as his father is in Iran. To quote the Sultan's words to the father: *zimām-i mamālik-i Īrān dar ikhtiyār-i tust*.

in letter 35. Rashīd al-Dīn's relations with 'Alā' al-Dīn Khaljī and his Indian properties recur a number of times. Letter 44 has already been mentioned. The reader naturally assumes that the Rashīd al-Dīn's friendship with 'Alā' al-Dīn and his Indian properties and pensions are to some extent related to the events of the mission from Arghun described in letter 30. In letter 24, inviting a well-known cleric to the mass wedding of nine of Rashīd al-Dīn's sons to a strange and suspect assortment of high-born ladies, Maḥmūd is to be married to the daughter of 'Alā' al-Dīn's son Mawdūd Shāh. How appropriate that one who is said in several letters to be the Governor of Kirman, not so very far from Dehli after all, should marry his father's old friend's granddaughter, but in fact neither Mawdūd Shāh nor his daughter is recorded as existing outside the letter.[43] Also unconfirmed is the existence of the peerless Indian mathematician Shams al-Dīn Hindī, resident at Dehli, who is listed in letter 20 with other learned recipients of Rashīd al-Dīn's bounty.[44] Indian properties are mentioned again in the list of Rashīd al-Dīn's wealth in letter 37. The list divides Rashīd al-Dīn's lands into those within the Ilkhanid kingdom and those outside; among the latter are ones in Sind and Hind, both purchased and granted by unnamed Sultans of Hind. It is hard to assume that the grants here should not include those made by 'Alā' al-Dīn according to letter 30. Also of interest is that properties in the region (*wilāyat*) of Ghaznī, Kābul, Zābul, Qandahār and even Lahore are classified as within the Ilkhanid kingdom. This is very much the area in which the supposed eastern campaign of letter 53 takes place; here is further evidence of the remarkable conception of the Ilkhanid border in that region held by the author of the Letters. Relevant too in this connection are the definitions of the boundaries of Iran, that is the Ilkhanid empire, occurring, with slight variations in four letters.[45] The kingdom of Iran stretches from the Oxus to the limits of Rūm; in the west and southwest the boundary is the border of Egypt or once the Western

[43] It is difficult to prove the non-existence of a person so long in the past but, for the record, there is no Mawdūd Shāh, nor anyone with a similar name, in the list of six sons of 'Alā' al-Dīn in the *Tārīkh-i Fīrūzshāhī* of the contemporary Diyā al-Dīn Baranī (ed. Sayyid Ahmad Khan [Calcutta, 1862]), p. 240.

[44] Since the writer says that he has been absent from Iran on campaign in Mamlūk territory for a considerable time a date in Ghazan's reign seems to be implied for letter 20.

[45] Nos. 8, 14, 20, 27.

sea. This is all found here or there in other Ilkhanid sources. However on the south-east the border is placed once on the Indus River system (*jadwal-i Daryā-yi Sind*) and on three occasions even further east, on the River Jūn, the Jumna.[46] Finally for the moment on this point, letter 48 is from Malik 'Alā' al-Dīn, evidently at his namesake the Khaljī Sultan's court.[47] The letter begins in a conventionally amicable way, describing the joy felt by the writer at receiving a letter from Rashīd al-Dīn, which has alleviated the grief he feels at being separated from such a friend. Gratitude is also expressed for the accompanying presents. Rashīd al-Dīn's solicitude for the weak and the effort he has expended on establishing good relations between Sultan 'Alā' al-Dīn and his own king (*pādishāh-i khwad*!) are praised. The writer's failure to correspond is due to his perception of his own unworthiness. He greatly desires that they should meet again. A list of presents for Rashīd al-Dīn, which have been sent with merchants to Basra, follows.[48] The natural first assumption is that the two became acquainted during Rashīd al-Dīn's stay at Dehli; the presents which 'Alā' al-Dīn has received, and the letter he is answering could easily have been brought by one of the numerous envoys sent by Rashīd al-Dīn to India according to letter 44. However, since is established that Rashīd al-Dīn was never in India these assumptions cannot stand. One can play with alternative speculations: for instance, Malik 'Alā' al-Dīn could himself have visited Persia and become acquainted with Rashīd al-Dīn there. Lands in India could have been acquired in other ways. However, there is no supporting evidence and it may be concluded that, while the appearance of internal coherence that such cross-references bestow upon the letters is not unreal, it is evidence, not of their authenticity, but of the fact that they are a conscious and deliberate forgery. As will be seen a number of the other letters with Indian references are to be rejected on wholly different grounds.

It is a mistake therefore to think that the material on India is marginal to the question of the authenticity of the Letters, but we

[46] It was presumably to try to avoid the problem posed by the Jumna that Petrushevsky claimed that Jūn here means the Jayḥān (Classical Issus, modern Turkish Ceyhan), a relatively small river flowing through Lesser Armenia. See "Rashīd al-Dīn's Conception of the State," pp. 153–4.

[47] The writer is not Sultan 'Alā' al-Dīn himself as assumed by Nizami and others. The Sultan is referred to in the text of the letter.

[48] See Digby (cited in note 4) for discussion of the list.

may now move on to a topic that may be considered more fundamental, that of the problems posed by a number of references to Rashīd al-Dīn's sons. We are told that it is a wise child that knows his own father, but a father is conventionally expected to know his own sons. One of the major difficulties about the Letters is that their author does not know what Rashīd al-Dīn's sons did or could have done, or even how many of them there were. Before considering some of the more general aspects of the question a number of letters concerning certain of the individual sons may be examined.

Like a number of the sons who appear in the Letters, Sa'd al-Dīn is unknown outside them. In the list of Rashīd al-Dīn's sons given in letter 37 he stands first. Letters 11 and 52 are addressed to him. There is nothing obvious in No. 11 by which to try to give it a date but though news of his dissipation and maladministration has reached his father Sa'd al-Dīn seems to have been in office as provincial governor for quite a short time. It does, however, appear to be considerably earlier than No. 52, the main topic of which is a description of Rashīd al-Dīn's charitable complex outside Tabriz, the Rab'-i Rashīdī. This, we are told, has been planned and brought to completion during Sa'd al-Dīn's absence. We do not know when the construction of the Rab'-i Rashīdī came to Rashīd al-Dīn or precisely how much of the project took.[49] But it must have been years, and this would perhaps imply a date in the reign of Ghazan for letter 11 and one at least some years into the reign of Öljeitü for No. 52. In both letters Sa'd al-Dīn is acting as governor of the same province, where one naturally tends to assume that he has been in office in the intervening period. One conspicuous problem with both letters, which does not however seem to have attracted attention, is the province of which he is governor. It is described in both rubric and text of No. 11 as covering Anṭākiyya (Antioch), Ṭarsūs (Tarsus), Sūs (*sic*), Qinnasrīn, 'Awāṣim and the Banks of the Euphrates (Sawāḥil-i Furāt), and in the rubric of No. 52 as Qinnasrīn and 'Awāṣim. Antioch,

[49] The surviving *Waqfnāma*, the trust deed of the Rab'-i Rashīdī, which treats the project as essentially complete, is dated 709/1309, but it is implied in the text itself (pp. 118–9) that it replaced an earlier version. There are grounds for thinking that this earlier *Waqfnāma* was probably issued in 708. The earliest reference to the Rab'-i Rashīdī appears to come from Qāshānī (p. 44) under 704/1305; the same source (p. 116) records the completion of major irrigation works connected with the project in 710/1310. (In letter 35, on the other hand, the Rab' seems to be fully functioning in the reign of Ghazan.)

Tarsus and Sūs appear again in the text of 52, and can be supposed to be under Sa'd al-Dīn's control, since he is asked to provide woollen-weavers from the three places to be settled in the Rab'-i Rashīdī. Considering first the geographical extent of the province, the actual settlement of Qinnasrīn is some twenty miles SSE of Aleppo.[50] When the Muslims occupied the north of Syria in the seventh century A.D. it was the chief town of the region and gave its name to one of the military districts into which Palestine and Syria were divided, the Jund Qinnasrīn, which initially included the whole of North Syria. By the tenth century the town had lost its leading position for good to nearby Aleppo and had become an insignificant place, but the district name Jund Qinnasrīn, or simply Qinnasrīn, to some extent survived.[51] Continuing with the places mentioned in the letter, Antioch is situated on the river Orontes, not far from where it flows into the Mediterranean. Tarsus is further north at the western end of the Cilician plain. Sūs may, as Muḥammad Shafī' suggested, stand for Sīs, the capital of Cilician Armenia. The name 'Awāṣim was applied in the region to a province brought into existence as part of defensive arrangements on what was then the Byzantine frontier in the early Abbasid period. It is described as lying behind and hence supporting the actual frontier districts. The early evidence for the name is to some extent contradictory, but in North Syria, where we seem to be, the 'Awāṣim may be defined as a band of territory situated to the north of the Jund Qinnasrīn, and extending from the coast by Antioch to the district of Manbij on the Euphrates.[52] As for the Banks of the Euphrates, the term does not seem ever to have been in regular use as a district name; presumably it is meant here to apply to some part of the region of the upper course of the Euphrates. The difficulty is that part of this large area never formed part of the Ilkhanid empire, part was only briefly under Mongol occupation, and part was never directly administered. Antioch was never a Mongol possession. The place Qinnasrīn and part of the district would have been briefly in Mongol hands during the invasions of Syria and the same would have been the

[50] Ghazan camped by it in the course of his second Syrian campaign in 700/1300–1. (*Jāmi' al-Tawārīkh*, ed. 'Alīzāda, III, 340.)
[51] *EI²*, art. "Qinnasrīn."
[52] *EI²*, art. "'Awāṣim"; M. Bonner, "The Naming of the Frontier: 'Awāṣim, Thughūr, and the Arab Geographers," *BSOAS*, 57 (1994), 17–24.

case with parts of the ʿAwāṣim, but on these occasions Mamlūk control was rapidly restored.[53] Proceeding further north, Lesser Armenia was a border principality between the states of the Īlkhāns and the Mamlūks; the suzerainty of the former was generally preferred by the Armenian kings, but the Īlkhāns did not administer the area directly.[54] Ḥamdullāh Mustawfī states that the area was not properly part of Iran.[55] Tarsus, and the Cilician plain as a whole, belonged to the Armenian kingdom. It is quite impossible that the area described in the two letters ever formed an Ilkhanid province. Letters 11 and 52 are obviously unreal on these geo-political grounds alone.

The same skewed perception of the Ilkhanid borders in the region of Syria can be observed in the additional occurrences of some of the place-names discussed above. In letter 11 itself it is stated that Rashīd al-Dīn has property in the "province" and he instructs his son to give the income from them in alms to the deserving. He has also set up charitable institutions in Antioch (and Malatya)[56] and Saʿd al-Dīn is instructed to see that the income reaches the beneficiaries. He is also to keep the bridges, cisterns and caravanserais that Rashīd al-Dīn has constructed in the area in good repair. Rashīd al-Dīn is thus represented as having been involved in the region considerably before Saʿd al-Dīn's appointment. There is of course no other testimony to such involvement by Rashīd al-Dīn in what was largely, as shown above, foreign, most of the time enemy, territory. It is all invention. That the person responsible for it did think that Antioch was part of the Ilkhanid empire is confirmed by letter 37, which lists among Rashīd al-Dīn's properties a quantity of land in Antioch, which is here classified, with Tarsus where further lands are listed, as part of Rūm.[57] In letter 40, peasants from the provinces

[53] It is doubtful in fact whether (Jund) Qinnasrīn or ʿAwāṣim were in administrative use as district names in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Their use in the Letters may be anachronistic, based on literary sources for earlier periods. However, that does not affect the geographical argument.

[54] See T.S.R. Boase, "The History of the Kingdom," in T.S.R. Boase (ed.), *The Cilician Kingdom of Armenia* (Edinburgh, 1978), pp. 1–33; S. Der Nersessian, "The Kingdom of Cilician Armenia," in Kenneth M. Setton (ed.), A *History of the Crusades*, II (Madison, 1969), pp. 630–658.

[55] Mustawfī, *Nuzhat al-Qulūb*, ed. and trans. G. Le Strange (Leyden and London, 1915, 1919), I, 100; II, 100.

[56] One might think that Malatya is therefore implied to be in Saʿd al-Dīn's province. The town, though not actually on the Euphrates, could quite happily belong to a district of Sawāḥil-i Furāt. However, elsewhere (Letters 37, 40) Malatya seems, more conventionally, to be situated in Rūm.

[57] *Letters A/B*, pp. 227/207. The writer may not have understood the difference between Antioch in Syria and the less important Antioch/Anṭākiyya in Pisidia, which was in Anatolia, but he always, with one exception, uses the name in association with ones from north Syria and Cilicia, in this case Tarsus.

(*mamālik*) of Qinnasrīn and ʿAwāṣim, as well as Rūm, are to be brought to settle the lands irrigated by a dam to be built at Malatya (which is discussed below). It seems once again that our author thinks that Qinnasrīn and ʿAwāṣim belong to the Īlkhāns. To parallel the mathematician of Dehli, the recipients of Rashīd al-Dīn's gifts in letter 20 include the (otherwise unknown) polymath Sayf al-Dīn Miṣrī, resident in Anṭākiyya.[58] Lesser Armenia too elsewhere seems to be regarded as an ordinary Ilkhanid province, for in letter 8 Öljeitü is reported as telling Rashīd al-Dīn that he will make the latter's son Majd al-Dīn governor of it, together with Greater Armenia and Diyār Rabīʿa. As with the references to India, so in this area the Letters maintain some consistency, but in a way that argues against rather than for their authenticity.

The next case to be considered is that of Maḥmūd. Unlike that of Saʿd al-Dīn his existence is attested outside the Letters. In the list of Rashīd al-Dīn's sons given in Rashīd al-Dīn's own hand in the *Waqfnāma* of the Rabʿ-i Rashīdi he comes eighth.[59] He appears to be the only son of Rashīd al-Dīn for whom a precise date of birth is recorded: 13 Jumādā I 709/19 October 1309.[60] If this is correct, Maḥmūd could not have been governor of Kirmān by 708, or, in fact, at any time before his father's fall. However, the date given for Maḥmūd's birth conflicts with that of the *Waqfnāma*,[61] and, for the sake of argument, it is here assumed that Maḥmūd was not excluded by youth from acting as a governor. Other references to him come from after his father's death. During the period when his brother

[58] *Letters A/B* pp. 63/70: "*funūn-i ʿulūm dārad.*"

[59] *Waqfnāma*, p. 44.

[60] Faṣīḥ Khwāfī, *Mujmal-i Faṣīḥī*, ed. Maḥmūd Farrukh, III (Mashhad, 1339), p. 18.

[61] The correctness of the date in Faṣīḥ's notice is supported by the placing of the birth at al-Maydān al-Kabīr, said to be known also as Maydān-i Sulaymān Shāh and to be between Hamadān and Baghdād. At this time Öljeitü's court was either in Sulṭāniyya and the neighbourhood or on its way to Baghdad. (See Melville, "Itineraries," p. 65.) However, the *Waqfnāma*, in which Maḥmūd is named as a beneficiary, was registered before the Chief Qāḍī at Tabriz more than two months earlier, on 1 Rabīʿ I 709/9 August 1309. Various possibilities suggest themselves to resolve the conflict of dates. Faṣīḥ's notice may be in some way corrupt; it could, for instance, originally have referred to a son of Maḥmūd. Alternatively, the section with the list of sons is a replacement which has been inserted into the *Waqfnāma* after the original registration.

Ghiyāth al-Dīn was vizier he was in control of Yazd.[62] In 739, in the reign of Sati Beg, Shaykh Ḥasan Chūbānī appointed him one of two joint viziers, but later the same year, after Sulaymān had been married to Sati Beg and made Īlkhān, he withdrew from the position.[63] In 743 he participated in a campaign against Arab tribes of South Persia led by Mubāriz al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Muẓaffar, to whose daughter he was at some stage married, and for whom he may have acted as a vizier.[64] On his death at Kirmān in the the next year his body was brought to Yazd for burial.[65] From the assorted later notices it emerges that his full name was Rukn al-Dīn Shaykh Maḥmūd and that he was also known as Shaykhī. Four of the Letters are addressed to him as Governor (*ḥākim*) of Kirmān. No. 44, as we have seen, contains what seems to be a reference to the coming tax year as 708. No. 10 states that the province of Kirmān has belonged (*taʿalluq dārad*) to Rashīd al-Dīn since the days of the late King Ghazan; a date in the reign of Öljeitü seems to be implied for this too. For Nos. 6 and 49 no obvious datings suggest themselves, but all four letters show Maḥmūd in power in his province; except for No. 49, where one cannot tell, they show him as established in Kirman for some length of time. As already mentioned, in letter 24 Maḥmud is about to marry a granddaughter of 'Alā' al-Dīn Khaljī, the Sultan of Dehli. He is in the list of sons in letter 37, and the villages represented on the map of a projected canal scheme near Mosul, the subject of No. 38 (which lacks precise indications of date), include one called Rukniyya, the only reference in the Letters to Maḥmūd's *laqab* of Rukn al-Dīn.

The question of Maḥmūd's government of Kirmān needs be examined in the light of the other information on Kirmān in the relevant period. The most detailed account is provided by the historian of the province, Nāṣir al-Dīn Munshī. Upon the Mongol occupation of Iran the Qarakhitai rulers of Kirmān had accepted Mongol suzerainty. The rebellion of Quṭb al-Dīn Shāh-i Jahān, led in 704 to his defeat and arrest and the end of the dynasty. Kirmān certainly did not belong to Rashīd al-Dīn in any ordinary sense of the word in the reign of Ghazan, as is claimed in letter 10. Kirmān was then entrusted to the Amir Nāṣir al-Dīn Ghūrī, who continued to govern it until the death of Öljeitü, after which he went to serve his patron Choban (Chūpān) in person.[66] Thus Maḥmūd could not have been governor during the reign of Öljeitü. At the beginning of the reign of Abū Saʿīd the government of Kirmān was contested for by rival parties at court, until, some time after Rashīd al-Dīn's death, it went to Nāṣir al-Dīn Ghūrī's son Quṭb al-Dīn Nīkrūz.[67] Maḥmūd could not have been governor of Kirmān for any length of time between the enthronement of Abu Saʿīd and his father's dismissal a few months later. Three of the letters addressed to him as such can be declared fictitious on these grounds. There is no reason to think that the fourth alone is authentic.

The third case is that of Khwāja Jalāl or Jalāl al-Dīn. In the Letters he plays a larger role than any of his brothers. Three are addressed to him and he is mentioned in eight or nine more. We also know a little more about his activities during his father's lifetime than about those of his brothers. Jalāl stands second in the list of sons in the *Waqfnāma*, which stipulates that he is to succeed as administrator of the Rabʿ-i Rashīdī trust upon his father's death.[68] Some indication of his age is given by the fact that a son was born to him in 713.[69] As early as 715 he is described as the eldest son;[70] it may be presumed that Muwaffaq al-Dīn ʿAlī, who was certainly the eldest when the *Waqfnāma* was written, had died in the interval.[71]

[62] Shabānkāraʾī, *Majmaʿ al-Ansāb*, ed. Mīr Hāshim Muḥaddith (Tehran, 1363), p. 214. *Cf.* Qāshānī, p. 196, for Rashīd al-Dīn's enjoyment of the taxes of Yazd.

[63] Ḥamdullāh Mustawfī, *Dhayl-i Tārīkh-i Guzīda*, trans. M.D. Kazimov and V.Z. Piriyev (Baku, 1986), pp. 31, 34; Hafiz Abrū, *Dhayl-i Jāmiʿ al-Tawārīkh*, pp. 204, 208.

[64] Muʿīn al-Dīn Yazdī, *Mawāhib-i Ilāhī*, I, ed. Saʿīd Nafīsī (Tehran, 1326), p. 134; Maḥmūd Kutubī, *History of the Muẓaffarids*, in Ḥamdullāh Mustawfī, *Tārīkh-i Guzīda*, ed. Edward G. Browne (Leyden and London, 1910–13), I, 634, II, 159; *idem*, *Tārīkh-i Āl-i Muẓaffar*, ed. ʿAbd al-Ḥusayn Nawāʾī (2nd ed., Tehran, 1364), p. 46; *Tārīkh-i Yazd*, p. 128; Aḥmad b. Ḥusayn Kātib, *Tarīkh-i Jadīd-i Yazd*, ed. Īraj Afshār (Tehran, 1345), p. 162.

[65] Faṣīh, III, 67.

[66] Nāṣir al-Dīn Munshī Yazdī, *Simṭ al-ʿUlā lil-Ḥaḍrat al-Aʿlā*, ed. ʿAbbās Iqbāl (Tehran, 1328), pp. 95–8; Qāshānī, p. 43; Shabānkāra-ī, p. 205.

[67] *Simṭ*, pp. 100–2.

[68] *Waqfnāma*, p. 44, *cf.* 119. Elsewhere in the *Waqfnāma* (p. 214) it is mentioned that a garden on the site of one of the outlying sections of the Rabʿ-i Rashīdī was bought from Jalāl's mother.

[69] Faṣīḥ, III, 21. Jalāl must, however, have been adult considerably before this, since his younger brother Ibrahim had a son as early as 703. (See note 84 below)

[70] Qāshānī, p. 196: *pisar-i mihtar*.

[71] In the *Waqfnāma* (pp. 49, 118–19), although described as the eldest, ʿAlī is excluded from the succession to the administration of the *waqf*. A possibility is that the earlier version of the deed provided for him to succeed as *mutawallī*. The *Waqfnāma* (pp. 206, 208) refers to his personal ownership of water-rights involved with those of the Rabʿ-i Rashīdī. The brief listing in Ibn al-Fuwaṭī is the sole source

According to Qāshānī, in late 713/early 1314 Öljeitü ordered that the provinces of Iran should be submitted to a process of regulation (*yāsāmīshī*) the application of which was entrusted to senior persons from the financial administration (*az ṣawāhib-i ʿizām ṭā'ifa-ī az ahl-i dīwān*). Among those thus appointed Jalāl al-Dīn was commissioned to deal with ʿIrāq-i ʿAjam.[72] In a passage in the *Tarjuma-yi Maḥāsin Isfahān* it is stated that Rashīd al-Dīn had a particular liking for Iṣfahān and that during his days of power he placed it under the control of a child of his own, such as Khwāja Jalāl, or another of his close associates.[73] This seems likely to refer to the same appointment of Jalāl mentioned by Qāshānī. It is the only case in which there is reasonable evidence that one of Rashīd al-Dīn's sons held a position that might qualify to be called a provincial governorship during his father's lifetime.[74] Two years later, in the course of a dispute at court, Tāj al-Dīn ʿAlī Shāh attacked Rashīd al-Dīn by accusing Jalāl of owing the huge sum of 300 *tūmāns* on account of the taxes of the city of Shūshtar. Jalāl gave his bond to the effect that he did not owe a penny, and the affair came to an end without the spilling of blood, though it may have weakened Rashīd al-Dīn's position.[75] Shūshtar is not in ʿIrāq-i ʿAjam but in neighbouring Khūzistān; this might indicate that Jalāl had been given powers over a wider area. In 717, soon after the twelve-year old Abū Saʿīd had ascended the throne, and when power lay with Amīr Choban, the latter's son Timurtash was appointed Governor of Rūm. Khwāja Jalāl received the position of *Ṣāhib Dīwān* of Rūm, that is was put in charge of the financial bureaucracy of the province.[76] The relationship between

for his *laqab* of Muwaffaq al-Dīn. See *Letters A*, p. 337 n. The edition of this section of Ibn al-Fuwaṭī's *Talkhīṣ Mujam al-Alqāb* has not been accessible to the writer.

[72] Qāshānī, p. 154.

[73] Muḥammad b. Ḥusayn Āwī, *Tarjuma-yi Maḥāsin Isfahān*, ed. ʿAbbās Iqbāl (Tehran, 1328), p. 138. The work is dedicated to Jalāl's brother, Ghiyāth al-Dīn Muḥammad.

[74] In the Letters Provincial Governors, who appear frequently and are consistently called *ḥākim*, appear to possess very extensive powers over their provinces. In Letter 8, for example, Öljeitü instructs Rashid al-Dīn to appoint Jalāl al-Dīn governor of Rūm in these terms: *wa hukūmat-i ān aṭrāf, barran wa baḥran, baladan wa qaʿran, mufawwaḍ dārī, wa iyālat-i ān ṭaraf musallam gardānī wa u-ra ba-zīnat-i dawlat wa rutbat-i ṣawlat muzayyan sāzī*. One would expect the ruler to make such an important appointment himself rather than leave it to his minister. The term *ḥākim* is used in authentic sources but Ilkhanid provincial government was a much more complicated affair than is revealed in the Letters.

[75] Qāshānī, pp. 196–7.

[76] Ḥāfiẓ Abrū, *Dhayl*, p. 123 (Here again Jalāl is described as Rashīd al-Dīn's eldest son: *pisar-i buzurgtar*.); Āqsarā'ī, *Musāmarat al-Akhbār*, ed. Osman Turan (Ankara, 1943), p. 313.

Governor and *Ṣāḥib-Dīwān* appears to have been cordial, for when, after the fall of Rashīd al-Dīn, commissioners were sent to "destroy" Khwāja Jalāl, Timurtash protected him. He later obtained in Timurtash's service a "ministerial" position with the title *nā'ib*.[77] When Timurtash himself attempted rebellion and was brought to court by his father it seems Jalāl accompanied him or joined him in Ādharbāyjān. The family feud with Tāj al-Dīn ʿAlī Shāh was expressing itself in argument over the accounts of Rūm when both Tāj al-Dīn and Jalāl died.[78] Tāj al-Dīn's death took place in Jumādā II 724/June 1324.[79]

From the Letters an alternative career for Jalāl al-Dīn can be constructed which, though not without resemblance to the one above at one or two points, differs strikingly in many others. The chronology is not always crystal clear. Letter 27, to the *ʿulamā* of Qayṣariyya, refers to that city's support of Geikhatu after the death of Arghun. The present ruler, unnamed, but obviously Ghazan, has told Rashīd al-Dīn that if he comes to power he will put to the sword all the Tājīks who have thus rebelled against him in order to show them their place. The writer has attempted to persuade the king to show mercy. Sharaf al-Dīn Tūqātī, who is deputy (*nā'ib*) of the writer's son Jalāl, who is responsible for the province of Rūm,[80] has been sent to investigate the situation of the addressees. The implied date is shortly after the accession of Ghazan, and it is clearly suggested that Jalāl is already Governor of Rūm. In letter 35, considered again

[77] Āqsarā'ī, p. 315. For another episode from Jalāl's time in Rūm after his father's death see Quatremère, pp. liv–lv; British Library MS. Or. 2885, fol. 402b. The British Library MS, and the one in the Bibliothèque Nationale used by Blochet, contain part of the *Jāmiʿ al-Tawārīkh*, with a continuation, anonymous but attributed by F. Tauer to Ḥāfiẓ Abrū, in which this passage occurs. See C.A. Storey, *Persidskaya Literatura*, trans. and revised Yu.E. Bregel (Moscow 1972), I, 342–4.

[78] *Tārīkh-i Jadīd-i Yazd*, pp. 142–3. Tāj al-Dīn's opponent is not named here but is called a son of Khwāja Rashīd and said to have come from Rūm with the intention of "attacking" Tāj al-Dīn. In a divergent account of what is clearly the same episode the "attacker" is identified as another of Rashīd al-Dīn's sons, Ghiyāth al-Dīn Muḥammad, who of course survived long after this. This is probably a simple mistake. (Abū Bakr al-Quṭbī al-Ahrī, *Tārīkh-i Shaykh Uways*, ed. J.B. Van Loon [The Hague, 1954], text p. 153.) The *Tarjuma-yi Maḥāsin Isfahān* (see n. 73 above), which was written in 729, refers to Jalāl as dead. For an elegy on his death by Saʿīd Harawī, see Jājarmī, *Muʾnis al-Aḥrār*, ed. Mīr Ṣāliḥ Ṭabībī (Tehran, 1337–50), II, 817–9.

[79] *Tārīkh-i Guzīda*, p. 616; Fasīḥ, III, 36.

[80] "... *mamālik-i Rūm dar ʿuhda-yi kifāyat-i ū buda* ..."

below, Ghazan is named as King. It is written from Rūm and ends with a detailed request for supplies in which Jalāl is named as Governor (*ḥākim*) of Iṣfahān. As mentioned above, letter 35 seems to predict the campaign in North-western India described in letter 53, but, though Governor of Iṣfahān in No. 35, in No. 53 Jalāl is, as has been seen, in command of the armies of Rūm, from which one might conclude that he is governor of the province again. In letter 40, concerning the construction of a dam at Malatya and addressed to Jalāl, Ghazan is the reigning monarch. Jalāl is described as Ḥākim of Rūm in the rubric, and this is consistent with the content of the letter. Coming to the reign of Öljeitü, letter 29 is addressed to the people of Sivas in Anatolia and concerned with a charitable institution founded in that city by Ghazan. Ghazan has died, but appears to have done so quite recently and Rashīd al-Dīn's son Jalāl is said to be resident in the province and appears to be in control. One might well think that he has been there since before Ghazan's death. On the other hand, letter 8, written from Sulṭāniyya,[81] reports a conversation between Öljeitü and Rashīd al-Dīn in which the King speaks of his desire to show favour to his Minister's sons, in particular to Jalāl. Jalāl has for some time (*muddatī*) been Governor of Iṣfahān (*ḥākim-i balada-yi Iṣfahān*). ʿIrāq-i ʿAjam is too small for talent like his. (Iṣfahān, as the chief city, is presumably here virtually synonymous with the province of Persian Iraq.) Rashīd al-Dīn is therefore instructed to transfer the province or kingdom (*mamlakat*) of Rūm to him. No allusion is made to an earlier appointment to Rūm. Letter 18 is addressed to Jalāl. He is asked to supply Rūmī slaves for the Rabʿ-i Rashīdī, which seems to imply that he is Governor of Rūm and that the reign should be that of Öljeitü. Similarly, in No. 22, the rubric of which states him to be Governor of Rūm, he is asked to supply drugs for the hospitals which Rashīd al-Dīn has created throughout Iran. A similar date may be implied. No obvious dating can be suggested for Nos. 32, 36 and 39, but in the first two of these Jalāl is connected with Rūm, and might be assumed to be Governor. Finally, in No. 37, besides appearing in the list of Rashīd al-Dīn's sons, Jalāl is credited with knowledge of his father's properties in Rūm. This important letter is a kind of testament, written when Rashīd al-Dīn was suffering from a "fatal"

[81] The impossible date, Shaʿbān 690, is here ignored.

disease (*maraḍ-i hālik*), and includes a long schedule of his properties. Öljeitü is on the throne and the Rabʿ-i Rashīdī is functioning. Of course, Rashīd al-Dīn never suffered from a fatal disease in the normal sense of the words,[82] but met his death at the hands of the executioner. However, one inevitably feels that in the chronology to be derived from the Letters No. 37 should stand right at the end.

The Letters, then, imply that, in the reign of Ghazan, Jalāl was Governor of Rūm once and probably twice and governor of Iṣfahān once and that, in the reign of Öljeitü, he was once governor of Iṣfahān or ʿIrāq-i ʿAjam and once or probably twice that of Rūm. There is a parallel with the record of his activities in other sources to the extent that in it he was in control of ʿIrāq-i ʿAjam in the reign of Öljeitü and that he later had a position in the administration of Rūm. As for ʿIrāq-i ʿAjam we have poor knowledge of the local history. For Rūm, however, there is, besides relatively good information on the appointment of Governors in the general chronicles, the contemporary local history of Āqsarāʾī. Āqsarāʾī was a member of the high administrative class of the region and, although not the most exhaustive or lucid of chroniclers, he does mention appointments by the Īlkhāns to the governorship and other high positions. As noted above, he does record Khwāja Jalāl's appointment as *Ṣāḥib-Dīwān* in 1317, but he makes no mention of any earlier appearance by him in Rūm. Jalāl was never Governor of Rūm under Ghazan or Öljeitü or even Abū Saʿīd, and the letters that state or imply that he was must be rejected. It is most unlikely that he had any claim to be called governor of Isfahan in the reign of Ghazan or earlier than 713 in that of Öljeitü.

Similarly, to deal briefly with one more son, Ibrāhīm is the addressee of letter 53, already mentioned several times and representing Ghazan as alive, and is said to be governor of Shīrāz. Letter 31 announces his despatch to Shīrāz to sort out the collection of taxes. The account of the government of Fars in the history of the contemporary Waṣṣāf,

[82] From his youth Rashīd al-Dīn was afflicted by a chronic and painful ailment of the joints. In the *Waqfnāma* (p. 243) he says that his life was several times despaired of; he attributed his recovery to the divine favour enjoyed by Öljeitü who used to visit him during his bouts of sickness. Qāshānī (p. 44) mentions what must be one of these occasions and also (p. 195) a later attack which prevented Rashīd al-Dīn from attending court for four months. *Cf.* Van Ess, p. 42, for attacks during Ghazan's reign, and the story told by ʿUbayd Zākānī, *Kulliyyāt*, ed. Parwīz Atābakī (2nd ed., Tehran, 1343), p. 273.

who was one of Rashīd al-Dīn's clients and involved in the financial administration and taxation of Fārs, with which a number of quite detailed passages in his history are concerned, makes no mention of Ibrāhīm. Nor does the the only slightly later local history of Ibn Zarkūb, the *Shīrāz-nāma*.[83]

A significant number of the letters concerning Rashīd al-Dīn's sons are thus demonstrably false or highly suspect. With the possible exception of Jalāl al-Dīn's positions in Iraq and Rūm, where, as we have seen, the evidence of the Letters diverges as much if not more than it corresponds, not one of the appointments they are supposed to have held is even mentioned in the other sources. Conversely, with the same possible exception, none of the cases—there seem to be only two more—in which contemporary sources tell us that Rashīd al-Dīn's sons held particular offices during their father's lifetime are mentioned in the Letters.[84]

The *Waqfnāma* of the Rab'-i Rashīdi makes it possible to discuss the question of how many sons Rashīd al-Dīn had on an initial basis which is exceptionally secure. It provides a list in their father's own handwriting of nine, who were all alive in or about 709/1309.[85] The

[83] Ibn Zarkūb Shīrāzī, *Shīrāz-nāma*, ed. Ismā'īl Wā'iẓ Jawādī ([Tehran], 1350), pp. 99–102.

[84] 1) Ḍiyā' al-Dīn 'Abd al-Laṭīf was sent to Khurāsān as *Ṣāḥib-Dīwān* to the Crown Prince Abū Sa'īd, probably early in 714 (spring 1314). Waṣṣāf (p. 614) is the only source to name him at this point but *cf.* Banākatī, *Tārīkh*, ed. J. Shi'ār (Tehran 1348), p. 478; Qāshānī, p. 179 (where Abū Sa'īd's appointment is placed a year later). Ibn Bazzāz relates an anecdote in which 'Abd al-Laṭīf appears acting as the Prince's "*wazīr*" in the neighbourhood of Jurjān. (*Ṣafwat al-Ṣafā*, MS. Biblioteca Sofia 3099, fol. 66a; ed. Ghulāmriḍā Ṭabāṭabā'ī Majd [Tabriz, 1373/1994], pp. 322–3).

2) At Rashīd al-Dīn's death 'Izz al-Dīn Ibrāhīm was executed before his father's eyes; it was claimed that he, as Öljeitü's *sharbat-dār*, had given the King the poisoned drink prepared by his father. (*Tārīkh-i Guzīda*, p. 613; Ḥāfiẓ Abrū, *Dhayl*, p. 128.) According to al-Ṣuqā'ī (see note 24) he was sixteen. However, there is reason to doubt that he was so young. In particular, Faṣīḥ (III, 44) notes the birth of a son to him on 17 Sha'bān 703/25 March 1304.

The contemporary Mustawfī (*Tārīkh-i Guzīda*, p. 613) describing events leading up to Rashīd al-Dīn's death states that his sons had positions at court (*dar ḥaḍrat-i pādishāh*) which made them the envy of viziers. From this it would appear that none of them were very young at that time, though in a work dedicated to Rashīd al-Dīn's son Ghiyāth al-Dīn Muḥammad when the latter was vizier there may be some exaggeration about the standing of the sons at court.

[85] *Waqfnāma*, pp. 44; *cf.* p. 119, where the same nine names occur. For the problem which may exist concerning the date of the list of sons see note 61 above. Rashīd al-Dīn made some marginal additions to the *Waqfnāma*, of which the latest seem to be those dated 715, but there is no addition to the list of sons.

Waqfnāma provides for sons yet unborn to be included *pari passu* with those already named to benefit from the *waqf* after Rashīd al-Dīn's death, and also for the sons of sons who should die to receive the share due to their fathers.[86] It does not seem likely that the list is incomplete. Given Rashīd al-Dīn's age and the hazards of medieval life, it would not be surprising if he had sons who died before the *Waqfnāma* was written. However, if that was so, and if they had had sons of their own, one would expect their grandfather to have provided for them in the *Waqfnāma* too. It is improbable then that there were at that time surviving male descendants of sons who had already died. Other sons could conceivably have been born after the date of the *Waqfnāma*, but if any were it is virtually impossible that they could have been employed in positions of responsibility before their father lost office in 717/1317.

In the *Waqfnāma*, rather curiously, each of the nine sons is referred either by his personal name, e.g., Maḥmūd, or by an abbreviated form of his *laqab*, e.g., Jalāl, for Jalāl al-Dīn. In all but two cases, those of Jalāl and Shihāb (al-Dīn), the missing name or *laqab* is known. The nine are: 1. (Muwaffaq al-Dīn) 'Alī; 2. Jalāl al-Dīn; 3. ('Izz al-Dīn) Ibrāhīm; 4. Majd al-Dīn (Isḥāq); 5. (Ḍiyā' al-Dīn) 'Abd al-Laṭīf; 6. (Ghiyāth al-Dīn) Muḥammad; 7. (Sharaf al-Dīn) Aḥmad; 8. (Rukn al-Dīn) Maḥmūd; 9. Shihāb al-Dīn. Ignoring their presence in the letters, there is reliable evidence outside the *Waqfnāma* for the existence of all of these except Shihāb. One other name is reasonably well attested as that of a son of of Rashīd al-Dīn, that of Pīr Sulṭān, who was put to death in 736, the day after his brother, the vizier Ghiyāth al-Dīn, was executed.[87] An economical interpretation here would be to assume that Pīr Sulṭān is the personal name of Shihāb al-Dīn. Otherwise, it seems that we must accept that Pīr Sulṭān was born after the *Waqfnāma* was written.

Turning to the sons as they appear in the Letters, the obvious starting-point is the list given in letter 37, which, as has already been said, is something like a last will and testament. No less than fourteen sons are named here. The nine names in the *Waqfnāma* all appear; the five additional ones are Sa'd al-Dīn, Shaykhī, Humām,

[86] *Waqfnāma*, pp. 44, 125–7.

[87] Mustawfī, *Dhayl-i Tārīkh-i Guzīda*, p. 22. The account of these events in the *Tārīkh-i Shaykh Uways* (text p. 159) speaks of Amīr Sulṭān rather than Pīr Sulṭān and calls him Ghiyāth al-Dīn's nephew, but it is difficult to reject the contemporary account of Mustawfī.

Pīr Sulṭān and ʿAlī Shāh. A possible fifteenth son, ʿAbd al-Mu'min, makes a single appearance as Governor of Simnān, Damghān and Khwār in letter 12, in which he is addressed as child (*farzand*). Two further listings occur in the letters. The map in letter 39 shows villages named after eleven sons, the nine of the *Waqfnāma* plus Humām and Pīr Sulṭān.[88] The nine sons involved in the mass wedding envisaged in letter 24 include seven of those named in the *Waqfnāma* (including ʿAlī) with the addition of Humām and ʿAlī Shāh. Neither of these two letters provides any obvious clues to suggest a dating. To try to provide a notional dating for letter 37 reveals its contradictions. As already mentioned, Öljeitü is on the throne and Rashīd al-Dīn is suffering from a fatal disease. The main subject of the letter is the disposition of his property after his seemingly imminent death. The Rabʿ-i Rashīdī is functioning and there is even reference to a great *Waqfnāma*. However, if we want to think that the letter is later than the existing *Waqfnāma*, the question arises why, of the five supernumerary sons, Saʿd al-Dīn in particular, was not named in the *Waqfnāma*, for, as has been seen, from relatively early in Rashīd al-Dīn's period of high office he is supposed to have been governor of a province. We could avoid the difficulty that this poses by assuming that letter 37 is earlier in date than the *Waqfnāma*, and that Saʿd al-Dīn had died without male offspring before the *Waqfnāma* was written, but in that case an equally fundamental problem arises with Pīr Sulṭān. As stated above his name does not occur in the *Waqfnāma* and he was alive much later. Yet why, since that is the case, does he not appear among the beneficiaries of the *Waqfnāma*? If letter 37 is earlier than the *Waqfnāma* Pīr Sulṭān was obviously alive by the time the latter was issued and should have been named.[89] And, on this set of assumptions, Shihāb al-Dīn and Pīr Sulṭān cannot be one and the same, because the Letters treat them as two. Once again one of the Letters proves to be fictional.

A few further points can be made on the subject of Rashīd al-Dīn's sons. It has been said above that among the real sons named in the *Waqfnāma* was Maḥmūd, whose *laqab* was Rukn al-Dīn, and

[88] The text of the letter speaks of fourteen villages, but the map only shows twelve, the first being named after Rashīd al-Dīn himself.

[89] Letter 45 is the only one addressed to Pīr Sulṭān, as Governor of Georgia. The "late King" of the rubric may be intended for Ghazan since detailed plans are made to co-ordinate an invasion of Syria. However, it is difficult to prove that this was not some abortive scheme of Öljeitü.

that among the supernumerary sons listed in letter 37 was one called Shaykhī (who in fact makes this solitary appearance in the Letters). From the other information that we have on Maḥmūd it emerges that he was often called by the variant names Shaykh Rukn al-Dīn, Shaykh Maḥmūd or simply Shaykhī.[90] The composer of the letters has failed to realize that the two names, Maḥmūd and Shaykhī, were applied to one person. More tentatively, it may be suggested that ʿAbd al-Mu'min's appearance as the *farzand* of Rashīd al-Dīn in the Letters has a rather similar source: among the notices on descendants of Rashīd al-Dīn preserved in the *Mujmal-i Faṣīḥī*, is one on an ʿImād al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Mu'min, who was in fact Rashīd al-Dīn's grandson, the son of Ibrāhīm.[91] If this speculation is correct, whether ʿAbd al-Mu'min in letter 12 is intended as a son or a grandson, it is unlikely he could have been Governor even of a smallish province during his grandfather's lifetime, for he would have been under fourteen at the time of the latter's fall. For the appearance of Humām in the Letters, assuming that Rashīd al-Dīn had no son of that name, the writer has no explanation to put forward. The names Saʿd al-Dīn and ʿAlī Shāh, the remaining supernumerary sons, suggest an association of a different kind in the mind of the compiler of the Letters, which, though quite impossible to confirm, may be worth noting. Conspicuously missing in the Letters is any reference to Rashīd al-Dīn's two ministerial colleagues, Saʿd al-Dīn Muḥammad Sāwajī and Tāj al-Dīn ʿAlī Shāh Gīlānī. It is true that a dispute with Rashīd al-Dīn and his faction in the bureaucracy had led to the overthrow and death of Saʿd al-Dīn and that a similar clash with Tāj al-Dīn ʿAlī Shāh ended with Rashīd al-Dīn's own execution, but their relations with Rashīd al-Dīn had not always been bad and if the Letters were genuine it would be surprising if there were no mention of them at all. Could it be that, perhaps unconsciously, the compiler of the Letters acknowledged their existence by using their names for two supposititious sons of their colleague and rival?

Considering questions of a different kind, we may move on to a problem which became apparent with the publication of the *Waqfnāma* of the Rabʿ-i Rashīdī. The discrepancies between the particulars given in the *Waqfnāma* and what is said about the Rabʿ-ī Rashīdī in the Letters have been noted but not, to the writer's knowledge,

[90] See the references in notes 60 and 64 above.

[91] See note 84 above.

examined in any detail. Letter 52, already demonstrated to be false on different grounds, contains, as mentioned, a description of the Rab'-i Rashīdī.[92] This includes figures for certain categories of the personnel of the institution which can be directly compared with those of the *Waqfnāma*. Blair has already declared those in the letter to be "impossibly inflated," and given some examples,[93] but the two sets may here be laid out together to bring the point home. Comparable material for the similar charitable foundation of Öljeitü at Sulṭāniyya is also given, from the *Nafā'is al-Funūn* of Āmulī. Āmulī held the post of professor (*mudarris*) there, and informs us that this project too was inspired and guided by Rashīd al-Dīn, who was appointed acting *mutawallī* by Öljeitü.[94]

	Waqfnāma	Letter 52	Sulṭāniyya
Theology teachers[95]	3	400	30
Theological Students	12	7,000[96]	100
Reciters of the Qur'ān	24	200	12
Doctors	1	50	–
Medical students	2	500	–

As might be expected, the data from the *Waqfnāma* are generally appropriate to a more modest institution than the royal foundation at Sulṭāniyya.[97] The figures of the letter, however, are indeed grossly inflated, completely out of proportion with the comparable material and implying an educational establishment on a modern scale. Other

[92] There is more on the Rab'-i Rashīdī elsewhere in the Letters, particularly in letter 37, but it is not used in this discussion.

[93] S. Blair, "Ilkhanid Architecture and Society: An Analysis of the Endowment Deed of the Rab'-i Rashīdī," *Iran*, 22 (1984), 88. The same article (pp. 86–7) tabulates the data on the staff of the institution in the *Waqfnāma*.

[94] Āmulī, *Nafā'is al-Funūn* (Tehran, A.H.Q. 1377–9), II, 257.

[95] The letter speaks of *'ulamā, fuqahā* and *muḥaddithān* together. The other sources classify the teaching staff as *mudarris* or *mu'īd* (assistant teacher, *repétiteur*). Of the latter one is given in the *Waqfnāma* and 10 at Sulṭāniyya. The categories have here been combined for comparison's sake.

[96] Of these, according to the letter, 1,000 were resident in a special Student's Quarter (of the Rab'-i Rashīdī presumably) and 6,000, attracted by the fame of the institution, lived in Tabriz.

[97] The description of Ghazan's charitable foundation at Shanb-i Ghāzān near Tabriz in the *Jāmi' al-Tawārīkh* (ed. 'Alīzāda, III, 421) gives almost no data on the number of personnel, except for the orphanage school. Here the figures compare well with those of the other genuine sources: Shanb-i Ghāzān, 100 orphans, 5 teachers, 5 guardians (*raqīb*), 5 female attendants; Rab'-i Rashīdī, 10 orphans, 1 teacher, 1 guardian (*atābak*); Sulṭāniyya, 4 teachers. The Letters make no mention of the orphanage of the Rab'-i Rashīdī.

figures in the letters are equally absurd: the Rab' is said to have 1,500 shops and 30,000 houses. Allowing a modest five persons to a house we arrive at a population of 150,000, a huge settlement by medieval standards. It cannot be accepted that a city of such size was brought into being at short notice in a region with limited natural advantages and at a site where it would have had to compete, not only with nearby Tabriz and the larger royal foundation at Shanb-i Ghāzān beside it, but also with the new city being brought into existence not very far away at Sulṭāniyya. In case it is thought that the schools of the Rab'-i Rashīdī might have been greatly expanded after the date of the existing *Waqfnāma* it should be observed that additions dated 715 do mention expansion, but on a plausibly restrained scale: 13 additional students and two more *mu'īds* for theology are provided for, as well as three medical students and a *mu'īd* for medicine.[98]

It is not unknown for copyists to exaggerate figures. However, the contradictions between the letter and the *Waqfnāma* are not limited to statistics. For instance, the *Waqfnāma* gives detailed prescriptions concerning how the 24 reciters of the Qur'ān (*ḥuffāẓ*) are to act in relays of three to provide for continuous recitation day and night (except at the time of the Friday and festival prayers);[99] the 200 *ḥuffāẓ* of the letter are divided into two teams, of different origin, one of which is under instructions to recite each day until the forenoon (*ḍuḥā*), and the other from then until sunset. In the letter provision is made for the various classes of personnel to live in streets (*kūcha*) and quarters which do not appear in the *Waqfnāma* at all. From the *Waqfnāma* it is evident that quarters were provided within the central complex for senior officials, but if they were married they were expected to lease land from the *Waqf* in the outlying quarters such as the Maḥalla-yi Ṣāliḥiyya, and build houses at their own expense.[100] In the letter the 1,000 students supposedly resident in the Rab'-i Rashīdī itself have been lodged in the Student's Quarter (*maḥalla-yi ṭalaba*), which is not mentioned in the *Waqfnāma*. The 12 theology students in the *Waqfnāma*, who were not permitted to be married or to go to Tabriz or the villages without special leave, were required to reside in individual chambers (*ḥujra*) in the Rawḍa, the central

[98] *Waqfnāma*, pp. 132, 148.

[99] *Waqfnāma*, pp. 135–6.

[100] *Waqfnāma*, pp. 175–91.

building of the complex which included the founder's tomb. There is no mention of weaving workshops in the *Waqfnāma*, nor any of the other workshops and craftsmen alluded to in the letter, except, it seems, paper factories.[101] In the letter methods of payment are mentioned which are unknown in the *Waqfnāma*. For instance, according to the letter, one of the two groups of *ḥuffāẓ* is to be paid from *waqf* properties in Rūm, the other from those in Shīrāz. The original *Waqfnāma* makes no such provisions for the hypothecation of revenues.[102] A final textual point of this nature is as exaggerated as the statistics. The stipends and allowances of the 6,000 students resident in Tabriz are to paid from the *jizya*, that is, the poll-tax of the unbelievers, from Greater Constantinople and India. Its suitability, not explained in the letter, is that in Muslim law such money was regarded as "clean (*ḥalāl*)," but in fact of course neither Constantinople nor India paid poll-tax to the Īlkhāns. Nor, if they did, is it easy to see how the money got into Rashīd al-Dīn's hands. In an attempt to defend the letter one might suggest that Constantinople paid some kind of tribute or gave presents to the Īlkhāns which they chose to regard as poll-tax, but in the case of India this is really out of the question. Once again, the writer of the letters has unrealistic assumptions about the extent of Ilkhanid power in the East and the West. Further comparisons could be added but more than enough has been said to show that the data on the Rabʿ-i Rashīdī in the Letters diverges in a most marked fashion from the real ones provided in the *Waqfnāma*.

Two other letters, 39 and 40, are also conspicuous for their "realistic" nature. Both are concerned with large irrigation projects, and include neat maps indicating the layout of the proposed canal works. No. 40, in which Ghazan is named as ruler, has been discussed from a different angle already; it is addressed to Rashīd al-Dīn's son Jalāl al-Dīn as Governor of Rūm, and as demonstrated above there is reason to think that he did not hold any such position so early. Be that as it may, the letter is exceptionally explicit about which reign it is written in. The new canal works are to be done for Ghazan, and are called after him. The names of several of the planned villages

[101] *Waqfnāma*, pp. 204, 207.

[102] Provisions for payment from particular sources are made in a series of later notes on the *Waqfnāma* (see pp. 289–90 of the edition), but evidently belong to a period when the institution was not functioning in its original form.

on the map allude to him: Ghāzānābād, Maḥmūdābād and so on. In the text Rashīd al-Dīn informs his son that jealous enemies have falsely maintained in the King's presence that Jalāl is not controlling his province and taking care of the subject population in a competent manner. He must ensure that all classes are happy, and pray for the King. In addition, in the Malatya plain he is to construct the new canal, drawing water from the Euphrates to irrigate ten new villages. Peasants are to be brought to populate the villages from Rūm, and from, as already mentioned, the (Mamlūk) territories of Qinnasrīn and ʿAwāṣim, and supplied with seed etc. Looking at the map we see Malatya standing on the left bank of the Euphrates. However, in reality Malatya stood on the right bank of a minor tributary of the Euphrates, some miles from where the former joined the latter, from the right.[103] The map to letter 39, which shows a similar scheme on the Tigris at Mosul, raises similar queries. In this case the project is Rashīd's own, and entrusted to an agent of his whom the addressees, the people of Diyār Bakr and Diyār Rabīʿa, are instructed to assist. As Muḥammad Shafīʿ noted, Mosul is here represented as divided centrally by the river. In fact, the city stands on the right bank alone. The Jabal Maqlūb mountain range, which in reality is east of Mosul, beyond the river, is marked on the the map on the west. Muḥammad Shafīʿ also pointed out that the head of the new canal is placed at Jazīra-yi ʿUmar, presumably standing for Jazīrat Ibn ʿUmar, which is 100 miles from Mosul as the crow flies. The new canal seems thus to be planned to be well over 100 miles long. The topographical points may seem petty, but every minor problem that arises shows how little trust that can be placed in the realistic nature of the Letters. The way they are shown on the maps, with dams or barrages (*sadd*) marked confidently across the two great rivers raises doubts about the soundness of both schemes. The situation they envisage seems rather that of the slow-flowing lower reaches of a river. Some of the inspiration for them is probably taken from the irrigation works which the Īlkhāns did undertake in such favourable locations, Ghazan's canals on the lower Euphrates[104] and Öljeitü's

[103] The mediaeval city, the site of which is now known as Eski (old) Malatya must be assumed to be intended. Modern Malatya is even further from the Euphrates. In this case too the author is consistent, for letter 45 speaks of crossing the Euphrates at Malatya.

[104] *Jāmiʿ al-Tawārīkh*, ed. ʿAlīzāda, III, 353, 411–12; *Al-Ḥawādith al-Jāmiʿa*, p. 497.

one in the delta of the Araxes.[105] The gorges of the upper Euphrates or the swift-flowing and quite deeply cut Tigris between Mosul and Jazīrat Ibn ʿUmar could not actually have been dammed by medieval technology.

It is not difficult to continue on these lines, but grounds have already been given in what has been said for the rejection of a third and more of the individual Letters. It has been shown that the problems are not limited to the few points raised by Levy and that particular misconceptions recur throughout the Letters. The difficulties are fundamental and pervasive. They cannot be resolved by *ad hoc* emendation in individual cases, for which the state of the text gives no general warrant. Even without an explanation of exactly why the Letters were produced the serious historian cannot continue to use them as a primary source for the Ilkhanid period.[106] There is more that could be said on such questions as, for instance, the style of the Letters compared with that of Rashīd al-Dīn's other works. However, this study will be concluded with a consideration of the real date of the Letters and some brief comments on the nature of the work.

The ignorance of the Ilkhanid period and of Rashīd al-Dīn revealed in the Letters seems to call for a date of composition several decades or more after Rashīd al-Dīn's death. A few matters of assorted detail suggest a later rather than an earlier date,[107] but the strongest evidence pointing to the Timurid period and the fifteenth century consists of a number of items in letter 35, which are parallelled in a unique episode in the career of Timur. The letter is supposedly written from Rūm during an expedition there by Ghazan. No expedition to Rūm was ever undertaken by Ghazan, who appears never to have visited Anatolia. Few of the Īlkhāns did. In 1277 Abaqa took an army some distance into the region in response to the invasion of the Mamlūk Sultan Baybars.[108] The only other campaign led there by an Īlkhān was the swift and savage attack on the unruly Turcomans of the south-eastern marches mounted by Geikhatu in 690/1291, shortly after his accession.[109] Neither of these episodes has much resemblance to the situation described in letter 35. However, there is one incursion into Rūm which has distinct similarities to the one in the letter, that of Timur, which took place between 1401–1403.[110]

The great event of Timur's campaign was the Battle of Ankara, with the defeat and capture of the Ottoman ruler Bayezid Yilderim. Letter 35 has no such centrepiece; in fact there is no mention of military action. Ghazan's campaign is represented as having been so successful that he decided that there was no need to continue it. (As mentioned repeatedly, he proposed to attack India instead.) For no obvious reason, we are first told how it was planned that the campaign would have proceeded. Winter was to have been spent on the shores of the sea of Rūm and in the province of Dunghūzlū, "the pleasure ground of Sultans, the resort of Khāqāns, the camping ground of ancient Emperors (*Qayāṣira-yi qadīm*), the encampment of great Kings." Dunghūzlū, modern Denizli, is a town in the upper valley of the Maeander (Büyük Menderes) in south-west Anatolia. It was also known to Muslim writers as Lādīq, from the classical Laodicaea ad Lycum, on or near the site of which it stood.[111] It cannot be said that it had never in earlier periods provided a camping ground for Kings. In January 1148 the Second Crusade, led by Louis VII of France, passed that way.[112] As this episode shows, the Maeander valley provided a route between the Aegean region and

[105] Qāshānī, p. 238.

[106] Petrushevsky ("*K voprosu*," p. 128) maintained that one of the weakest points of Levy's argument was that it did not explain why the Letters should have been forged. The fallacy is obvious: of course it is possible that something should be known to be inauthentic without the reasons for its production being apparent. *Cf.* Piltdown Man.

[107] Anachronistic use of the term *suyūrghāl* (*Letters A/B*, pp. 166/151, 233/211); passing allusion to a great theologian Yāfiʿī, which (unless a corruption for Rāfiʿī, as suggested by Shafiʿ) can only refer to ʿAffīf al-Dīn ʿAbdallāh al-Yāfiʿī, fl. c. 1300–1367 (*Letters A/B*, pp. 138/126, and, for Yāfiʿī, *EI*², s.v.).

[108] *Jāmiʿ al-Tawārīkh*, III, ed. ʿAlīzāda, pp. 144–6. *Cf.* Reuven Amitai-Preiss, *Mongols and Mamluks. The Mamluk Īlkhānid War, 1260–1281* (Cambridge, 1995), pp. 176–7.

[109] The most important account is that in the anonymous chronicle published by F.N. Uzluk as *Anadolu Selçukluları Devleti Tarihi*, III (Ankara, 1950), pp. 87–8. *Cf.* Āqsarāʾī, pp. 170–9; Waṣṣāf, pp. 260–2; *Jāmiʿ al-Tawārīkh*, III, ed. ʿAlīzāda, pp. 234, 236; C. Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*, trans. J. Jones-Williams (London 1968), pp. 298–9.

[110] For the European sources for Timur's campaign reliance is largely placed on Marie-Mathilde Alexandrescu-Dersca, *La campagne de Timur en Anatolie (1402)* (Bucharest, 1942, repr. London, 1977). For a briefer account see H. Hookham *Tamburlaine the Conqueror* (London, 1962), pp. 243–61. *Cf.* also Adam Knobler, "The Rise of Tīmūr and Western Diplomatic Response, 1390–1405," *JRAS*, 1995, pp. 341–9.

[111] *EI*², art. Deñizli.

[112] K.M. Setton (ed.), *A History of the Crusades*, I (Madison, 1969), pp. 498–500.

the plateau of Anatolia and its southern coast. However, in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries it was part of the Muslim marches (Ūjāt) which were divided among petty Turcoman rulers, and generally beyond the direct control of the the Saljuqs of Rūm or the Īlkhāns' governors of Anatolia.[113] Geikhatu stormed and sacked Lādīq in the course of his campaign of 1291, but otherwise no Īlkhān went near it.[114] The significant point for the argument is that few if any writers in Ilkhanid Iran would have had more than the slightest knowledge of the town, let alone the quality and history of its camping-grounds. The author of the Letters does not reveal himself as particularly well-informed about Rūm. However this was precisely the area in which the great conqueror Timur spent part of the winter of 1402–3. He passed through Dunghūzlū on his way to the Aegean coast, that is "the shores of the sea of Rūm," and camped in the plain there on his return after the capture of Smyrna. On the first occasion, according to Niẓām al-Dīn Shāmī, "They saw a town where good things were cheap and fruits abundant. The place seemed good in His Majesty's eyes."[115]

Letter 35 continues by explaining that the change of plan has been caused by the satisfactory submission of a number of specified rulers and potentates as well as obstinate but unidentified rebels. Much diplomatic activity accompanied Timur's Anatolian campaign, and there are a number of parallels. Among those who have supposedly submitted to Ghazan are the Princes (*mulūk*) of Cyprus and the Slavs (*saqlāb*) and the Lords (*ṣanādīd*) of Rūm from Sinope to ʿAynṭāb. Whoever the Slavs might here be intended to be,[116] neither they nor the King of Cyprus seem to be known to have sent

[113] In 727/1327 Timurtash, governor of Rūm and son of Choban, was trying to the subdue the area and seems to have been engaged in besieging Dunghūzlū when he heard that Abū Saʿīd had turned against Choban and killed his other son Dimishq Khwāja. See MS. British Library Or. 2885, fol. 413a, where the placename is written BʿRLW etc.

[114] See note 109 above. *The Encyclopaedia of Islam* (art. Deñizli) is wrong in asserting that Hülegü went to the region of Denizli.

[115] Niẓām al-Dīn Shāmī, *Ẓafarnāma*, ed. F. Tauer (Prague, 1937–56), I, 265; *cf.* Sharaf al-Dīn Yazdī, *Ẓafarnāma*, ed. M. ʿAbbāsī ([Tehran], 1336), II, 329, 332, 345; ed. A. Urunbayev (Tashkent, 1972), fols. 418b–421a, 425b. Shāmī writes the name Dunghuzlugh, Yazdī Tunghūzlugh; both are Eastern Turkish forms, in contrast to the Dunghūzlū of the letter.

[116] A Serbian contingent fought for Bayezid at Ankara, but no Serbian diplomatic contacts with Timur seem to be known. It is perhaps doubtful whether the Serbs would have been called Saqlāb.

embassies to Timur, but a number of minor princes of Anatolia, most of whom had recently been dispossessed by Bayezid, had naturally sought Timur's support.[117] More significant for the argument is another group listed in the letter, "the chiefs and notables of the Islands of the Franks (*ṣudūr wa aʿyān-i jazā'ir-i Ifranj*), such as Iṣṭanbūl, Bunduq (Venice) and so on." They are said to have have accepted to pay land-tax (*kharāj*, due from Muslims as well as unbelievers) and poll-tax (*jizya*), as, it is stated, they earlier did to Abbasid Caliphs of the eighth and ninth centuries. Venice itself of course had not done so in that period, nor did it do so to Timur. The two main Persian chronicles of Timur's life do not mention the Republic at all, but Venice was in communication with him and hoped to profit by this.[118] Of truly Frankish islands it is Genoese Chios (Sāqiz, modern Turkish Sakız), opposite the conquered Smyrna, that the Persian chronicles do mention as accepting to pay *jizya* and *kharāj*.[119] They also say the Franks who had gathered at Fūcha (Phocaea, modern Turkish Foça), a Genoese settlement on the mainland north of Smyrna, had earlier accepted to pay *jizya* to secure their safety.[120] As for Istanbul, according to the Persian chronicles, after the battle of Ankara messengers had been sent to the Byzantines (who would surely not have welcomed being included among the Frankish islands), demanding the payment of *jizya* and tribute; a return embassy announced the acceptance of this.[121] Returning to the letter, it claims that

[117] Cyprus was at the precise time distracted by conflict between the King and the Genoese of Famagusta. See Sir George Hill, *History of Cyprus* (Cambridge, 1948–9), II, 448–55. Nevertheless Cyprus was aware of the arrival of Timur, for Ibn Taghrībirdī records that not long earlier, in 803/1400, both parties sent letters to Egypt, offering their assistance against Timur. See Ibn Taghrībirdī, *History of Egypt*, trans. William Popper (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1954–60), I, 44.

[118] Alexandrescu-Dersca, pp. 25–6, 38–9, 83.

[119] Shāmī, p. 269; Yazdī, ed. ʿAbbāsī, II, 344; ed. Urunbayev, fol. 425a.

[120] Shāmī, p. 268; Yazdī, ed. ʿAbbāsī, II, 343; ed. Urunbayev, fol. 424b; Alexandrescu-Dersca, pp. 90, 137. There were two Phocaeas, Old and New, both Genoese. Alexandrescu-Dersca sees the Persian accounts as referring to Old Phocaea, perhaps because New Phocaea is known to have been in contact with Timur earlier, but the Persian chroniclers obviously tend to present such negotiations in a summary fashion.

[121] Shāmī, p. 264; Yazdī, ed. ʿAbbāsī, II, 331; ed. Urunbayev, fol. 419b. European documentary evidence shows that negotiations with Constantinople had begun considerably earlier. The Greeks were already committed to provide Timur with naval assistance and pay tribute. There is little doubt that if Timur had not appeared Constantinople would have fallen to Bayezid, who was besieging it and to whom tribute was already being paid. See Alexandrescu-Dersca, pp. 39–40, 52, 86–7,

the Princes (*mulūk*) of Egypt and Syria have submitted and placed Ghazan's titulature on their coinage. Of course, in the reigns of both Ghazan and Timur Egypt and Syria formed one kingdom, well-known as a great power in the region, which normally had one King, the Mamlūk Sultan.[122] Though rebellions and struggles for power were common enough in the Mamlūk state, it is surprising to see it stated without further explanation that it has more than one ruler. Ghazan had repeatedly attacked Syria, but no Mamlūk Sultan had ever offered submission to him or any other Īlkhān. Whether Timur was really more effective in this respect is somewhat doubtful, but the Persian accounts of his campaign in Rūm state that while Timur was still in Western Anatolia an embassy did arrive from the young Sulṭān Faraj announcing that the name of Timur (and that of his Chaghatai puppet Maḥmūd Khan who had in fact just died) had been placed on the coinage and in the *khuṭba* of his kingdom, and that *kharāj* and tax (*māl*) would in future be regularly paid to Timur's treasury.[123]

Some of the similarities between Letter 35 and the story of Timur's campaign are more striking than others. It certainly cannot be claimed that the author of the Letters was basing his work closely on any particular account of Timur's activities. The technique here, as elsewhere, consists of using scraps of information, names, concrete details of various kinds from different sources and weaving them together into a fictional structure. However, the central story of the letter, the presence of the conquering monarch with his armies in Rūm and the submission of the other principalities and powers of the region is the same, and there are several close parallels of detail. As has been said, there is no other historical event which resembles

123–4, 140. (This episode is perhaps to be seen as providing the idea of the *jizya* of Constantinople being spent on the Rabʿ-i Rashīdī in letter 52.)

[122] It was probably this kind of imprecision that led Levy to describe the Letters as vague.

[123] Shāmī, p. 274; Yazdī, ed. ʿAbbāsī, II, 356–7; ed. Urunbayev, fol. 430b. Yazdī (ed. ʿAbbāsī, II, 330–1; ed. Urunbayev, fol. 419b) describes Timur's earlier despatch of an embassy to Egypt demanding submission on these terms and threatening to invade Egypt if they were not accepted. It set off on 1 Rabīʿ I 805/29 September 1402. The Castillian envoy Clavijo heard at Rhodes in August 1403 that such demands had been made of the Sultan. (Clavijo, *Embassy to Tamerlane*, trans. Guy Le Strange [London, 1928], p. 43.) The Arabic sources confirm that these exchanges took place, but represent them as an accommodation between equals rather than submission by the Sultan. One of Timur's grievances was that an officer of

it much, and it seems unlikely that fiction could, in such a case, have anticipated fact. It is suggested therefore that letter 35 draws much of its inspiration from accounts of Timur's campaign, which means that the Letters can date from no earlier than the early fifteenth century.

The geographic sweep of the area covered by the Letters entails a knowledge that, for all its defects, at many times would have been difficult to acquire. It does in many respects suit the Ilkhanid period. Yet it suits the Timurid period just as well, perhaps in some ways better. Noticeable in the Letters is the complete absence of reference to relations with the Chaghatai Khanate, a constant preoccupation in the real Ilkhanid world. This could be explained by the fact that at the time the Letters were written the topic would have been sensitive; in addition, invention would have been circumscribed by existing knowledge of the area. Knowledge of Rūm, as we have seen, could have been acquired through Timur's campaigns just as well as through Ilkhanid control of the area. And awareness of India would have been heightened by Timur's activities. It has long been known that a *terminus ante quem* of not long after A.H. 875/1470 is provided for the Letters by the appearance of extensive quotations from them in the *Āthār al-Wuzarā* of ʿUqaylī.[124] An earlier dating is perhaps suggested by a sentence in the *Dhayl-i Jāmiʿ al-Tawārīkh* of

his, Atlamish, who had come into Egyptian hands in the time of Faraj's father Barqūq, had been kept in Egypt ever since. The Persian accounts state that the embassy sent from Anatolia repeated the demand for Atlamish and that he was finally released and accompanied Faraj's embassy. Maqrīzī gives an account of the release of Atlamish, in response to an embassy sent by Timur after the battle of Ankara, stating that he left Cairo on 1 Jumādā II 805/27 November 1402. However, Maqrīzī says nothing about submission to Timur, but rather that Timur stated in his letter that if Atlamish was released he would go to Samarqand. In any case, it does not seem likely that Faraj would have been sufficiently alarmed about Timur at this point to take such a humiliating step. See Maqrīzī, *Kitāb al-Sulūk* ed. M. Ziyāda *et al.* (Cairo, 1934–73), III, 1098. No numismatic confirmation of the Persian accounts is given in P. Balog, *The Coinage of the Mamlūk Sultans of Egypt and Syria* (New York, 1964). Earlier, just before his attack on Syria, Timur had sent messages saying that he had come to see that the coinage and *khuṭba* of Egypt were in Maḥmūd's and his own names and would withdraw after establishing the Sultan on these terms. However, though the Sultan was defeated in battle and Syria was occupied he did not in fact submit at that time. See Maqrīzī, III, 1031, 1044; Ibn Taghrībirdī, trans. Popper, II, 35; Ibn ʿArabshāh, *Tamerlane or Timur the Great Amir*, trans. J.H. Sanders (London, 1936), p. 119.

[124] Ed. Jalāl al-Dīn Ḥusaynī Urmawī (Tehran, 1337), pp. 287–322. The list of fourteen sons given by ʿUqaylī is obviously almost entirely based on the Letters.

Ḥāfiẓ Abrū, written between 1417 and 1420. Here it is stated that at the time of his death Rashīd al-Dīn had thirteen sons.[125] As has been seen, the letters refer to fourteen or fifteen sons, while other evidence points to a figure of eight at the time of Rashīd al-Dīn's fall.[126] However, it could also be argued that the number of sons in the letters was inspired by Ḥāfiẓ Abrū's statement. In any case, a date some time in the long reign of Shāhrukh (1405–1447) is most probable for the composition of the Letters. As Ḥāfiẓ Abrū's activities indicate, interest in the Mongol past was very much alive then.

As to why the Letters were produced, there is no easy answer to the question "*cui bono?*" in terms of concrete benefit or profit. The only obvious beneficiary is the reputation of Rashīd al-Dīn and if an author must be suggested, one of his descendants is the most likely suspect.[127] Otherwise, as a forgery, the work seems to belong to the category of the playful, designed to bamboozle harmlessly, rather than to cheat. The compiler, in spite of curious lapses, was educated and widely read. Occasional oddities in the Letters carry the marks of cabinet scholarship. He had knowledge of, probably access to, several of the genuine works of Rashīd al-Dīn, including the *Jāmiʿ al-Tawārīkh*, the theological compositions and the *Waqfnāma*. Some stylistic tricks remind one of these other works, for instance the use of *īn ḍaʿīf*, "this weak one" for the writer and the use of *farzand-i aʿazz*, "dearest child," in addressing sons, but these may not have been peculiar to Rashīd al-Dīn.

As evidence for political and administrative history and for the prosopography of the Ilkhanid period the Letters have negative value. For concrete social details, the names of commodities, for example, they may be of some use, though even here caution is required: we cannot tell in which corner of his library the author may have found them or precisely when he may have resorted to invention. It is as fiction that the work does have originality. Though so far the argument has required attention to be concentrated on contradictions and errors, the very considerable learning, ingenuity and imagination that have gone into the work should also be noticed. Whatever his intention, the author has succeeded in producing something approaching a historical novel, epistolary in form of course. Chronology is non-linear and there is no plot, but the work has been provided with some structure. At the beginning, No. 1 is a formal introduction, in praise of God and His prophet, No. 2, a moralizing piece, introduces the topic of the just ruler and 3 and 4 alert us to the importance of the role of the vizier. The last piece, No. 54, addressed to an unidentified son, concludes the collection with an exposition of the qualities of the good man. One cannot speak of development of character, but there is a manifest protagonist, Rashīd al-Dīn, and through him the real author's preoccupations are to some extent revealed.

The Rashīd al-Dīn of the Letters has some surprising characteristics. As vizier he seems to have remarkable freedom of action, though he is supported of course by his sons and other employees. These govern provinces and lead armies on his instructions. His ministerial colleagues are never named. Kings are mentioned with respect, though often rather less than is normal for the period. There are allusions to plots against the minister and some criticisms of his sons, but the situation is simplified and idealized. It bears no very close resemblance to the dangerous and difficult bureaucratic world revealed by Waṣṣāf, Qāshānī and Rashīd al-Dīn himself. Our hero maintains Islamic values, is free with moral advice, and particularly emphasizes support for the *ʿulamā*. As Petrushevsky noted, there is some criticism of Turks and Mongols, though in fact the two most striking examples of this are not represented as the words of Rashīd al-Dīn.[128] Petrushevsky rightly saw this as part of the old tendency in Iranian thought favouring an ideal of strong and stable central government and this is a significant feature of the Letters as a whole. The fictional Rashīd al-Dīn has a very high opinion of himself; his frequent braggart boasting is wholly inappropriate for a royal employee. For instance, in No. 31, alluding to his own vizierate and not to the monarch he served, he informs the addressee, a tax official of Fars,

[125] Ḥāfiẓ Abrū, *Dhayl*, p. 127. *Cf.* MS. British Library Or. 2885, fol. 395a. The passage is reminiscent of that of Mustawfī, mentioned in note 84 above, where, however, no number is given.

[126] As noted above, it appears that Muwaffaq al-Dīn ʿAlī died before his father.

[127] The writer knows no solid evidence for the existence of descendants of Rashīd al-Dīn in the fifteenth century. However, someone was taking the trouble to have the *Waqfnāma* kept legally valid as late as 811/1408. (*Waqfnāma*, p. 25.)

[128] Petrushevsky, "Rashīd al-Dīn's Conception of the State," p. 154, (*Letters A/B*, pp. 274/249.) Petrushevsky attributed these phrases to Rashīd al-Dīn himself, not noticing that this letter (No. 47) is supposedly written by a Muʿīn al-Dīn Parwāna. In letter 8 (pp. 17/25) two named Amirs of *tümens* are referred to disparagingly, but the speaker is Öljeitü.

that, as he already knows, "on account of our spreading of justice and fostering of equity, the Princes of all quarters of the world are overjoyed to correspond with us. . . . The Sultans of Egypt and Syria require our care, the Monarchs of India and China are agreed upon our greatness, and the Princes of Turks and Tājīks from far and near have raised their hands in prayer for us and opened their lips in praise of us, etc."[129] Similarly, in No. 38, to a clerical figure, Ṣadr al-Dīn Muḥammad Turka, it is stated that God's grace "has tamed the stallion of desire beneath our thighs, and ordered the regions of earth, the expanse of the world, by our commands and prohibitions."[130] In letter 52, addressed to his son Sa'd al-Dīn, among other such exaggerations, he maintains that the King has made him his *walī-'ahd*, that is Viceroy or even heir apparent. We may contrast the prudent modesty of the real Rashīd al-Dīn, who hardly mentions himself in his history of Ghazan Khān, in which the King is the hero, and who, in the *Waqfnāma*, expresses the conviction that any heavenly reward due for his written works belongs to the ruler who encouraged their production, Öljeitü.[131]

It is true that at times, as in letter 38, the triumphal tone is oddly mixed with more normal expressions of humility.[132] However, the conventions of mediaeval Iranian politesse, certainly as expressed in writing, do not allow anyone, except possibly rulers and princes, to refer to themselves in real life in the supremely self-satisfied way often used by the Rashīd al-Dīn of the Letters. It is one of the most surprising features of the work, but can, it may be suggested, be taken as helping to reveal the preoccupations of the real author's class and time. On account of the offhand attitude diplayed towards Mongols and Turks, and the exaggerated powers enjoyed in them

[129] *Letters A/B*, pp. 169/153. "*. . . ba-sabab-i 'adl-gustarī wa inṣāf-parwarī mulūk-i āfāq ba-murāsilat-i mā mubtahij . . . wa salāṭīn-i Miṣr wa Shām ba-tarbiyat-i mā muhtāj wa shahriyārān-i Hind wa Chīn ba-buzurgī-yi mā muttafiq al-kalima. Mulūk-i Turk wa Tājīk az dūr wa nazdīk dast ba-du'ā-yi mā bar dāshta wa lab ba-thanā-yi mā gushūda. . . .*"

[130] *Letters A/B*, pp. 240/218. "*. . . tawsan-i murām-rā dar zīr-i rān-i mā rām gardānīda ast wa khiṭṭa-yi ghabrā wa 'arṣa-yi dunyā-rā ba-awāmir wa nawāhī-yi mā intizām dāda . . .*"

[131] *Waqfnāma*, pp. 244–5.

[132] On occasions the humility itself is expressed at points where it is inappropriate. For example, letter 27 is written in the manner of a decree, and it would be wholly abnormal for the issuer of a decree to refer to himself in it as "this weak and feeble one (*īn ḍa'īf-i naḥīf*)." Similarly, it does not seem at all likely that a father, particularly one in the position of Rashīd al-Dīn, would refer to himself as "this weak one" in a letter such as No. 11 addressed to one of his own sons.

by the Great Vizier, the Letters are unlikely have been intended for presentation to the real holders of power in the Timurid world, that is the Timurid rulers, princes or amirs. The intended audience must rather have been the Tājīk scribes, the bureaucratic administrators, the continuators of the tradition to which, despite his Jewish origin and his exceptionally broad interests, Rashīd al-Dīn did come to belong. The early Timurid bureaucrats, as Manz has noted, enjoyed relatively low status and lacked real power.[133] An unusual and interesting feature of the Letters, seen as a whole, is their revelation of the frustration of the social group it comes from, taking consolation for their unsatisfactory position in the present in nostalgia for an unreal past.

[133] Beatrice Manz, *The Rise and Rule of Tamerlane* (Cambridge, 1989), pp. 113–18.

MONGOL EMPIRE AND TURKICIZATION: THE EVIDENCE OF FOOD AND FOODWAYS

PAUL D. BUELL

Introduction

By the time the Mongols rose to power and began their own outward migrations, Turkic peoples had gone before them to penetrate Central Asia and adjacent areas thoroughly, and to dominate politically if not culturally a large part of the Old World. In south Russia, Turkic Qipchaqs controlled the steppe and exerted a strong cultural influence upon the city states of the Kievan Rus. Soon, pursued by Mongol enemies, Qipchaqs were to enter Hungary, following on the heels of the Turkic Onogur and others before them. In the north, penetration of the vastness of Siberia by the ancestors of the Jaquts was already well underway. Turks, although different Turks than the present inhabitants of the area, were also found in what is now Kazakhstan, the former Soviet Central Asian Republics, and Hsin-chiang (Sinkiang), including the oasis states, and in the China borderlands. Further to the south, other Turkic groups had reached India, Iran, the Levant, and even North Africa (the future founders of the Mamluk Empire). As a consequence of these latter migrations, associated with the rise of the Seljuk Empire, Byzantine Anatolia was well on the way to becoming the Turkey of today. Even distant Yemen was soon to have its Turkic dynasty.

The Mongols accelerated and deepened the process of Turkic diaspora. Their empire provided a political and economic backdrop utterly favorable to the life and migrations of nomadic peoples of every persuasion, including Turkic-speaking groups. Mongols also physically moved Turkic groups from one end of Asia to the other; Qipchaqs and Qangli from the Russian and Siberian steppes to China,[1] for example, and Turkic groups from the east to Russia.

[1] On the Qipchaq (Qangli) and other foreign guards of the Mongol qans of China see, as an introduction, Hsiao Ch'i-ch'ing, *The Military Establishment of the Yuan Dynasty* (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1978), pp. 92 ff.

Mongols also actively sought out individual Turks to staff an increasingly complex imperial government. Turkic Uighurs in particular served with distinction at every level and exerted an influence upon their Mongol masters all out of proportion to their numbers.[2]

With Turkic-speaking groups and individuals distributed so widely and so strategically within the Mongolian world order, Turkicization was almost inevitable. It was most pronounced and most rapid within the Golden Horde. Mongols were never very numerous in the Mongolian west and most of the pastoral population controlled by Batu and his successors was comprised of Qipchaqs, along with new Turkic migrants. By the end of the thirteenth century, at latest, Golden Horde culture, as the surviving literary monuments and descriptions of outsiders make clear, was preponderantly Turkic.

Turkicization of the Chagatay *ulus* was slower due to the geographical proximity of Turkistan to the Mongolian heartland and its Mongols. But in Turkistan too Mongols were never numerous, particularly in the west, and even the "Mongolian" groups of culturally conservative Moghulistan were thoroughly Turkic by the end of the fourteenth century at latest. The more numerous but culturally isolated Mongols of Azerbaijan and Iran had disappeared even before, although some retained their political identity as Mongols long after becoming Turks or Iranians culturally. Although the Mongols of Mongol China never disappeared as such down to the end of Mongolian rule there, and even survived the collapse in a few favored areas,[3] above all due to the close proximity of a relatively unassimilated Mongolian homeland, major Turkicization is none the less noticeable there too among the elite and, through the elite, more broadly.

[2] As an introduction see Igor de Rachewiltz, "Turks in China under the Mongols: A Preliminary Investigation of Turco-Mongol Relations in the 13th and 14th Centuries," in Morris Rossabi (ed.), *China among Equals, the Middle Kingdom and its Neighbors, 10th–14th centuries* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: The University of California Press, 1983), pp. 281–310. In same volume see also Thomas T. Allsen, "The Yüan Dynasty and the Uighurs of Turfan in the 13th Century," pp. 243–80. For a biography of an individual Uighur (or Önggüt) who played a major role in the politics and government of the early Mongol empire see Paul D. Buell, "Chinqai (ca. 1169–1252): Architect of Mongolian Empire," in Edward H. Kaplan and Donald W. Whisenhunt, (eds.), *Opuscula Altaica, Essays Presented in Honor of Henry Schwarz* (Bellingham: Center for East Asian Studies [Studies on East Asia, 19], Western Washington University, 1994), pp. 168–86.

[3] See Henry Serruys, *The Mongols in China during the Hung-wu Period (1368–1398)* (Brussels: Institut belge des hautes études chinoises [Mélanges chinoise et bouddhiques, XI], 1980).

Most significant of the forces promoting Turkicization of Mongols and others in East Asia were direct cultural influences exerted by Önggüts[4] and Uighurs, and other Turkic groups present in some numbers in the Sino-Mongolian borderlands or nearby. Since these groups were to a large extent sedentary in the thirteenth century, types of cultural influence were quite different from those exerted by nomadic Turks, and in the case of the Uighurs, included much Middle Eastern cultural content, which they re-interpreted and transmitted to the Mongols. Yüan rulers also employed large Turkic guards comprised of formerly nomadic Turks (Qipchaq and Qangli), and actively recruited government officials from among them. Some dominated Yüan government for long periods of time.[5] Turkicization also took place through the North Chinese, themselves Turkicized by centuries of Turkic cultural and political influence from Han times on.

Turkicization of Mongols took many forms in East Asia. Turkic linguistic influence was particularly pronounced, reinforcing trends predating the establishment of Mongolian empire. Turkicization was also significant in several cultural areas (particularly music),[6] and in daily life. In this paper we will examine in detail one hitherto little understood area of Mongol Turkicization for which the evidence is substantial and persuasive, food and foodways, a sphere in which Mongols had much to learn from Turkic peoples.

Although medieval Mongols and medieval Turks are often lumped together as barbarians, standing at much the same cultural level, reality was quite different. While the era of Chinggis Khan marked the beginning of Mongolian literacy and of the exposure of the Mongol culture to a wider world, Turks had already been literate by that time for more than 600 years. They had not only begun to produce a substantial written literature, but a Turkic urban culture sophisticated in other ways as well. Bearers of this urban culture were principally, although not exclusively, those Turks who had come into contact with the Islamic world and had become assimilated to its

[4] On the important Önggüt see Paul Pelliot, *Recherches sur les chretiens de l'Asie centrale et d'extrême-orient* (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1973).

[5] For an introduction to late Yüan politics see John W. Dardess, *Conquerors and Confucians, Aspects of Political Change in Late Yüan China* (New York and London: Columbia University Press [Studies in Oriental Culture, IX], 1973).

[6] The fourteenth-century *Cho-keng lu* includes a list, in Chinese transcription, of Mongol court music. Several of the selections are clearly Turkic. See T'ao Tsung-i, *Cho-keng lu* (Taipei: Shih-chieh shu-chü [Tu-shu cha-chi ts'ung-k'an ti-erh-chi], 1970), pp. 430–1.

culture to varying degrees. They included the ruling elites of culturally mixed states, along with their less sophisticated but still Islamicized followers and other common Turks; all of those who had taken up residence in cities and oases, in many cases displacing and assimilating Iranians. Even Turks who continued to live the traditional life on the steppe were not immune to those influences stemming from the sedentary Islamic world and were culturally advanced in many respects compared to the Mongols, including in their foods and foodways, as is well documented in our sources.

Maḥmūd al-Kāshgharī, for example, along with other early Arab and Persian commentators on the Turks, makes clear that the Turks of his time, even nomadic Turks, ate, in addition to their traditional diary foods and mutton, an unexpectedly large variety of grain foods. They included not only simple grain foods made by roasting, frying and boiling (e.g., *talqan*, toasted grain or a porridge made from toasted grain, *qawurmac*, wheat fried in butter, *yarmis*, groats etc., *qawut*, porridge of parched millet, butter and sugar, *töp*, a porridge, *kürshäk*, a boiled millet flavored with butter, and *bulgamac*, unsweetened flour pudding), but also noodles and noodle foods (*cöp, ügrä, tutmac*), pancakes, breads and breadings (*quyma*, a thin pancake flavored with sugar, *ätmäk/ötmäk*, bread, *kömäc*, hearth bread cooked in ashes, *toquc*, a round flatbread, *cöräk*, a round, flat fine bread, *yuwqa*, a thin bread, sometimes used like fillo to construct thicker coverings, *pöskäl*, a thin flat bread similar to *yuvqa*, *böskäc*, bread cooked in loaves, *cuqmin*, bread steamed in a special pot, *közmän*, an ash cake, and *yamata*, or possibly *mamata* since the reading is uncertain,[7] a breading used on chicken or meat to prevent the fat running out).[8] The early Turkic diet, as somewhat later sources (principally Chinese dietaries and cookbooks of the Mongol era summarized below) witness, was also rich in fruits and nuts, some gathered,[9] some imported, and the Turks had begun to use sugar.

Later sources also make clear that the Uighurs and other oasis

[7] Charles Perry, personal communication, December 18, 1991. I am grateful to Dr. Perry for his advice in writing this paper.

[8] See Charles Perry, "Grain Foods of the Early Turks," in Paul D. Buell and Eugene N. Anderson, appendix by Charles Perry, *A Soup for the Qan: Chinese Dietary Medicine of the Mongol Era as Seen in Hu Szu-hui's Yin-shan Cheng-yao* (London: Kegan Paul International, 1998), pp. 617–638.

[9] For eighteenth century information on Turkic gathered foods, see now Ingvar Svanberg, "Turkic Ethnobotany and Ethnozoology as Recorded by Johan Peter Falck," *Uppsala: Svenska Linnésällskapets Årsskrift 1986–1987* (1987), pp. 53–118.

Turks, as they became Muslims, in addition to adopting new foods, usually modified to take into account locally available foodstuffs and local tastes, improved existing foods through using new spices and ingredients, and by adapting them to the latest cooking methods from the Near East (e.g., use of the tannur oven). By the time of Mongol conquest, Turks living in and around China already possessed not only a sophisticated knowledge of grain foods of every sort, but were using the latest noodles and pasta to produce delicately flavored soups and noodle dishes rivalling those eaten in Baghdad. They had also taken over the northern Iraqi *sopa seca* using chickpeas as a thickener, Iranian spiced meat stews, and a wide variety of sweets including the fruit-juice *sharbat* and rich pastries. Among them was the direct ancestor of the modern baklava.[10]

The oasis Turks of the thirteenth century were thus well along in their absorption and assimilation of Middle Eastern Foodways and were beginning to make their own original contributions to a now enlarged tradition. Since this was being done without breaking totally with the past, oasis Turks ruled by the Mongols were positioned to transmit two distinctly different foodways to their overlords. One was comprised of their own, in many ways culturally assimilated foods, foodstuffs, eating, and cooking traditions, the other of largely northern Iraqi and Iranian traditions, intermediated by Turks. The Mongols took eagerly to both but without giving up their own traditions; to native Turkic traditions since they were so much like their own, only, in most cases, better, and to what was new, foreign and exotic as part of their own cultural development, and as a reflection of a conscious Mongol effort to borrow widely from among all their subject peoples. They did so in part out of claims to universality, in part to make themselves more acceptable to the conquered, and in part to produce a synthetic imperial cultural tradition, elements of which at least would appeal to everyone. Thus Mongol era culture was not unlike the empire itself, which freely combined political institutions, practices and personnel from all parts of the Mongolian world integrated by an overall structure that was Mongolian.[11]

[10] On the history of the baklava, see now Charles Perry, "The Central Asian Origins of the Baklava," in: *Ikinci milletlerarası yemek kongresi tebliğleri* (Konya, 1989), pp. 356–59.

[11] On the Mongolian empire as a political structure see Paul D. Buell, "Kalmyk Tanggaci People: Thoughts on the Mechanics and Impact of Mongol expansion," *Mongolian Studies*, 6 (1980), 41–59.

As a consequence two distinct processes were thus observable in thirteenth and fourteenth century Mongolian foodways. One was a process of borrowing and of assimilation, as the Mongols sampled the best of what the East and West had to offer, drew upon their own traditions and established their court foodways. The second was a process of cultural interaction. This took place as eastern and western traditions combined in the new elite cuisine, and as elements outside the court imitated it and developed it further. These elements included other Turkic and Mongolian members of the elite, responding to similar cultural and political needs, also Turkic and Mongol masses as a whole, including those relatively primitive Mongols remaining in the homeland and living the old life.[12] The new elite cuisine was also taken up by Chinese, Iranian and other non-Altaic subjects of the Mongols. As a result, the Mongols not only helped produce a new Eurasian elite culture, but also promoted considerable cultural change within the conquered sedentary domains as well, as the Chinese cookbooks of the era make clear. In so doing the Mongols set in motion a profound but little studied change in the habits of much of a continent, one whose influence persists even to the present.

To document this change we begin our examination with a review of the relatively unassimilated Mongolian foods and foodways of earliest empire. These are then compared with the highly sophisticated (and clearly Turkicized) cuisine of the fourteenth century Mongol court as revealed by the imperial dietary manual *Yin-shan cheng-yao* (*YSCY*), "Good and Essential Things for the Emperor's Food and Drink," presented to the court in 1330 by one Hu Szu-hui. He was possibly an Uighur, certainly a Sino-Turk.[13] Broader cultural influences

[12] The *Hua-i i-yü*, a translator's manual reflecting the more general Mongolian usage of the fourteenth century, lists several Mongolian words referring to foodstuffs and foods borrowed from the Turks, including *ütmek* (Tu. *ötmek*), "bread," and *üdzüm* (Tu. *üzüm*), "grape." See Antoine Mostaert, *Le matériel Mongol du Houa I I Iu de Houng-ou (1389)*, ed. Igor de Rachewiltz and Anthony Schönbaum (Brussels: Institut Belge des Hautes Études Chinoises, 1977).

[13] On the *YSCY*, its history, and authorship see Buell, Anderson, and Perry, *A Soup for the Qan* 10–15, and Paul D. Buell "The *Yin-shan Cheng-yao*, A Sino-Uighur Dietary: Synopsis, Problems, Prospects," in Paul U. Unschuld (ed.), *Approaches to Traditional Chinese Medical Literature*, (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989), pp. 109–127. Two facts are clear about author Hu Szu-hui (or perhaps Hu-szu-hui, rendering a Turkic Qusqi, as suggested by Igor de Rachewiltz in a letter of 26 September, 1991) from a simple reading of his book. One is that his Chinese education was good and thorough (his Classical Chinese is excellent), and that he must have grown up in, or in close proximity to China, or at least in a highly

are traced through the *Chü-chia pi-yung shih lei* (*CCPYSL*) a late fourteenth century household encyclopedia, for popular Chinese rather than elite consumption, a Moghul recipe in a court ritual book, and a post-Mongol-era Iraqi cookbook. A complete translation of all 12 "Muslim" recipes from the *CCPYSL* is provided in an appendix below.

The Turkicization of Mongol Foodways

As is well known, prior to empire, the Mongols lived from the foods produced by their animals, principally dairy products, supplemented by whatever else the Mongols could take or gather from their environment when the need arose. The most important herd animal was the sheep, which produced milk, sheep's butter, cheese and other fermented products, rarely meat. Also widely herded, particularly in more arid regions, was the goat, with products similar to that of the sheep, and, mostly in the north, cattle. The centerpiece of steppe life but less important as a source of food was the horse. It did, however, produce a high caloric meat, and also blood as an emergency ration,[14] while fermented mare's milk was the most preferred of all Mongolian foods and the source of considerable prestige for anyone possessing it in abundance. Camels were rare but the meat was eaten and camel kumiss almost as highly prized as kumiss from mares.

To supplement limited meats produced by domestic animals, generally too valuable as pastoral capital and as sources of dairy products to slaughter, Mongols hunted a large variety of large and small game,

Sinicized environment to identify so strongly with Chinese culture. The other is that his Turkic, and to some extent Mongol culture, was natural to him, more so than simple exposure to the court environment of the era would have accounted for. The many Turkic words and expressions in the *YSCY* are absolutely germane to the text, are always used correctly (even grammatically), and exhibit a complete dialectical consistency (Hu's Turkic language is unquestionably East Turkistani and very close to Modern Uighur with forms such as *tutum-ash, um-ash, sajhimur*). Hu must have spoken Turkic, probably Uighur, as a second language and he must have grown up in a culture where Chinese and Turkic, and for that matter Mongolian cultural elements existed side-by-side and interacted freely. This can only have been in one of the highly mixed societies of the Sino-Mongolian borderlands. The clear connection of many *YSCY* recipes with the modern Hui cooking of Ning-hsia strongly suggests that this region, the western portions of the former Hsi-hsia empire may have been his home.

[14] See John Masson Smith, Jr., "Mongol Campaign Rations: Milk, Marmots and Blood?," in Pierre Oberling (ed.), *Turks, Hungarians and Kipchaks, a Festschrift in Honor of Tibor Halasi-Kun* (Washington, DC: Institute of Turkish Studies, 1984), pp. 223–228.

some quite lowly (e.g., the bobac marmot, or *tarbaqan*, and small birds). Marco Polo's by no means exhaustive list of Mongolian game animals includes the wild boar, gazelles, various species of deer, Siberian tigers, bears, wild cattle, wild asses, wolves, foxes, deer, wild goats, hares and various water fowl such as cranes and swans.[15] Although in theory disdaining fish, the Mongols did fish and fish may have been an important food in some areas. Also disdained by the Mongols, in theory, were vegetable foods but these were almost certainly as important a part of Mongol diet in the pre-empire period as they have been in the recent past. Plant foods gathered by the recent Mongols include wild seeds, grains, fruits, berries, vegetables, roots and tubers, including numerous members of the genus *Allium*,[16] and even fungi.[17] Cultivated grains were uncommon, but some did enter Mongolia as booty or as trade food. There was also some agriculture in Mongolia itself.[18]

Food was consumed fresh (but usually not milk since the Mongols are as lactase deficient as the Chinese), but most often in some processed form, e.g., through drying, fermenting or cooking. Two forms of cooking were preferred. Whenever possible whole pieces of meat were roasted on the spit (to make *shi'üsün*, "roasted meat-provisions"). But since meat were rarely available in the necessary quantity to

[15] Henry Yule and Henri Cordier, *The Book of Ser Marco Polo, the Venetian*, two volumes (rpt., Amsterdam: Philo Press, 1975), I, pp. 396 ff. Damrinbazar lists the following wild animals as common sources of wild meats for the recent Mongols: Deer, reindeer, elk, antelopes, wild sheep, wild and mountain goats, wild camels, kulan and other wild asses, the wolf, the lynx, the snow leopard, the leopard, the bear, wild swine, hares, *tarbaqan*, badgers, bustards, geese, snipe, the lammergeyer, pheasants, quail, partridge, cranes, duck, and swans. See Damrinbazar, *et al., Mongolyn ideen tovchoo* (Ulaanbaatar: BNMAU Shinzhlekh ukhaany khevlel, 1991 [1987]), pp. 120 ff.

[16] The Sung loyalist poet Wang Yüan-liang, in his series of poems recounting the journey of the last Sung emperor to Pei-ching, notes Mongol consumption of raw onions in particular among other, from his point of view, outlandish foods. See Wang Yüan-liang, *Shui-yün chi*, Wu-lin wang-che i-shu edition, 7b–8a.

[17] For a list and linguistic atlas of nearly 80 traditional Mongolian gathered plant foods, see B. Rinchen, *Mongol ard ulsyn ugsaatny sudlal khelniy shinzhleliyn atlas*, two volumes (Ulaanbaatar, 1979). Note that Mongolian use of gathered plant foods as a major dietary supplement is noticed, among others, by the Persian historian Juwaynī who refers to the nut of the Siberian cedar (*Pinus cembra*), *qusuq*, as the "dessert" of the Mongols. See 'Alā' al-Dīn 'Aṭā-Malik Juwaynī, *The History of the World-Conqueror*, translated by J.A. Boyle, 2 volumes (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1958), p. 21.

[18] On agriculture, hunting and fishing in twelfth and thirteenth century Mongolia, see as an introduction to Iwamura Shinobu, *Mongoru shakai keizaishi no kenkyū*, (Kyōto, 1968), pp. 29–93.

make this cooking method universally practicable, a far more common method of cooking was boiling. A broth was made by boiling bones, most often with a small amount of meat still attached. Sometimes a whole "leg of lamb" was used. Added as thickeners were seeds, grains, tubers, roots, fruits and berries, etc., even green vegetables, whatever was available. The end product, after along and careful slow cooking, was a very thick stew or a *sopa seca*, called *shülen* by the Mongols. In the *Secret History* (chapter 124) this is the honorific word for "food" in general (in contradistinction to *undan*, "drink"), a fact indicative of the popularity of such food.[19]

With the coming of empire, the Mongols were exposed to a greater range of foods (above all grains) and ingredients (especially spices and other additives). In some cases they adopted whole foreign food complexes (e.g., the Middle Eastern *sharbat* so popular throughout Yüan China).[20] But they remained true to their own traditions as well and continued to drink kumiss, eat roast meat, and decoct soups. The big difference in the latter case was that the "soups" in question, while recognizably *shülen*, were far more sophisticated. They were notably improved by the addition not only of new ingredients, but new spices. As a result entirely new dishes were produced within an existing Mongolian tradition.

The *YSCY* includes recipes for no less than 27 classic *shülen* among the ninety-five recipes for "Strange Delicacies of Combined Flavors" of *chüan* 1 (pages 26a–50b in the Szu-pu ts'ung-k'an hsü p'ien reprint of the 1456 edition). The following examples are typical:

Mastajhi [Mastaki] Soup

It supplements and increases, warms the center, and accords *ch'i*.[21]

[19] On these early Mongolian foods, see Paul D. Buell, "Pleasing the Palate of the Qan: Changing Foodways of the Imperial Mongols," *Mongolian Studies*, 13 (1990), pp. 57–81. See also the general discussion of Mongolian foods today in Damrimbazar, *Mongolyn ideen tovchoo*.

[20] See the *YSCY*, 2, 8a; *CCPYSL*, 11, 15b–18a.

[21] The *YSCY* purports to be a medical text and classifies Mongolian and other foods and foodstuffs in terms of their properties as assigned by traditional Chinese medicine. The text also treats individual recipes as if they were combination of herbs intended to cure or respond to a particular condition or pathology. Since Chinese medicine makes little distinction between herbs and foods, both feed or impede *ch'i*, life force, and thus sustain or limit life, such classification is not in and of itself unusual. What is unusual is the application of this system, often not very successfully, to non-Chinese traditions, as here. In some cases *YSCY* prescriptions are subtle expressions of Islamic as well as Chinese medicine, since Islamic medicine was widely practiced in China during the Mongol era. See the detailed discussion in Buell, Anderson and Perry, *A Soup for the Qan*, pp. 128 ff.

Mutton (leg; bone and cut up), tsaoko [*Amomum tsao-ko*] cardamoms (five), cinnamon (2 *ch'ien*),[22] chickpeas ["Muslim beans"] (one-half *sheng*; pulverize and remove the skins).

Boil ingredients together to make a soup. Strain broth.[23] [Cut up meat and put aside.] Add 2 *ho* of cooked chickpeas, 1 *sheng* of aromatic nonglutinous rice,[24] 1 *ch'ien* of *mastajhi*. Evenly adjust flavors with a little salt. Add [the] cut-up meat and [garnish with] coriander leaves. (1, 16b).[25]

Fenugreek Seed Soup

It supplements lower primordial energy,[26] orders loin and knee, warms the center, and accords *ch'i*.

Mutton (leg; bone and cut up), tsaoko cardamoms (five), fenugreek seeds (1 *liang*; a kind of *hulba[t]* [i.e., Fenugreek Seeds]).

Boil ingredients together and make a soup. Strain [broth]. Add Tangut *Um Ash*,[27] or "Rice Heart *Suyqa[sh]*,"[28] half a *ch'ien* of *kasni* [Asafoetida]. Adjust flavors with a little salt. (1, 27a–b)[29]

In both recipes mutton is boiled with a spice or spices (the "signature spice"[30] is the large cardamom), the broth thickened by typical Middle Eastern additives, namely chickpeas in one recipe, fenugreek seeds, in the other. The latter was a vegetable and not a spice in ancient Iraq, apparently the usage here too.[31] Additional foods and spices

[22] A *ch'ien* is today 3.12 g or .011 oz and is one-tenth of a *liang*. Sixteen *liang* make a *chin* (about 500 g). A *sheng* is today 31.5 cu in (slightly less in the fourteenth century), and is comprised of 10 *ho* (each 3.17 cu in). 0.0827 lb, or about 1.32 oz, and is one-tenth of a *liang* (0.827 lb).

[23] On this practice in medieval Arabic cooking see Peter Heine, *Kulinarische Studien: Untersuchungen zur Kochkunst im arabisch-islamischen Mittelalter, mit Rezepten* (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1988), p. 64.

[24] On the use of rice in medieval Near Eastern cooking, see Heine, 39–40.

[25] Compare Buell, Anderson, and Perry, *A Soup for the Qan*, pp. 275–6.

[26] This is the vital *ch'i* affecting the lower body.

[27] See G. Doerfer, *Türkische und mongolische Elemente im Neupersischen [TMEN]*, four volumes (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrasowitz, 1963–75), II, pp. 123–4. This is Perry's *uwmach*, "small soup noodles, pea-shaped dumplings," or, locally, "a vegetable porridge." See Perry, in Buell, Anderson, and Perry, *A Soup for the Qan*, 625–6.

[28] On this and other medieval Chinese noodles see now Françoise Sabban-Serventi, "Ravioli cristallins et tagliatelle rouges: les pâtes chinoises entre XII[e] et XIV[e] siècle," *Medievales*, No. 16–17 (1989), 29–50. On the derivation of this word from the Chinese *ch'i-tzu*, see Buell, Anderson, and Perry, *A Soup for the Qan*, p. 115.

[29] Compare Buell, Anderson, and Perry, *A Soup for the Qan*, p. 279.

[30] In my analysis of these Mongol era recipes I have closely followed the conceptual framework developed by Elisabeth Rozin in her highly innovative *Ethnic Cuisine, the Flavor-Principle Cookbook* (Lexington, Mass.: The Stephen Greene Press, 1983).

[31] My colleague Olav Hekala, who has cooked these and many other dishes of

were then added to the thickened broth, including mastaki, asafoetida, salt, cilantro, more chickpeas, rice, and Tangut (in this case Uighur) *um-ash*, etc. In both recipes the basic soup is Mongolian, but the spicing and additives are Middle Eastern, largely channelled through the Turks. This is clear from the reference to *um-ash*, a purely Turkic grain food, in the once recipe, and also from the form of the word mastaki, i.e., *mastajhi*, showing a Turkic palatalization noticeable throughout the foreign vocabulary of the *YSCY* (e.g. *shajhimur*, for an expected Mo. *saqimur* in 3, 52b).

Turkic influence is even stronger elsewhere in the text of the *YSCY* as is witnessed by the following recipes. The first is for a *Chöppün*, an Uighur noodle soup[32] and not literally a Chinese *ch'un-p'an*, or plate of fresh vegetables prepared in spring for some eminent personage. Despite its Uighur name and flavorings, this soup is very much in the Mongol tradition of the *shülen* as well with its finely cut up meat (Tu.: *qima*), sheep organs, Chinese chive greens and tubers, a steppe mushroom, and smartweed shoots. There follow recipes for a soupy bread stuffing or "companion," also known from at least one Central Asian source,[33] and for *tutum-ash*, a staple of the Mongol era:

***Chöppün* Noodles**

They augment the center, and increase *ch'i*.

White flour (six *chin*; cut into fine vermicelli), mutton (two legs; cook. When done, cut into strip *qima* [and stuff vermicelli]), one set each of sheep intestines and lungs (Cook. When done cut up.), eggs (five; fry into an omelet. Cut into "streamers"), sprouting ginger (four *liang*), root and tuber of the Chinese chive (half a *chin*), *möög* [mushrooms; *Tricholoma mongolicum*][34] (four *liang*), oil rape leaf, smartweed shoots, safflower.

Use bouillon for the ingredients. Add one *liang* of black pepper, Adjust flavors with salt and vinegar. (1, 37a–b).[35]

Ishkäne

It augments, and increases [for] the five internal organs.[36]

Mutton (leg; cook. When done cut up finely), sheep's tail (two; [cook]. When done cut up finely). Cut into long strips: sacred lotus rhizome (two), cattail rhizome [*Typha* sp.] (two *chin*), cucumbers (five), sprouting ginger (half a *chin*), cheeses (two), pickled ginger (four *liang*), sweet melon pickles (half a *chin*), eggs (ten. Fry into an omelet), *möög* [mushrooms] (one *chin*), Swiss chard, Chinese chives.

Use a "good meat soup" and blend together ingredients. Fry [i.e., cook dry] with two *chin* of sesame paste, and half a *chin* of finely ground ginger. Adjust flavors with onions and vinegar. Eat with "Iranian buns."[37] (1, 36b–37a)[38]

***Tutum-ash* (This is a kind of kneaded noodle)**

They supplement the center, and increase *ch'i*.

White flour (six *chin*. Make into *tutum ash*), mutton (leg. Roast the meat. [Make into] *quruq qima* [and stuff *tutum ash*]).

Use a Good Meat Soup for ingredients. Add the noodles and roast [cook dry]. Adjust flavors evenly with onions. Add garlic, cream [or yogurt],[39] finely ground basil.[40] (1, 28b).[41]

Other examples of Turkic foods in the *YSCY* include several kinds of *börek* (one called *piräk* in the text, *YSCY*, 1, 48a–b),[42] *cuqmin*, a steamed cake (1, 49b),[43] a stuffed Turkic pot-bread or *yuwqa* (the *yufka*

the era, notes that while tasty, this Fenugreek soup is very bitter. Bitterness may have been loved by the Mongol palate and possibly also cut the grease of the mutton.

[32] On *chöp*, "noodle," and the rare word *mün* (here assimilated to *pün*), "soup," see Perry in Buell, Anderson, and Perry, *A Soup for the Qan*, pp. 626, 633.

[33] On *eshkäne* (*wei-hsiang*) see G. Doerfer, *TMEN*, IV, 261. This rare word may be formed from Turkic *ish-* or *esh-* means "to be one of a pair, a companion." The similarity to the Western *companatium*, "food eaten with bread," is striking.

[34] Today the fungus called *mo-ku* by the Chinese is usually *Agaricus campestris*, the common field mushroom, closely related to the Western domestic mushroom (*A. bisporus*). This is clearly not what is illustrated in the *YSCY* (3, 47a) and Wasson in his *Soma, Divine Mushroom of Immortality*, (Ethno-mycological Studies I, [New York, 1968]), pp. 170–1, notes that the term *mo-ku* is also applied to *Tricholoma mongolicum* in north China. This species is found in Mongolia and is apparently what the artist was attempting to illustrate. Wasson provides strong evidence that Chinese *mo-ku* is a Mongolian loan word, Khalkha *möög*.

[35] See Buell, Anderson, and Perry, *A Soup for the Qan*, p. 296.

[36] The "five internal organs" are the heart, liver, spleen, lungs and kidneys.

[37] The *YSCY*'s "Iranian buns" are a variety of the Turkic steamed bread *cuqmin*.

[38] See Buell, Anderson, and Perry, *A Soup for the Qan*, pp. 295–6.

[39] As Doerfer's authorities (Doerfer, *TMEN*, II, 458) make clear, Central Asian *tutum-ash* was traditionally eaten with yogurt.

[40] In the Near East today *tutmaj* is flavored with mint and not basil, the *YSCY*'s "fragrant herb."

[41] See Buell, Anderson, and Perry, *A Soup for the Qan*, pp. 298–9.

[42] On this word see Doerfer, *TMEN*, II 321. Note that the Chinese form, *p'ieh-lieh*, clearly indicates an initial "p." The word may ultimately be from the Chuvash or their ancestors who gave the same word to the early Slavs, among whom it appeared as *piróg*.

[43] The Chinese is *cheng-ping*, "*cheng* cakes," or "*cheng* bread." The description makes it certain that *cuqmin*, which is also steamed "in a special pot," as called for here, is meant:

of modern Turkey), in this case using a fillo for the skin in what is perhaps the earliest surviving recipe for this type of food,[44] *chizig* (1, 45a–b), "flour cooked with rendered sheep's tail fat,"[45] an Uighur delicacy called *Shoyla Toyym* (1, 35b) "Porridge Abundance"[46] and *to* (2, 31a), "a batter soup." All of these grain foods, with the exception of the *börek/piräk*, were already known in Maḥmūd al-Kāshgharī's time although versions here are far more sophisticated.

Chuqmin (same as "long bread")

White flour (ten *chin*), vegetable oil (one *chin*), Chinese flower pepper (one *liang*; roast and discard the juice), fennel (one *liang*; roast).

[Mix] ingredients and keep overnight. Use leaven, salt, soda and warm water. Combine this with flour [dough]. The next day add flour to thicken. Combine again into a dough. Divide each *chin* [of dough] into two loaves. Put into a *ch'ung* and steam. (1, 49b)

Compare Buell, Anderson, and Perry, *A Soup for the Qan*, p. 317.

[44] On *ywqa* or *yubqa*, here transcribed as *yen-tzu*, literally, "fat bread," see Doerfer, *TMEN*, IV, 211–212, and Perry, in Buell, Anderson, and Perry, *A Soup for the Qan*, p. 629. The *YSCY* recipe is unmistakably for a Turkic *ywqa*, in spite of calling for Mongolian ingredients such as lily root (*jha'uqasu[n]*), *möög* mushrooms, and the finely cut up mutton (*qima*):

Butter Skin *Yubqa*

Mutton, sheep's fat, sheep's tail, onions, prepared mandarin orange peel, sprouting ginger. (Cut up each finely. One can perhaps add *jha'uqasu[n]*. This is a kind of lily root.)

[To] ingredients add spices, salt, and sauce and mix [everything] together uniformly. Use vegetable oil, rice flour and [white wheat] flour, combine to make the skins. (1, 48a)

Compare Buell, Anderson, and Perry, *A Soup for the Qan*, pp. 314–5. The "sauce" called for here is probably not the expected soy sauce, but the "sheep's liver sauce" called for in similar *YSCY* recipes (e.g. 1, 29a, 30a, 30b, 32a).

[45] On *chiziq* see Doerfer, *TMEN*, III, pp. 2–3. The Chinese transcription, *ch'i-szu-ko* is clearly *chiziq*. The *hsi* preceding *ch'i-szu-ko* simply means "fine" and is not part of the transcription. Compare the text's *pai na-ba*, "white" *nabat* (a kind of sugar). See Lao Yan-shuan, "Notes on non-Chinese terms in the Yüan imperial dietary compendium *Yin-shan Cheng-yao*," *The Bulletin of the Institute of History and Philology, Academia Sinica*, 39 (Oct. 1969), 399–416, p. 407.

[46] On this name see Buell, Anderson, and Perry, *A Soup for the Qan*, p. 114. See also the discussion of the Chinese transcription of the name for this dish in Herbert Franke, "Additional notes on non-Chinese terms in the Yüan imperial dietary compendium *Yin-shan Cheng-yao*," *Zentralasiatische Studien*, 4 (1970), 7–16. The first word is clearly Uighur *šoyla*, "a very thick porridge consisting mostly of rice, fat, carrots and meat." See Henry Schwarz, *An Uyghur-English Dictionary* (Bellingham: Center for East Asian Studies, Western Washington University [East Asian Research Aids and Translations 3], 1992), 523. The second word is clearly *toyyim*, a word not in the Schwarz dictionary but in Kazakh meaning "abundance," "profusion," "satiation," a derivative of *toy*, "feast."

In addition to its many Turkic recipes, the text of the *YSCY* employs Turkic expressions, including Turkicized versions of Arabic and Persian words freely. They include names for various liquors, *boza* "beer,"[47] *sürmä*, "liquor,"[48] in the *YSCY* "brandy," and *tngri*, a variety of Qaraqojha Wine (*YSCY*, 3, 6b), and food stuffs, *mäske* (2, 9a), "fresh butter," also "cream," *mastajhi*, "mastaki," *shajhimur*, "rape turnip," *qatiq* (2, 5b) "dried sour milk,"[49] *qima*, "finely chopped meat,"[50] *um-ash*, also *umach* (1, 39b), round pieces of dough for soups, etc.,[51] *chöp* (1, 30a, 31b etc.), "noodles to be rolled tightly in the hand,"[52] and *salma* (1, 38b–39a), small, thin, "water polished (Chinese *shui-hua*)" soup noodles."[53] One *YSCY* dish (1, 48b) is called a *shilön* (Tu. from Mongolian) "soup,"[54] while recipe directions call for the use of a Turkic *qashiq* (2, 9a), "spoon,"[55] and for cutting ingredients up like small Turkic coins, *sashuq* (1, 27a etc.).[56]

Turkic culinary influence is thus pervasive in the *YSCY* and the *CCPYSL* (13, 17a–19b)[57] provides evidence that it was pervasive outside Yüan court circles as well. The latter text's 12 "Muslim recipes," for example, include another recipe for the popular *tutum-ash*, the oldest known recipe for a baklava, called *güllach*, one for a sweet *börek* (*Chäkärli piräk*), a Turkic *halwa* called *baldy* ("honeyed"), a recipe for Lungs Uighur Style, and a dry cooked stew called *qavurma*,[58] made from a

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[47] The *YSCY* incorrectly equates *po-tsao/boza*, always a beer, usually fermented from millet (see Doerfer, *TMEN*, II, 337–341), with *sürme*, a liquor which is clearly a brandy there, although originally a wine. Hu Szu-hui was perhaps confused by the changing semantics of *sürme*.

[48] On *sürme* see Doerfer, *TMEN*, III, 249–250 and in A. Caferoğlu, *Eski Uygur Türkçesi sözlüğü* (İstanbul: Edebiyat Fakültesi Basımevi, 1968), p. 214.

[49] This is Franke's guess (Franke, "Additional Notes," 11) but in my view he is quite correct. On *qatiq* see Doerfer, *TMEN*, III, 374–5.

[50] See Franke, "Additional Notes," 9.

[51] Chinese *ma-ch'i*. See Doerfer, *TMEN*, II, 123–124. This may be a synonym for *um-ash* but the form is apparently not Uighur, indicating that Hu may have received his Turkic recipes from several sources.

[52] The Chinese writing of this Turkic word, *ch'ou-fen*, "rolled noodles," is an example of an intentional choice of characters which confer meaning as well as express sound in transcribing foreign words. The process for making these noodles is the same as that employed in making *salma*, see below in the text.

[53] On this noodle see Perry in Buell, Anderson, and Perry, *A Soup for the Qan*, p. 626.

[54] See *YSCY*, 1, 48a–b, where a recipe calls for *piräk* to be cooked in water, making a "soup" dish. See Lao, "Notes," pp. 411–2.

[55] Transcribed into Chinese as *a-ch'ih*, used to stir *mäske*. See Doerfer, *TMEN*, III, 390–1.

[56] See Franke, "Additional Notes," p. 13.

[57] Reprinted in Shinoda Osamu and Tanaka Seiichi (eds.), *Chūgoku Shokukei Sōsho*, volume 1 (Tōkyō, 1972), pp. 330–366.

[58] On this word see Doerfer, *TMEN*, IV, 294.

sheep's head, honey, nuts and other tasty ingredients. Other Turkic recipes appear elsewhere in the text. There are, for example, recipes for several other types of *börek* under their Chinese name *chüeh-erh*, "horn," and a recipe for *salma* noodles. The recipe for *chäkärli piräk* also calls for another Turkic food as an ingredient, *kürshäk*, a baked cake used as a filled that is a further development of the more simple, unbaked grain dish mentioned by Maḥmūd al-Kāshgharī.[59]

In addition to purely Turkic content, the *CCPYSL* also includes recipes of Iranian or even Baghdadi origin, in most cases clearly modified with the Turkic palate in mind. These include a wheat-based *halwa*, not unlike that eaten by the Uighurs today, a similarly modified *julapia*, or fritter,[60] a *qarisa*, a thick meat (mutton) sauce prepared with wheat, a "sour soup" using locally available *mume* plums (*Prunus mume*), a straight adaptation of a traditional Iranian soup using prunes,[61] and many recipes for *sanbusak* (including one for "thin rolled pancakes" translated below), in one case calling them by that name. From farther afield are a rich *qoresh-e* meat sauce, and what is unmistakably a form of bulgur.[62] What other Turkic and common Islamic influence lies beneath seemingly Chinese-sounding recipes in other sections of the *CCPYSL* will have to await full evaluation of this most important text.

While in many cases there has been a further adaptation of Turkic or Iranian recipes to Chinese conditions (the bean paste of the *güllach* in place of probably what originally must have been a durum flour),

[59] In Maḥmūd al-Kāshgharī's time *kürshäk* was "a food made of millet grains boiled in water or milk and then buttered." See Maḥmūd al-Kāshgharī, *Diwanü luğat-it-Türk tercümesi*, Besin Atalay (ed.), 3 vols. (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi [Türk Dil Kurumu Yayınları 521], 1985–6), I, 478. The *kürshäk* of the *CCPYSL* clearly represents a further development and has been baked into a dry cake to crumble and use as a filler, to absorb the honey.

[60] Compare the zoulbia in Najmieh Batmanglij, *Food of Life, a Book of Ancient Persian and Modern Iranian Cooking and Ceremonies* (Washington, DC: Mage Publishers, Inc., 1990), p. 194.

[61] Compare the recipe for "Sweet and Sour Soup" (*Ash-e miveh*) in Batmanglij, *Food of Life*, p. 32.

[62] The recipe is as follows (*CCPYSL*, 14, 40a):

> Making Wheat Yellow
>
> During the sixth month take wheat. Wash and remove floating participles. Put into water. Dry seven days in a hot sun. Change the water each morning. On the seventh day strain and remove the wheat. Dry and steam cook. Cover in a container. When it is yellow on top and dried out, make into a condiment for use.

what is interesting is how much the original spirit of Middle Eastern and Turkic foodmaking has not been violated. This fact implies, among other things, that the Chinese cooks of the time did not find such traditions all too foreign. The *CCPYSL*'s recipe for "water polished" noodle, for example, the Chinese transcription/translation of Tu. *salma*, would not be out of place in an Ottoman or even modern Turkish cookbook:[63]

> Use the best quality flour. During the spring, the summer and the autumn use freshly drawn water. Add oil and salt. First mix together uniformly. When the flour becomes dough-like, gradually add water. Press together into balls. Use the hands to [press] open. Make into [flat] lumps. Then sprinkle with oil and water. Combine by kneading one or two hundred times. After doing this three or four times, the dough will be very soft, like a cake. With the dough placed on a table, use a rolling pin[64] and roll out more than a hundred times. If one does not have a rolling pin knead a hundred times with the hands. When the dough is ready, it can then be divided to make noodle fingernails. Put into recently cooled water. Soak for a couple of hours or so, waiting until the noodles are ready. Then put into the pot. [The noodles] will be ample and fine. Prepare them as one pleases. During the winter months soak the noodles in warm water. (18, 21b)

Thus a Turkic-influenced Mongol-era cuisine of China is as well described in the *CCPYSL* as it is in the *YSCY*. It is also well described in texts from other parts of the former Mongolian world order, or associated regions, indicating that this cuisine was that of a Mongolian empire, not just of Mongol China. The fifteenth century Iraqi cookbook *Kitāb al-Ṭibākha*, for example, includes recipes for *Tutum-ash* (*tutmaj*) and for *salma*,[65] indicating that both foods were as popular in the West as they were in the East. In addition, there are other

[63] Compare, for example, directions for dough processing given in Ayla Esen Algar, *The Complete Book of Turkish Cooking* (London and New York: Kegan Paul International, 1985), pp. 222–223. My colleague Olav Hekala, who has prepared many of the noodle and other dough recipes of Mongol-era cookbooks, notes that the doughs resulting from these manipulations are extremely thin and are in every respect an early fillo dough.

[64] The Chinese term used here for rolling pin (so much is clear from the context), *ao-p'eng*, it can also be read *niu-p'eng*, is quite possibly a transcription of a foreign word and may be an attempt to represent some local form of the Modern Turkish word *oklava* (Kazakh *oqtaw*), a special rolling pin used by the Turks in making noodles. See Ayla Algar, *Classical Turkish Cooking* (New York: Harper Collins, 1991), p. 174.

[65] Charles Perry, "Kitab al-Tibakhah: A Fifteenth Century Cookbook," *Petits Propos Culinaires*, 21 (Nov. 1985), pp. 17–22:

foods described in the *YSCY* and the *CCPYSL* which also became west Asian staples, presumably through the example of Mongol imperial cuisine. These include the *piräk/börek* first described in the fourteenth century Chinese sources, but later standard Ottoman and now modern Turkish cuisine, the *CCPYSL*'s *güllach*, which I suggest is a proto-baklava[66] not unlike the baklavas of Afghanistan and other parts of Central Asia, the fillo-covered *yuvqa* (modern Turkish *yufka*) and the type of stew called *kogurma* (*qavurma* in Turkey).[67] Also a food clearly disseminated west by the Mongols, although probably originally a Central Asian food, was the *manty*, now found almost universally in the Turkic world and, thanks to its popularity among the Ottomans (its invention is attributed to no less a personage than Mehmed the Conqueror),[68] far beyond as well.[69]

But perhaps the most significance piece of evidence supporting the theory that the Mongols propagated a cuisine of their own, one which influenced the foodways of many other Asian cultures, is provided by the following recipe (interpreted by Charles Perry) from a Moghul-era ceremonial book, the sixteenth century *Ā'īn-i Akbarī*, for a "Mongol" recipe (a *shölen*):

1 lb meat	1/2 oz fresh ginger
1/4 lb dried chickpeas	1 tsp minced garlic
2 tsp salt	1 tsp pepper
1 cup rice	1 tsp cinnamon
2 oz butter	1 tsp cardamom
half an onion	1/8 tsp clove

Salma: Dough is taken and twisted and cut in small pieces and struck like a coin with a finger, and it is cooked in water until done. Then yoghurt is put with it and meat is fried with onion for it and mint and garlic are put with it.

Tutmaj: Dough is rolled out and cut and cooked in water until done. Yoghurt, mint and garlic and clarified butter and fried meat are put with it. (page 20)

Tutmaj is still a popular dish in the Middle East and is one of the earliest (pre-Ottoman) Turkic borrowings by a broader Middle Eastern food culture. See modern recipes in Arto der Haroutunian, *Middle Eastern Cookery* (London: Pan, 1982), p. 80, and Claudia Roden, *A Book of Middle Eastern Food* (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin, 1970), p. 135. On the early popularity of the dish see also Algar, *Classical Turkish Cooking*, p. 5. On the history of Turkish food in general see also Semahat Arsel *et al.*, *Timeless Tastes, Turkish Culinary Culture* (Istanbul: Vehbi Koc Vakfi, 1996) (I am grateful to Mr. Arsel and to the English editor, Priscilla-Mary Isin, for supplying a review copy of this wonderful history and recipe book, whose publication was sponsored by the Divan Hotel).

[66] The word baklava itself may be a Turkicized Mongolian, from the word that is *bayla-* in Classical Mongolian, with the basic meaning "tie, wrap up, tie up in bumbles, pile up. heap," precisely what is involved in making *güllach*. Compare also Khalkha *baglaa*, "bale, bunch, bundle," etc. Baklava is possible a Turkicized verbal form with the Turkic verbal ending *-u(ı)* substituted for the Mongolian *-x*.

[67] See Vural Yiğit, "Türk-Islam kültürürün, gıda bilim ve teknolojisinin gelişmesine katkilari," *Proceedings of the II. International Congress on the History of Turkish and Islamic Science and Technology*, 3 volumes (Istanbul: I.T.U. Research Center of History of Science and Technology, 1986), I, 183–195, p. 186.

[68] *Ibid.*, 185.

[69] Conventional wisdom (e.g., Doerfer, *TMEN*, IV, 23–24) is to derive Central Asian *manty/manta/manti*, etc. from the Chinese. There is good reason for doing so.

A steamed bun called *man-t'ou*, also *man-t'ou*, later *man-t'ou*, "barbarian heads," according to a tradition whereby Chu-ko Liang's sacrificed mutton stomachs formed into "heads" with dough to propitiate a south Chinese river god who used to demand the real thing, Chu-ko Liang's "heads" subsequently being reproduced by generations of Chinese in bread, has been eaten since time immemorial in west and south China. See the tradition summarized in Murohashi Tetsuji, *Dai kanwa jiten*, 13 volumes (Taipei: Pei-i ch'u-pan-she, 1987), XII, 424a–b. But there are difficulties with this equation since the various forms of word *manty* (and the *manty* itself) are so well spread among Turkic-speakers and have such linguistic depth that some authorities have rejected the proposed Chinese derivation of the word on these grounds alone (e.g., the *Qazaq tilining qysqasha etimologiyalyq sözdegi*, [Alma-Ata: Ghylym, 1966], pp. 142–3). A second problem is that the classic *man-t'ou* of China, as it is still eaten today, is an altogether different food from the Central Asian *manty* or, for that matter, the *man-t'ou* of the *YSCY* and the *CCPYSL*. The south Chinese *man-t'ou* of today is never stuffed and is always a bread food. This also seems to have been true of the earliest forms of the *man-t'ou* (whatever we choose to believe about Chu-ko Liang and his imitation heads). The Central Asian *manty*, on the other hand, like the *man-t'ou* of the *YSCY*, is always stuffed and is quite often not a bread food at all. It can be a stuffed vegetable skin (*YSCY*, 1, 47b), or even an animal intestinal cavity breaded to hold in the juices, as is the case in a recipe given by late Yüan literatus and epicure Ni Tsan (*Yün-lin-t'ang yin-shih chih-tu chi*, edited by Ch'iu P'ang-t'ung, [Pei-ching: Chung-kuo p'eng-jen ku-chi ts'ung-k'an, 1984], pp. 6–7). Recipes of this sort seem alien to China and more likely to be found in Iran or urban Central Asia. And this is probably their origin. In my view, the *man-t'ou* of the *YSCY*, the CCPYSL and of Ni Tsan's cookbook are a relatively recent Central Asian introduction. They represent the Central Asian food now known as *manty*, etc. whose only link with the classic Chinese *man-t'ou* is a similarly sounding name which Chinese of the era elected to write with the same characters used for a purely Chinese food, the south Chinese *man-t'ou*. The word *manty* itself almost certainly derives from Middle Turkic *yamata* (or *mamata*), defined by Maḥmūd al-Kāshgharī as "dough smeared on fat chicken or meat so that the fat will not run out when the meat is roasted" (Perry, in Buell, Anderson, and Perry, *A Soup for the Qan*, p. 634; see also Maḥmūd al-Kāshgharī, ed. Atalay, I, 445, where the reading is y?amata), precisely the use of the dough in the Ni Tsan example given above. Other derivations are also possible, including one from the verbal root *man-*, "to gird oneself, put on a sash; to gird on a sword; dress," also "dip, plunge into," in this case "plunge into the steam and cook" (Maḥmūd al-Kāshgharī, ed. Atalay, II, 30). The word is also explainable as a derivative of the Indo-European loan word *pan/nan*, or in this case *man* (consonants such as m, b and p can be interchangeable according to phonological context in Turkic languages), i.e., "bread," modified by the Turkic ending *+tu-/ty*, "with," in this case serving as a diminutive, i.e. "little bread," although this would not explain the non-bread character of many *manty*.

> Bring the meat to the boil in 5 cups of water with the salt; skim, add the chickpeas and cook for 1 1/2 hours, then add the rice and cook for another 1/2 hour, stirring from time to time and adding water as needed to keep a porridgy consistency. The onion and garlic would be fried with the spices and stirred in toward the end.[70]

This recipe is unmistakably for the same kind of dish as the classic *shülen* of the *YSCY*, but with a few local refinements. If this really was what people in the sixteenth century thought was "Mongolian" food, then this food was no haphazard combination of foods but rather a specific and consistent cuisine. That it was, moreover, a Turkicized one is clearly suggested by other evidence suggested above. If Mongol rule promoted Turks as ethnic groups, they also seem to have promoted Turkic foods, or at least Turkicized foods through the preferred imperial usage as well. The many survivals of Mongol era foods in Ottoman and other West Asian cuisines is unquestionably indicative of the importance of the cultural transmissions involved. The imperial foods of the Mongol era may have been, in many cases, local Central Asian in origin, but it was the Mongols who assimilated them and made them into an international cuisine, the first truly "orld cuisine, associated with themselves, and with the Turks who here in the end the biggest gainers from their empire.

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[70] Charles Perry, "A Mongolian Dish," *Petits Propos Culinaires*, 19 (Mar. 1985), pp. 53–55.

Appendix

The 12 "Muslim" Recipes of the CCPYSL (13, 17a–19b):

1. *Chākārli pirāk* ("sweet bōrek")

Walnuts, two *chin*. (Remove the skins in warm water). Clean and dry. Put into a mortar and pulverize. Add one *chin* of cooked honey, one *chin* of roasted *ch'ü-lü-ch'e* [*kürshāk*?] cakes, crushed in the hand. Combine three ingredients evenly. Work into small patties. Adjust consistency with roasted *ch'ü-lü-ch'e* cakes. Cover the stuffing with a dough skin. Knead into *sanbusak* shapes. Put into the oven, and cook until done stuck on the walls of the oven.

2. Rolled Thin Pancakes

Spread out thin wafers. Set out walnuts, pine nuts, peach kernels, hazel nuts, tender lotus seeds [*Nelumbium speciosum*], dried persimmons, lotus rhizome,[71] ginko fruits, prepared chestnuts, *badam* [Per: almonds]. Except for the yellow of the chestnuts, to be cut into strips, cut everything up finely. Combine with crystallized honey. Add pulverized lamb, ground ginger, salt, onions, and combine. Make the filling. Put into the thin wafers. Fry in oil.

3. *Kogurma*

Cook a sheep's head. When it has been cooked to pieces, remove bones. Add chick peas to the original juice. Wait until the chickpeas are cooked soft and then add glutinous rice power to form a *kogurma* paste. Add butter, honey, pine nuts, wall nuts. Mix evenly. Serve.

4. "Sour Soup"

Wu-mei, the quantity does not matter, sugar, vinegar; boil [together] until well done. Remove the dregs and kernels and put into a sand pot. Add honey. Taste to see if the balance of sourness and sweetness is right. Add pulverized pine nuts, walnuts and cream. Boil. The walnuts will blacken from exposure to the *wu-mei*. For the broth use meat broth. Again adjust flavors. Serve together with cooked mutton ribs and knuckles, meat paddies and chick peas.

[71] On the lotus and its various food products see Frederick J. Simoons, *Food in China, A Cultural and Historical Inquiry* (Boca Raton, Florida: CRC Press, 1991), pp. 112–115.

5. ***Tutum-ash***

These are like "water-polished" noodles [i.e., *salma*]. Combine [ingredients] into small balls. Trim. Allow to soak up water. Work with the hand. Work into small thin cakes. Add to the pot and cook until done. Remove [from pot] when cakes have absorbed juice. Fry "sour meat."[72] Eat as desired.

6. **Baldy**

One large cup of water; bring to a boil. Add a half *chin* of honey. Remove the froth. Use 6 *liang* of bean powder and blend into a paste. Put into a pot. Watch the consistency of the paste and add water. To cook [prepare] use a dish and sesame oil. Oil the pan. When it is ready baste with butter. Cut with a knife and eat.

7. **Halwa**

[Take] dried flour and roast. Spread out and roast again. Add honey. Add a little water and stir to form the *halwa*. Cut into slices.

8. **Güllach**

Mix evenly egg white, bean paste and cream [to make a dough]. Spread out [dough] and fry into thin pancakes. Use one layer of white powdered sugar, [ground] pine nuts and [ground] walnuts for each layer of pancake. Make three-four layers like this. Pour honey dissolved in ghee ["Muslim oil"] over the top. Eat.

9. **Qoresh-e**

[Take] 20 chicken eggs. Break, mix evenly. Cut up finely 2 *chin* of mutton and add half a *chin* of fine spices,[73] crushed onions 10 bulbs. Roast in sesame oil. Cook dry. Stir in egg white. Mix evenly. Use one

[72] The *CCPYSL* does not specify how this meat is prepared. A basting with yogurt or sour cream would produced the desired effect.

[73] Most early Chinese cook books are vague about their spices, simply calling for them without further indication of what spices are intended. With the *CCPYSL* we are on firmer ground since the text includes two different spice combinations at the end of *chüan* 14 (40a–b), both showing Muslim influences in their choice of spices:

Great Spice Combination for a Large (or the Imperial) Kitchen (made by powdering the following and forming it into pellets with *cuqmin* dissolved in water.)

[Processed] Stinking Elm (*Ulmus Macrocarpa*) pulp
lesser galangal (*Alpinia officinarum*)
long pepper (*Piper longum*)
greater galangal (*Alpinia galanga*)
grains-of-paradise (*Amomum villosum* and *A. xanthioides*)
Szu-ch'uan pepper (*Zanthoxylum simulans* and *Z. bungeanum*)

cup of vinegar and a half cut of liquor, 2 *liang* of bean powder and make into a paste. Stir together again with the dried meat using egg white. Pour into a wine pot. Use bamboo cuticle to fasten the mouth. Add to boiling water. Cook until done. Wait until it is cold and break the pot. Cut into slices and eat after basting with butter and honey.

10. **Julapia**

Combine bean paste with flour. Make into a thick paste. Put into boiling oil to fry. When soft eat. A variety: The bean paste can perhaps be left out. Only use flour and sweet meats and form into a paste in cold water. Fry.

11. **Qarisa**

Take one bowl of wheat, pound. Remove the skins. [Take] 4–5 *chin* of beef or mutton and cut into slices. Cook together into a fine meat paste. Put into a bowl and spread out. Baste with rendered fat of sheep's tail or sheep's head oil. Serve with yellow roast buns. [Textual note:] Add pine nuts.

12. **"West of the River Lungs"**

Connect heart, sheep lungs, one set. Clean in water. Use 4 *liang* of bean paste and broth. Work into meat. Use 4 *liang* of flour and scallion juice. Work into meat. Honey, 3 *liang*, half a *chin* of butter, pine

dried ginger
roasted cinnamon
zhira (*shih-lo*, Ar. "dill")
fennel
Mandarin orange peel (peel of *Citrus reticulata*)
apricot kernel (*Prunus armeniaca*)

Quick Spice Combination for Flavoring (made by finely pounding the following and forming into small "pills" with water)

makdunis (*ma-ch'in*, "Muslim celery," i.e., parsley)
black pepper
fennel
dried ginger
cinnamon
Szu-ch'uan pepper

The first spice combination is of particular interest due to its use of processed stinking elm seeds (in Chinese, *wu-i*, made by drying and salting the seeds, then applying a sour grain mash as a fermentation agent, see the *CCPYSL*, 14, 40b), as a very strongly flavored condiment. This fact, and the use of bread to form the spice pellets strongly suggests that this "major spice combination" has strong links with the *murri* tradition of the Arabic world. See Charles Perry, "Medieval Near Eastern Rotted Condiments," *Oxford Symposium 1987: Taste* (1988).

nuts, walnuts--remove the skin and clean, pound with a 10 *liang* weight. Filter finely and remove dregs. Stir together and combine. Pour onto the lung. When covered completely, put into cooking pot. Cook until done, Put on the table in a Tatar [Ta-tan] plate.[74] First baste and marinate lung. Put the excess broth into sesame paste. Cook until done. Make into bounties.[75]

A Note on Transcription

In the text above and the notes a simplified system has been employed for technical reason in transcribing Middle Mongolian, medieval Turkic, Persian and Arabic. With a few exceptions, all diacritic marks have been omitted including indications of vowel length. "H" has been used after consonants to indicate voicing of "c" and "j" in Mongolian and Turkic. As much as possible forms are spelled consistently and usually according to some authority (Perry for medieval Turkic grain foods). All Chinese is transcribed according to the Wade-Giles system currently in use except that umlauts are indicated. European languages are spelled normally except for Modern Turkish references which have also been simplified. Those knowing the relevant languages will have no difficulty whatever in reconstructing the original forms.

[74] This is presumably the large serving plate known called *tabaq* (from Ar. *ṭabaq*) by the Mongols. See the *YSCY*, 1, 47a.

[75] Compare the very incomplete version of this recipe in the *YSCY*, 1, 42b where it is called "Tangut," i.e. ho-hsi Lungs.

Glossary

a-ch'ih 阿赤
ao-p'eng 拗捧

cheng-ping 餣餅
ch'i 氣
ch'i-ssu-ko 乞思哥
ch'i-tzu 餏子
ch'ien 錢
chin 斤
Cho-keng lu 輟耕錄
Ch'ou-fen 搊紛
Chü-chia pi-yung shih-lei 居家必用事類
Chu-ko Liang 諸葛亮
Ch'ü-lü-ch'e 曲呂車
chüan 卷
chüeh-erh 角兒
ch'un p'an 春盤

ho 合
Ho-hsi 河西
hsi 細
Hsi-hsia 西夏
Hsin-chiang 新疆
Hu Ssu-hui 忽思慧
Hua-i i-yü 華夷譯語
Hui 回

liang 兩
lung 籠

man-t'ou 曼頭，饅頭，蠻頭
mo-ku 蘑菇
ma-ch'i 馬乞
ma-ch'in 馬芹

Ni Tsan 倪瓚
Ning-hsia 寧夏

Pai na-ba 白納八
p'ieh-lieh 撇列
po-tsao 撥糟

sheng 升
shin-lo 蒔蘿
shui-hua 水滑
Shui-yün chi 水雲集
Ssu-pu ts'ung-k'an hsu-p'ien 四部叢刊續編

Ta-tan 大單

Wang Yüan-liang 汪元量
wei-hsiang 圍象
wu-i 蕪荑
wu-mei 烏梅

yen-tzu 奄子
Yin-shan cheng-yao 飲膳正要

NOTES ON SHAMANS, FORTUNE-TELLERS AND *YIN-YANG* PRACTITIONERS AND CIVIL ADMINISTRATION IN YÜAN CHINA*

ELIZABETH ENDICOTT-WEST

Introduction

The political and religious influence of shamans among the Mongols has been traced back to the earliest literary monument of the Mongolian people—the *Secret History of the Mongols* (1228). Evidence of the persistence of the shamanic tradition among various groups of Mongols continues to be uncovered even today.[1] While the purpose of this essay will be to examine the continuing influence—particularly political influence—of shamans, fortune-tellers, and *Yin-yang* experts throughout the period of the Yüan Dynasty, a few brief comments on shamans in the *Secret History* are perhaps in order.

Interestingly, the most common word for "shaman" in Mongolian, *bö'e*, does indeed appear in the *Secret History*, but not in any of the passages of the text that refer to Kököchu Teb Tenggeri, the notorious shaman whom Chinggis Khan (upon his wife's advice) ordered put to death. Nonetheless, the linear, word-for-word Chinese translation of the *Secret History* (embedded in the text) identifies Teb Tenggeri as a "shaman's title" (*wu-ming*).[2] Indeed, Walther Heissig has already pointed out that nowhere in the *Secret History* is it specifically stated that Teb Tenggeri was a shaman; his title, translated by Heissig as "the fully heavenly," has led to the assumption that he was a shaman.[3]

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[1] See, for instance, Caroline Humphrey, *Karl Marx Collective. Economy, Society and Religion in a Siberian Collective Farm* (Cambridge, 1983), pp. 402–417. For a brief discussion of shamanistic survivals in contemporary Inner Asia, see V.N. Basilov, *Izbranniki dukhov* (Moscow, 1984), pp. 204–207.

[2] See *The Secret History of the Mongols* 244 and 245, for instance.

[3] See W. Heissig, "Shaman Myth and Clan-Epic," in *Shamanism in Eurasia*, ed. Mihály Hoppál (Gottingen, 1984), Part 2, p. 319.

Other translations of the epithet Teb Tenggeri include "Lord Cunning" and "The Very Divine."[4]

It is clear that throughout the Yüan period, shamans continued to play an important ritual role at the court of the imperial Mongols. The Yüan dynastic history (*Yüan shih*) in fact includes a section entitled "Dynastic customs and old rituals" (*kuo-su chiu-li*), much of which is devoted to descriptions of shamans presiding over seasonal ceremonies.[5] Yet what can be said of the political role of shamans and other sorts of spiritual advisers at the courts of the Mongolian rulers in China? The evidence, as sketched below in this essay, points to a lasting political influence, and yet also suggests that, when perceived as operating outside of civil administrative control, such people were subject to government sanctioned suppression. This theme in Mongolian history—the powerful shaman who oversteps his authority—a theme that appears in the *Secret History of the Mongols* with Teb Tenggeri—continued to be played out throughout the Yüan period. The only change is in the cast of characters: the ranks of shamans are joined by fortune-tellers and *Yin-yang* experts as advisers to khans and imperial princes.

By way of a final introductory note, this article will not attempt to compare or differentiate Mongolian and Chinese shamanistic beliefs and practices, a herculean task of classification already undertaken by, for instance, Mircea Eliade in his book *Shamanism*.[6] Clearly, however, Mongolian shamanism was not totally alien in the Yüan Chinese context. As Joseph Needham has pointed out, Chinese shamanistic practices by this time had "fused imperceptibly with the numerous pseudo-sciences (divination, astrology, fate-calculation, geomancy, oneiromancy, etc.)."[7] Mongolian shamanism and Chinese *Yin-yang*

[4] For two different interpretations of the exact meaning of the epithet Teb Tenggeri, See Francis Woodman Cleaves, "*Teb Tenggeri*," *Ural-Altaische Jahrbücher* 39 (1967), pp. 248–260; and Igor de Rachewiltz, "The Secret History of the Mongols: chapter ten," *Papers on Far Eastern History*, 26 (Sept., 1982), pp. 75–76. De Rachewiltz translates Teb Tenggeri as "The Very Divine," while Cleaves translates it as "Lord Cunning."

[5] See Sung Lien *et al.*, *Yüan shih* (Peking, 1976) 77:1923–1926. This section has been translated into German by Paul Ratchnevsky, "Über den mongolischen Kult am Hofe der Grosskhane in China," in *Mongolian Studies*, ed. Louis Ligeti (Amsterdam, 1970), pp. 417–443. *Yüan shih* will hereafter be abbreviated as *YS*.

[6] For a discussion of shamanic techniques in Chinese history, see Mircea Eliade, *Shamanism. Archaic Techniques of Ecstasy*, trans. from the French by Willard R. Trask (Princeton, 1974), pp. 447–461.

[7] Joseph Needham, *Science and Civilisation in China*, Vol. II, *History of Scientific Thought* (Cambridge, 1956), p. 139.

beliefs and practices very likely complemented one another and partially blended in the Yüan period, thus creating even greater problems of imperial control from Qubilai's reign onward.

The Situation before Qubilai's Reign

The Mongols' reliance upon experts in divination was noted by many foreign travellers and historians of the thirteenth century. For instance, the Armenian historian Kirakos of Ganjak, writing around 1241, in his chapter on the customs of the Mongols notes their dependence upon such experts:[8] "Furthermore, their women were sorceresses and prophesied all things, and without the command of their sorcerers and magicians they did not go upon a journey in any direction, unless they commanded it."

In fact, a prominent female political adviser of the regent Töregene was accused by political opponents of sorcery. This was the notorious Fāṭima, a female servant of Ögödei's widow, the regent Töregene. Fāṭima was accused of sorcery and in particular of bewitching Ködön, Güyük Qa'an's brother,[9] who, it is said, died as a result of Fāṭima's magic. As Qa'an, Güyük (r. 1246–48) extradited Fāṭima from his mother Töregene's household and had Fāṭima tortured and executed by a rather gruesome process. Everyone connected with Fāṭima was also put to death.

Güyük Qa'an's widow, Oghul Ghaimish, herself became the target of her enemies' accusation that she was a sorceress. It seems that among the mid-thirteenth century Mongols, as among other peoples in various eras and locales, one of the handiest means to dispose of a political foe was to level the accusation of sorcery or witchcraft. Möngke Qa'an, who, as we shall see shortly, surrounded himself with all sorts of shamans and prognosticators, accused Oghul Ghaimish of witchcraft. In the words of William of Rubruck, the Franciscan friar

[8] John Andrew Boyle, "Kirakos of Ganjak on the Mongols," *CAJ*, 8 (1963), 208 [reprinted in Boyle, *The Mongol World Empire 1206–1370* (London, 1977)].

[9] Ködön, whose name is spelled Köten by the Persian historian Juwaynī, was the brother of Güyük, not, as Morris Rossabi writes, his cousin. See Morris Rossabi, "Khubilai Khan and the women in his family," in *Studia Sino-Mongolica. Festschrift für Herbert Franke*, ed. Wolfgang Bauer (Wiesbaden, 1979), p. 165. On Ködön as brother of Güyük, see Louis Hambis, *Le chapitre CVII du Yuan che* (Leiden, 1945), p. 71. For Juwaynī's account of Fāṭima, see John Andrew Boyle (tr.), *The History of the World-Conquerer* (Manchester, 1958), I, pp. 243–246.

who visited Qaraqorum during Möngke's reign, "Mangu [Möngke] told me with his own lips that Camus [Oghul Ghaimish] was the worst of witches, and that with her sorcery she has destroyed her entire family."[10] Oghul Ghaimish clearly was executed because of her opposition to Möngke.

As for the situation at Möngke's court, both the Yüan dynastic history and William of Rubruck testify to the numbers and immense influence of shamans (*wu-hsi*) and fortune-tellers (*pu-shih*) in the service of the Qa'an. As the *Yüan shih* reports, by 1253 there were so many shamans and fortune-tellers at Möngke's court that the Qa'an appointed two officials (with Mongolian names) to manage all of them.[11]

> In the twelfth moon of the second year of Möngke's reign (January 2–30, 1253), A-hu-ch'a (Aghucha)[12] was appointed to take charge of sacrifices (*chi-ssu*), shamans who were skilled in healing (*i-wu*), and fortune-tellers (*pu-shih*). A-la pu-hua (Ala[gh] Bukha)[13] assisted him.

The very last lines of Möngke's annals in the *Yüan shih* are devoted mainly to praising the late emperor's personal qualities, and especially his attentiveness to government business. These lines also contain, however, overt criticism of Möngke's dependence upon shamans and fortune-tellers as government advisers:[14] "Yet, he very much believed in the art of shamans and fortune-tellers (*wu-hsi pu-shih chih shu*), and before he took any actions he had to consult them faithfully first; scarcely a day went by [without his consulting them], and he himself never wearied of them."

William of Rubruck's writings corroborate the Chinese sources. On his way to Möngke's residence, William witnessed the following:[15]

[10] Peter Jackson, (tr. and ed.) with David Morgan, *The Mission of Friar William of Rubruck. His Journey to the Court of the Great Khan Möngke 1253–1255* (London, 1990), p. 249. On Möngke's purge of his opponents and the show trials that ensued, see Thomas T. Allsen, *Mongol Imperialism. The Policies of the Grand Qan Möngke in China, Russia, and the Islamic Lands, 1251–1259* (Berkeley, 1987), pp. 32–35.

[11] *YS*, 3:46.

[12] This is the only mention of A-hu-ch'a in the *Yüan shih*, according to the *Yüan shih jen-ming so-yin* (Peking, 1982). The word *aghucha* in Mongolian means "an animal's back or rump."

[13] According to the *Yüan shih jen-ming so-yin*, there are eight separate A-la pu-hua in the *Yüan shih*. The index editors believe that this A-la pu-hua is not mentioned elsewhere in the *Yüan shih*. For the Mongolian name Alagh, see *Secret History*, 149; A-la has been reconstructed as "Ala[q] by Paul Pelliot and Louis Hambis," *Histoire des Campagnes de Gengis Khan* (Leiden, 1951), p. 149.

[14] *YS*, 3:54.

[15] Jackson, *William of Rubruck*, pp. 192–193.

> While we were on our way in, an attendant emerged carrying some sheep's shoulder-blades, charred until they were as black as coal. I was extremely curious as to what he was doing with them, and when I later enquired about it I learned that [the Chan] does nothing in the world unless he has first consulted these bones, with the result that he does not allow a man to enter his residence without previous reference to the bone.

Friar William also gives a fairly detailed description of how Möngke deciphered the lines of the burned bones. In addition, William has much to say of the influential "soothsayers" who surrounded Möngke:[16] "There are many of them, and they always have a chief, a sort of pontiff, who regularly sets up his quarters in front of Mangu Chan's principal dwelling, at a stone's throw's distance." William describes the soothsayers as being "familiar with astronomy." Most importantly, the soothsayers had the power to declare whether engaging in battle on a particular day would end in a favorable or unfavorable outcome.

This information on Möngke in both the *Yüan shih* and in William of Rubruck only reinforces the notion that shamans and their fortune-telling colleagues exerted enormous influence upon the daily doings of the thirteenth-century Mongols. The acceding to (and occasional revolt against) shamanic power is of course well documented in the *Secret History of the Mongols* in the persona of Kököchu Teb Tenggeri (as discussed above). Shamanic influence was still to be reckoned with in Möngke's time. As we shall see in the following section, Qubilai's court was less welcoming towards fortune-tellers and their kith. Qubilai's response to the abundance of such advisers many of whom must have been left over from Möngke's reign was to incorporate the capable ones into his newly-emerging bureaucracy and to persecute those perceived as mere trouble-makers and charlatans.

The Situation under Qubilai (r. 1260–1294) and his Successors

In Marco Polo's account of the workings of Qubilai's court, astrologers played an undeniably influential role: they advised the Khan on the outcome of battles and on the placement of the capital city of Khanbalik (Ta-tu), and they predicted thunderstorms, earthquakes, other

[16] Jackson, *William of Rubruck*, p. 240.

natural disasters, and rebellions.[17] Marco Polo estimated that in the capital there were about 5,000 astrologers and diviners of various backgrounds—Christian, Saracen, and Cataian—and all were provided for by Qubilai.[18] In fact, in *Yüan shih* 203, we may find the biography of one such adviser to Qubilai, a Chinese expert in astronomical, calendrical, and divination affairs by the name of Chin Te-chin.[19] Thus, it is clear that such people did not disappear with the end of Möngke's reign.

Yet it is also clear that starting with the later years of Qubilai's reign a variety of imperial decrees was issued to control the range of activities of fortune-tellers. As we shall see below, several prohibitions preserved in the *Yüan shih* and the *Yüan tien-chang* ("Institutions of the Yüan Dynasty," compiled 1320–1322) were issued starting in the 1290's warning *Yin-yang* people, i.e., fortune-tellers or astrologers, not to travel to the households of the imperial princes and other imperial family members, apparently because they were suspected of stirring up trouble by predicting unwelcome events. It is likely that *Yin-yang* practitioners and other sorts of fortune-tellers were less influential at Qubilai's court than at Möngke's, and thus they gravitated to the courts of the imperial princes where their advice was more welcome. We shall also see that a clear distinction was made between government-sanctioned *Yin-yang* instructors, who were acceptable, and the non-authorized practitioners whose activities were condemned.

As early as 1291, *Yin-yang* practitioners were reported to be causing trouble in the households of imperial princes, and their presence in those households was prohibited.[20] In 1295, during the reign of Temür (the Emperor Ch'eng-tsung, r. 1294–1307), the *Yüan shih* records the following:[21] "In each route (*lu*) there was established a *Yin-yang* instructor (*Yin-yang chiao-shou*); as before, prohibit *Yin-yang* people (*Yin-yang jen*) from travelling to the residences of the imperial princes (*chu-wang*) and the imperial sons-in-law (*fu-ma*)."

The institution of *Yin-yang* instructors was a part of Qubilai's effort

[17] See A.C. Moule and Paul Pelliot, *Marco Polo: The Description of the World* (London, 1938), I, 196, 212.
[18] Moule and Pelliot, *Marco Polo*, I, 252.
[19] *YS*, 203:4538–9.
[20] See *Ta-Yüan sheng-cheng kuo-ch'ao tien-chang* (Taipei, 1976 reprint of the Yüan ed.), 32:9a. This passage is fully translated below on p. 9. This source will hereafter be cited as *YTC*.
[21] *YS*, 18:392.

to bureaucratize, and thereby control, the numerous practitioners of *Yin-yang*. In 1291, *Yin-yang* schools (*Yin-yang hsüeh*) were first established in the routes; each route was assigned an instructor.[22] There was a capital examination for those students who excelled in magic and divination and whose names were reported to the provincial authorities. The most talented were appointed to serve in the Bureau of Astronomy (*Ssu-t'ien-t'ai*).[23] In fact, among the sub-officials listed as serving in the Bureau of Astronomy was one *Yin-yang kuan-kou*.[24] In the Yen-yu reign period (1314–1320), *Yin-yang* instructors were appointed in all the routes, prefectures (*fu*), and subprefectures (*chou*). All *Yin-yang* people were supposed to be under the jurisdiction of such *Yin-yang* instructors, who in turn were subordinate to the Astrological Commission (*T'ai-shih yuan*).[25] In the foregoing description, one can easily perceive the attempt by the Yüan government to incorporate these fortune-tellers into local, regional, and capital-based agencies which would hypothetically exert some measure of control over their activities.

Most troublesome to the Yüan government were the meddlesome activities of *Yin-yang* practitioners who maintained unauthorized contacts with imperial family members. In the usual multi-layered documentation style of the *Yüan tien-chang*, we come across the following set of documents:[26]

> In the first year of the Chih-ta [reign period:1308], the Chiang-che Regional Secretariat (*hsing-sheng*) received the communique (*tzu*) of the Central Secretariat (*Chung-shu-sheng*) and the report (*ch'eng*) of the Academy of Scholarly Worthies (*Chi-hsien yuan*) [which stated]:

[22] See *YS*, 81:2034. See also Yüan-chu Lam, "The First Chapter of the 'Treatise on Selection and Recommendation' for the Civil Service in the *Yüan shih*," (unpublished ms., 1984), pp. 115–116, 136. Charles O. Hucker in his *A Dictionary of Official Titles in Imperial China* (Stanford, 1985), p. 583, defines *Yin-yang hsüeh* as follows: "*Yin-yang School*, a training unit in geomancy; from Ming if not earlier, established under the authorization of local units of territorial administration but without state subsidies, to train practitioners of geomancy and similar arts; in Ch'ing the nominal Principal (*cheng-shu*) at the Prefecture (*fu*) level was in fact supervisor of local fortune-tellers, entertainers, women dentists, midwives, etc., as a kind of licenser and inspector." As *YS*, 81:2034 reports, *Yin-yang* schools in fact were established in the Yüan period.

[23] According to Hucker, *Dictionary*, p. 457, the Bureau of Astronomy was first created in the T'ang Dynasty and was responsible for astronomical observations.

[24] *YS*, 90:2297.

[25] The Astrological Commission, a Yüan innovation, prepared and distributed the official state calendar. See Hucker, *Dictionary*, p. 482.

[26] *YTC*, 32:9a.

> On the fourteenth day of the tenth moon of the eleventh year of the Ta-te [reign period: November 9, 1307], we respectfully received the imperial decree (*sheng-chih*) [which stated]:
>
> "From this time onward, *Yin-yang* masters (*fa-shih*) are prohibited from going to [the residences of] imperial princes (*chu-wang*) and imperial sons-in-law (*fu-ma*). If such people go, let them be punished by death." "Respect this."
>
> Moreover, in the sixth moon of the 28th year of the Chih-yuan [reign period: June 28–July 26, 1291], we respectfully received the report (*ch'eng*) of A-lu-hun sa Arghun Sari[gh][27] [which stated]:
>
> "In an excerpt of a translation from a Mongolian-language document, Hsiang-shan[28] said:
>
> '"Vice-director (*shao-chien*) Le[29] memorialized [as follows]:
>
> '"'At [the court of] Nai-yen (Nayan),[30] a person with the family name Ho, a skilled practitioner of *Yin-yang*, spoke evil words. Last year when he was brought to [the court of] Nayan, that person was killed. At present, that type of skilled practitioner of *Yin-yang* should be prohibited from contacting imperial sons-in-law, great princes, and others, no matter who. In Han-erh and Man-tzu lands [i.e., northern and southern Chinese territories],[31] the officials in each route should carefully enumerate the number of skilled practitoners of *Yin-yang*. . . .'"'"'"

This series of imbedded documents reveals *inter alia* that visits by *Yin-yang* people to imperial relatives were considered enough of a threat that violators were subject to the death penalty, and that such visits continued to be a problem in the years after Qubilai's reign. Unfortunately we can only speculate about the "evil words" spoken by the *Yin-yang* practitioner named Ho.

We can do more than speculate, however, concerning the ethnic

[27] This is, I believe, A-lu-hun sa-li, a prominent Uighur who served the Yüan court. He lived from 1245–1307. The date of this report falls in the period when Arghun Sari[gh] was serving as minister (*p'ing-chang cheng-shih*). See *YS*, 130:3176. On the name Arghun, see Hambis, *Yuan che*, p. 91, note 3. On the name Sari[gh], see V.M. Nadeliaev *et al.* (eds.), *Drevnetiurkskii slovar'* (Leningrad, 1969), p. 488, where *sariγ* is registered meaning "yellow."

[28] There are, apparently, four different Hsiang-shan in the *Yüan shih*, according to the *Yüan shih jen-ming so-yin*. The biographical data on each of these individuals is so meagre as to make impossible a valid identification of the Hsiang-shan in this text.

[29] I have located no information on vice-director Le.

[30] This most likely is Prince Nayan, descendant of Belgütei; certainly it cannot be the Prince Nayan who revolted in 1287 and died the same year. See Hambis, *Yuan che*, p. 40, note 16; p. 48; p. 49, note 10.

[31] On the term Man-tzu, see Paul Ratchnevsky, *Un code des Yuan* (Paris, 1972), II, 63, note 2.

background of some of these *Yin-yang* practitioners who travelled to the courts of imperial relatives. An imperial decree dated December 31, 1311 states:[32]

> As for Han-erh [Northern Chinese, Khitan, Jurchen] and Hui-hui [Muslim] *Yin-yang* people, let them be prohibited from going to and communicating with the imperial princes (*chu-wang*), imperial sons (*chu-tzu*), imperial daughters (*kung-chu*), and high officials. Send down a written document prohibiting this.

Another example of *Yin-yang* people with Hui-hui names occurs in a passage in *Yüan tien-chang* 57 where it is reported that "the *Yin-yang* people Hu-sa-mu-ting (Ḥusām al-Dīn) and Mai-chu-ting (Majd al-Dīn)" were killed by Hülegü, the Il-Khan of Persia (Hsü-lieh Ta-wang: Prince Hüle['ü], sixth son of Tolui) because the two had "harbored evil intentions." This passage also provides us with another instance of *Yin-yang* practitioners being put to death by a member of the Mongolian imperial family.[33]

Also, among the sub-officials listed under the Directorate of Muslim Astronomy (the Hui-hui *ssu-t'ien chien*) were 18 *Yin-yang* people (*Yin-yang jen*), who may very well have been Muslim, though this is not ascertainable.[34]

The persistence of this perceived threat well beyond Qubilai's reign is underscored by the repetition of prohibitions against *Yin-yang* practitioners and fortune-tellers (*pu-shih*) entering the residences of imperial princes and high officials in 1332 and again in 1334 when *Yin-yang* people were warned against fortune-telling among imperial family members.[35] It is clear that *Yin-yang* practitioners and other sorts of fortune-tellers were less influential at the courts of Qubilai and his successors than they had been at Möngke's court, and thus they gravitated to the courts of the imperial princes where their advice was more welcome. Given the history of coups and attempted coups in the Yüan period, however, it is no wonder that the Yüan

[32] *YTC*, 32:9b. The same document with one minor difference in wording appears in *T'ung-chih t'iao-ko* (Hang-chou, 1986), 28:317. This source will hereafter be cited as *TCTK*.

[33] I am indebted to Professor Francis W. Cleaves for sharing with me his as yet unpublished translation of this passage from *YTC*, 57:11a–11b. On Hsü-lieh as the Chinese transliteration of Hüle['ü] or Hülegü, see Hambis, *Yuan che*, pp. 88–89. Further information on the two *Yin-yang* people has been impossible to locate.

[34] *YS*, 90:2297.

[35] See *YS*, 36:805, and *YS*, 38:823.

emperors attempted to restrict the presence of such a potentially rabble-rousing group among imperial relatives.

The Yüan period of course was not unique in the overall history of Chinese dynasties' attempts at controlling or suppressing both shamanism and *Yin-yang* experts. As Joseph Needham has pointed out, the exclusion of shamans from state sacrifices and rituals began well before the T'ang period; "[i]n the Sung they [shamans or *wu*] were definitely persecuted by governors and prefects, and down to the end of the Ching provisions against sorcerers and wizards remained in the Penal Code."[36] As Needham also points out, shamanism, in spite of suffering suppression, was reinfused periodically by "fresh waves of primitive religion from the north,"[37] i.e., during the conquest dynasties of Liao, Chin, and Yüan.

In fact, there is a striking similarity—at least in superficial terms—between the activities of the followers of Tsou Yen's *Yin-yang* school, which originated in the State of Ch'i in the late Warring States era and remained influential in the Ch'in and Han periods, and the *Yin-yang* practitioners of the Yüan period. The early *Yin-yang* experts visited rulers' courts to impart what Needham refers to as "the half-scientific, half-political doctrine with which the Naturalists [i.e., the *Yin-yang* experts] were able to frighten the feudal lords."[38] Possessing what they deemed to be information about the cyclical movements of destiny, these early *Yin-yang* people sought roles as court advisers. Similarly in the Yüan period, the *Yin-yang* experts were attempting to carve out niches for themselves at the courts of the imperial princes. Among an Inner Asian people such as the Mongols, one might think that the *Yin-yang* people would have found a more generous reception for their prognostications, but the Yüan imperial government in the end proved to have much in common with indigenous Chinese dynasties in their overarching concern with suppressing the purveyors of heterodox, and potentially rebellious, information and advice.

The Yüan government's concern about roving fortune-tellers was matched by its worry about heterodox texts. Apparently *Yin-yang* texts

[36] Needham, *Science and Civilisation*, II, 137.

[37] Needham, *Science and Civilisation*, II, 138.

[38] Needham, *Science and Civilisation*, II, 238. On Tsou Yen's *Yin-yang* school, see also Kung-chuan Hsiao, *A History of Chinese Political Thought*. Vol. I. *From the Beginnings to the Sixth Century* A.D., tr. F.W. Mote (Princeton, 1979), pp. 61–65.

were considered as dangerous as weapons in the wrong hands, as this excerpt from the *Yüan shih* monograph on punishments (*hsing-fa chih*) relates:[39]

> As for those who are in charge of criminal affairs, if they improperly allow prisoners in detention to drink and gamble, or allow someone to bring in a knife, or paper and brush, or *Yin-yang* writings to [the place of detention], they shall be punished.

A longer excerpt from the "prohibitions" (*chin-ling*) section of the monograph on punishments includes the following regulations concerning *Yin-yang* people and others suspected of deviant activities:[40]

> Whoever dares secretly to keep prohibited books on astrology (*t'ien-wen*) and divination (*t'u-ch'an*) of the *Yin-yang* school (*chia*) will be punished. It is forbidden the *Yin-yang* School to fabricate books of divination; it is forbidden the Buddhist and Taoist Schools privately to compose canonical texts (*ching-wen*), and in all cases it is forbidden to mislead the people by pernicious talk (*hsieh-shuo*) and heterodox doctrines (*tso-tao*). Those who break the law will face grave punishment. As for those who reside in a monastery or temple, the punishment shall extend to its superior; as for those who live outside, the local authorities (*yu-ssu*) shall investigate them. As for those who speak falsely about prohibited books, they shall be exiled. It is prohibited followers of the *Yin-yang* School and their sort to poison people's minds by making sacrifices to the stars by lantern light. Whoever falsely speaks of the movement of a star as a portent of calamity or good luck shall be beaten 107 times with the heavy stick. All *Yin-yang* masters (*fa-shih*) are forbidden to enter without authorization the homes of imperial princes, imperial princesses, or imperial sons-in-law. It is forbidden to practice physiognomy (*hsiang-fa*), the writing of charms (*shu-fu*), and hydromancy (*chou-shui*) by means of *Yin-yang* [methods], and in all cases heterodox arts and deluding the people by making them hope to achieve advancement in office are forbidden. Whoever breaks this law will be punished.

Under the heading "Writings and Sayings of Sorcery" (*yao-shu yao-yen*),[41] the *T'ung-chih t'iao-ko* ("Code of Comprehensive Institutions";

[39] *YS*, 103:2635; this passage is translated by P. Ratchnevsky in volume one of his *Un code des Yuan* (Paris, 1937), p. 343. My translation differs a bit from that of Ratchnevsky.

[40] *YS*, 105:2684; I follow Ratchnevsky's translation in volume four of his *Un code des Yuan* (Paris, 1985), pp. 359–362, with a few minor changes.

[41] Philip Kuhn has translated this term as it appears in Ch'ing period statutes as "books or sayings of sorcery." See Philip A. Kuhn, *Soulstealers. The Chinese Sorcery Scare of 1768* (Cambridge, 1990), p. 87. Kuhn notes in his discussion of various Chinese terms depicting aspects of sorcery that "[t]here exists no comprehensive study of Chinese sorcery in any language." *Soulstealers*, p. 96.

compiled in 1321) contains a report (*ch'eng*) of the Central Secretariat and Censorate dated 1314;[42] this report gives a fairly detailed picture of one case of heterodox writings:

> Ch'en Hsing-tsu[43] of Mien-yang Prefecture (*fu*)[44] reported:
> "The wife of Fu Wan-i, A-li, hired someone to copy out a heavenly text, in which it was written that this year there would be landslides and earthquakes and that people would perish in great numbers. They arrested them all even down to the person who printed the work, Li Hsing-yü, and others. They obtained in full their confessions; they were pardoned by imperial amnesty."
> The Board of Punishments (*Hsing-pu*) determined [the following]:
> "As for the baseless text that was printed, probably because they are interested in fame, the followers of Buddhism and Taoism do not behave in a disciplined manner and they often compose sayings of sorcery (*yao-yen*), give away lucky charms and water (*fu-shui*), conspire for money and objects, and falsely mislead the people; the consequences are not insignificant. It would be appropriate to enact restrictions uniformly. If there is this sort of law-breaking, the penalties should extend to the heads of the monasteries and temples; [but] as for those who do not live in monasteries and temples, but roam in all directions, the kind who unrestrainedly make heterodox statements, order the officials of locales in which such people are found to increase their surveillance."

There are several prohibitions against the activities of so-called *yao-jen* or sorcerers scattered throughout the *Yüan shih*; some of these people are accused of transmitting heterodox texts while others seem to have simply been rebels. The following excerpts from the *Yüan shih* are typical:

> T'ien Yü[45] spoke words of sorcery (*yao-yen*); there was a government decree (*ch'ih*) reducing the death penalty for him to exile to a distant location. [Date: April 28, 1268][46]

> In Chi-nan Wang Pao-ho[47] misled the people through sayings of sorcery (*yao-yen*), and he plotted rebellion; there was a government decree (*ch'ih*) ordering the execution of the five chief wrong-doers, and the others were not punished. [Date: July 12, 1268][48]

[42] *TCTK*, 28:315–316.

[43] Ch'en Hsing-tsu is not listed in the *Yüan shih* index; he and the others named in this report cannot be identified at this time.

[44] Mien-yang *fu* was in the Ho-nan Regional Secretariat (*Hsing-sheng*).

[45] There is no further biographical information on this person in the *Yüan shih*.

[46] *YS*, 6:118.

[47] There is no further biographical information on this person in the *Yüan shih*.

[48] *YS*, 6:118.

> The sorcerer (*yao-jen*) Meng Ch'ung[49] was found to be plotting to usurp authority; together with his gang of 13 he was executed. [Date: April 22, 1295][50]

Such sorcerers were considered more than just a harmless nuisance in apparently every period of Chinese history, and thus there is nothing uniquely Yüan about them.[51] But it is worth pointing out that in spite of the religious tolerance with which the ruling Mongols of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries are often credited, Yüan government administrators were not in the least tolerant of heterodox texts or speech, since they could (and did) incite rebellion. In this case, the interests of the Mongolian Yüan civil administration coincided with the interests of virtually all administrations throughout China's history: keeping law and order in the empire.

Another dimension of the Yüan government's concern with individuals engaged in divination or sorcery comes to light when we examine their connection with eunuchs at the court. First of all, it is clear that by the early fourteenth century, the status of *Yin-yang* experts had greatly deteriorated, if we are to judge by a decree of 1308 which grouped *Yin-yang* people with eunuchs and other socially suspect groups: "All eunuchs (*nei-shih*), physicians (*t'ai-i*), *Yin-yang* [people], and musicians (*yueh-jen*) must not become involved [in the affairs of] regularly appointed officials or officials of nominal rank (*ch'ang-hsüan san-kuan*)."[52] In 1331, the Board of Punishments was ordered by imperial decree to investigate the matter of a eunuch (*nei-shih*) with the Mongolian name Sa-li pu-hua (Sari[gh] Buqa) practicing some form of shamanistic sorcery (*wu-ku*), the nature of which is left undescribed.[53] I have dealt elsewhere with the not uncommon occurrence in Yüan period Chinese and Korean sources of eunuchs with Mongolian names, some of whom were quite certainly *not* Mongolian, but rather Chinese and Korean.[54] Of particular relevance here is the

[49] There is no further biographical information on this person in the *Yüan shih*.
[50] *YS*, 18:392.
[51] Kuhn notes that the death penalty was applied in Ch'ing and earlier times to sorcerers accused of making prognostications. See Kuhn, *Soulstealers*, p. 87, and p. 247, note 16.
[52] *YS*, 22:496. On the term *nei-shih* as "eunuch," see Hucker, *Dictionary*, p. 350.
[53] *YS*, 35:789.
[54] See E. Endicott-West, "Aspects of Khitan Liao and Mongolian Yüan Imperial Rule: A Comparative Perspective," in *Rulers from the Steppe. State Formation on the Eurasian Periphery*, ed. Gary Seaman and Daniel Marks (Los Angeles, 1991), II, 199–222.

instance of a eunuch (*huan-che*) with the Mongolian name Pai-chu (Baiju) who fell into disfavor in 1331 for applying what was apparently a shamanistic treatment to the ailing heir apparent. The Yüan dynastic history reports:[55] "There was an investigation into the eunuch (*huan-che*) Pai-chu (Baiju) who was in attendance upon the heir apparent who had measles. [Because] he (Baiju) served meals late, and because he wiped [the heir apparent's] eyes and nose with butter, and moreover recited incantations, he was sentenced to a beating of 107 strokes, and banished from the capital."

While further evidence must be collected if we are to establish more than a tenuous link between eunuchs and the practice of shamanism in the Yüan period, we may with a reasonable degree of certainty say for now that the status of *Yin-yang* experts, shamans, and other such people underwent a transformation between the mid-thirteenth and mid-fourteenth centuries. After Möngke Qa'an's reign, the political role of such personnel was severely circumscribed at the imperial court, and their social status correspondingly declined. In part, the reason for this transformation and decline can be ascribed to the realities and requirements of exerting political control through civil administration in China. Then, again, the theme of conflict between ruler and shaman is an old one in Mongolian history.

[55] *YS*, 35:778–779.

Glossary

A-hu-ch'a 阿忽察
A-la pu-hua 阿剌不花
A-li 阿李
A-lu-hun sa 阿魯渾撒
A-lu-hun sa-li 阿魯渾薩理

ch'ang-hsüan san-kuan 常選散官
Ch'en Hsing-tsu 陳興祖
ch'eng 呈
Chi-hsien yüan 集賢院
Chi-nan 濟南
chi-ssu 祭祀
Chiang-che 江浙
ch'ih 敕
Chin-ling 禁令
Chin Te-chin 靳德進
ching-wen 經文
chou 州
chou-shui 咒水
chu-tzu 諸子
chu-wang 諸王
Chung-shu-sheng 中書省

fa-shih 法師
fu 府
fu-ma 駙馬
fu-shui 符水
Fu Wan-i 傅萬一

Han-erh 漢兒
Ho 何
Ho-nan 河南
hsiang-fa 相法
Hsiang-shan 香山
hsieh-shuo 邪說
hsing-fa chih 刑法志
Hsing-pu 刑部
hsing-sheng 行省
Hsü-lieh Ta-wang 旭烈大王
Hu-sa-mu-ting 忽撒木丁
huan-che 宦者
Hui-hui ssu-t'ien chien 回回司天監

i-wu 醫巫

kung-chu 公主
kuo-su chiu-li 國俗舊禮

Le 勒
Li Hsing-yü 李行余
lu 路

Mai-chu-ting 麥術丁
Man-tzu 蠻子
Meng Ch'ung 蒙蟲
Mien-yang 沔陽

Nai-yen 乃顏
nei-shih 內侍

Pai-chu 拜住
p'ing-chang cheng-shih 平章政事
pu-shih 卜筮

Sa-li pu-hua 撒里不花
Shao-chien 少監
sheng-chih 聖旨
shu-fu 書符
Ssu-t'ien-t'ai 司天臺
Sung Lien 宋濂

Ta-Yüan sheng-cheng kuo-ch'ao tien-chang 大元聖政國朝典章
t'ai-i 太醫
T'ai-shih yuan 太史院
t'ien wen 天文
Tien yü 田禹
tso tao 左道
t'u ch'an 圖讖
T'ung-ch'ih t'iao-ko *通制條格*
tzu 咨

Wang Pao-ho 王保和
wu-hsi 巫覡
wu-hsi pu-shih chih shu 巫覡·筮之術

wu-ku 巫蠱
wu-ming 巫名

yao-jen 妖人
yao-shu yao-yen 妖書妖言
Yin-yang 陰陽
Yin-yang chia 陰陽家
Yin-yang chiao-shou 陰陽教授
Yin-yang hsüeh 陰陽學
Yin-yang jen 陰陽人
Yin-yan kuan-kou 陰陽管勾
yu-ssu 有司
Yüan shih 元史人名索引
Yüan shih jen-ming so-yin 元史人名索引
Yüan tien-chang 元典章
yüeh-jen 樂人

QUBILAI QA'AN AND 'PHAGS-PA BLA-MA

Sh. Bira

There is a great variety of sources in different languages available on the history of the Mongol Empire. And it is my impression that most historians of the Mongol Empire deal with the sources written in Chinese, Persian, Turkish, Mongolian, and some other languages. But we have to keep in mind, that there are some other source materials, such as those in Tibetan, which have not yet been studied properly by historians of the Mongol Empire.

My paper is based mainly on Tibetan sources, and, therefore, it might give some idea of the significance of this category of historical sources for the study of the history of the Mongols. In my previous works, published in the 1960s and 1970s, I dealt with some Tibetan sources relating to the Mongol history of the 13th–14th centuries.[1] There is, of course, no need to repeat that. But I want to emphasize that the Tibetan sources must not be underestimated in the study of the history of the Mongol Empire.

Of these sources, one should mention the following: the works of 'Phags-pa bLa-ma, "Sa-skya bka'-'bum" (Complete Works of Sa-skya Abbots) in 15 volumes; "Hu-lan deb-ther" (The Red Annals) by Tshal-pa Kun-dGa' rDo-rJe written in 1346; "Deb-ther sngon-po" (The Blue Annals) by Goslo-tsa-ba gZhon-nu dPal written in 1476–78; "mKhas-pa'i dGa'-ston" (The Feast of Sages) by dPa'-bo gTsug-Lag phRen-pa written in 1564; and, "Sa-skya gdung-rabs" (The Genealogy of the Sa-skya Abbots) which was composed in 1630, but contains much source material belonging to the earlier period. Several others might also be mentioned.

In this paper I would like to touch mainly on the religious policy of Qubilai-Khan (1260–1294) and on his relationship with 'Phags-pa bLa-ma bLo-Gros rGyal-mTshan (1235–1280). (Hereafter, I will use simply 'Phags-pa bLa-ma.)

It seems to me that it is high time to get rid of the image of the

[1] Sh. Bira, *O Zolotoi Knige Sh. Damdina* (Ulaan Baatar, 1960); *idem, Mongol'skaya Istoriografiya (XIII–XVIII v)* (Moscow, 1978).

Mongol as a dreadful warrior riding on a horse and equipped with bow and arrow, ready to vanquish everything in his way. I do not think that the Mongols entered the stage of world history merely as plunders or conquerors. They had already created their own national statehood, but furthermore, they built the largest world empire that has so far existed. Being true nomads, they were very mobile, and they acted as *Kulturträger* or transmitters of the acquisitions of various civilizations. They contributed to the ethnic and cultural formation of many peoples and nations, and they left perceptible traces in the life, customs, and languages of various peoples. And they innovated the world's first communication system that linked the East and the West.

In this respect, Qubilai Qa'an was most characteristic. He was occupied more with the problems of ruling and building the empire rather than conquering and devastating. He was the greatest cosmopolitan ruler that has ever been known in history. His knowledge was universal, and he had to deal with diverse cultures and religions. From an early age, Qubilai was taught to read and write Mongol. He was surrounded by a wide variety of advisers and teachers: Chinese Confucians, Nestorian Christians, Chinese and Tibetan Buddhists, and Central Asian Muslims. It is characteristic that, although Qubilai had numerous Chinese teachers and advisers and lived for a long time in China, he remained a steadfast Mongol ruler, and he was far from being a puppet of his advisers. Taking into account the role of Confucianism in the political life of China, he could have chosen it as the main spiritual tool for ruling his Empire, as had happened before him with some so-called "barbarian" rulers of China. Qubilai Qa'an, however, took great care of the national and cultural identity of his ethnically small people, and he pursued the policy of securing Mongol rulership by way of balancing various political, cultural, and religious factors. Nevertheless, as it is known from Tibetan sources, in his policy Qubilai Qa'an paid particular attention to Buddhism. Although he adhered in principle to the traditional Mongol policy of religious tolerance, Qubilai gave priority to Tibetan Buddhism. We have every reason to assert that Qubilai's policy towards Buddhism was a result of his aforethought considerations and close contacts with Tibetan Buddhists who, since the reign of Möngke Qa'an, had begun arriving in northern China in growing numbers. It is known that during this period, long before he became Qa'an, Qubilai displayed his sympathy to Buddhism and its advocates.

Allow me to remind you of how he organized, on the instruction of his brother Möngke Qa'an, several debates between Buddhists and Taoists, the two groups which were contending with each other for the patronage of the Mongol court. It was Qubilai's favour to Buddhism that eventually determined the victory of the Buddhists over their Taoist opponents. And at the last debate, which was convened by Qubilai in 1258 in the town of K'ai-p'ing and in which 'Phags-pa bLa-ma played the leading role, the Mongol ruler decreed the Taoists were defeated.

One has to say that Tantric Buddhism preached by the lamas from Sa-skya monastery had some advantages in the eyes of the Mongols. First of all, it was more familiar to ordinary Mongols because the Tibetans had already adapted Buddhisim to suit it to their society which was very similar to that of the Mongols. Buddhism in Tibet had incoporated much from the native belief, Bon, and Tibetan Bon and Mongol Böge had much in common as folk religions. Tibetan Tantric Buddhism, with its magical and supernatural elements of Bon shamanism was much more appealing to the shamanist Mongols. Secondly, as we will see below, the Tibetan lamas, particularly Sa-skya lamas, adhered to the old tradition of Buddhism, which had been politically very active in seeking collaboration with secular authorities, in this case, with the Mongol rulers for their own interests, no matter whether they contradicted or not the national interests of Tibet.

Lastly, but most importantly is that Qubilai, who wanted to avert the possibility of spiritual predominance of the conquered people, realized the political value of Tibetan Buddhism as a useful vehicle for consolidating his power. Historical sources testify that Qubilai attached great significance to the mastering of the souls of his cosmopolitan subjects. In one of his decrees it is said:

ta uru ut minu mona qoyina
ulus irgen-i quriyabasu gesü
beyeyi anu quriyatala
setgili anu quriyabasu setgili anu
guriyaca beyas anu qa'a e'ütqun.[2]

("If you wish to subdue peoples before or after me, having seized the body, hold the soul, if you hold the soul, where could the body go.")

[2] L. Ligeti, "Monuments en ecriture 'Phags-pa. Pieces de chancellerie en transcription chinoise," *Monumenta Linguae Mongolicae Collecta*, vol. III (Budapest, 1972), p. 123.

Following the examples of his predecessors, particularly that of prince Godan, the second son of Ögödei Qa'an, Qubilai kept close contact with the Sa-skya monastery of Tibet and invited its abbot 'Phags-pa bLa-ma to his court. I will not discuss the details concerning the historical meetings of Qubilai and 'Phags-pa bLa-ma, because they are more or less known. Professor Rossabi's book on Qubilai Qa'an[3] shows that historians of the Mongol Empire are displaying more and more interest in the historical role of 'Phags-pa bLa-ma and are making available some important data on this matter taken from Tibetan and other sources.

Here I would like to touch only on some specific items concerning the activities of 'Phags-pa bLa-ma as the Imperial Preceptor of Qubilai Qa'an and the legacy he left to the Mongols. But before dealing with this problem, it seems necessary to say a few words about 'Phags-pa bLa-ma himself. He was the most learned lama among the five famous abbots of the Sa-skya monastery. He could be compared only with his uncle, the celebrated Sa-skya pan-chen Kun-dga' rGyal-mTshan (1182–1251). 'Phags-pa bLa-ma was born in 1235, when his father Zhans-Tsha bSod-Nams rGyal-mTshan was 52 years old. At the age of ten, he proceeded to the domain of Godan in North China in the retinue of Sa-skya pan-chen, and at the age of 18 he became the Court Chaplain (bla-mchod) of prince Se-chen (Mong. Sečen), i.e., Qubilai. At the age of 21 he took up the final monastic ordination. In 1260, at the age of 26, when Qubilai ascended the imperial throne, 'Phags-pa bLa-ma became the Imperial Preceptor. He lived many years in the capital with some occasional intervals when he returned to Tibet. In 1280, at the age of 45, he passed away.[4] From the Tibetan sources we find out that 'Phags-pa bLa-ma was the most trusted adviser of Qubilai since the early stage of his career. It is likely that he was especially prepared by the Mongol ruler for his particular purpose. He associated so much with the Mongols that he adopted many Mongol customs. Furthermore, he and Qubilai Qa'an had became much closer through marital alliances. His younger brother married a Mongol princess, as did his nephew and, later, one of his grandnephews.

'Phags-pa bLa-ma enjoyed great authority not only as the Imperial

[3] Morris Rossabi, *Khubilai Khan: His Life and Times* (Berkeley, 1988).

[4] *The Blue Annals*, tr. Geroge N. Roerich and Motilal Banarsidass (2nd ed., Dehli-Varanasi-Patna, 1976), pp. 211–212.

Preceptor, but also as a distinguished literary man who had greatly contributed to the development of Buddhist literature and translation in his country. It was under his patronage that the celebrated Indian works, such as Daṇḍin's "Kāvyādarsha," the "Bodhisattvādānakalpalāta" by Kshemendra, "the Meghadūta" by Kālidāsa, and the "Buddhacarita" of Ashvaghosha, were translated into Tibetan.

Qubilai Qa'an must have been fully satisfied with the pious service rendered to him by 'Phags-pa bLa-ma since the beginning of their contacts. The Tibetan lama coped better than anyone else with the task of ideological justification for the domination of the Mongol Qa'an. For this purpose he wrote numerous works especially dedicated to his patron and his relatives. Of particular interest for our topic are the following works:

1. "Shes bya rab gsal" (The Explanation of the Subject of Cognition).
2. "rGyal po la gdams pa'i rab byed" (Advice to the Emperor).
3. "bDe bar gshegs pa'i gsung rab 'gyur ro 'tshal bzhengs pa'i gsal byed sdeb sbyor gyi rgyan rnam ba bkra" (The Ornaments of Prosody, Lightening the Creation of Writings of Buddha).
4. "rGyal bu ji big de mur la gdam du byas nor bu'i phren ba" (The Advice to Prince Jibigtemür, the so-called Jewel Rosary).
5. "Go pe las rgyas 'brin bsdus bzhengs pa'i mtshon byed" (On the Occasion of Creating Three Versions of Prajnaparamita: Extensive, Middle and Short).
6. "Ji big de mur gyis phal chen gser od ston phrag brgya ba rnams bzhengs pa'i mtshon byed" (On the Occasion of Creating Works Phal-chen, gSer-od, sTon phrag brgya ba by Jibigtemür).
7. "Gyal po yab sras kyis mchod rten bzheng pa la bsngags pa'i sdeb sbyor dandaka" (The Metrical Verses Dandaka, the Praising on the Occasion of Building Stupa by the Khan and His Sons), and others.

Most of these works were composed in the form of an epistle in short verses after the examples of the epistolary works of Nāgarjuna, Mātṛceṭa, Chandragomin and others. They contain, besides the brief summary of the main postulates of Buddhism, short genealogies of Tibetan and Mongol kings, and instructions of the so-called "Two Orders." Some of the works represent an eulogy of skilfully composed verses glorifying Qubilai Qa'an and prescribing to him the attributes of the universal Buddhist ruler, Chakravartin or the Dharmaraja (Chos kyi rgyal po), just as the Indian Buddhist sages did regarding their famous patrons, Ashoka, Kanishka and others.

It is, of course, not possible to deal in details with all these works in a brief communication. I shall confine myself just to some observations and conclusions that I have made in the process of my study.

The above mentioned work, "Shes bya rab gsal," which was written by 'Phags-pa bLa-ma in 1278 by order of Qubilai's son Jingim, laid the foundation of a new scheme of writing Mongol history, that is the scheme of the three Buddhist monarchies: India, Tibet and Mongolia. In this work, 'Phags-pa bLa-ma elevated the Mongol khans to the rank of the kings, Chakravartins and Tibetan kings, the great patrons of Buddhism. 'Phags-pa bLa-ma begins the history with a genesis of the universe, the non-animated and animated worlds, including human society, according to Buddhist cosmology, and then he comes to the history of India, Tibet and Mongolia. By the way, I wish to underline that the Buddhist concept of the evolution of the non-animated and animated worlds should be regarded as a very rationalist idea which calls to mind the modern evolutionary theory of pre-biologic, biologic and metabiologic phases of evolution put forward by Jonas and Peter Salk. This interesting problem is something I hope to develop in the future.

'Phags-pa bLa-ma begins the genealogical history of the Mongols with Chinggis Khan whom he called "Khan Chakravartin," born "as a result of the ripening of fruits of the previous good deeds after 3250 years since the nirvana of Buddha."[5] He also declared Qubilai the khan ruling according to the teaching of Buddha.

'Phags-pa bLa-ma also elaborated for the Mongol court the concept of the "Two Orders" in his above mentioned works, particularly in the "Explanation of the Subject of Cognition" and "The Advices to Prince Jibigtemür," the so-called "Jewel Rosary." In the latter it is said:

> You are the possessor of wealth and glory,
> What does mean the material gift?
> Like the moon light in winter illuminates the (flower)
> Kumuda,
> I wish to present you the gift of my Doctrine.
> He who possesses the worldly riches,
> But does not get familiar with the true Doctrine,
> Is like the feast mixed with poison,
> And brings only unhappiness and sorrow.
> If he is deprived of worldly glory,

[5] 'Phags-pa bLa-ma, "Shes-bya rab gsal," *Sa skya bka'-'bum*, vol. pa, fol. 19a.

He is like the jewel in husks,
And no use to others.
He who possesses both of these riches,
Brings benefit to himself and others;
Like the refined jewel,
He serves as decoration for himself and others,
This is why listen What I am going to speak
In order to show
The benefit of mastering the two principles (orders).[6]

The author goes on expounding briefly the substance of the "Two Orders": the secular and the spiritual. According to 'Phags-pa bLa-ma, the first order includes prescriptions for the secular or the khan's power, rules for the behaviour of the khan himself, and the art of ruling. He insists that the best way of "peaceful ruling" is to build the empire on the firm ethic and moral principles of Buddhism. He advises Qubilai Qa'an not to refer to violence, because "it is not the means to strengthen the khan's power." He is of the conviction that "by means of peace one can obtain peace" as "the fire must be put out by water, but not by fire itself."[7] Concerning the juridical aspects of the first order, the Imperial Preceptor appealed for the renouncement of capital punishment, asserting that, "He who washes out dirt from his cloth is wise, but not he who burns it with dirt."[8]

'Phags-pa bLa-ma devoted much more attention to the explanation of the second order, the spiritual principle of power. Of particular interest in this respect are the above said "Advice to the Emperor," and the extensive commentary on this work, the "Ornaments of Clear Doctrine," composed in 1275. The author called Qubilai Qa'an "The Dhārmaraja, defending the spiritual power of All-Mighty Buddha." What 'Phags- pa bLa-ma preaches in his works reminds us of the didactic manuals of Indian Dhārmasūtras and Dhārmaśāstras. The Tibetan teacher, like the Indian Buddhist sages, teaches "right conduct" consisting of observance of Dharma in order to reach the final aim, spiritual salvation. He concentrates on the moral norms of general character and on the main elements of spiritual law to be observed by the Qa'an. He deals extensively with the teaching of

[6] 'Phags-pa, "rGyal bu Ji big de mur la gtam," *Sa skya bka'-'bum*, vol. ba, fol. 13a/159a.
[7] *Ibid.*, fol. 17a/163b.
[8] *Ibid.*, fol. 14b/160b.

Karma, emphasizing that "what are the deeds, the same are the consequences." The teaching of the ten virtues and the ten sins occupies the central place in his interpretation of the spiritual principle of the Qa'an's power. Referring to the teaching of *Shunyata* ("Voidness"), 'Phags-pa bLa-ma tries to inspire Qubilai Qa'an with the idea that one should not be carried away by worldly deeds for the sake of wealth and glory, but must think, first of all, of the perfection of his spiritual world, that is, of his spiritual salvation, Nirvana. He appeals to his patron to become a true Boddhisattva-khan so that he could perceive the Buddhist wisdom in successfully ruling his vast empire.[9]

I have just briefly touched on the 'Phags-pa bLa-ma's understanding of the "Two Orders." And I must say, that this famous concept has been mainly studied on the basis of the well-known Mongol book "The White History" (*Cayan teüke*) dating, in all likelihood, from the end of the 13th century, in other words, from the period of the reign of Qubilai Qa'an.[10] According to the conviction of Professor Sagaster, any study of the ideological foundations of the relationship between Religion and State in Tibet and Mongolia must have as its starting-point the philological and ideological interpretation of the "White History." But while not underestimating the importance of the "White History" for the study of the "Two Orders," I must say that it was 'Phags-pa bLa-ma who was the first to initiate the political theology of the relationship between State and Religion in the Tibeto-Mongolian Buddhist world, and he has left a great deal of material on this matter. Even though there are no references to 'Phags-pa bLa-ma's works in the "White History," it is most likely that his works were the real sources for the composing of the Mongol book on the "Two Orders" during the time of Qubilai Qa'an. And I think that any study of the "Two Orders" will suffer if it neglects the primary sources on this problem.

It appears that 'Phags-pa bLa-ma played no less a role in the elaboration and development of the political theory of the relations between State and Religion in the area of Tibeto-Mongolian Buddhism than its Christian counterparts in Europe, the theorists of the *duo ordines*, Pope Gelasius (Giovanni de Gaeta) who died in 1119, Marsilius

[9] *Ibid.*, fol. 17a/163a.
[10] Sh. Bira, "Analiz Osnovnykh Dannykh 'Beloi Isorii' i Vremya ee Sostavleniya," *Studia Historica* (Ulaan Baatar), 8 (1970); K. Sagaster, *Die Weisse Geschichte* (Wiesbaden, 1976).

of Padua (Marsiglio dei Mainardini) (1280–1343?), Saint Thomas Aquinas (1225?–1274), and others. It is interesting to note that intensive intellectual work had been carried on in the field of the political and ecclesiastical theory both in Christian Europe and Buddhist Asia in, more or less, a contemporary period, even though it took place quite independently in the two extreme parts of the world. Moreover, I must say that if we compare them carefully, we could find, not only many similar details, but also surprising homogenities in the theories of the "Two Orders" of both the Christian and the Buddhist authors.

It should be pointed out that the 'Phags-pa bLa-ma's theory of the "Two Orders" had very far-reaching consequences for the Mongols. The Mongols did much to make it their own political teaching and to realize it in their political practice for several centuries. The appearance of the above mentioned "White History" in the reign of Qubilai Qa'an testifies to the fact that the Mongols produced their own book on the principle of mutual interdependence of the Qa'an's power and religion embodied in the same formula of the "Two Orders" innovated by 'Phags-pa bLa-ma. It is written in the "White History": "The cornerstone of sacred religion is the Lama, the Lord of Doctrine, the head of power is the Khan, the Sovereign of terrestrial power. The teaching of the true Doctrine, like the silken knot, cannot be loosened, the laws of the powerful khan, like the golden yoke, cannot be crushed down."[11]

It can be seen that it was Qubilai Qa'an who, having decreed 'Phags-pa bLa-ma to be the Imperial Preceptor and, in turn being sanctioned as the Patron of Religion, realized the theory of the "Two Orders" in the practice of his universal empire. Qubilai Qa'an and 'Phags-pa bLa-ma personified in reality the "Two Orders," State and Religion, and their relations essentially signified the "alliance between the Throne and the Altar." Later on, every time when it was necessary to strengthen the national statehood and to defend the independence of the country, the Mongols repeatedly resorted to the theory and practice of the "Two Orders." Briefly, let me remind you of some instances. At the end of the 16th century with the introduction of Lamaism, the most influential rulers of Mongolia, after having again gotten into close contact with the religious head of Tibet, tried

[11] *Cayan Teüke*, MS. Mongolian State Library, Ulaan Baatar (no pagination).

to revive the Qubilai Qa'an's policy of the "Two Orders." As is well known, Altan Khan invited the Third Dalai Lama to Mongolia and set up an alliance with him. And the theory of the "Two Orders" again occupied the main place in the political and theological thinking of the Mongols.

In his struggle against the Manchus, Ligden Qutuqtu Khan (1604–1634) tried to consolidate his power by way of restoring Qubilai Qa'an's policy of the "Two Orders" having renewed the traditional relationship with the Sa-skya monastery. In 1617 he invited to his court Sa-skya lama Shirab pandita and declared him the Khan's preceptor and granted him the title of "Vajradhara Qutuqtu." The other example can be taken from the recent history of Mongolia. In 1911, when Mongolia declared its independence after the fall of the Manchu empire, Boydo-gegen, the religious head of Mongolia, was proclaimed the Mongol khan "holding the reins of Religion and State." It was the latest attempt of the Mongols to restore the traditional policy of the "Two Orders," and this time with some modification: the "Two Orders" were embodied in one person, Boydo-gegen, as an absolute Monarch.

QUBILAI QA'AN AND THE HISTORIANS: SOME REMARKS ON THE POSITION OF THE GREAT KHAN IN PREMODERN CHINESE HISTORIOGRAPHY

T.H. Barrett

The following remarks stem in the first instance from a reading of Morris Rossabi's recent biography *Khubilai Khan*, and in particular represent an expansion of his point that his own work did not build upon any great weight of Chinese language scholarship assessing Qubilai's life and times.[1] Indeed, to us Westerners, for whom Marco Polo's emperor will probably remain for ever *the* emperor of China *par excellence*, a biography of Qubilai Qa'an may seem an obvious task to undertake, but a quick glance at one or two reference works soon confirms that for all his achievements and even despite the length of his reign, the most famous of the Mongol emperors is completely overshadowed in interest for the Chinese scholar by his Chinese opponent, the great national hero Wen T'ien-hsiang.[2] I am not a student of China's later imperial history, still less a Mongolist, but as a researcher in the field of early medieval Chinese religious history, an area largely neglected by traditional scholarship, the investigation of another historiographic "blind spot" holds a certain comparative value.

The topic of Qubilai's image in China has, of course, been touched upon before, even in English-language publications. Professor Rossabi himself, as a result of his researches, was able to publish a separate study pointing out three clear instances where the *Yüan Shih*, our main Chinese source on Qubilai's reign, demonstrably fails to do him justice.[3]

[1] Morris Rossabi, *Khubilai Khan: His Life and Times* (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 1988), p. xii.

[2] Thus Yang T'ien-hsün, *Chung-kuo li-tai nien-p'u tsung-lu* (Peking: Shu-mu wen-hsien ch'u-pan she, 1980) lists (pp. 137–8) six annalistic biographies for Wen, against none for Khubilai. Sampling the production of articles listed in the yearbooks *Chung-kuo li-shih-hsüeh nien-k'an* (Peking: Jen-min ch'u-pan-she, 1983, 1984) for the early eighties, when Chinese historiography was undergoing something of a renaissance, reveals a nine to five balance of articles in favour of Wen in 1983, and a six to two balance in his favour in the following year, though by 1991 the publication of Rossabi's book itself seems to have caused a reversal in these figures.

[3] M. Rossabi, "Chinese Myths about the National Minorities: Khubilai Khan, A Case Study," *Central and Inner Asian Studies*, 1 (1987), 47–81.

There are also many valuable comments on Chinese historiography in an article by John D. Langlois on the "Yüan analogy" in Ch'ing scholarship, as a result of which Chinese historians under Manchu rule looked back to the period of Mongol rule in China as one of particular interest.[4] Even the period falling between these two studies has been summarized accurately enough by Langlois and Hok-lam Chan as one in which reasonably balanced attitudes towards Mongol rule at the start of the Ming were totally abandoned in the wake of the T'u-mu incident of 1449, thanks to which the Chinese emperor fell into Mongol hands, raising once more the spectre of Mongol conquest.[5] The study of Ming historiography on the Mongols cannot, of course, be divorced from Ming policy towards them, which in itself went through distinct phases, as has been made clear by Arthur Waldron in his acclaimed study of the Great Wall.[6] Ideally, of course, an account of Qubilai in Ming sources would have to give due interpretative weight to the full range of Chinese responses to their dangerous but fascinating northern neighbours, responses in which we may see fear mingled with admiration, expressed at times even in imitation.[7] Even so, a brief survey of Ming reactions to Qubilai as more narrowly conceived by an outsider to Ming history may at least raise the more obvious issues which others may wish to tackle in greater depth later.

Thus while it is true that something which has been described as racial thought may be detected in the early Ming,[8] this was not so widely spread as to colour Qubilai's reputation. The only reference to Qubilai on the part of the Ming founder, Chu Yüan-chang, which

[4] John D. Langlois, Jr., "Chinese Culturalism and the Yüan analogy: Seventeenth-century Perspectives," *HJAS* 40 (1980), 355–398.

[5] On this incident, and on its severe political repercussions, see Ph. de Heer, *The Care-taker Emperor* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1986). For the historiographic repercussions, see John D. Langlois, Jr. (ed.), *China under Mongol rule* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), p. 19 (Langlois, summarizing Li Tse-fen) and 96–7 (Chan).

[6] Arthur Waldron, *The Great Wall of China* (Cambridge: CUP, 1990), pp. 56–59, and note also the remarks on pp. 90, 91, concerning the psychological consequences of the T'u-mu disaster.

[7] I am grateful to Nicola di Cosmo, Richard Davis and Howard Goodman for pointing out some of the larger Ming context to the materials cited here, though (as will be seen below) I have preferred not to venture myself beyond a fairly circumscribed approach to my topic.

[8] J. Fincher, "China as a Race, Culture and Nation: Notes on Fang Hsiao-ju's Discusssion of Dynastic Legitimacy," in D.C. Buxbaum and F.W. Mote (eds.), *Transition and Permanence: Chinese History and Culture. A Festschrift in Honour of Dr. Hsiao Kung-ch'üan* (Hong Kong: Cathay Press, 1972), pp. 59–69.

I have noticed is quite cordial.[9] Since, however, he terms Qubilai a "man of heaven" (*t'ien-jen*), a term suggesting a remarkable figure capable of founding a dynasty,[10] and puts the blame for Yüan rule firmly on Sung inadequacy, we may suspect that he was here setting the tone for all later Ming historians by keeping his own situation primarily in mind. We should, of course, remember that the early Ming, though responsible for driving China's former Mongol rulers back to their homeland, also incorporated a fair number of Mongols within its own forces, and as it were did not deny them the right to have entered China in the first place. Liang Yin (1309–1390), the early Ming historian most frequently cited by later writers on Qubilai, does take the Mongol conqueror to task for not having promoted Chinese to high office and for not maintaining posts devoted to criticism of policy, but he also allows that Qubilai ruled over an empire unparalleled for size.[11]

This, incidentally, illustrates one of the most remarkable features of Chinese writing on the Mongol empire: its total failure to comprehend that China had been absorbed into a larger political unit. The automatic assumption, even with scholars as alert and as critical as the great Ch'ing historian Chao I (1727–1814),[12] is that the Mongols extended the Chinese empire. I am not sure that this assumption could have been questioned under Manchu rule, or even (given the nature of the Chinese claim on much of the Western portion of the territory of the People's Republic) today, but, be that as it may, this ability to conceive of Mongol China as an age of *Chinese* glory may explain why some of Liang's contemporaries make even more positive statements about Qubilai.[13]

[9] Chu Yüan-chang, *Ming T'ai-tsu wen-chi* (edition of *Ssu-k'u ch'üan-shu*), 16.3b.

[10] Note *San-kuo chih* (Peking: Chung-hua shu-chü, 1959), 9, p. 275 and 21, p. 602 (commentary citation of the *Wei-lüeh*); I am most grateful to Howard Goodman for pointing out that of the various possible meanings of the term, this is the only one which seems at all likely in context.

[11] Liang is one of the two historians whose verdicts on Qubilai are quoted in the late Ming collection of judgements on historical figures compiled by Cheng Hsien, *Ku-chin jen-wu lun* (Taipei: Kuang-wen shu-chü, 1974), p. 36.13b: for this work, *cf. Pei-ching t'u-shu-kuan ku-chi shan-pen shu-mu* (Peking: Shu-mu wen-hsien ch'u-pan-she, n.d., preface 1986), p. 2775, and for Liang, p. 1160 of the same catalogue. Liang's verdict is also quoted on p. 23.61b of the *Hsü Tzu-chih t'ung-chien kang-mu*, treated below, and in other late Ming histories I have not had occasion to cite.

[12] Chao I, *Kai-yü ts'ung-k'ao*, 18 (Peking: Shang-wu yin-shu kuan, 1957), pp. 349–512.

[13] E.g. Chang Mei-ho, also quoted in the *Ku-chin jen-wu lun*, 36.1a, presumably from the 1397 compilation listed in the *Pei-ching . . . shu-mu*, p. 1163, and elsewhere.

Likewise, even a little later a continuation of the *Yüan Shih* written under the reign of Chu Yüan-chang's successor, the Yung-lo Emperor, does not hesitate to criticize Qubilai, but is also prepared to give him credit (in a somewhat patronizing way) where credit is deemed due,[14] and indeed makes excuses for him. Thus his Chinese advisers are blamed for not warning him of the dangers of Buddhism, but it is conceded that Emperor Wu of the purely Chinese Liang dynasty made a complete fool of himself over Buddhism, so no wonder Qubilai slipped up.[15]

This damning with faint praise yields after the T'u-mu incident to condemnation, pure and simple, in an upsurge of historical writing characterized by strongly anti-Mongol sentiment. I would, on the basis of the materials I have seen, fully agree with Arthur Waldron's contention that the Ming apear to have responded politically to the disaster by stressing their character as a nation, so as to minimize the significance of Mongol control over one Chinese emperor.[16] But it is not simply the tone of historical writing which is affected: one may also trace the impact of this shift in stance deep into Chinese theories of history, as may be seen for example from the study of doctrines of dynastic succession carried out by Jao Tsung-i.

His most remarkable extract comes in fact from a scholar, Chang Huang (1527–1608), who lived in the somewhat less perfervid atmosphere of the sixteenth century, but still only allows the Mongol period to be treated as "history outside history," *shih-wai chih shih*,[17] evidently for the reason thast alien races do not count as having history at

[14] Hu Ts'ui, *Yüan-shih hsü-pien* (in edition of *Ssu-k'u ch'üan-shu*), p. 1.12a, which prefaces its commendation with the words "Even though he arose from the northern deserts . . .," a phrase that recurs also on p. 1.22a. On the date of this work, *cf. Pei-ching . . . shu-mu*, p. 289.

[15] Hu, *Yüan-shih hsü-pien*, 1.12b. Late Ming criticism of Mongol imperial religiosity has already been noted by Herbert Franke, *From Tribal Chieftain to Universal Emperor and God: The Legitimation of the Yüan Dynasty* (München: Verlag der Bayerischen Akademie der Weissenschaft, 1978), p. 43. Hu is full of apt analogies, e.g. p. 3.2a comparing Qubilai's actions against Japan with T'ang T'ai-tsung's campaigns against Korea; he even hints (as we might expect) at an implicit analogy with Ming policy by declaring (p. 3.10a) that Qubilai was wise to abandon his Japanese campaigns, and would have been even wiser to abandon Vietnam as well.

[16] Waldron, *Great Wall*, p. 93.

[17] Jao Tsung-i, *Chung-kuo shih-hsüeh shang chih cheng-t'ung lun* (Hong Long: Lung-men shu-tien, 1977), p. 160; *cf.* p. 45 for Jao's comment. I have referred to Jao's study for the theoretical aspects of Ming historiography on the Mongols for sake of convenience; his treatment is by no means comprehensive, given his primary focus on a somewhat different topic.

all—quite the attitude which prevails in some British history departments today. But Jao also pays due attention to Ch'iu Chün (1420–95), another writer equally disposed to view the Yüan dynasty as a mere anomalous blip in the regular rhythms of Chinese rule.[18]

As it happens, Ch'iu was in policy terms something of a defence expert, and was in particular an able proponent of fortification against the Mongol threat.[19] Perhaps as a result of this special interest, his historical writings do in fact preserve at least one fragment of information of value to Mongol studies.[20] It must be said, however, that in general his lack of objectivity makes him read somewhat awkwardly to twentieth-century Western eyes.

Thus Qubilai's addiction to the pursuit of military glory is compared to that of the First Emperor or Emperor Wu of the Han, but the latter are then excused on the grounds that at least they were dealing with a genuine threat to China from northern nomads.[21] Qubilai, by contrast, is depicted as bent on the conquest of faraway countries simply in pursuit of treasure, exchanging the lives of useful subjects for useless things.[22] Likewise, four out of the five most corrupt ministers of the Yüan lived during his reign, a sure sign of his greed.[23] And though he suppressed Taoism, there are indications that he suppressed the cult of Confucianism, too, and then cowed his historians into omitting all mention of the event—something even the First Emperor of China was not ruthless enough to achieve![24]

Ch'iu's comments were incorporated into late Ming works, but the subsequent Manchu regime clearly found him unduly offensive, and his historical writings were only republished in the 1930s when they were evidently seen as a potential rallying cry in the face of Japanese aggression.[25] Other mid-Ming publishing products were taken

[18] Jao, *Chung-kuo . . . cheng-t'ung*, pp. 154–6, reprints Ch'iu's main theoretical contribution to this topic.

[19] Waldron, *Great Wall*, pp. 112–4; for fuller details on this particular aspect of his writings, the Princeton dissertation on the topic by Chu Hung-lam listed in Waldron's bibliography should be noted.

[20] See T.H. Barrett, "The Secret History of the Mongols: Some Fresh Revelations," *BSOAS*, 55.1 (1992), 115–9, for this information, and for some more details concerning Ch'iu as an historian.

[21] Ch'iu Chün, *Shih-shih cheng-kang* (Ching-ch'uan: Kuo-shih chia-shu, 1936), p. 31.7a–b.

[22] Ch'iu, *Shih-shih cheng-kang*, 31.8a.

[23] Ch'iu, *Shih-shih cheng-kang*, 31.14a–15a.

[24] Ch'iu, *Shih-shih cheng-kang*, 31.18a–19a.

[25] Chi Yün (comp.), *Ssu-k'u ch'üan-shu tsung-mu t'i-yao* (Taipei: Taiwean Shang-wu yin-shu-kuan, 1971, reprint of 1934 edition), pp. 1058–9, gives the official Ch'ing verdict on Ch'iu: the preface to the edition of his work cited (edited by Kuo Hsin and Lu Ta-chieh) gives a good indication of the factors which motivated the 1936 republication.

up by the Manchus, as less overtly nationalistic, but here we find the Manchu emperors commenting tartly on any passages where the Ming historians show too evident a bias against the Mongol ruler.

The Ch'ien-lung Emperor, for example, praises Qubilai's decision to take on Hsü Heng (1209–1281) as an advisor, especially by comparison with the benighted rulers of the Sung, who could not use good advice,[26] but he rejects the notion of Ming historians that Hsü Heng's advice was actually infallible as betraying pro-Chinese prejudice.[27] Where Qubilai is described as having at one point promoted Taoist rituals, the Manchu emperor refuses to believe it, accusing the historians of making a mistake.[28] Qubilai's expedition to find the source of the Yellow River is also commended, though not the scientific thoroughness of the enterprise, for, as an editorial comment by one of Ch'ien-lung's scholars points out, the Ch'ien-lung Emperor's grandfather, the K'ang-hsi Emperor, had been obliged to send an expedition to secure more accurate information, and only in the Ch'ien-lung reign itself had final confirmation of the accuracy of ancient texts on the subject been obtained.[29]

This note explains some of the testiness of the K'ang-hsi Emperor himself, reacting to a Ming commentator who describes the expedition as "useless": surely it was an unprecedented achievement; why call it useless?[30] In general, however, the K'ang-hsi Emperor emerges as less easily provoked than his grandson, especially in view of the frequently provocative anti-Mongol observations of the commentators included in the text before him, the *Hsü Tzu-chih t'ung-chien kang-mu*, "Continuation of the Outline Comprehensive Mirror." This was a work compiled in 1476 by Shang Lu (1414–86), an associate of Ch'iu

[26] Kao-tsung (i.e. the Ch'ien-lung Emperor), comp., *Yü-p'i li-tai t'ung-chien chi-lan* (edition of *Ssu-k'u ch'üan-shu hui-yao*; Taipei: Shih-chieh shu-chü, 1980), p. 93.42b–43a. The edition used here, and with the next work cited, comes from a reprint of the "pilot project" for the better-known (but, for the texts, in its modern reprints either too illegible or too bulky) *Ssu-k'u ch'üan-shu*: cf. the study by Wu Che-fu, *Ssu-k'u ch'üan-shu hui-yao tsuan-hsiu k'ao* (Taipei: Kuo-li Ku-kung po-wu-yüan, 1976), and p. 167 for the texts concerned.

[27] *Yü-p'i li-tai t'ung-chien chi-lan*, p. 93.62b.

[28] *Yü-p'i li-tai t'ung-chien chi-lan*, p. 95.30b–31a.

[29] *Yü-p'i li-tai t'ung-chien chi-lan*, p. 95.38a.

[30] Sheng-tsu (i.e., the K'ang-hsi emperor), ed., *Yü-p'i hsü tzu-chih t'ung-chien kang-mu* (ed. *Ssu-k'u ch'üan-shu hui-yao*), p. 23.2b.

Chün, to which the emperor found added one set of remarks (including that just quoted), the *Kuang-i*, by Chang Shih-t'ai, first published in 1490, and another, the *Fa-ming*, by Chou Li, whose dates are unclear but who was certainly a Ming writer.[31]

Both commentators are capable of commending Qubilai on occasion: Chang for his raising official salaries, Chou for his freeing of slaves, for example.[32] But both are also quite relentless in their criticism of aspects of Qubilai's policies they find unworthy of a ruler of China—and blame outweighs praise by quite a wide margin. Both commentators also share certain consistent concerns: the Mongol interest in Buddhism, and Qubilai's support for it in particular, invariably elicits highly unfavourable remarks.[33] Campaigns outside China are likewise given a consistently negative evaluation, particularly in cases (such as the Yüan campaigns in Vietnam, for instance) where Ming rulers, too, had tended on occasion to follow Mongol example.[34] Since Japanese aggression against the Ming had already proved troublesome, the view taken of Qubilai's attempts at conquering Japan are particularly instructive.[35] The *Fa-ming* insists that Japan is so insignificant as to be an opponent unworthy of a Chinese emperor's attention;[36] the *Kuang-i* similarly points out that Japan is merely a group of sparsely populated, underdeveloped islands in the middle of the ocean, and would only have constituted a curiosity of no practical value, even if it had been conquered.[37]

Both commentators show an interest in the workings of *t'ien*, their equivalent of Divine Providence, in Chinese history, an interest which is made manifest in several different ways. The *Fa-ming* upholds the traditional belief in natural disasters as portents of Heaven's disfavour, and comments on the extreme frequency of such portents towards the end of Qubilai's reign.[38] The *Kuang-i* wrestles more openly

[31] For Shang's original compilation, see *Pei-ching . . . shu-mu*, p. 276, and for Chang Shih-t'ai's commentary, p. 277; Chou Li may be the writer listed on p. 1264, since other men of this name lived either under the early Ming or later under the Manchus.
[32] *Yü-p'i hsü tzu-chih t'ung-chien kang-mu*, pp. 23.19b, 22.1b respectively.
[33] E.g. *Yü-p'i hsü tzu-chih t'ung-chien kang-mu*, pp. 20.52a–b; 21.18a, 23.10a, 29a, 46a, etc.
[34] See Edward Dreyer, *Early Ming China* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1982), pp. 174–80, 214–18 and 226–30; *cf.* also n. 15, above.
[35] See So, Kwan-wai, *Japanese Piracy in Ming China during the Sixteenth Century* (Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1975), pp. 3–4.
[36] *Yü-p'i hsü tzu-chih t'ung-chien kang-mu*, p. 23.9a.
[37] *Yü-p'i hsü tzu-chih t'ung-chien kang-mu*, p. 23.47a.
[38] *Yü-p'i hsü tzu-chih t'ung-chien kang-mu*, p. 23.47a.

with the question (no doubt lying behind some of the literature surveyed by Jao Tsung-yi) as to whether Mongol rule conformed to Heaven's will or not. Chang Shih-t'ai is prepared, it seems, to allow a certain role for Heaven, even though he is not entirely fatalistic.[39] Chou Li, in discussing the last days of the Sung, hints at the ultimate indestructability of Chinese civilization.[40] For that matter Chao I, the epitome of the rationalistic Ch'ing scholar, also feels obliged to attribute the Mongols' rapid early victories to the support given them by Heaven.[41] All such passages read somewhat oddly to the student of the T'ang, when the indications seemed to be that Chinese historiography was moving irrevocably towards greater rationality, and that the tradition of historiographic interest in the signs of heaven's will was "already moribund by the end of the T'ang, at least."[42] Experts on late imperial China, on the other hand, will doubtless be quite accustomed to ways of thinking unaffected by this false dawn. Their impact on Qubilai's personal reputation, however, need not necessarily have been deleterious, in that they tended to dignify him with a certain historical significance in the working out of "China's Destiny." Just as Milton found in writing about Satan in "Paradise Lost," it surely must have been difficult for Chinese historians writing in the light of Providence to portray Qubilai as a mere monster: the Mongol ruler understood as a simple barbarian would have been, one feels, an unworthy match for true heroes like Wen T'ien-hsiang.

Such considerations, at any rate, rather than a more general (though indeed equally possible) decadent late Ming Chinese admiration for the virile savagery of Mongol life might well explain the occurrence even after the T'u-mu incident of entirely positive evaluations of Qubilai. In the case of conspicuous praise from Li Chih (1527–1565), already noted by Langlois,[43] one cannot rule out a certain desire simply to outrage received opinion. We need not, however, suspect such motives in the writings of Sun Ch'eng-en (1485–1565), a much

[39] *Yü-p'i hsü tzu-chih t'ung-chien kang-mu*, p. 21.35b; *cf.* p. 22.64b–65a.
[40] *Yü-p'i hsü tzu-chih t'ung-chien kang-mu*, p. 21.41b; note the reference to the *Analects*, 9.5.3, "this cause of truth" (Legge), or as Peter Bol translates more appositely for this context, "this culture of ours."
[41] Chao I, *Nien-erh shih cha-chi* 30 (Peking: Chung-hua shu-chü, 1963), pp. 679–80.
[42] H.G. Lamont, p. 194, n. 49 of "An Early Ninth Century Debate on Heaven," Part I, *Asia Major*, 18 (1973), 181–208.
[43] Langlois, "Chinese Culturalism and the Yüan Analogy," pp. 360–1.

more conventional figure who nevertheless portrays Qubilai as a conquering hero.[44] So for all that I have remarked concerning the Chinese writers' tendency to see the character of Marco Polo's Great Khan as an unstable mixture of piety and violence utterly repellant to Confucian norms—a character, in other words, much more in tune with the sensibilities of a European quattrocento readership—the Chinese demonization of this "other" never becomes complete. Rather, Ming (and Manchu) historical portraiture, in common with the general tendency of Chinese historiography, is so expressionistic, so shamelessly committed to the dictum that all history is contemporary history and that one of the most important functions of the past is to serve as a mirror for the present, that any characterization of Qubilai takes second place to direct or indirect comment on the writer's more immediate interests.[45]

Some of these interests may smack of contemporary history to us as well, to judge by recent reports of the Chinese view of the territorial legacy of the Mongol empire.[46] Some raise intriguing cross-cultural comparisons: when the contrast between the voyages of Columbus as a new beginning in history and those of Cheng Ho as a mere anomalous episode forces us to look once more at the alternatives to the European pattern of expansion, what are we to make of commentary on the Yellow River expedition? The facts are well enough known, thanks to the work of Bottazzi and Franke,[47] but the historiographic ramifications might well repay closer scrutiny.

[44] Sun Ch'eng-en, *Wen-chien chi* (ed. *Ssu-k'u ch'üan-shu*), p. 41.37b.

[45] Just to cite one example from an entirely different period of Chinese history, yet again one in which the Chinese/other distinction is central, the reader may wish to consult Michael C. Rogers, *The Chronicle of Fu Chien: a Case of Exemplar History* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1968).

[46] Thus a passage on p. 4 of Jasper Becker, "The Lost Country: Mongolia Revealed," *Britain-China: Magazine of the Great Britain-China Centre*, 50 (Summer, 1992), 3–6, is worth quoting in full as more contemporarily relevant than one might care to think: "Ironically, given the ancient distrust between nomad and farmer both the KMT and Communists argue that Genghis Khan should really be considered a Chinese hero—who lies buried in China—and therefore not only is all of Mongolia part of China, but his conquests too. China's current claim to Tibet and much else stems from the conquests of his descendants like Khubilai Khan. Recently a Reuters correspondent obtained an internal document of the Inner Mongolian secret police which asserted China's claim to all of Mongolia although, diplomatically, Peking has recognised it since 1949."

[47] Emilio Bottazzi, "Un esplorazione alle sorgenti del Fiume Giallo durante la dinastia Yüan," *Annali dell'Istituto Orientale di Napoli, Nuova Serie*, 19 (1969), 529–546; "Una poesia di epoca Ming sulle surgenti del Fiume Giallo," *Annali dell'Istituto Orientale di Napoli, Nuova Serie*, 20 (1970), 529–546; Herbert Franke, "The Exploration of the Yellow River Sources under Emperor Qubilai in 1281," in G. Gnoli and L. Lanciotti (eds.), *Orientalia Iosephi Tucci Memoriae Dicata*, vol. I (Rome: IsMEO, 1985), pp. 401–416.

But ultimately, however much larger than life the real Qubilai Qa'an ever was, he was simply and utterly dwarfed in the eyes of later Chinese writers by the question of China's destiny, as posited by the fall of the Southern Sung. Here, however, we are confronted by an issue so vast and so alien (even if, alas, still very contemporary) that the outsider to this period of historical study despairs of making any contribution at all. For one notes that even insiders have taken on this topic with both the requisite knowledge and enthusiasm, only to leave it abandoned without producing any results.[48] It would be wrong to suggest that no progress is being made: apart from the tangential contribution of Jao, already mentioned above, one may point for example to an essay by Wang Te-i on interpretations of the Sung occasioned by the republication works of the Ming historian (*chin-shih* of 1521) Wang Chu.[49] One might also add that Richard Davis has detected interesting tensions in Chinese historiography even under the later days of Mongol rule, so when dealing with the fall of the Sung and its conqueror it may be artificial to start simply with Ming historiography in any case.[50]

But the point of Rossabi's observation, the occasion for my own foregoing remarks, has, I would think, now become clear. We may find it easy enough to gain some understanding of the Great Khan through reading Marco Polo, but if we are to understand him through reading Chinese sources, we must understand China first; that enterprise, for its part, depends crucially on an understanding of Chinese history, in which he played, after all, an undeniable part. Where mysteries are wrapped in enigmas, the lone historian must pause, and prudently await reinforcements.

[48] See James H. Zimmerman, "Sung History and Chinese Historiography," *Sung Studies Newsletter*, 2 (October, 1970), 4–11. This fragment notes that "The Sung eventually came to have one ugly fault which overshadowed all its cultural achievements: it had let the barbarians into China," and points to the value of Ming historiography in exploring this problem, assuring us (pp. 8–9) "It is these re-workings of Sung history which I am studying at the moment." It is my understanding that such is no longer the case.

[49] Wang Te-i, "Yu *Sung shih chih* t'an-tao Ming-jen ti Sung shih kuan," in Wang Chu, *Sung shih chih* (Taipei: Ta-hua shu-chü, 1977), pp. 1–23 (second separately paginated preface). Wang Chu's work is of a piece with the historiography I have described, but yields little of interest concerning Qubilai himself.

[50] Richard L. Davis, "Historiography as Politics and Yang Wei-chen's 'Polemic on Legitimate Succession,'" *T'oung Pao* 59 (1983), 33–72.

CHINA AS A SUCCESSOR STATE TO THE MONGOL EMPIRE

HIDEHIRO OKADA

1. *The Khan-Emperorship*[1]

The greatest legacy of the Mongol Empire bequeathed to the Chinese is the Chinese nation itself.

The history of what we conventionally call China began in 221 B.C.E. when its first emperor, Shih-huang-ti of the Ch'in, conquered city-states of diverse ethnic origins and politically unified what was then known as the *t'ien-hsia* or "the land under heaven." This first China lasted only for twelve years until the emperor died and old kingdoms resurrected in force. Eventually King Liu Pang of the Han assumed the title of emperor but other kingdoms prevailed and the land under heaven was far from reunified. It took another sixty years before a centralized imperial structure was more or less fully restored under the reign of Wu-ti, Liu Pang's great-grandson. Thus did the first China come back to life.

Wu-ti's reign was immortalized by his court historian Ssu-ma Ch'ien in the very first comprehensive history of China, *Shih-chi*. History is not just a record of what has happened. It is rather a systematic interpretation of the man-inhabited world along the axes of both space and time in dimensions surpassing the reach of any single individual. Thus a well-written history has the power of ideologically defining the reader's perception of the world, and *Shih-chi*, the first world history in Asia, was truly decisive in determining what China was for many, many centuries to come.

Ssu-ma Ch'ien begins his history with the reign of Huang-ti, whose reported imperial accomplishments closely resemble those of Wu-ti. Huang-ti and his four direct successors are classed together as the Five Tis (*wu ti*). Originally the character *ti* meant no more than a

[1] The present writer has written extensively on the nature of the Chinese civilization, mostly in Japanese. For the most comprehensive, see the following: H. Okada, "Higashi Ajia tairiku ni okeru minzoku," in *Kan minzoku to Chūgoku shakai*, ed. M. Hashimoto (Tokyo, 1983), pp. 47–110.

"spouse," and each of the Five Tis was a heavenly husband of the guardian goddess of a city-state. Despite their assigned role in *Shih-chi* as prototypes of the Ch'in-Han emperorship, they clearly belong to mythology.

Somewhat less mythical history starts with the Hsia, whose first king is credited with the creation of mountains and rivers, or the physical world. The Hsia is described as if it ruled all the land under heaven and accordingly treated as a dynasty, as are the Yin and the Chou, that followed it. Yet in reality there does not seem to have been any semblance of a political unity under those so-called Three Dynasties (*san tai*), which were not much more than the relatively powerful among many city-states. Thus there really was no China in the pre-Ch'in period.

Neither was there a Chinese nation yet. Legends told about the Hsia have a strong Southeast Asian flavor, and its kings are said to be the ancestors of the Yüeh people who inhabited the East and South China Sea coast. Those southern connections make the Hsia an I people, a term which originally meant "low," hence "lowlanders" who inhabited the flood plains east and southeast of Honan Province. In contrast to the Hsia southerners, both the Yin and the Chou who came in later and established themselves in what was to become North China were clearly of North Asian origins. The Yin were Ti hunters from the north and the Chou Jung nomadic herdsmen from the west. Those three ethnic groups of different modes of living, together with Man slash-and-burn peasants in the mountains south of Honan who built the kingdom of Ch'u, are conventionally regarded as the Four Barbarians (*ssu i*) as if the Chinese had an early existence as a nationality separate from them. The fact is that the early population in the walled cities were of an ethnically mixed ancestry. In other words, the Chinese of the Ch'in-Han period had descended genealogically from the Four Barbarians, who had adopted an urban civilization and turned themselves into a new ethnic group within the walls of their cities.

The Chinese national identity was defined not genetically but by the three components of its civilization: the Chinese characters, the city, and the emperor.[2] A Chinese was a person who read Chinese characters, correct usage of which was imperially decreed, lived in a city

[2] On the peculiar nature of the Chinese characters which do not correspond to any particular language and the resultant absence of a common spoken language

administered by officials appointed by the emperor, and had his name listed in the emperor's census register. Biological extraction had nothing to do with his identity. Such evolution of the Chinese nation was completed only shortly before Ssu-ma Ch'ien wrote his history around the turn of the first century B.C.E. Our historian, however, felt it necessary to legitimize the emperorship by assigning its origin to the most distant past and establishing its uninterrupted transmission through the blessed reigns of the Five Tis and the Three Dynasties, rather than admitting its creation by the denigrated Ch'in emperor. This scheme effectively placed the origin of China as a nation at the very beginning of world history because the emperorship was synonymous with the Chinese civilization.

The structure of Ssu-ma Ch'ien's work amply expresses the centrality of the emperorship by surrounding its imperial annals (*pen chi*) with individual biographies (*lieh chuan*) of those whose life was related to the emperors in some way. Even the great nomadic empire of the Hsiung-nu, whose *shan-yü* was the Han emperor's equal, is not accorded recognition as an independent political entity and is relegated to an individual biography in *Shih-chi*. Our historian adopted this attitude because to him the world was the emperor and the emperor was the world, and his world history was a history of the emperorship.

This format of *Shih-chi* was fully adequate when Ssu-ma Ch'ien described his world around 100 B.C.E., and the concept of China thus defined by his work was to determine the Chinese perception of the world and its history for more than two thousand years to come. But in reality the first Chinese world lasted only for four centuries. Its population, which numbered more than fifty million in the mid-second century, collapsed in the aftermath of the Yellow Turbans (*huang chin*) Uprising that broke out in 184 C.E., leaving only less than five million survivors half a century later. This virtual extinction of the first Chinese nation was what prompted the migration of the North Asian nations into China in the third century, and the newcomers were to become masters of North China, where the Chinese Chin Dynasty disintegrated by itself in a civil war in 300. Although traditionalist historians of China long insisted that a succession of the legitimate emperorship continued in the South after the North

in China, see: H. Okada, "Shinjitsu to kotoba," in *Ajia to Nipponjin*, ed. H. Okada (Tokyo, 1977), pp. 127–148.

was lost, those Southern Dynasties (*nan ch'ao*) were not much more than regimes in exile in barbarian lands outside China.

Now a completely new Chinese nation evolved in the North, who spoke a common language whose phonology revealed a strong Altaicization of Old Chinese of the Han times. When the Sui, a Northern dynasty of Hsien-pei origin, finally conquered the South and thus created a second China in 589, the new historical reality called for a new historiographical format but none was readily available to the court historians, who had no choice but to fall back on the traditional one inherited from *Shih-chi*.

Inadequacy of the definition of China as the sole theater of history and the centrality of the emperorship in the world established by Ssu-ma Ch'ien became even more obvious when Emperor T'ai-tsung of the T'ang, another dynasty of Hsien-pei origin, briefly assumed the qaghanship of the nomadic Türk Empire overthrown by him in 646. Then the Sha-t'o Turks dominated North China in the tenth century, followed by the Qitays and the Jurchens who built their Northern empires in succession. Those empires, with their own dynastic tradition, clearly belonged to a separate and independent world apart from China. It is not justified to view them as dynasties of conquest, for they never really settled in China. Peking was only a winter camp for the Qitay and Jurchen khans, with the additional function of an administrative center for the local Chinese population.

The Mongols proved far more realistic than the Chinese when it came to writing histories. After Qubilai Qa'an conquered the Southern Sung in 1276 and thus completely absorbed China and the second Chinese nation into the Central Eurasian world, the historians at the Mongol court produced *Liao-shih* and *Chin-shih* in recognition of the legitimacy of those Northern dynasties, rather than relegating them to a biographical section in *Sung-shih* as Chinese traditionalists would have done. This historiographical arrangement in itself represented a highly significant change in world view, in that it amounted to allowing the existence of two equally legitimate emperorships side by side. Thus the Chinese emperorship lost its most important attribute, its centrality, and was replaced by the North Asian khanship. The Chinese kept calling their khans emperors, but those emperors were no longer the center of the traditional Chinese world only, but in fact a Chinese aspect of the khans ruling the vast Mongol Empire and its successor states.

The Mongol Yüan Dynasty lost China in 1368. This by no means

put an end to the dynasty, for China was only one of its colonies. The Yüan Dynasty persisted in Mongolia for the next two decades until the last direct descendant of Qubilai Qa'an lost his life in a rebellion and his throne was taken over by a descendant of Arigh Böke in 1388. Still the new khan and his successors kept up their dynastic tradition calling their nation Dayan/Dayun (for Ta yüan). The Chinggisid house and the Mongol tribes supporting it were for a time overwhelmed by the Oyirad (Oirat), a powerful anti-Chinggisid tribal confederation, but rose again in the second half of the fifteenth century. Thus the Mongols never accepted the Ming emperors reigning in China as their sovereigns as long as the Chinese dynasty continued.

2. *The Chinese Ming Dynasty*

With the new khan-emperorship came a new nation. The Chinese Ming Dynasty was not a resurrected form of the old Sung Dynasty but one of the many successor states to the Mongol Empire, distributed all way across the Eurasian Continent.

As regards territories, the Ming did not extend beyond the old borders of China except in two regions: Yunnan and the Liao River Basin in Southern Manchuria, both of which it had inherited from the Mongols. Yunnan, an old Thai kingdom, had been conquered by Qubilai himself before his accession and become part of the Mongol Empire, but not of China. The Liao River Basin had lost its ethnic Po-hai population in civil wars in the thirteenth century and been repopulated by the Korean captives transplanted there by the Mongol army invading their peninsular homeland.[3] There was no historical ground on which to base Chinese territorial claims in either region. Given such non-Chinese origins of those new territories, the only possible justification of the Ming sovereignty over them was a claim that the Ming emperors were legitimate successors to the Mongol khans who used to rule them.

The first Ming emperor, Hung-wu, was the one who publicly admitted how much he and his new nation owed to the Mongols. When Toghon Temür Khan died in Mongolia and his son Maitreyapāla

[3] On the Korean-immigrant origin of the Chinese-speaking population in Southern Manchuria in the Ming times, see: H. Okada, "The Koreans in Manchuria in the Yüan times," *Han-kuo Hsüeh-pao*, 5 (1985).

was brought back prisoner by the Chinese army, the Ming emperor bestowed on the deceased khan the posthumous title of Shun Huang-ti in formal recognition of his legitimate imperial status. Hung-wu also disapproved the aggrandizing language of the congratulatory memorials presented to him by his vassals, saying: "The Yüan was master of the central empire for a hundred years, during which our and your parents all depended on it for livelihood. How can you speak such ostentatious words?"[4]

The conscious effort on the part of the Ming emperors to identify themselves with the political tradition of their Mongol predecessors is evident also in the bureaucratic structure of their government, which they borrowed directly from the Mongols.

The three top offices in the Yüan imperial government, the Secretariat (*chung shu sheng*), the Bureau of Military Affairs (*shu mi yüan*) and the Censorate (*yü shih t'ai*), all had original connections with the person of Chabui Qatun, the Qunggirad empress of Qubilai Qa'an. The Secretariat was a council of Chinese warlords serving the khan, whose meetings were presided over by Prince Chinkim, Qubilai's son by Chabui, with the assistance of Antun of the Jalayir whose mother was a sister of Chabui. After the Rebellion of Li T'an in 1262, the office was turned over to the Chinese intellectuals surrounding the prince and its military administration was transferred to the Bureau of Military Affairs, of which the prince was also appointed Supervisor. The Censorate was first headed by Toghachar, a grandson of Chinggis Khan's brother Temüge Odchigin, but it was in that office that a movement eventually started advocating the khan's abdication in favor of the prince. There was also another top office, the Department of State Affairs (*shang shu sheng*), which later merged with the Secretariat. Despite the historical association of its name with the council of ministers, the Yüan version was in fact a financial organization managed by Aḥmad of Banakat, a confidant of Chabui Qatun, with the sole purpose of raising revenues for Qubilai Qa'an.[5]

Such organization of the Yüan imperial government owed little to the supposedly traditional Chinese bureaucratic structure going all the

[4] *Ming-shih*, chap. 2, T'ai-tsu 2, under the 3rd year of the Hung-wu era.

[5] On the strongly personal nature of the central government bureaucracy created by Qubilai Qa'an, see: H. Okada, "Mongoru no tōitsu," in *Kita Ajiashi (Shinpan)*, ed. M. Mori & N. Kanda (Tokyo, 1981), pp. 169–182.

way back to Shih-huang-ti of the Ch'in, but was what Emperor Hung-wu actually inherited from the Mongol Yüan. The structure had to be slightly modified after the emperor organized a successful *coup d'état* in 1380, massacred his old secret society brethren and assumed personal control of all the three offices. The Secretariat was abolished in name and each one of its Six Ministries (*liu pu*) was placed under the direct control of the emperor. The Chief Military Command (*ta tu tu fu*), corresponding to the Yüan Bureau of Military Affairs, was also divided into Five Chief Military Commissions (*wu tu tu fu*), each taking orders directly from the emperor. The Censorate was for a time abolished but soon revived under a new name, *tu ch'a yüan*, with not one but two Censors-in-Chief to head it.

Another instance of Mongol legacy inherited by the Ming Dynasty was its administrative structure. This Chinese dynasty was peculiar in having imperial princes enfeoffed in outlying provinces and commanding their personal armies, a practice unknown under the T'ang or the Sung Dynasty. It is, however, easily explained as a Mongol heritage. In Mongol society all organizations were built on the personal, rather than bureaucratic, principle, and the Yüan local administration was no exception. The impression one has in reading the geographical chapters of the *Yüan-shih* that the empire was neatly divided into twelve provinces governed uniformly is an illusion, produced by the Ming historiographers whose frame of reference was again none other than the old *Shih-chi* format. Under the Yüan Dynasty, as a matter of fact, the inhabitants of each city or locality had personal connections to the house of a tribal chief who had conquered them in the days of the Mongol conquest. In some cases even an entire province constituted a princely fief. This arrangement Mongol style, copied by the Ming, was what gave the Chinese dynasty a tribal-feudal outlook.

Then there was the Ming military structure. As was the case with any other Chinese dynasty, the true base of the Ming imperial power was the army, not the civilian-Confucian bureaucracy. The dynasty had its own military aristocracy, comprising the descendants of the generals who had personally followed its founder, Emperor Hung-wu. They enjoyed exceptional privileges in their home province, Anhwei. In fact they were the equivalent of a home tribe to the emperor, comparable to the nomadic tribal chiefs who surrounded the Mongol khan in the Yüan court.

The political importance of the Ming military only increased after

the death of Hung-wu and the usurpation of the imperial throne by his son Yung-lo in a civil war. The new emperor built a new capital at Peking, right at the gateway to Mongolia. The choice of location for his capital was an indicator of his wish to be not just an emperor of China but a khan of the Mongol Empire, as Peking was not quite in China. With this shift of the seat of imperial power, the Nine Frontier Defense Commands (*chiu pien chen*) stationed along the Great Wall gained a great political influence, so much so that every new emperor had first to bribe their troops to win support for his accession. Emperor Cheng-te yearned for the extravagance of the border city of Hsüan-fu, where he kept returning dressed as a general, to escape the boredom of his Peking court. These circumstance go well to prove that the Ming emperorship was military rather than civilian-bureaucratic, contrary to what Confucian traditionalists would have us believe.

The decimal organization of the Ming populace introduced by Hung-wu was another prominent example of Mongol legacy and an old North Asian tradition going all way back to the Hsiung-nu Empire. The emperor first organized the families of his troops as professional Military Families (*chün hu*), in Centuries (*po hu so*), Chiliarchies (*ch'ien hu so*) and Guards (*wei*) or military counties. Then he expanded the system to include also Civilian Families (*min hu*), whose basic organizations were an equivalent of Centuries called *li* (Communities), each of which belonged to a County (*hsien*). The hereditary military officers commanding local Guardsmen were of Mongol origin, as is learned from their census registers, called *hsüan pu*, surviving today.

Even Neo-Confucianism, philosophical orthodoxy for bureaucratic purposes under the Ming Dynasty, owed its status to the Mongol Yüan. After suffering repeated persecutions as a heresy under the Chinese Southern Sung, it won for the first time official recognition as the standard interpretation of classical texts when the Yüan Dynasty reintroduced the Imperial Examinations (*k'o chü*) in 1313.

Thus the Ming Dynasty was in all its aspects a shrunken form of the Mongol Empire if anything.[6]

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[6] For a general discussion of the peculiarities of the Ming political structure, see J. Matsumura, "Kojiki kara kōtei e," in *Shikinjōno eikō*, ed. N. Kanda (Tokyo, 1968), pp. 29–55.

3. *The Manchu Ch'ing Empire*

The Manchu Ch'ing was not a dynasty of conquest ruling in China either. Nine years before the Manchus conquered China, the first Ch'ing emperor, Hong Taiji, was elected to his throne at Mukden in 1636 by the representatives of his Manchu banners, sixteen Inner Mongolian tribes and the Chinese armies that had gone over to his side, when a jade seal of old Yüan emperors was brought back by the victorious Manchu army, obtained from a widow of Lingdan Khan of the Chaqars, the last legitimate Chinggisid khan of the Mongols. Interpreting the arrival of this seal as a clear indication of heavenly mandate for the Manchus to rule the world, Hong Taiji proclaimed a new dynasty, Daicing, and styled himself in three languages, Gosin Onco Hūwaliyasun Enduringge Han in Manchu, Aghuda Öröshiyegchi Nayiramdaghu Boghda Qaghan in Mongolian and K'uan Wen Jen Sheng Huang-ti in Chinese, all meaning "the Vastly Gracious, Harmonious and Holy Khan-Emperor." This trilingual title signified a full revival and inheritance of the Mongol imperial tradition originating in Chinggis Khan, which legitimized in the eyes of Asian nations Manchu rule of the eastern half of the old Mongol Empire.[7]

It is too obviously wrong to call the Ch'ing a Chinese empire, because, again, China was only one of the Ch'ing colonies and the Chinese population, though numerically large, was a political and cultural minority under the Manchu dynasty. Even the *Great Ch'ing Code* (*Ta ch'ing lü li*), applied only to the Chinese subjects, leaving other parts of the empire outside its jurisdiction.[8]

The Ch'ing khan-emperor was several things in one. To the Chinese he was their Chinese emperor in the tradition of Shih-huang-ti of the Ch'in and Wu-ti of the Han. To the Mongols and other nomads

[7] The Manchu claim of the Mongol imperial rights to rule the world was discussed by the present writer in "The Yüan Imperial Seal in the Manchu Hands: The Source of the Ch'ing Legitimacy," a paper read at the 33rd Meeting of the Permanent International Altaistic Conference, Budapest, June 24–29, 1990. See *Altaic Religious Beliefs and Practices* (Budapest, 1992), pp. 267–270.

[8] The *Great Ch'ing Code* owed almost all its contents to the *Great Ming Code* (*Ta ming lü*), authored and promulgated by Emperor Hung-wu of the Ming, and had therefore no provisions for legal cases involving non-Chinese persons. In the Ch'ing Empire each nationality was governed by a separate code: *Pa-ch'i Tse-li* for the Manchus, *Great Ch'ing Code* for the Chinese, *Li-fan-yüan Tse-li* for the Mongols and the Tibetans, and *Hui-chiang Tse-li* for the Muslims of East Turkestan. See M. Shimada, *Shinchō Mōko Rei no kenkyū* (Tokyo, 1982), pp. 89–90.

he was their khan, a supreme leader of their tribal confederation, in the tradition of Chinggis Khan. To the Tibetans he was the greatest patron of Tibetan Buddhism, in the tradition of Qubilai Qa'an. The Muslim population of East Turkestan had only an indirect relation to the Manchu khan-emperor through his General stationed on the Ili (*I-li chiang chün*), who had replaced their former overlord, the Junghar *khong tayiji*, after the 1758/59 conquest of the region.

4. *The Republic of China*

The Republic of China claimed to have inherited the rights to rule the empire built by the Manchus from the last Ch'ing emperor when he abdicated in 1912, but neither the Mongols nor the Tibetans acknowledged them. The Mongols of Outer Mongolia declared independence from the Ch'ing Empire on the eve of the foundation of the republic, and elected the last Rje-btsun-dam-pa Qutughtu of Urga their khan. In Tibet the Ch'ing troops withdrew and the Thirteenth Dalai Lama returned to Lhasa from his exile in India. In December 1912 the Mongols and the Tibetans concluded a treaty of friendship and exchanged diplomatic recognition between themselves as independent nations.[9] With Manchuria under Japanese domination and Sinkiang too remote to exercise effective control over, the Republic of China remained little more than a Chinese nation-state as long as it existed on the continent.

Not only politically but culturally too, the Republican China retained very little of the imperial, supposedly Chinese, tradition. In the last days of the Ch'ing Empire, old institutions had been replaced by new ones imported wholesale from Japan following China's humiliating defeat in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894/95. The Japanization process most significantly presented itself in language and military affairs. Chinese nationalism, born for the first time in the Republican period, also was a by-product of Japanization, which gave the Chinese a new definition of China as an ethnically homogeneous nation with a long, uninterrupted history of its own civilization little affected by occasional barbarian intrusions. This new national consciousness of the present-day Chinese amounts to a revival of Ssu-ma Ch'ien's

[9] U. Onon & D. Pritchatt, *Asia's First Modern Revolution* (Leiden, 1989), pp. 111–113.

world view and is historically untenable, but has affected both the Chinese themselves and modern foreign historians to a great degree.

5. *The People's Republic of China*

In contrast to the Republic of China, which was a Chinese nation-state as was the Ming, the People's Republic of China is not China but an empire in the mold of the Mongol Empire, as is obvious from the fact that its claim of suzerainty over Tibet is based on the historical relationship between the Mongol-Manchu khan-emperors and the Tibetan Buddhist church that existed in the days of the Yüan and Ch'ing Dynasties. This means that the PRC too is a successor state to the Mongol Empire, owing its political legitimacy and the rights to rule its present territories ultimately to Chinggis Khan.

6. *Conclusion*

The Mongol Empire did to Asia and Eastern Europe what Rome did to Western Europe. The principle of unity established by Chinggis Khan with his heavenly mandate was what made it possible for the Russian khan-tsars to expand their rule over the western half of the old Mongol Empire and has ultimately shaped the now-defunct Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.[10] Thus China in the east and Russia in the west are the greatest legacies of the Mongol Empire that survive in the world today.

[10] The famous episode of Ivan IV, who enthroned Simeon Bekbulatovich, alias Sain Bulat of the Kasimov, as tsar of All Russia in Moscow and then succeeded the latter on the throne, amply illustrates the importance of being a Chinggisid to be a khan-tsar. Ivan's great seal carries the word "tsar" only with regard to Kazan and Astrakhan, which goes to prove that the Russian title is none other than Mongolian "khan" in translation. In other words, the legitimacy of Russian "tsar" ultimately derived from the khanship of Chinggis Khan. See O. Pritsak, "Moscow, the Golden Horde, and the Kazan Khanate from a Polycultural Point of View," *Slavic Review*, 24 (1967), 576–583.

Glossary

Cheng-te 正德
Ch'i-tan (Qitays) 契丹
ch'ien-hu so 千户所
Chin 晉
Chin-shih 金史
Ch'in shih-huang-ti 秦始皇帝
chiu pien-chen 九邊鎮
Chou 周
chung-shu sheng 中書省
Ch'u 楚
chün-hu 軍户

Han wang Liu Pang 漢王劉邦
Hsia 夏
hsien 縣
Hsien-pei 鮮卑
Hsiung-nu 匈奴
Hsüan-fu 宣府
hsüan-pu 選簿
Huang-chin 黃巾
Huang-ti 黃帝
Hui-chiang Tse-li 回疆則例
Hung-wu 洪武

I 夷
I-li chiang-chün 伊犁將軍

Jung 戎

k'o-chü 科舉
K'uan Wen Jen Sheng Huang-ti 寬溫仁聖皇帝

Li 里
Li-fan-yüan Tse-li 理藩院則例
Li T'an 李璮
Liao-ho 遼河
Liao-shih 遼史
lieh-chuan 列傳
liu-pu 六部
Liu Pang *see* Han wang Liu Pang

Man 蠻
min-hu 民户
Ming 明

Nan-ch'ao 南朝
Nan Sung 南宋
Nü-chen (Jurchen) 女真

Pa-ch'i Tse-li 八旗則例
pen-chi 本紀
Po-hai 渤海
po-hu so 百户所

San Tai 三代
shan-yü 單于
shang-shu sheng 尚書省
Shih-chi 史記
Shih-huang-ti *see* Ch'in shih-huang-ti
shu-mi yüan 樞密院
Shun Huang-ti 順皇帝
Ssu-I 四夷
Ssu-ma Ch'ien 司馬遷
Sui 隋
Sung-shih 宋史

Ta Ch'ing (Daicing) 大清
Ta Ch'ing lü-li 大清律例
Ta Ming lü 大明律
ta-tu-tu fu 大都督府
Ta Yüan 大元
T'ang T'ai-tsung 唐太宗
Ti 狄
ti 帝
t'ien-hsia 天下
tu-ch'a yüan 都察院
T'u-chüeh (Türk) 突厥

Wei 衛
Wu-ti 武帝
Wu Ti 五帝
wu tu-tu fu 五都督府

Yin 殷
yü-shih t'ai 御史臺
Yüan 元
Yüan-shih 元史
Yüeh 越
Yung-lo 永樂

SOME COMMENTS ON THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE DECLINE OF THE MONGOL EMPIRE ON THE SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE MONGOLS

Udo B. Barkmann

If you ask a historian about the legacy of the Mongol Empire he will surely tell you about the consequences of the Mongol invasions in the conquered lands. He will work out two components, a positive one that includes the achievements of the Mongolian Yüan dynasty in China (1271–1368) and of the Ilkhanate in Persia (1220–1356/57), as well as a negative one in the same lands. The latter means, e.g., the development in conquered Muslim lands which was characterized by a decline of the cities, agriculture, the massive destruction of cultural objects, the rejection of ethnic identities and strong demographic recessions, the consequences of which were felt by the people over centuries. It is legitimate to say, in general terms, that Mongol rule provoked a long lasting disruption of many structures in the Middle East.

But only rarely do people raise questions about the consequences of the Mongol Empire and especially of its decline for the Mongolian heartland and the nomadic Mongolian society. As it is very complicated to find reliable sources, these questions are rather difficult to answer. We have hardly any chronicles which throw light on this period. But we do know that the decline of the Mongol Empire led to a qualitative change in the development of Mongolian society, the expression of which was a stagnant phase in its social evolution. This happened after a period of almost eruptive development in Mongolian society. Within two centuries, the Mongols left behind the stage of the primitive society. Tribes united to become tribal confederations. With the establishment of private property in livestock, the usurpation of tribal territory by several members of the tribal aristocracy took place. This process did not run in a straight line but was rather contradictory in itself and strongly influenced by the geographical conditions of the country. Here, we have to take into account that nomadic mobility and the elements of accident resulting from it often prevented this process from being continuous.

From the beginning, war and forays played an important role for the Mongols. They were a means to gather and accumulate individual wealth and the reason for a growing differentiation of private property among the members of the tribal aristocracy. With the introduction of a strongly centralized Khanate under Chinggis Khan, first signs of the rise of feudalism were to be seen, particularly with regard to the development of the tribal aristocracy. A new nobility in the service of the Khan developed from the nobility of kin and merit (*nobilitas codicillaris*). It was embedded in the military decimal system, to which Natsagdorj referred as "an early form of binding the life of a simple nomad to a territory."[1] In times of peace, this system practically corresponded to a normal life. "The head of a group of a thousand was a nobleman in the service of the Khan. He obtained such a group as a feoff in the best sense of the word because these units must not be conceived as a standing army but as a number of warriors who lived with their families in the territory allocated to them."[2] The head of a group of a thousand was, therefore, an enfeoffed nobleman of the Khan and his feoff was a reward for his work, i.e. mainly for his military service.

At the same time, a new type of a nobleman in the service of the Khan emerged, who received his feoff exempt from tax and duty to the Khan. The *Secret History of the Mongols* gives the example of Sorqan-shira, an old liegeman who was enfeoffed in this way by Chinggis Khan and who could even pass this enfeoffment to his heirs. Thus we can state that the group of a thousand was actually the main pillar of the process of feudalization. According to the ideas of Chinggis Khan, it could be an ethnically homogeneous group, unless the loyalty of the tribal group was in doubt. Here, relationships of dependence and subordination developed. But the subordination to the group of a thousand no longer developed, as Max Weber writes, "due to interests," "the dull habitation to everyday routine" or "merely the personal likings of the dominated man,"[3] but on the basis of a meanwhile legitimated and institutionalized rule. Note that the centralization of the structures of power in the Khanate introduced by Chinggis Khan and his followers totally neutralized the effects of nomadic nobility. Of course, this development is connected with socio-economic differentiation. The second type of nobleman in the service of the Khan—represented by Sorqan-shira—also involved the possibility of a different development for the early feudal Mongolian Khanate. However, the frame set by the nomadic mode of production was rather narrow and, apart from the simple reproduction of livestock, there were very few chances for a development of trade on a large scale so war became the basis of livelihood for the Mongolian Khanate.

[1] Š. Nacagdorž, *Mongolyn feodalizmyn ündsen zamnal* (Ulaanbaatar, n.d.), p. 58.

[2] U.B. Barkmann, "O nekotorych aspektach stanovlenija feodal'nych otnošenii v mongol'skom kočevom obščestve v period pravlenija Čingis-chana," *Mongolica* (Ulaanbaatar), 1 [22] (1990), 20.

[3] M. Weber, "Die drei reinen Typen der legitimen Herrschaft. Eine soziologische Studie," in *Rationalisierung und entzauberte Welt*, in *Schriften zur Geschichte und Soziologie* (Leipzig, 1989), p. 224.

According to the *Secret History of the Mongols*, Chinggis Khan raised about 95 groups of thousands in 1206, i.e. he integrated about 100,000 warriors into his army. We can start from the assumption that these warriors were Mongols in the narrow sense of the word, as can be gathered from the names of the heads of these groups of thousand. On the other hand, this is not to deny that others, such as the Naiman, served in this army, too. If we also count their families, we arrive at an estimated total of 500,000 to 1,000,000 Mongols. The 100,000 men of the Mongolian core units were the backbone of the Mongolian army, from which, during the era of the empire, commanders were recruited when foreign tribes and/or people from other tribes were integrated into the army. They marched thousands of miles, through foreign lands and empires. Many of them died in the campaigns, chose to stay in the conquered lands, were assimilated or, although far away from home, kept their ethnic homogeneity. Chronicles report that the wives and children of the warriors accompanied the army and even refer to big live-stock herds they carried with them.

Under Ögödei Qa'an, Qaraqorum was still the centre of the empire. Later, the centre moved to the capitals and seats of the court in the respective regions. Under Qubilai Qa'an, Daidu (which later was called Peking) became the capital and residence of the Mongolian Khan until the fall of the Yüan dynasty in 1368. Mongolia of course remained the Holy Land of the ancestors, the land of the father of the dynasty, Chinggis Khan. But for the upper class it became a country that they visited sporadically, perhaps because they still felt attached to it, or just to hold a battue there. What were the consequences for the original heartland? The exodus of its warriors and their families left it more and more deserted and the remaining basic population was, at least locally, subject to foreign ethnical infiltration,

which might even be seen as a result of the massive influx of repatriated prisoners of war at a time when Qaraqorum still was the empire's political centre. This depopulation led to the decline of extensive nomadic animal husbandry. The consequences were irreparable and could be felt over a long period of time since stockbreeding could recommence only when new breeding structures had been created, a process which according to the experience of Mongolian nomads would drag on over many decades. This means that the original Mongolian heartland was doomed to political and economic insignificance.

After the fall of the Yüan dynasty in 1368, large crowds of Mongols returned to their original homeland. Franke writes: "There is a striking contrast between the furious troops of Chinggis Khan, the great conqueror and the army of exhausted, will-less idlers of his epigones one and a half centuries later."[4] In his chronological history of the Eastern Mongols, Sagang Sechen writes that only 60,000 of the 400,000 Mongols deployed in China managed to escape to Mongolia. These figures seem to be quite reliable. There are reports, in *Asarayči neretü-yin teüke*, that Toghon Temür, the last Qa'an of the Yüan dynasty, managed to escape together with approximately 100,000 Mongols while some 300,000 of them were left behind. In a letter which Nûrhaci, the future ruler of the Manchu, wrote to Ligdan Khan and which was quoted in *Huang-ts'ing k'ai-kuo fang-lüeh*, he says: "As I have been told, only 60,000 Mongols made their escape, after a total of 400,000 had been captured by the Chinese during the conquering of the town of Daidu."[5] Led by their Khan, a large number of the Chinggisid aristocracy also fled to the land of their ancestors.

Toghon Temür and his court seem to have been strongly sinicized (at least with regard to their habits and household), on which the chronicler Sagang Sechen commented critically by saying that Toghon Temür took to flight "after, lost in amusement and sensual pleasures, he had been deceived by the cunning plot of an enemy vassal."[6] This assumption has been substantiated by other sources, too: According to the *Altan Tobči* and *Asarayči neretü-yin teüke*, for example, Toghon

[4] O. Franke, *Geschichte des Chinesischen Reiches* (Berlin, 1948), IV, 551.

[5] Huang-Ts'ing K'ai Kuo Fang-Lüeh, *Die Gründung des mandschurischen Kaiserreiches*, tr. E. Hauer (Berlin and Leipzig, 1926), p. 99.

[6] J.I. Schmidt (ed. and tr.) *Geschichte der Ostmongolen und ihres Fürstenhauses, verfaßt von Ssanang Ssetsen Chungtaidschi der Ordus* (St. Petersburg, 1829), p. 145.

Temür at best laments the loss of the conveniences afforded by his palaces. In *Asarayči neretü-yin teüke* he says: "My Daidu, you simple but perfect home decorated with all kinds of precious stones! You fresh and beautiful Shang-tu, sited in yellow steppe, summer residence of former Khans."[7]

As we know, the fleeing Mongols returned to the innermost part of Mongolia where they founded the Bars Qotan settlement near the Kerülen river. New conflicts were generated by the return of the Khan and his 60,000 to 100,000 vassals. Struggles for power with local rulers flared up and the authority of the Khan was probably too weak to secure power. The decline of the Mongol Empire on a large scale also led to the desintegration of the underlying structures of power. This was mainly due to the decay of the decimal system, the major background for Mongolian feudal society. Particularism determined the practical policies not only of the local rulers but also of the Chinggisids. What seems to be more important, though, is the economic effect of the sudden return of so many people—most of them warriors or former courtiers, who were alienated from nomad working processes—to their original homelands. In view of a presumably sparse settlement of population on the territory of the Kerülen area, it was impossible to provision a large army, all the more so since extensive nomad animal husbandry could scarcely generate a surplus product. Thus, the situation in Mongolia was inevitably heading towards economic collapse. The population could only be fed by slaughtering live-stock at random, which was bound to disrupt the vital breeding structures of the herds for decades to come. This situation forced the Mongols to go on repeated forays into the Chinese Ming Empire. These raids were neither planned nor can they be described as orderly expeditions. Yet they were a disturbing factor affecting economic life in the northern regions of the Ming Empire. Resolute measures were taken in the reign of Emperor Yung-lo (who according to Mongolian sources might have been a descendant of Toghon Temür) between 1402 and 1424. He undertook various large-scale punitive expeditions against the Mongols but also tried hard to take political advantage of smouldering conflicts between the Khalkha and the Oirat, i.e. The Eastern and Western Mongols respectively. In 1409, when one of his armies sent out to

[7] H.R. Kämpfe (tr.) *Das Asarayči neretü-yin teüke des Byamba Erke Daičing alias Šamba Jasak* (Wiesbaden, 1983), p. 87.

fight the Mongols had been beaten, he decided to take command of the expeditions himself. In the autumn of 1410 he led an army of 100,000 men and 30,000 transport carts into the battle against the Mongols. Further compaigns were conducted in 1414 and 1421. Yung-lo had vowed to defeat the enemy utterly. The 1421 expedition was of enormous dimensions. Franke writes: "As it seems, the strictly military task of mobilizing troops from the existing garrisons was not as great a burden for the empire as the organization of baggage and supplies. A train was formed consisting of 340,000 donkeys, 117,573 carts and 235,146 men carrying several hundreds of thousands [measures] of grain."[8] The number of campaigns as well as their proportions show how difficult it was to get the better of the Mongols. As an important conclusion drawn from the Mongol threat, the Ming ruler chose to make Peking the empire's new capital. This is particularly important in view of the fact that "ever since the reign of the Sung dynasty (960–1280), removing the capital to central or southern China" had been synonymous with "yielding the North to a foreign power."[9] It is not the purpose of this article to give a comprehensive survey of all Chinese invasions of Mongolia. However, and in spite of the scantiness of clues in Mongolian sources, there cannot be a doubt about the long-term effects of these invasions on life in Mongolia.

We have every reason to believe that they caused the population in Eastern and Central Mongolia to decrease, also adding to the stagnation in animal husbandry. The economic decline was the result of a reduction in nomad labour force as a consequence of war, the massive slaughtering of livestock for provisions by the Chinese army, as well as the devastation of fertile grassland caused by the movement of troops and excessive grazing of pack animals. In this context, we must not forget that all Chinese march routes ran near the few rivers, in order to supply their troops with water. But these areas were also the most fertile pasture areas of Eastern and Central Mongolia. The impact of such a massive destruction of food sources is very obvious, particularly when we consider that the power of a local ruler strongly depended on how many vassals he had, whereas the law of population of so-called "pure" feudalism was determined by the principle of food sources.

[8] W. Franke, "Chinesische Feldzüge durch die Mongolei im frühen 15. Jahrhundert," *Sinologica* (Basel, 1953), p. 86.
[9] *Ibid.*, p. 82.

All attempts to create a strong central power in Mongolia proved abortive. Nevertheless, the Chinggisids maintained their claim to power as well as the dignity of their Great Khan. Yet there is no convincing evidence whether or not those Khans really enjoyed power. The Chinggisids may have just as well regarded them as merely their patriarchs. Anyway, the power of the Chinggisids was relative. There was a deep gap between their claim to power and reality. This gap was the result of disagreement in their own ranks and their growing incapacity to put up resistance to the Oirat, who were gathering strength. The fact that an Oirat ruler named Ügechi in 1399 managed to bring "the greater part of the Mongol people" under his control seems to indicate the political and military weakness of the Chinggisids. The consequences speak for themselves. Sagang Sechen writes: "From that moment on, the people of the Mongol had gotten into confusion and disorder..."[10] In the years that followed, the Chinggisids did not succeed in stabilizing their position. They kept up the succession to the Khan's throne but the Khan himself was still far from being a factor of power. However, accounts from chronicles of the early Manchu era[11] seem to indicate the Chinggisids' return to power at the beginning of the 15th century. It is interesting to note that from that time on, the claim to power of the Chinggisids had been expressed more on the basis of rights derived from the progenitor Chinggis. We thus can find an invocation of Chinggis Khan by Sagang Sechen: "... the ruling people has no leader and head and is, therefore, in confusion. Call on the leader, our father, so that he will save our lives."[12] And when Adai Taiji ascended to the throne in 1426 he did so "in the face of the ruler," i.e. Chinggis Khan. That means that the enthronement of the legitimate Khan was then carried out in the Chinggis Khan Shrine of the Eight White Yurts in the Ordos region. So this place received, apart from its original ritual function, more and more the character of a political institution that became indispensable for the legitimation of power.[13]

The Oirat were aware that this way the claim to power of the

[10] Schmidt, *Geschichte der Ostmongolen*, p. 145.
[11] See also L. Danzan, *Altan tobči*, tr. and ed. N.P. Šastina (Moscow, 1957); *Šira tudži-mongol'skaja letopis' XVII veka* (Moscow, 1957); Schmidt, *Geschichte der Ostmongolen*.
[12] *Ibid.*, p. 147.
[13] See also K. Sagaster (ed.) *Die Weiße Geschichte (Čayan teüke)* (Wiesbaden, 1976).

Borjigin and/or Chinggisids could be considerably consolidated. They consciously committed a sacrilege and murdered Adai Khan in the Chinggis Khan Shrine if we follow the accounts by Sagang Sechen. The chronicle says: "He (Adai) reached the Orda of the ruler where he hid himself away but nevertheless, unarmed and defenceless as he was, he was seized and killed."[14] Whatever the sentence for the murderer was, the *Altan tobči* and the *Asarayči neretü-yin teüke* both tell that the murderer himself found a mysterious death in the Chinggis Khan Shrine. Chinggis had taken revenge—at least in the understanding of his contemporaries.[15]

Esen Khan, who had already been enthroned by the Oirat in 1417, in contrast to Adai tried to push through the Oirat against the Khalkha Mongols' interests. Perhaps it was his goal to push away the Khalkha Mongols by all available means. But the Mongols revolted against him. Sagan Sechen even says that especially "the humble people of the Mongol" united against him justifying themselves: "... it seems that he had planned to kill and exterminate us Mongols."[16] A large number of Mongols left the territory of Esen Khan who says later in the chronicle: "I had intended to destroy the lineage of the Borjigin ..."[17]

In the middle of the 15th century, the Chinggisids made more and more attempts to stabilize the Mongolian Khanate politically. Again and again they believed that they had finally found the right potentate in the new Khan. When Molon Taiji was enthroned to the Khan in 1453 it was prophesied: "By you the great people will regain strength in the legal order. Ascend to the throne as a Khan."[18] But the prophecy was not fulfilled. Only one year later Molon was killed and his successor also only ruled for some five years.

Only with the reign of Batumöngke Dayan Khan, who ascended the throne "as a descendant of the ruler in straight lineage" when he was still a child in 1470, did the Khanate became politically more stable. A few passages in the sources tell us that at the beginning of his reign he was able to establish the inner unity of the Khanate through military power and mainly with the help of his wife, an

[14] Schmidt, *Geschichte der Ostmongolen*, pp. 150–151.
[15] Danzan, *Altan tobči*, p. 269; Kämpfe, *Asarayči neretü-yin teüke*, pp. 94–95.
[16] Schmidt, *Geschichte der Ostmongolen*, p. 153.
[17] *Ibid.*, p. 167.
[18] *Ibid.*, p. 171.

energetic and politically far-sighted princess. A campaign against the Oirat at the very beginning of his reign broke their power and created favorable external conditions for political development in the Khanate. According to the chronicles of the Ming dynasty, Batumöngke Dayan Khan proposed to the Ming emperor to establish friendly relations between the two empires. This might also indicate that the political horizon of Batumöngke Dayan Khan was not limited only to its own sphere of power.[19] Batumöngke commanded six *tümen*, i.e. about 60,000 male subjects in an empire that extended from the Ordos region to the river Kerülen in Eastern Mongolia. Sources say that he devided the six *tümen* into a right and a left wing. For all the reservations in view of the very poor clues in the sources, we may assume that the *tümen* system probably helped tie the aristocracy down to the developing structures of power in the Khanate. There is some indication that Batumöngke Dayan Khan bestowed on his noble men the title of a *Dai Darkhan* for their merits in the field, earnings, golden seals and other honorary titles, which even allows the conclusion they might have been signs of investiture and/or enfeoffment. Thus, a part of the aristocracy was taken into the service of the Khan.

The account given by Sagan Sechen tells us that Batumöngke Dayan Khan also introduced a tax system in the Khanate, of unknown form. Thus it may be assumed that livestock breeding had been able to regenerate among the Mongolian nomads. Batumöngke seems to have paid much attention to the cultivation of the Chinggis Khan cult. He did so not only because he was a Chinggisid but also in the realization of the important political function of the cult to legitimate and consolidate the power of the Chinggisids. Batumöngke Dayan Khan ruled over many decades. Only through his reign more than one hundred years after the decline of the Mongolian Yüan dynasty in China, did the Mongolian Khanate arise to a new life and achieve more and more inner stability. This development was possible due to favourable external conditions and based on the recovery of livestock breeding. Moreover, a political consensus among the Chinggisids certainly helped settle particular claims to power. It is significant that this historical process was in close connection with the political ability of survival of the Chinggisids.

[19] *Bügd Najramdach Mongol Ard ulsyn Tüüch*, I (Ulaanbaatar, 1966), p. 430.

HOW MONGOL WERE THE EARLY OTTOMANS?

Rudi Paul Lindner

A sensible answer to the question heading this essay requires an understanding of the terms involved. "Mongol" and "Ottoman" in their most common understanding at the turn of the fourteenth century were terms denoting, on the one hand, those members of a tribe owing allegiance to the Mongol khan, and, on the other hand, again the members of a tribe, this one formed around Osman the son of Ertoğrul, probably in the later 1290s. To be a "Mongol" or an "Ottoman" implied loyalty to a political figure, the chief of the tribe. Since political loyalties may change with circumstances, a Mongol or an Ottoman might, as opportunity and advantage appeared, develop another allegiance, especially in Anatolia. If these definitions held true, than our title really asks whether the early Ottoman tribe formed an integral part of the Mongol enterprise.[1]

This paper contains no convincing proof that the answer to the question is yes. This is not surprising, given the recent assertion that "the earliest history of the Ottomans is a black hole."[2] Instead, here the reader will find a minor constellation of different varieties of evidence that may, projected against the Anatolian darkness, bear some affinities to the Mongols.

Possible connections between the Ottomans in their formative years and the Mongols, especially the Ilkhanids of Persia, have not only escaped scholars, but there has even been a horror Tartarorum, best expressed in the Paris lectures of Fuad Köprülü some two generations

[1] See a more detailed justification of this approach in my "What Was a Nomadic Tribe?," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 24/4 (1982), 689–711, inspired by F. Barth's study of the Basseri. I wish to thank my master, John Masson Smith, Jr., for his kind comments on this essay and for delivering the lecture on my behalf at SOAS.

[2] C. Imber, "The Legend of Osman Gazi," in *The Ottoman Emirate (1300–1389)*, ed. E. Zachariadou (Rethymnon, 1993), p. 75. This is the latest of Dr. Imber's spirited and well-planned assaults on those who use the chronicles without due reserve. While some of Dr. Imber's specific examples are entirely convincing, there appear to me to be exceptions. I leave for later discussion the implications of the recent definitive identification of a black hole.

ago. Köprülü recounted the fifteenth century Ottoman traditions according to which Osman's grandfather crossed Anatolia and occupied a homeland in northern Phrygia in the thirteenth century, but he held that these were false. Arguing that the study of place names allowed the dating of some Turkish immigration to the eleventh century, Köprülü concluded that the family from which Osman stemmed arrived in the wake of the Seljuks and not the Mongols.[3] His goal was to distance the Ottomans as far as possible from the Mongols. Without accepting his arrival date, others have followed his lead, forming the Ottomans without either mold or context in a historiographical wilderness offering no shelter. In his London lectures three years after Köprülü's, Paul Wittek described the ideology of the Holy War as the engine fuelling the Ottoman rise to power and thus further distanced the Ottomans from the Mongols, not known for their *ghazi* spirit. The Ottomans, indeed most of the Anatolian beyliks, thus received permission from modern historians to grow without the guidance or the example of Mongol rule. But this is not the only, and perhaps not even the best, alternative.

It is perhaps an accident of the survival, editing, and translation of sources that has assisted in the persistence of such a belief. The excellent and widely available translation of Ibn Baṭṭūṭa by H.A.R. Gibb, perhaps the earliest (1331) extended description of the Ottomans available in English to students, does not mention the Mongols as factors in west Anatolia. The hospitality of the *akhis*, the comparison between a flourishing (after only five years) Ottoman Bursa and a decaying Byzantine Nicaea (only just fallen to the Ottomans), all these strike the reader. The only sense of a recent Mongol impact is the number of scholars who appear to have gone to ground in west Anatolia from points east. Another view comes from the geographical treatise of al-ʿUmarī, who discusses Mongol governors, the impact of the Mongols on the west, and who makes of the Mongols an impressive presence in the 1330s. But Franz Taeschner's edition of al-ʿUmarī's Anatolia is a bibliographical rarity, and the only available translation in a western language, that of Quatremère, is imperfect and approaching its bicentenary.

Our search begins with an initial problem. How far back towards the beginnings of their accounts we may harbor a minimal belief in

[3] F. Köprülü, *The Origins of the Ottoman Empire*, tr. G. Leiser (Albany, 1992), pp. 72–77.

the fifteenth century Ottoman chronicles is sharply contested at present. The texts suffer from substantial editorial and imaginative emendations, and their contents elucidate later rather than earlier Ottoman history. There is, however, a good deal of evidence to help the reader observe, if not admire, the process of later emendation and accretion, and there are also certain traditions contemporary with the fourteenth century Byzantine witnesses of Ottoman expansion. There is no reason to discard the entire tradition, and there is hope even in the most obvious nonsense. The early accounts of the Ottoman conquest of Karacahisar, a castle southwest of the Byzantine Dorylaion, from the Byzantines is such nonsense, since the entire area had been in Seljuk hands since 1180 at the latest. Geographical and other considerations, however, suggest that Karacahisar, which controls the entry to the plain of Dorylaion from the southwest, was, towards the end of the thirteenth century, in the hands of the neighboring, and competing, *beylik* of Germiyan, centered at Kütahya, and so an event that made perfect geographical and strategic sense became made over in order to portray the Ottomans as early, consistent, warriors for the faith.[4] It seems worth the effort to evaluate the chronicle material case by case.

There was a shared understanding among the early Ottoman tradition-bearers, including the so-called Royal Calendars, the presently unavailable source used both by Ahmedi (fl. 1400) and Şükrullah (mid-fifteenth century), Anonymous Chronicles (from 1421), and the account of Yakhshi Faqih preserved in Ashıqpashazade (ca. 1480–ca. 1500, with earlier material going back to Orkhan), that a group of important conquests that opened up the routes to the lower Sangarius and the fertile plains east of Bursa and Nicaea occurred at about the same time, in the year 699/1299. This understanding occurred quite early on, no later than in an Arabic chronicle composed in 1396 by Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad b. al-Jazarī, who had joined the court of Bayezid I.[5] Some of the chronicles link these events and

[4] See for the moment *Nomads and Ottomans in Medieval Anatolia* (Bloomington, 1983), p. 20. A more lengthy treatment will appear in *Beginning Ottoman History* (Ann Arbor, in press).

[5] *Düsturname-i Enveri*, ed. Mükrimin Halil [Yinanç] (Istanbul, 1930), p. 87, and his "Ertugrul Gazi" in *Islâm Ansiklopedisi* The conquests in question are Bilecik (not to be confused with the Belokome of Pachymeres), Inegöl, and Yarhisar (in some traditions, Köprühisar). *Cf.* the forthcoming study of early Ottoman historical geography by Professor Clive Foss.

year to an Ottoman proclamation of independence from the Seljuk sultans. While some faith in the historicity of the conquest and their dating may be justified, the reader might exercise some hesitation on the matter of the Seljuk-Ottoman relationship and its termination, no matter how engaging the story. We are fortunate to have another source at our disposal.

The thirteenth century was a silver age in Anatolia, much more so than in the rest of the eastern Mediterranean, where there were few mints striking silver coins and fewer striking pure silver. But within the peninsula as many as ten silver mines yielded enough precious metal for an increasing number of mints and a production of silver coinage greater than at any point in the remembered past. Most of the dirhems became tribute to the Mongols after 1243, but enough of them remain for today's collectors to build substantial collections at reasonable cost. Increased output and mint proliferation do not tell the entire story, however. The thirteenth century Anatolian silver coinage also boasted a fineness ten to twenty per cent greater than that struck in Egypt, the Levant, and Byzantium, so much so that the coin earned a special nickname in the marketplace by the end of the century: "*akçe*", little white [thing], white because of its superior silver content. The purity of Anatolian dirhems remained quite high, ninety percent and higher, throughout the century, one aspect of the coinage that remained uniform from mint to mint.[6]

The proliferation of mints occurred at the same time as the slow devolution of central Seljuk power.[7] Some of the mints were surely official; others reveal local emirs striking under the Seljuk umbrella; the Mongol rulers established others as they took over the east of the peninsula, and yet others represented the increasingly independent Turcoman chiefs. Even if all the issues resembled, with greater or lesser skill, the Seljuk style, the ample supplies of silver and the availability of mines made it possible for all the entrepreneurs to reap the profits of coinage. It is important to bear in mind that this mint proliferation was unique in the contemporary Near East, just

[6] Professor Adon A. Gordus of The University of Michigan kindly performed neutron activation analyses of hundreds of Anatolian silver coins to derive fineness data.

[7] For an interesting comparison with changes in architectural patronage, see H. Crane, "Notes on Saldjuq Architectural Patronage in Thirteenth Century Anatolia," *JESHO* 36 (1993), 1–57.

as was, for similar reasons, the proliferation of caravansarays along the thirteenth century Anatolian routes.

It is the pace of proliferation, and its achievement in 699/1299, that is of interest here.[8] There are two or three mints in the 1220s and 1230s, and then a slow growth began during the dynastic quarrels of the 1240s, rising to fifteen-twenty mints after the Mongols took over direct administration of the east in the later 1270s. What is amazing is the *annus mirabilis*, 699/1299, when there is a spike of over forty mints compared with the much lower numbers for preceding and following years (after 699/1299, for example, there are normally between ten and fifteen Anatolian mints for the Ilkhanids). Something very unusual was going on, neither a year of remonetizing at the end of a cycle nor the impact of a sudden bullion flight. This mint expansion (and subsequent contraction) was different in kind from the record of the preceding decades. What happened—or, recalling the Ottoman tradition, what else happened—in that year?

At this time, the Mongols were the real power to the east of the Ottomans, and their governor was Sülemish. In 1298 he revolted gainst Ghazan Khan, and from Syria, the Anatolian frontier [*uj*], and Cappadocia he raised an army with Turcomans and what Rashīd l-Dīn termed riffraff [*runūd wa awbāsh*]. By promising to parcel out the revenues and provinces of Mongol Anatolia he gathered around his banner a substantial force, some 50,000 experienced men by Rashīd al-Dīn's (perhaps overly generous?) estimate. When the snows melted and the routes cleared in the spring of 1299, Ghazan's general Qutlughshāh wrought his revenge. Within a year the Turcoman allies of Sülemish had fled and the Mongols had destroyed him and some of his henchmen.[9] Although it was neither the first nor the last revolt of a Mongol governor of Anatolia, Sülemish's rising caused the greatest concern to Ghazan. Qutlughshāh could not remain in Anatolia to ensure a lasting order, for he had to put down a revolt in Georgia, and Ghazan himself was preparing for an invasion of

[8] See the date listed in my "A Silver Age in Seljuk Anatolia," in *A Festschrift Presented to Ibrahim Artuk on the Occasion of the Twentieth Anniversary of the Turkish Numismatic Society* (Istanbul, 1988), pp. 267–274. In graphical form a slightly larger body of data appears in *Beginning Ottoman History*.

[9] This is a very bald summary of a longer tale reconstructed from Rashīd al-Dīn, *Geschichte Gāzān Ḫan's*, ed. K. Jahn (London, 1940), pp. 121–123, and Kerim al-Din Mahmud Aksarayi, *Müsameret ül-ahbar*, ed. O. Turan (Ankara, 1944), pp. 239–247, 270–271.

Mamluk territory later in 1299. The Ilkhan had little time to spare for the peninsula. How could he win time and Anatolian support, especially in competition with the promises of revenue by Sülemish?

Ghazan could provide them with the profits from coinage, and this provision is a most reasonable explanation of the extraordinary expansion of Anatolian mints during this year. It is not that so much silver was struck in that year, since the coins from most of the mints of 699 are uncommon or rare, but that for a brief time so many mints produced coins, all of which were of a very specific type, distinguishable from one another only by the mint name.[10]

In the early 1970s a hoard of 500 Seljuk and Ilkhanid dirhems, unearthed near Kütahya, appeared on the market, and it contained a number of coins of this type from 699. Among them was one bearing the mint inscription *sīn-ʿayn* or *ghayn-dāl*. Not to be confused with the rather different coins from Saʿdiye/Saʿidiye in Persia, nor of the style of Siʿirt, this may be from Söğüd, a coin of Osman, part of Ghazan's reward for loyalty to the Ilkhan.[11]

There is less ambiguous textual evidence for this link. In one of the Ilkhanid accounting treatises, the *Resale-i falakiye*, there is a listing, among the dependencies or dependents in the province of Rum that provided income to the central power, of a certain "Orkhan". This is, of course, the second Ottoman leader, son of Osman.[12] The material in this section seems to date from early in Orkhan's reign.[13] What was true for Orkhan—subordination to, and acknowledgement of, Mongol authority—seems to have been *a fortiori* true of Osman, who had had fewer resources and a stronger Ilkhanate to his east.

It is possible to object that this Ilkhanid document represents no more than wishful thinking, although, since the *Risale* was not written

[10] For published examples of this type, see G. Kürkman and Ö. Diler, *Alaiye paraları* (Istanbul, 1981), p. 45, and T. Aykut, *Ak Akçe* (Istanbul, 1992), pp. 78–79.

[11] This coin appears in *Beginning Ottoman History* and is now in the Tübingen collection, as is an equally interesting coin struck in imitation of a type of the Ilkhan Öljeitü around 1317/1318, with the mint name Bursa, from a small hoard of west Anatolian dirhems. I thank Stephen Album for allowing me to study and publish these two hoards. Bursa remained in Byzantine hands until 1326, but its rulers had been paying tribute to Osman for nearly a decade, and he had established fortified points outside the citadel to blockade the city. See *Nomads and Ottomans*, p. 27, n. 140. This coin as well is pictured in *Beginning Ottoman History*.

[12] *Die Resala-ye falakiyya*, ed. W. Hinz (Wiesbaden, 1952), p. 162 f. 93b.

[13] P. Remler, "New Light on Economic History from Ilkhanid Accounting Manuals," *Studia iranica* 14 (1985), p. 164.

for a wider public, it seems unlikely that so futile an exercise was intended. We have, in any case, another, independent, text that can be brought to bear on the problem. The Byzantine chronicler George Pachymeres, a contemporary of the events he describes, mentions, in discussing the events between Ghazan's death and the accession of Öljeitü, that one of Öljeitü's dependent beys demanded from the Byzantine emperor Andronicus II an area for his own subjects to settle, the land known as the Mesonesion.[14] The Mesonesion is well-known, since it is associated with a mustering-place of the Byzantine army known as Malagina.[15] Malagina has been located in the Sangarius plain just north of Lefke and above Mekece, an area for which the Ottomans contended at this time. The Mesonesion is the land south of present-day Adapazarï and the great bend of the Sangarius, also an area in which Byzantine sources place the Ottomans during these years. Osman was, then, well within Öljeitü's orbit. The Ilkhans justifiably thought of Osman and his tribesmen as Mongols, owing an ultimate loyalty to the Ilkhan.

Pachymeres provides two other precious notices relevant to this question. In his discussion of the last days of Byzantine Sardis, he noted the influence of the Mongols far to the southwest of Anatolia in 1304 and the fear that they induced in the "independent" Turkish beys as a result of Byzantine diplomacy.[16] At the very end of his chronicle, in 1307, indeed the last set of events he discussed, Pachymeres returned to this theme, discussing Andronicus' diplomacy with Öljeitü to bring pressure on the rear of Osman and the beys. From 1307 on for another decade the Byzantine sources mention no further Ottoman assaults. Whether this reflected Mongol pressure or less of an interest in Anatolian affairs by Pachymeres's successors remains an open question.

At the turn of the fourteenth century the Mongols successfully put down revolts in Anatolia. They obtained, at the very least, temporary admission of their sovereignty through grants of the profits of coinage. They made specific claims not only upon the Ottomans for tribute and obedience but also claims upon the Byzantines on behalf

[14] Pachymeres, ed. Bonn, II, 460.

[15] See C. Foss, "Byzantine Malagina and the Lower Sangarius," *Anatolian Studies* 49 (1990), 178–180.

[16] C. Foss, *Byzantine and Turkish Sardis* (Cambridge, 1976), pp. 121–124. I thank Professor Foss for this citation.

of their Mongol subjects, in return for which they claimed to control their excesses. The coin of 699/1299 might be a part of this, for on this hypothesis the Ottomans did have something on their minds in 699: not independence from the Seljuks, but an acceptance of Mongol overlordship.[17]

[17] The letters attributed to Rashīd al-Dīn discuss Mongol estates west of Ankara. One might make something of this, although in light of Mr. A.H. Morton's paper in this volume it seems wiser to leave this particular "evidence" aside.

THE EARLY HISTORY OF THE MOGHUL NOMADS: THE LEGACY OF THE CHAGHATAI KHANATE

HODONG KIM

The history of a nomadic tribal confederacy around the T'ien-shan range known as Ulus-i Moghul, that is, the Moghul Khanate,[1] in the second half of the fourteenth century is veiled in darkness.[2] Our ignorance stemms from almost total lack of historical records. Even Mīrzā Muḥammad Ḥaydar who left us the most valuable source on the history of this state, *Tārīkh-i rashīdī*, had recourse to a Timurid source when he described the reigns of the first two khans, Tughluq Temür and Ilyās Khwāja.[3] This makes a sad contrast to affluent source materials and detailed secondary studies on its western neighbours, the Timurids.[4] The lack of knowledge on the early history of the Moghul Khanate makes it extremely difficult for us to evaluate

[1] There is no consensus among scholars about the proper name of this state. Soviet scholars generally adopt the term "Moghulistan," but, to my view, it was basically a geographical expression (although sometimes it meant a political entity in that area) designating the steppe area to the north of the T'ien-shan range. For their opinion on this matter, see K.A. Pishchulina, *Iugo-vostochnyi Kazakhstan v seredine XIV—nachale XVI vekov* (Alma-Ata, 1977), p. 188. "The Eastern Chaghatai Khanate" which is widely employed by Chinese scholars cannot be justified not only because such a term did not exist in any historical source but also because there was no corresponding "Western" Chaghatai Khanate.

[2] The most detailed study so far is the aforementioned work by Pishchulina. She fully utilized a number of Muslim records and made a great contribution to reconstructing the political history of the Moghul Khanate as well as its socio-economic structure up to the first half of the fifteenth century. In China, Tian Weijiang published a series of articles on the Moghul Khanate, but most of them cover later period. For example, see his "Shiwu shiji Dong Chahetai Hanguo lishi tanyu" [Investigation of the Eastern Chaghatai Khanate in the fifteenth century], *Minzu yanjiu*, 1988, no. 5, pp. 89–96; "Zhungaer bu de nanxia yu Dong Chahetai Hanguo de fumie" [Southward movement of the Junghar tribe and the fall of the Eastern Chaghatai Khanate], *Xinjiang Daxue xuebao*, 1989, no. 1, 47–53. In Japan we have Eiji Mano's "Jūgo seiki shotō no Mogūrisutān" [Moghūlistān in the early fifteenth century], *Tōyōshi kenkyū*, 23–1 (1964), 1–27.

[3] See English translation by E.D. Ross, *A History of the Moghuls of Central Asia* (first published in 1895; London, 1972, new impression), pp. 15–50. Hereafter *Tārīkh-i rashīdī* will be abbreviated as TR.

[4] The most recent work by B.F. Manz, *The Rise and rule of Tamerlane* (Cambridge, 1989), shows the high level of studies on the Timurids.

the whole process and the historical implication of the dissolution of the Chaghatai Khanate. This paper attempts to make a contribution in filling that gap. It starts from the analysis of a letter written by two Mongol chieftains which has been considered to have nothing to do with the Central Asian Moghuls, and will thereupon touch upon the political turmoils in Central Asia in the 1380s, also describing what happened during the preceding decades in Moghulistan. The paper does not try to list all the details of political events but to grasp the dynamics of the Moghul tribal confederacy. Finally the persistence of the legacy of the Chaghatai Khanate will be discussed.

1. *Letter of Namun the Son-in-Law*

The first emperor of the Ming dynasty, Hongwu, having overthrown the Yüan empire and expelled the Mongols beyond the Great Walls, issued an order in 1382 to compile a Mongol-Chinese bilingual textbook for those who should learn the Mongol language. After seven years of hard work, Ming scholars accomplished the task and the book was entitled *Hua-I yiyu*, "The Sino-Barbarian Glossary." It was made of two different parts, the first half being a glossary containing numerous Mongol vocabularies (844 items in total) classified according to subject matter and the second half a collection of exemplary letters (7 memorials and 5 edicts) transacted between Emperor Hongwu and various Mongol chiefs. All these edicts and memorials were transcribed in Chinese characters based on the same principle as we found in *Yuanzhao bishi* ("The Secret History of the Mongols") which they transcribed almost simultaneously.[5] It is of no wonder that scholars of our time regarded these two works as important sources for the study of the medieval Mongolian language and published transcriptions as well as translations with detailed annotations.[6] Owing to their efforts we have enough information about those twelve

[5] On this see W. Hung's "The Transmission of the Book Known as The Secret History of the Mongols," *HJAS*, 14 (1952), 433–492.

[6] M. Lewicki's *La langue mongole des trascriptions chinoises du XIV^e siècle. Le Houa-yi yi-yu de 1389* (Breslau, 1949) and its second volume (Vocabulaire-Index) with the same title (Breslau, 1959); E. Haenisch, *Sino-mongolische Dokumente vom Ende des 14. Jahrhunderts* (Berlin, 1952); his *Sino-mongolische Glossare: I. Das Hua-I ih-yu* (Berlin, 1957); M.L. Ligeti, *Pièces de chancellerie en transcription chinoise* (Budapest, 1972); A. Mostaert, *Le matériel mongol du Houa i i yu de Houng-ou* (1389), ed. by I. de Rachewiltz (Brussels, 1977).

letters—who wrote to whom, and when and where they were written—except for one entitled "Namun fumashu" ("Letter of Namun, the Son-in-Law"). What we have, of course, is the date and the location of its composition and the names of senders: it was at the end of 1388 by two Mongol chiefs called Namun and Engke Tura at the place of "Qaladel" (this is a mistake for Qaradel). However, since the names of Namun and Engke Tura are mentioned nowhere in *Ming shilu* ("The Veritable Records of the Ming Dynasty"), unlike the other Mongol chiefs in *Hua-I yiyu*,[7] we do not know who they were, where Qaradel was, and why they sent such a letter to Emperor Hongwu. The answers to these questions will give us an unexpected lead to the little known history of the early Moghul Khanate which arose in the eastern realm of the Chaghatai Khanate.

Before we attempt to solve these mysteries, it is necessary to know what the contents of the letter are. The entire text of this letter is actually quite short and the following English version is based upon A. Mostaert's French translation which is considered the most accurate so far.[8]

> To the Emperor [of] the Great Ming who is at high above. [This is] the memorial of ours, Namun the Son-in-Law (*güregen*) and Engke Tura the Brave (*bātur*).
>
> At first, the Mongol people who, by the order of Chinggis Qahan, the lord of the empire, have been given as an allotment to the lord Cha'adai Qahan so that they could follow him, he organized them and entrusted them to our ancestors to be governed.
>
> Since that time to the present, [our families], protected by the Heaven all the time, in the same manner as before, have been in charge. At present, if [the Emperor] gives a favour, at the moment when the foundations of the great empire, at high, conjoin so much, let the decree of Qahan decide, according to the customs, to send his ambassadors and messengers, to open the roads and highways for his merchants and traders, and to make the Prince (*ong*) Gunashiri endeavour to organize [his] passage via Qamil [= Hami] and [, by this measure, contribute to the organization of] the foundation of the great empire. Our memorial, we have written on the new eighth [day] of the first month in the winter of the dragon year when we were staying at Qala[= Qara]-del.[9]

[7] H. Serruys, "The Dates of the Mongolian Documents in the *Hua-i i-iü*," *HJAS*, 17 (1954), 419–427.

[8] Mostaert, *Le matériel mongol*, pp. 9, 25.

[9] Haenisch (*Sino-mongolische Dokumente*, pp. 14, 24) takes "Qala dele" as a place name, but Lewicki (*La langue mongole*, p. 142) thinks that the name was "Qala del," without -e which is an ending. Mostaert (*Le matériel mongole*, pp. 25, 87) concludes that the proper name of this place was "Qara-del."

Since the entire text is not long, it is not easy for us to have a firm grasp of the authors' real intention because the expressions are terse and the subject is abrupt. Nonetheless, we can extract the following points: (1) Namun and Engke Tura, the co-authors of the letter, inherited from their ancestors the right to govern the Mongol people whom Chinggis Khan had alloted to Chaghatai, (2) they wished to facilitate the comings and goings of envoys and merchants, thus to have political and economic relationships with Ming, (3) they hoped to secure the cooperation from the part of Emperor Hongwu so that Gunashiri Ong could come to their country by way of Hami, and finally (4) the letter was written on November 6, 1388 at the place called Qaradel. However, these facts are not sufficient for answering the questions raised earlier. In order to have the answers we need to know who these two chiefs were.

Fortunately, we know at least who Gunashiri was. His name appears in *Ming shilu* as "Wunashili."[10] He was one of the chiefs who followed Tögüs Temür, a ruler of the Northern Yüan. Tögüs Temür, having been utterly defeated in 1388 by the Ming expeditionary army led by General Lan Yu around the lake of Buyur Nor, took the flight to the Tula river but was killed there by a Mongol chief called Yesüder who allied with the Oirats. After the death of his lord, Gunashiri wandered somewhere in the west of Qaraqorum.[11] According to *Ming shilu* he was enfeofed as Weiwu Wang ("Prince of Weiwu") and was later renamed as Su Wang ("Prince of Su").[12] Based upon this report, P. Pelliot and J. Matsumura discovered that he was a descendant of Chaghatai's grandson, Chübei, and his family had hereditarily held a fief in the area of Kansu corridor with the titles of Pin Wang, Su Wang, or Weiwu Wang.[13]

[10] In Ming sources his name was also transcribed as "Hunashili," "Gunashili," "Nahuli," and so on. All these, of course, are trying to convey the sound of Gunashiri. See P. Pelliot, *Le Hōja et le Sayyid Husayn de l'Histoire des Ming* (Leiden, 1948), pp. 134–136, note 103.

[11] Sei Wada, *Tōashi kenkyū: Mōko hen* [A Study of East Asian History: Mongolia] (Tokyo, 1959), pp. 29–30, 40.

[12] *Ming Taizong shilu* (in the 6th month of the 2nd year of Yonglo; p. 0573); *Mingshi*, "Xiyu 1," p. 8511. For *Ming shilu* the facsimile edition of Honggechao (National Library of Peiping), published in 1968 in Taipei, was used here. As for *Mingshi*, the printed edition published by Zhonghua Press in 1976 was used.

[13] Pelliot, *Le Hōja*, pp. 134–136, note 103; Matsumura, "Mindai Hami ōke no kigen," *Tōyō gakuhō*, 93–4 (1957), 32–48.

With the help of this clue there was an attempt by a scholar, Juten Nagamoto, to trace the identities of Namun and Engke Tura. He, disagreeing with the contention of the Hsi-yü ch'uan ("Biography of the Western Region") in *Mingshi* ("Dynastic History of Ming") that Gunashiri had been ruling the Hami region from the last years of Yüan dynasty, argued that Gunashiri's fief must have been in Shazhou, the modern Dunhuang. He put the letter of Namun as its evidence. According to his assumption, "Qara Dele" is the combination of "black" (*qara*) and "Shazhou" (*dele*). In other words, Namun and Engke Tura who were living around Shazhou in the Kansu corridor had an intimate connection with Gunashiri who had a fief there, and they wrote that letter in order to invite him to come to his own domain so that the region would regain political stability.[14]

Although his assumption is extremely interesting, we cannot accept his conclusion as long as he does not present positive evidence that "Qara Dele" was actually Sha-chou.[15] However, as has been already pointed out by Haenisch, the name of the place was not "Qara Dele" but "Qara Del" because "-e" is a locative/dative ending in Mongolian.[16] Even if we disregard the advice of Haenisch and other scholars on this matter, no known dictionary proves that "Qara Dele" or "Dele" designates Sha-chou. On the contrary, a letter of Samandashiri contained in the same *Hua-I yiyu* calls Shazhou just as it was pronounced.[17]

Then, where was Qaradel? It seems futile to try to find such a place name in any historical map. So we would rather to take an indirect method: first to identify Namun and Engke Tura, and then to find a connection between Qaradel and the two chiefs. The letter states that the two chiefs inherited the right to supervise the Mongols who had been alloted to Chaghatai and calls their country "the great empire" (*yeke ulus*). It would be natural for us to assume that they were Mongol nobles somewhere in the realm of Chaghatai Khanate.[18]

[14] Juten Nagamoto, "Minsho no Hami ōke ni tsuite" [On the Hami Kingdom in the early Ming period], *Tōyōshi kenkyū*, 22–1 (1963), 15–18.

[15] He does not provide us any authority upon which his assertion was based. According to Mostaert's *Dictionnaire Ordos* (2nd ed., New York, 1968, p. 137), "dele" is used in the expression of "dele sula" which means "vague, sans connextion, tranger, qui n'a pas d'occupation, déterminées."

[16] See note 9.

[17] Mostaert, *Le matériel mongol*, p. 9.

[18] Haenisch also pointed out that the letter came "from the land of Chaghatay, Inner Asia." *Sino-mongolische Dokumente*, p. 19.

However, in the year of 1388, when the letter was composed, a unified Chaghatai Khanate factually ceased to exist. The hegemony over its western half was taken by Temür or Tamerlane and its eastern half was divided by various Moghul tribes because of internal disorder. If Namun and Engke Tura were in the former domain of the Chaghatai Khanate, they must have been active in either of the two parts. Wherever they were, Timurid historical sources are the only contemporary reports from which we can anticipate some detailed informations on the events in Central Asia.

The best known and also the most detailed contemporary sources are two *Ẓafar-nāmas*: one was written by Niẓām al-Dīn Shāmī in A.H. 806 (1403–04) and dedicated to Temür himself,[19] and the other was compiled by Sharaf al-Dīn ʿAlī Yazdī in A.H. 828 (1424–25) who, based on Shāmī's work, consulted with other official documents and personal memos as well.[20] To our surprise, both of these two works mention a Moghul tribal chief called Ankā Tūrā. His name was written differently according to pages or manuscripts: Īnkā Tūrā, Īnk Tūrā, Īnke Tūrā, Ank Tūrā, Ankā Tūrā, Ankū Tūrā, and so on.[21] In spite of these wide variations, there is no doubt that all these try to render the name of Engke Tura. In the above-mentioned sources he appears on two occasions: in February of 1387 when he raided the borders of Transoxania, Temür's domain, and in 1389 when Temür sent expeditionary army to crush him. Let us, for a moment, postpone a more detailed description of his clash with Temür to the following chapter and stick to the task of identification of Engke Tura and Namun.

Is it possible to regard Engke Tura in two *Ẓafar-nāmas* and Engke Tura in *Hua-I yiyu* as one and the same person? Of course, it would be possible since it is not the kind of name that we often encounter among Mongol personal names.[22] Moreover, the two "Engke Turas"

[19] I used F. Tauer's critical edition (*Histoire des conquêtes de Tamerlan intitulée Ẓafarnāma*, vol. 1: Texte Persan du Ẓafarnāma, [Prague, 1937]). Hereafter, this will be called ZNS.

[20] *Ẓafar-nāma* by Yazdī (2 vols., Tehran, 1957). Hereafter, ZNY.

[21] Tauer, *Histoire des conquêtes de Tamerlan intitulée Ẓafarnāma*, vol. 2: Introduction, Commetaire, Index (Prague, 1956), p. 212.

[22] Engke means in Mongolian "peace." See O. Kowalewski, *Dictionnaire Mongol-russe-français* (vol. 1, Kazan, 1844), p. 173. On the word *tura* (or *törü, törä, töre*), meaning "law, government," see G. Doerfer, *Türkische und mongolische Elemente im Neupersischen* (vol. 1: *Mongolische Elemente im Neupersischen* [Wiesbaden, 1963]), pp. 264–267; Mostaert, *Dictionnaire*, p. 674.

are chronologically almost identical: one was active in 1387–1389 and the other wrote the letter in 1388. Nevertheless, these are not sufficient. We still need more concrete proofs in order to ascertain our assumption.

In this sense, the following statement in *Muntakhab al-tawārīkh-i Mu'īnī* written by Mu'īn al-Dīn Naṭanzī[23] is decisive.

> After Sulṭān Ghāzī [= Temür] had crushed Qamar al-Dīn at Sangir Yighāj and turned his state (*il*) and people (*ulus*) into like threads and snakes, he came back. Khiḍr Khwāja Oghlān, taking advantage of this opportunity, held a firm grip over the Moghul people (*Moghūl ulus*). He sent messengers to the court [of Temür] and in the manner of submission tied himself to the saddle-strap of His Highness Sulṭān Ghāzī. When [Khiḍr Khwāja Oghlān] felt secure from the threat of the victorious army, he stretched the hands of oppression over the mass of [Moghul] people and subjected those who were disobedient. However, Khiḍr Shāh and Yūsuf Shāh, who were wolves of that steppe and leopards of that forest, always wanted the tumult of the people to be calm down, and *ānke tūrā* and *nāmūs* were in the same direction.[24]

From the context, the two words, *ānke tūrā* and *nāmūs* correspond to Khiḍr Shāh and Yūsuf Shāh and seem to be personal names. If it is so, there is no doubt that the first name is Ankā Tūrā in the Timurid sources. Then, who is Nāmūs? Is this a misspelling of Nāmūn?

Naṭanẓī completed his work and dedicated to a lord of Fārs, Iskandar Sulṭān b. 'Umar Shaykh b. Temür in A.H. 816 (A.D. 1413–14). After Iskandar was expelled by Shāhrukh b. Temür, Naṭanzī cut off the part containing eulogy of Iskandar and dedicated a new version to Shāhrukh in 817 (1414). There are three important copies: (a) London MS. copied in 1463 (Or. 1566 at British Library), (b) Leningrad MS. copied in 1497 (C. 381 at the Leningrad Branch of Institut Vostokovedeniia Akademii Nauk), and (c) Paris MS. whose date of copying is not known (Suppl. Pers. 1651 at Bibliothèque Nationale). Of these three manuscripts, the first two are almost identical even repeating the same mistakes. Probably they were copied from an original version dedicated to Iskandar. On the other hand, the Paris MS. is much shorter and lacks the eulogy of Iskandar, which means it was copied from the new version.[25]

The English translation quoted above is based on the printed

[23] J. Aubin (ed.), *Extraits du Muntakhab al-tawarikh-i Mu'ini (Anonyme d'Iskandar)* (Tehran, 1957).
[24] *Muntakhab*, p. 131.
[25] *Materialy po istorii Kirgizov i Kirgizii*, vol. 1 (Moskva, 1973), pp. 112–113.

edition by J. Aubin who utilized basically the London and the Paris MSS. but took the latter as his "basic text."[26] The word *nāmūs* seems to have been taken from the Paris MS. since he appended a note that the London MS. has *nāmūn* instead of *nāmūs*.[27] Moreover, the Leningrad MS. also clearly writes *nāmūn*.[28] Then we should, as pointed out above, naturally follow the two earlier and more complete versions. In the Arabic script, *nūn* (n) and *sīn* (s) can easily be confused when they were written quickly. It is highly probable that the copist of the Paris MS. was mistaken because the word was completely unknown to him. Therefore, the word *nāmūs* should be corrected as *nāmūn*, and there can be no doubt that *ānke tūrā* and *nāmūn* are Engke Tura and Namun who wrote a letter to Emperor Hongwu.

However, if one does not realize the two words, *ānke tūrā* and *nāmūn*, are personal names, it is easy to make a mistake either in copying or translating these words. As was shown in J. Aubin's edition, the name of Engke Tura was spelled in various forms somewhere else in Naṭanzī's work, but not as *ānke*.[29] This form, with ā (*alif madda*), can confuse readers as if the word is the combination of *ān* + *ke* which means "that which." A well-known Russian scholar, O.F. Akimushkin, was also misled by this. He translated the passage as follows: "custom and law were on the same direction." Apparently he regarded *tūrā* and *nāmūn* as representing the Mongol words *tura* and *nomun*.[30]

From the analysis of the Timurid sources, we are certain that Engke Tura and Namun were Moghul chiefs who fought against Temür. Still there remains one more question: Where was Qaradel? Considering that Namun's letter was written at the end of November, Qaradel must have been the area where their *qishlaq* ("winter quarters") was found and where the two chiefs were active. Let us check again the Timurid sources. Yazdī reports numerous place names, many of them still unidentified, when Temür's expeditionary army marched against Engke Tura who was fleeing from his base. However, some of them can be identified such as Ayaghuz, Qara Guchur, Shibartu and Ala Köl.[31] All these were situated in the area of Semirechye to

[26] See J. Aubin's "Forword" in *Muntakhab*.
[27] *Ibid.*, p. 131.
[28] *Materialy po istorii Kirgizov*, p. 120, note 69.
[29] *Muntakhab*, p. 338.
[30] *Materialy po istorii Kirgizov*, p. 120.
[31] On Ayaghuz, see V.V. Bartol'd, *Ocherki istorii Semirech'ia* (*Sochineniia*, vol. 2, pt. 1

the south of the Lake Balkhash, which means that the main arena of Engke Tura's activity was in that area.

Fortunately, we can find a more specific mention in Yazdī's work which reads that Engke Tura's *yurt* ("pasture") was "Qarā Tāl."[32] Qara Tal, meaning "black steppe" in Mongolian, is one of the seven rivers (thus named Semirechye) flowing into Lake Balkhash and also designates the steppe in its vicinity.[33] This place was a favourite winter camping ground among the Central Asian nomads. For example, at the beginning of the sixteenth century, a Qazaq chief made Qara Tal his winter quarters.[34] Therefore, we may be justified to ask about the relation between Qara Tal in Yazdī who reported it was Engke Tura's "yurt" and Qaradel where Engke Tura and Namun wrote a letter.

There can be no doubt that the letter was originally written in Uighur script as testified by numerous documents drawn up by the Moghuls at that time.[35] In the Uighur scripts there is no difference between the back vowel *a* and the front vowel *e*.[36] In the meantime, although *t* and *d* had different characters, sometimes they were indistinguishable. For example, when one writes a proper noun like "Bai Temür" or "Tugh Temür" in two separate words, *t* is clearly marked. However, when it is written in liason, the character *d*, instead of *t*, is used. So they become "Baidemür" and "Tughdemür."[37] It seems that this is what happened in the case of Qara Tal. If it was written in liason, there is no way to confirm whether its real sound is *qaratal*, *qaratel*, *qaradal*, or *qaradel* as far as one does not know that place. In other words, in the original letter this place must have been written as *q'r'd'l*, and compliers of *Hua-I yiyu* who were not familiar with Central Asian topography decided to transcribe it as "qaradel." However, his decision could be justified because the word makes a perfect sense meaning "black mane."[38]

Now, the questions which were raised at the beginning in relation with Namun's letter were answered. First of all, Namun and Engke Tura who sent a letter to Hongwu were Moghul chiefs active in Central Asia during the 1380s, and they were powerful enough to make Temür launch large-scale expeditions. Their letter was written at Qara Tal, not Qaradel, in Semirechye where their winter quarters were located. With these new findings in mind we should now ask why they sent such a letter to Emperor Hongwu, and in order to answer this question we should turn our attention to the early history of the Moghul Khanate.

2. *Qamar al-Dīn's Revolt*

In the year of 1365 a certain Qamar al-Dīn, a chief of Dughlat tribe, revolted and, having killed Ilyās Khwāja Khān who was the successor of Tughluq Temür, proclaimed himself khan. His action could not be approved by many nomadic chiefs in the Moghul Khanate, so it resulted in extreme internal disorder lasting almost a quarter of a century and provided Temür, who had just succeeded in taking hold of Transoxania, a good opportunity to subjugate the Moghul nomads. If it had not been for Qamar al-Dīn's revolt and the subsequent civil wars in the Moghul Khanate, the rise and success of Temür might have been much slower and less brilliant if not impossible. In this sense, Qamar al-Dīn's revolt is a significant event in medieval Central Asian history. The author of *Tārīkh-i rashīdī* gives the following explanation about why he revolted.

> After Amīr Tūlik's death, the office of *ulusbegi* was given to Amīr Būlājī, and when this latter followed his brother to the dwelling of eternity, the office of *ulusbegi* devolved upon his son Amīr Khudāīdād. But Amīr Qamar al-Dīn, going down on his knees before the [Tughluq Temür] Khan, said to him: "The office of my brother should first come to me, for his son is only seven years of age and is not fit for the duties attached to the position." Tughluq Temür would not pay any attention to him, but appointed the then seven-year-old Amīr Khudāīdād

[Moscow, 1963]), p. 82; *Istoriia kul'turnoi zhizni Turkestana* (*Ibid.*), p. 320, note 3. On Qara Guchur, see *Materialy po istorii Russko-mongol'skoi otnoshenii 1635–1654* (Moscow, 1974), p. 402; on Shibartu, *Xiyu tuzhi* (compiled during the Ch'ien-lung reign of the Ch'ing dynasty; reprinted in Taipei, 1970), vol. XI, 17v; on Ala Köl, Pishchulina, *Iugo-vostochnyi Kazakhstana*, pp. 74–76; *Materialy po istorii Kirgizov*, p. 137.

[32] ZNY, I, 354.

[33] TR also writes "Qarā Tāl." See Ross tr., p. 274 and note 2. Also *cf.* the manuscript in British Library (Or. 157), 205v. There is another place called Qara Dal mentioned in *Yuanzhao bishi* (§ 197), but from the context, it is clear that it is located not in Semirechye but in Mongolia proper.

[34] TR/Ross, p. 274.

[35] L. Ligeti, *Monuments préclassiques* (vol. I: XIII^{e} et XIV^{e} siècles [Budapest, 1972]), pp. 6, 208–237.

[36] A. von Gabain, *Alttürkische Grammatik* (Wiesbaden, 1974), p. 17.

[37] W. Radloff, *Uigurische Sprachdenkmäler* (Leningrad, 1928), p. 72.

[38] The compilers of *Hua-I yiyu* employed the word *del* in that meaning. See Mostaert, *Le matériel mongol*, p. 49. Also consult Kowalewski, III, 1716.

> to the office. Qamar al-Dīn was a violent man, and was angry at being superseded by a child of seven; but he could do nothing. When, subsequently, the Khan died he revolted.[39]

Thus Qamar al-Dīn killed eighteen princes (*khānzāda*) in a single day and took the title of khanship (*ism-i khāniyyat*). The sources are not in agreement about when exactly he revolted: some state that he killed Ilyās Khwāja Khan and revolted, but others write that he took action only after the death of Ilyās Khwāja Khan.[40] Whatever the truth is, it is clear that his action was caused by his discontent at not being nominated to *ulusbegi* by Tughluq Temür Khan. Why did the Khan not approve Qamar al-Dīn's request but, instead, appoint only a seven-year old child to the post of *ulusbegi*?

The Khan's decision was congruent with his policy of centralization. He had been enthroned in 1347–48 with the help of Amīr Būlājī, a Dughlat chief, which means that his monarchical power had a serious limitation from inception. The tribe of Dughlat was the most powerful of all the Moghul tribes and the title of *ulusbegi* which was conferred upon its chief was regarded as the representative of all the Moghul tribal chiefs.[41] The power basis of the Dughlats stemmed from their monopoly over the oasis cities in the Tarim Basin, called Mangalay Sübe[42] at that time. Although such a monopoly does not seem to have been established from the time of Chinggis Khan or his son Chaghatai as the author of *Tārīkh-i rashīdī*, a

[39] TR/Ross, p. 38 (TR/Or 157, 30r–30v).

[40] Pishchulina, *Iugo-vostochnyi Kazakhstan*, pp. 58–60.

[41] TR/Ross, pp. 54–56.

[42] According to manuscripts of TR this word was written variously Mangalāī Sübe, Mangalāī Sübā, Mangalāī Sübe, Mangalāī Sübā, etc. Mīrzā Ḥaydar, the author of TR, writes that Chaghatai entrusted a part of his domain, called Mangalāī Sübe, to a chief of the Dughlats, and that the term Mangalāī Sübe is the equivalent of *aftāb rū*, or "sun-faced." Ross reads the word as "Mangalāī Sūyah" and N. Elias gives a long note trying to interpret this term, but he failed to clarify the meaning. I propose to read this word as Mangalāī Sübe since it represents the Mongolian words *mangalay sübe*. *Mangalay* means "front," and *sübe* means "eye of a needle, narrow passage, strategic point." In *Yuanzhao bishi* (§ 240) we find a word *sübe*, which has the meaning of "pass" (*kouzi*). In Rashīd al-Dīn's *Jāmiʿ al-tawārīkh*, the word *sübe* was used several times (see J.A. Boyle, *The Successors of Genghis Khan* [New York, 1971], pp. 299, 326), and its meaning can be rendered as "pass, strategic point." I think "Mangalāī Sübe" in TR literally means "strategic point(s) in the front." Since the main domain of Chaghatai was in the steppe to the north of T'ien-shan (i.e., Moghulistan), Mangalāī Sübe corresponded to the south of Moghulistan i.e., Tarim Basin). This was exactly what Mīrzā Muḥammad meant when he used the term Mangalāī Sübe.

Dughlat, asserts,[43] their domination over that area was firmly consolidated at least by the middle of the fourteenth century. With this power basis the Dughlat chief Būlājī was able to put up Tughluq Temür as khan when Qazān Khan was killed by Qazaghan, chief of the Qara'unas tribe. However, the Dughlat was not the only tribe in Moghulistan, though it was the most powerful. There were other tribes which played significant roles, as testified later in Tughluq Temür's invasion of Transoxania. In this sense, the Moghul Khanate was, from the start, a tribal confederacy made up of several large tribes such as the Dughlat, the Begchik, the Kereyit, the Qangghali, the Bahrin, the Erkenüt, and others.[44] When Būlājī enthroned Tughluq Temür, he had to obtain aid from other tribal chiefs. However, these tribes did not always agree. Rather it would be correct for us to say that they were tied with mutual checks and balances, upon which the political power of khan lay. Therefore, if Tughluq Temür who owed his khanship to the Dughlat chief and other tribal leaders hoped to achieve the consolidation of his power, it was necessary for him not only to break the hegemony of the Dughlats but also to eliminate the centrifugal tendency of these tribes. When he invaded Transoxania in 1360, he was already a powerful monarch having numerous tribal armies under his command. Although we do not have detailed informations, we can have at least a glimpse, through the *Tārīkh-i rashīdī*, about how he achieved his aim.

The first measure which he took to strengthen his power was conversion to Islam. His conversion was regarded as a decisive moment for the expansion of Islam in Central Asia not only by medieval Muslim historians but also by modern scholars.[45] It was the work of two sufi saints, Jamāl al-Dīn and his son Arshad al-Dīn from the town of Lop-Katak, who persuaded Tughluq Temür to embrace Islam. Their descendants exercised strong influence in the court of the Moghul khans and formed a *ṭarīqa* ("path") called Katakī. This local *ṭarīqa* was later divided into two branches based on Kucha in

[43] The skepticism is almost unanimous among scholars. See Pischulina, *Iugo-vostochnyi Kazakhstana*, p. 45; E. Mano, "Moghūlistān" (*Acta Asiatica*, 34 [1978]), 49–50; Liu Yingsheng, "Chahetai Hanguo de fenlie" [The disintegration of the Chaghatai Khanate], *Xinjiang Shehui kexue*, 1985, no. 5, pp. 103–104.

[44] For a detailed analysis of the tribal composition and its changes, see Mano's "Moghūlistān."

[45] TR/Ross, p. 15; R. Grousset, *The Empire of the Steppes*, tr. by N. Walford (New Brunswick, 1970), pp. 344–345.

the west and on Turfan in the east. Around the beginning of the sixteenth century some of the members belonging to the latter branch joined the Naqshbandiyya, which were more influential and better known in Central Asia, and became themselves Naqshbandīs, while the western branch fiercely opposed to this new force in order to keep their religious as well as secular interests in Eastern Turkestan. Although the Katakīs did not succeed after all in keeping their influence, their role in converting Tughluq Temür Khan and in expanding Islam among the nomadic Moghuls and sedentary Uighurs should not be underestimated.[46]

In addition to the expansion of Islam, the conversion of Tughluq Temür was significant in terms of strengthening his monarchical power as well. At first, Tughluq Temür who owed his khanship to tribal chiefs could not single-handedly order warlike nomads to discard their traditional customs and accept a new religion, so he decided to "interview the princes one by one" in his tent and to kill those who refused as "heathens and idolaters."[47] In other words, he could not proclaim his conversion in public and force the nomads to follow his step because he was worried about their opposition. His worry was not unfounded: a certain Churās, who later became the eponymous ancestor of the Churās tribe, refused to follow the Khan's example. Only after Arshad al-Dīn showed his "miraculous power" by striking down a champion of wrestling, could Churās be persuaded, and 160,000 nomads became Muslims in one day.[48] The story sounds like a fairy tale and we do not have to believe all its detail. However, what this story symbolically means is apparent: Tughluq Temür faced strong opposition from at least some members of tribal peoples but succeeded in overcoming it.

By the adoption of Islam Tughluq Temür who had started as a nominal ruler could arm himself and his followers with an ideology which facilitated internal consolidation and outward expansion. Islam provided nomadic tribal people with the consciousness of a homogeneous religious community (*umma*) and religious sanction for the wars for the expansion of the domain of Islam (*jihād*), which certainly

[46] For more detail on the Katakī order, consult my paper "Muslim Saints in the 14th to the 16th Centuries of Eastern Turkestan" in *International Journal of Central Asian Studies*, vol. 1 (Seoul, 1996), pp. 285–322.
[47] TR/Ross, p. 14.
[48] TR/Ross, pp. 14–15.

contributed to checking their centrifugal tendency. In that sense, Islam became an ideology of unification as well as an ideology of expansion. Chronology also confirms this assumption: Tughluq Temür became khan in 1347–48, converted to Islam in 1354, and started the western expedition in 1360. By that time his army was invincible and he was no more a nominal ruler but a mighty conqueror.

However, religion alone was not enough. In order to strengthen his power Tughluq Temür needed to weaken the most powerful tribe in the Khanate, the Dughlat, and this could not be achieved without intervening in intra-tribal politics. A tribe in Central Asian history has not always been a unified actor against outer forces. We can hardly find the cases of "segmentary opposition," as described by Evans-Pritchard in the case of African tribes, in its ideal type. There were not a few factors which caused internal dissension within a tribe, and opposing parties frequently chose different partners outside, sometimes in other tribes and other times among opposing candidates to the khanship. One of the most sensitive factors was the question of succession: in other words, who should be a new tribal leader. This was exactly what happened in the Dughlat when Būlājī had died. The younger brother of the deceased chief, Qamar al-Dīn wanted himself to be the successor, but, faced with internal opposition, turned for help to the supra-tribal leader, Tughluq Temür Khan. He, however, failed to gain support from the Khan who did not see it as in his interests to support the ambitious Qamar al-Dīn. So he backed a seven-year old child who would have a very difficult time in succeeding to his father's title without his endorsement and whom he could easily manipulate. Apparently the Khan regarded his intervention in the succession struggle of the Dughlats as the best opportunity to strengthen his control over this powerful tribe. However, his intervention was ultimately unsuccessful: as soon as he died and his successor Ilyās Khwāja's Transoxanian expedition ended in disaster, Qamar al-Dīn revolted.[49]

The revolt of Qamar al-Dīn instantly touched off strong opposition from other tribal leaders. The chiefs of the Kereyits, Kūmza and Uzbek Temür, fled to Transoxania under the protection of Temür, and Ḥājjī Beg of the Erkenüt tribe chose a military confrontation.[50] The reason why Qamar al-Dīn failed to obtain support from the

[49] TR/Ross, pp. 38–39.
[50] TR/Ross, pp. 39, 41.

other Moghul tribes is not hard to understand. He did not have any way of justifying his action. Since the establishment of the Mongol Empire, nobody had questioned the charismatic authority of the Chinggisids who were called the "Golden Clan" (*altan uruq*). It was an unanimously accepted rule that nobody except the Chinggisids could be called khan. Qamar al-Dīn was probably the first who is known to have attempted to break this rule and failed. Later we find similar cases in Esen of the Oirats and Galdan of the Junghars all of whom met the same fate. Temür was wise enough to call himself just "Son-in-Law" (*güregen*). Mu'īn al-Dīn Naṭanzī conveys in the following words how the contemporaries felt about the charisma of the "Golden Clan": "One year after his (= Ilyās Khwāja) enthronement all the important decisions in the country were in the hands of powerful chiefs, and everybody was fearful of everybody. However, since there were the seeds of Chinggis Khan, nobody wanted to submit himself to commoners (*qarachu*)."[51] In these circumstances it is fairly predictable what kind of reaction the behaviour of Qamar al-Dīn, a *qarachu*, who killed a Chinggisid and called himself khan would have caused. "Tribal chiefs, if possible, without a single exception, allied with each other and opposed to him,"[52] so "Moghulistan was engulfed with confusion."[53]

Opposition to Qamar al-Dīn was not limited to non-Dughlat tribes. He was also opposed by his own tribal members. For example, Khudāīdād's mother, Mīrak Āghā, saved and hid one of Tughluq Temür's son named Khiḍr Khwāja so that Qamar al-Dīn could not lay his hand upon him.[54] The reason why he could not mobilize the full support even from his tribal members was because at the bottom of all these turmoil lay the question of intra-tribal succession struggle. Many scholars noticed succession struggles on the supra-tribal level, that is, who should be the next khan, but few paid attention to the

[51] *Muntakhab*, p. 125.

[52] Maḥmūd b. Walī, *Bahr al-asrar fī manāqib al-akhiyār* (cited from Pishchulina's *Iugo-vostochnyi Kazakhstan*, p. 60).

[53] TR/Ross, p. 39.

[54] TR/Ross, pp. 51–52. Mīrzā Ḥaydar wrote her name as Mīr Āghā (*cf.* Or. 157, 41r) while 'Abd al-Razzaq Samarqandī wrote Amīrā Āghā (*Materialy po istorii kirgizov*, p. 154). However, according to Naṭanzī who left the most detailed report about her, the name was Mīrak Āghā (*Muntakhab*, pp. 130, 418) and she was Khiḍr Khwāja's *atabeg*. *Atabeg* was a title given to guardians of princes. On this title, see Pishchulina, *Iugo-vostochnyi Kazakhstan*, p. 199; R.A. Arat, *Vekai: Babur'un hatirati*, vol. II (Ankara, 1946), pp. 579–581.

same kind of disputes on the intra-tribal level, that is, who should be the next chief of a tribe. The History of the Dughlats,[55] as described in *Tārīkh-i rashīdī*, provides a rare example which permits us to look into what happened on the tribal level. This unique source covers altogether seven generations of the family of Dughlat chiefs, about two hundred years from the mid-fourteenth to the mid-sixteenth century, and shows who succeeded whom as chiefs of the tribe. A detailed analysis leaves no doubt that there was hardly any succession which was free from internal disputes. Sometimes the disputes resulted in genocidal bloodshed, and other times the disputes within the Dughlat developed into civil wars involving the entire Khanate as we observe in the revolt of Qamar al-Dīn. Another good example is the rebellion of Abā [*sic*] Bakr who took the western part of Kashgharia for about 35 years (1479/80–1514) fiercely fighting with his Dughlat opponents and khans who allied with them.[56] "Bloody tanistry," a term which J. Fletcher used to describe succession struggles on the supra-tribal level in the Turco-Mongol tradition,[57] can also be applied to the intra-tribal level which shows almost exactly the same phenomenon. However, we should not forget that those two levels were not separated. Tribal politics in a nomadic state, which usually took the form of a tribal confederacy, were all-embracing. Generally speaking, what happened on the intra-tribal level was not solved by itself but was usually connected to the inter-tribal as well as the supra-tribal dimension. Sometimes it involved with the extra-tribal forces. In this sense, B.F. Manz made an important observation when she analyzed the process of Temür's rise to power. The dynamics of tribal politics which, according to her, cover "the relationships within tribes, among tribes, and between tribes and a supra-tribal leader"[58] can also be found in the Moghul Khanate. The case of Qamar al-Dīn's revolt is one of the classic examples—it was caused by the succession disputes within the Dughlat tribe but developed into the massacre of the khan and his family as well as into the civil

[55] A general description of the Dughlat tribe can be found in Bartol'd's "Duglat" in his *Sochineniia*, vol. V (Moscow, 1968), pp. 529–533.

[56] On the succession struggles over the khanship as well as inside the Dughlat tribe, see my article "Jon'gi Mogul Hangug eui gyesung bunjaeng eul tonghae bon yumogjog bujog jongchi eui tugjing" [Succession Struggle and Tribal Politics in the Former Moghul Khanate], *Dongyang sahak yongu*, 33 (1990), 63–100.

[57] "Turco-Mongolian Monarchic Tradition in the Ottoman Empire," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, 3–4 (1979–80), 236–241.

[58] *The rise and rule of Tamerlane*, p. 30.

war involving most of the Moghul tribes. Then it invited the intervention of outside force. Temür's invasion of Moghulistan started with this background.

In A.H. 773 (1371–72) Temür made a "preliminary" raid against the Moghuls reaching only to the place called Sangir Ighachi to the southwest of Lake Issik Kul.[59] He launched a large scale expedition again in 776 (1375) to break the power of Qamar al-Dīn. His army, passing through Sairam, marched to Semirechye deep into Moghulistan, and Qamar al-Dīn fled toward the shores of the Ili river evading a head-on collision with the enemy. However, he was attacked by the pursuing army of Temür and ran away to Uch (= Ush Turfan). To search for Qamar al-Dīn's whereabouts, Temür dispatched his son Jahāngīr, who came back, without having found him, after taking prisoner a number of Moghul nomads and the family of Qamar al-Dīn's brother, Shams al-Dīn.[60] Next year, Temür sent another army of thirty thousand commanded by Sar Bugu Qipchaq and ʿĀdil Shāh Jalayr so that they could find and kill Qamar al-Dīn by any means. Nevertheless, Sar Bugu, having heard that Temür had departed for the expedition to Khwārazm, revolted and fled to Urus Khan in the Qipchaq steppe. Later he, in alliance with Qamar al-Dīn, attacked Andijan. At this alarming news Temür turned back his army from Khwārazm and began to pursue Qamar al-Dīn. The result was disastrous: he was ambushed by enemies four thousand strong at Atbashi and came back to his home barely saving his life "with the help of heaven."[61]

In the following year, 1377, Temür again sent to Moghulistan his son ʿUmar Shaykh, who met Qamar al-Dīn's army at the plain of Quratu and was engaged in a pitched battle. This time Qamar al-Dīn was utterly defeated and could not but flee. After the victorious army returned, Temür took the command of the expeditionary army for himself and followed the fleeing Qamar al-Dīn. The advance troops (*mangalay*) reached as far as Bugham in the vicinity of Lake Issik Kul where they delivered another crushing defeat to Qamar

[59] Pishchulina, *Iugo-vostochnyi Kazakhstan*, pp. 63–65.
[60] ZNY, I, 188–191. According to TR/Ross (pp. 41–42) those who were taken as prisoners were Qamar al-Dīn's wife Tūmān Āghā and his daughter Dilshād Āghā. However, this is a mistake of Ross. See TR/Or. 157, 33v; ZNY, I, 190 (in Yazdī, her name is not Tūmān Āghā, but Būyān Āghā or Tūyān Āghā).
[61] ZNY, I, 194–199; TR/Ross, pp. 44–47.

al-Dīn.[62] After he returned home, he dispatched another army in 1383 to trace Qamar al-Dīn, but in vain.[63] Thus the successive expeditions of Temür against Qamar al-Dīn which lasted more than a decade brought about the complete destruction of Qamar al-Dīn's power, and as a result there arose new candidates vying for the takeover of the hegemony over the Moghul Khanate. One of these candidates was Engke Tura who sent a letter to Emperor Hongwu in 1388.

3. *In Search of a Khan*

Temür's expedition against Moghulistan caused a change of power balance and a restructuring of tribal composition. Many of the tribes which had been active and powerful during the second half of the fourteenth century when Tughluq Temür had invaded Transoxania lost their significance. A study of the *Tārīkh-i rashīdī* shows that, around the beginning of the sixteenth century, the Dukhtuy, the Barlas, the Barqi and the Ordubegi formed the Left Wing (*javānghār*), and the Itärchi, the Könchi, the Churas and the Begchik formed the Right Wing (*barānghār*), and the Dughlat and Khan formed the Center (*ghol*). Of these tribes the Barqi, the Ordubegi, the Itärchi, the Könchi, the Begchik and the Churas did not exist during the reign of Tughluq Temür.[64] On the contrary, the Qarluqut, the Qangghali, the Bulghachi, and the Erkenüt which had been active were not found in the above list. Although we can think of several factors that caused this fundamental change in the structure of the Moghul tribal confederacy, such as contribution to the enthronement of a khan or massive migration of tribal people, the war with Temür seems to have been decisive.

Soon after the expulsion of Qamar al-Dīn there appeared two powerful chiefs among the Moghuls. One was Khudāīdād of the Dughlats who had been only seven years of age when Qamar al-Dīn revolted but was now grown up and commanded the Dughlat tribe, with the help of his mother Mīrak Āghā, instead of his ambitious uncle; the other was Engke Tura of the Erkenüt. According to the record of Yazdī, Engke Tura was a nephew (*barādarzāda*) of Ḥājjī Beg who had been a chief of the Erkenüt during the reigns of Tughluq

[62] ZNY, I, 201–204; TR/Ross, pp. 48–50.
[63] ZNY, I, 261.
[64] E. Mano, "Moghūlistān," p. 57.

Temür and Ilyās Khwāja.[65] As far as we can check, there was a certain Tughluq Khwāja who was the brother of Ḥājjī Beg.[66] He may have been Engke Tura's father, though we cannot be certain. Nonetheless, the one who succeeded the post of tribal chief after the death of Ḥājjī Beg was not his son Ängirchāq but his nephew Engke Tura.[67]

Engke Tura, after the fall of Qamar al-Dīn, tried to rally the support of the Moghul tribes and resist the invasions of Temür. The first instance in which he is recorded in the primary sources is in February of 1387 when he raided the town of Andugan (= Andijan) that had been incorporated within the territory of Temür. He laid siege to that town, pushing 'Umar Shaykh who was defending it very hard, but when Temür's support army arrived he withdrew to Moghulistan.[68] We can surmise the strength of Engke Tura from the report of Naṭanzī that his force numbered about twenty thousand.[69] To Temür he was a new threat which had to be eliminated by all means. Thus, the largest and the last campaign of Temür against Moghulistan was inevitable and it took place in 1389. His decision was also motivated by the formation of an anti-Temür front at that moment. Qamar al-Dīn reappeared in the Qipchaq steppe and in alliance with Toqtamish, the new leader of the Golden Horde, began to threaten the Syr Darya frontiers. This new threat was almost synchronic with Engke Tura's attack on Andugan in 1387.[70] Temür

[65] Ḥājjī Beg was one of the commanders who participated in Tughluq Temür's expedition of Transoxania, and he also commanded the left wing of Ilyās Khwāja's amry. See ZNY, I, 15, 79. K.I. Petrov was misled by the author of *Majmū' al-tawārīkh*, Sayf al-Dīn Akhsīkentī, and regarded Engke Tura as a legendary hero of the Qirghiz tribe who fought against Temür. According to him, Engke Tura's real name is Bai Murat Cherik and "engke" represented his title "inak." However, as Bartol'd already pointed out, Sayf al-Dīn's work contains a number of historically unfounded stories. Pishchulina also could not agree with Petrov's interpretation. See *Istoriia Kirgizskoi SSR*, vol. I (Frunze, 1984), pp. 398–400; *Materialy po istorii Kirgizov*, pp. 200–209; Pishchulina, *Iugo-vostochnyi Kazakhstan*, p. 71.

[66] ZNY, I, 64.

[67] According to ZNS (I, 30) and ZNY (I, 83), Ängirchāq commanded the advanced troops of Ilyās Khwāja's army.

[68] Shamī's description of this event is basically same with Yazdī's except that it was Uzgend, not Andugan, which was besieged. Both Uzgend and Andugan were located on the upper Syr Darya, and they were geographically very close. Therefore, the area which became the target of Engke Tura's attack seems to have been the northeastern frontiers of Transoxania such as Uzgend, Andugan, Tashkent, Sairam, and others. *Cf.* ZNS, I, 106–107; ZNY, I, 318–320.

[69] *Muntakhab*, p. 338 (*Materialy po istorii Kirgizov*, p. 125). *Cf.* ZNY (I, 318–319).

[70] Pishchulina, *Iugo-vostochnyi Kazakhstan*, pp. 70–72.

must have felt encircled by hostile powers in the north and in the east which were mustering formidable nomadic cavalry troops. He determined to strike first the Moghuls led by Engke Tura and then Toqtamish of the Golden Horde.[71]

All the political circumstances surrounding Central Asia in 1388, described above, were leading toward an imminent and full scale attack by Temür against Moghulistan. On the other hand, the internal situation of Moghulistan was sadly inappropriate to meet such an attack. Tribal people had been killed and dispersed because of civil wars and Temür's incessant invasions, and the tribes could not make a concerted resistance against the outside threat. Moreover, for more than two decades since the assassination of Ilyās Khwāja Khan there had been no khan. In order to rally the Moghul tribes, therefore, the first thing they needed to do was to put up a khan as a symbol of political unification. Neither Khudāīdād nor Engke Tura could claim to be a khan, but they could become a king-maker. So they had to find and invite one of the Chinggisids, and it was extremely important to take the initiative in this matter because the timing would decide their own future political career as well as the fate of their tribes.

Khudāīdād and Engke Tura found two different candidates. The former searched for Khiḍr Khwāja who was the only survivor among Tughluq Temür's sons and had been hidden by Khudāīdād's mother twenty-five years ago.[72] Engke Tura had no such luck but heard that a certain Gunashiri, a descendant of Chaghatai, was wandering in Northern Mongolia. So Engke Tura decided to invite him and sent a letter, jointly signed with Namun who had the prestigious title of "Son-in-Law" and ought be duly appreciated by the Ming court, to Hongwu to facilitate his coming to Moghulistan. It was not a mere coincidence that the action of those two chiefs, Khudāīdād and Engke Tura, were almost simultaneous. Khiḍr Khwāja began to appear as khan in the sources from 1389, and it was the winter of 1388 when Engke Tura wrote his letter of invitation. However, Gunashiri could not come to Moghulistan but, as later history tells us, became the founder of Hami Kingdom. What happened to him and why did he stop in Hami?

The reason was Temür's invasion of Moghulistan in 1389 and the

[71] ZNY, I, 337.

[72] TR/Ross, pp. 51–52.

defeat of Engke Tura. Temür himself took command of 120 thousand troops and launched a full scale attack against the nomadic people belonging to Engke Tura in Semirechye to the south of Balkhash. His army then proceeded to Ulan Charliq where they encountered and defeated the tribe of Bahrin. Temür obtained information from prisoners that Engke Tura was staying at the place called Urung Yar. He instantly began to pursue him but lost his prey. He divided the army and let them find Engke Tura, while he himself marched along the western slopes of the Tarbaghatai, passing through Shara, Shibartu, Qui Muragh, Quraghan and Buyurlaghu. 'Umar Shaykh, Temür's son, reached Qubaq where he met Engke Tura and fought a battle. Defeated in this battle, Engke Tura fled to a place named It Ichmäs Ala Köl where his army was hit hard again by 'Umar Shaykh. There is no report telling whether Engke Tura was killed in this battle, but this was the end of his short career. Temür convened a great *quriltai* at Saray Ordam on the River Emil and decided "to send troops to all directions of Moghulistan and destroy Ulus-i Jatah," i.e. the Moghul Khanate. He divided his army into five columns ordering them to march to every corner of Moghulistan and, after turning the region to the north of T'ien-shan into a complete desolation, he collected his force in the valley of Yulduz and came back to Samarqand. In the next year, another army sent by him to Semirechye, passing Issik Kul and Qara Tal, the *yurt* of Engke Tura, fought with Qamar al-Dīn, who finally fled crossing over the Altai. This was the end of Qamar al-Dīn and Engke Tura. Khiḍr Khwāja, the new ruler of the Moghul Khanate, could retain his post only by submitting himself to Temür.[73]

Gunashiri's decision to stay in Hami was caused by this change of situation in Moghulistan. He had no reason to continue his journey when Engke Tura and Namun, his invitors, disappeared. One may be curious about why he took the indirect route, going down to the south and passing through Hami, instead of the direct way via the steppe of western Mongolia. It was because there was a hostile group of Oirats in that steppe. Gunashiri was a follower of Tögüs Temür whom Yesüder killed with the help of the Oirats. So it is not hard to imagine the inimical relation between Gunashiri and Oirats. Around the middle of the fourteenth century the realm of

[73] On Temür's campaign of 1389, see ZNY, I, 338–348; *Materialy po istorii Kirgizov*, pp. 136–142; Pishchulina, *Iugo-vostochnyi Kazakhstan*, pp. 74–80.

the Oirats extended to the upper Yenisei and the region of Khobdo in the west and to the upper parts of Onon and Kerulen in the east.[74] Therefore, to have a safer passage Gunashiri could not but take the southern route passing through Hami.

If we keep in mind these circumstances, then we can understand why Engke Tura and Namun sent a letter to Emperor Hongwu who seems to have had no relation to this matter. In April of 1380 Hongwu ordered General Bu Ying to march to the Western Region and to "open the Hami route." In May the Ming army reached Baicheng and subjugated the remnants of the Yüan in the Kansu corridor.[75] Awed at this display of Ming military might, the rulers of Hami sent envoys and tributary horses to the emperor, and the Ming court responded to this with its own envoys with imperial edicts to "the region of Uighurs."[76] "The region of Uighurs" is nothing but Uighuristan whose central cities were Turfan and Hami. In this way the Kansu corridor and Uighuristan fell under the influence of the Ming dynasty, and it is apparent that without its cooperation it would have been difficult for Gunashiri to pass through that area. That was why Engke Tura and Namun sent a letter to the Ming emperor. In the letter they asked his cooperation not only in inviting Gunashiri but also in establishing a friendly relation between the Ming and the Moghul Khanate. In this sense, we cannot accept the assertion of E. Haenisch that it was "the letter of submission" (*Ergebenheitsbrief*).[77] The letter was written in the spirit of mutually equal relations.

Then what was the response of the Ming court to the letter? Although *Ming shilu* does not have any mention about the arrival of envoys from Engke Tura or Namun Güregen, we find an interesting remark that at the end of 1389 the Emperor sent two surrendered Mongol officials to Gunashiri (spelled as Unashiri) to the west of Qaraqorum to deliver his edict. In the edict the Emperor, after stating the grandiose accomplishment of unification and the voluntary capitulation of many Mongol nobles since the destruction of the Yüan dynasty, proclaims as follows: "We dispatch envoys and let you know

[74] Bai Cuiqin, "Mingdai Wala gaishu" [Introductory description of the Oirats in the Ming period] in *Ming shilu Wala ziliao zhaibian* [Materials on the Oirats abstracted from Ming shih-lu] (Urumchi, 1982), pp. 4–5.

[75] *Ming Taizu shilu* (in the fourth month of the 13th year of Hongwu; p. 2078); *ibid.* (in the fifth month of the same year; pp. 2087–2088).

[76] *Ibid.* (in the fifth month of the 14th year of Hongwu; p. 2165).

[77] Haenisch, *Sino-mongolische Dokumente*, p. 19.

the fact that We are the lord of All-under-the-Heaven. You, Unashiri, should know this, and, if you have something to say, send an appropriate memorial when Our envoys come back. We will handle accordingly."[78] So the contents of the edicts appear to have had no relation with Namun's letter. However, *Ming Shilu* records that in May of the next year, 1390, Gunashiri sent two envoys from Hami and that in October he was fighting with "other tribes" (*biebu*). In April of 1391 he had requested the Ming court to open a frontier market and, when it was refused, he harassed "tributary envoys of Uighur from the Western Region [to the Ming court]" and fought against the Ming army.[79] From this chronological development we can reconstruct what happened between 1388 and 1390: Namun's letter which was written at the end of 1388 arrived at the Ming court sometime next year, the court sent the envoys to Gunashiri at the end of 1390, Gunashiri started for Moghulistan after he received the Ming envoys, and by May of 1391 he had already reached Hami. These events leave no doubt that Gunashiri left Mongolia in order to go Moghulistan but decided to stay in Hami because of the demise of his invitors.

With this turn of the events, the history of Central Asia entered on its new phase. Khiḍr Khwāja, a newly enthroned Moghul khan, who could not stand against the onslaught of Temür, resumed amicable relations with his powerful neighbour and opened new diplomatic relations with the Ming dynasty by sending his enovoys in 1391.[80] While adopting a friendly policy toward his neighbours, he exerted his efforts in consolidating his internal basis of power. The tribal structure within the Moghul Khanate was no longer the same as it had been before the revolt of Qamar al-Dīn: the old powerful tribes were either weakened or had disappeared, and, in their stead, new tribal groups such as Itärchi and Könchi emerged. The Dughlats, under the leadership of a new chief, Khudāīdād, who had found and enthroned Khiḍr Khwāja, became more powerful than ever.

Gunashiri, having become weakened after his defeat in the battle with the Ming army in 1391 led by Song Sheng and Liu Zhen, sent

[78] *Ming Taizu shilu* (in the twelfth month of the 22nd year of Hongwu; pp. 2977–2978).

[79] *Ibid.* (in the fifth month of the 23rd year of Hongwu; p. 3023) (in the 9th month of the same year; p. 3057) (in the 2nd month of the 24th year; p. 3087) (in the 8th month of the same year; p. 3188).

[80] *Ibid.* (in the seventh month of the 24th year of Hongwu; pp. 3131–3132).

to the court a diplomatic mission with tributary horses in the next year.[81] The relation between the two countries, however, remained still chilly having no more communication until Engke Temür, his younger brother and successor, finally made a peace agreement in the first year of Emperor Yong-lo (1403). In that year he was enfeofed as Zhongshun Wang ("Loyal and Obedient King") and in 1406 his kingdom was renamed as the Garrison of Hami (*Hami wei*), thus forming a part of the frontier garrison system of the Ming dynasty.[82] This kingdom, founded by Gunashiri, survived until it was demolished in the second decade of the sixteenth century by the eastern branch of the Moghuls.

In the meantime, Temür the Conqueror, after having subjected Central Asia, the Middle East, and the Southern Russian steppes, drove his army to the east for the conquest of China which was his ultimate goal, in order to revive the Mongol world empire. On his way to China, however, he met his death in the town of Utrār on the shore of the Syr Darya in 1405. His death instantly touched off succession struggles and division of the empire. Transoxania, with its capital of Samarqand, fell into the hands of his son Shāhrukh. The new ruler, giving up his father's aggressive policy, sent a mission to Ming China in order to establish a friendly relationship.[83]

In this way, around the beginning of the fifteenth century, the political situation in Central Asia and the international relations around it seemed to overcome the turbulence that had been ensued by the fall of Chaghatai Khanate and Yüan Empire. However, new waves of disturbance were approaching the horizon of Central Asia. An energetic and ambitious emperor of China, Yung-lo, was going to launch massive expeditions against the nomads in the Mongolian plateau, and the successors of Temür were waging incessant internal struggles over the hegemony of the empire as well as deadly confrontations with surrounding foes. Finally the weakening of the Timurids and the Moghuls facilitated the southward migrations of the Uzbeks, the Qazaqs, and the Qirghizs, which resulted in radical

[81] Sei Wada, *Tōashi kenkyū: Mōko hen*, pp. 41–42.

[82] For more detailed description of the establishment of the Garrison of Hami, see Juten Oda, "Uighuristan," *Acta Asiatica*, 34, pp. 25–28; Sunao Hori, "Mindai no Turfān ni tsuite" [Turfan in the Ming period], *Machikaneyama ronsō*, 8 (1975), 13–37.

[83] J. Fletcher, "China and Central Asia, 1368–1884" in *The Chinese World Order*, ed. by J.K. Fairbank (Cambridge, MA, 1968), pp. 206–216.

changes in the political and ethnic map of Central Asia from around the beginning of the next century.

4. *Persistence of the Chaghatai Legacy*

So far we have discussed the history of the Moghulistan in the latter half of the fourteenth century. By way of conclusion I would like to make a few remarks on the legacy of the Chaghatai Khanate. When the Khanate was divided into two parts around the middle of that century, nomadic tribes in both Transoxania and Moghulistan inherited a similar political tradition from the Chaghatai Khanate, that is, the tribal politics as we explained above. One of the most peculiar aspects of tribal politics in the Chaghatayid realm was the balance of power between supra-tribal leaders and tribal chiefs as a result of interactions on several different levels—intra-, inter-, supra-, and extra-tribal levels—in the tribal confederacy. The balance had never been static but dynamic. We call it dynamic because it could easily be broken but was resilient enough to recover its former balance. As a result, many khans and chiefs were killed in internal disputes but some were kept at bay so as not to have a complete dominance over the others.

Temür utilized this tribal politics in gaining hegemony over Ulus Chaghatai, but he cut off the vicious circle of tribal warfare and could successfully turn his tribal army into the army of conquest and become a world conqueror.[84] This did not happen in the Moghul Khanate. Qamar al-Dīn may have had a chance. He was unfortunate because he was Temür's contemporary. However, his failure stemmed largely from the tribal politics within the Moghul confederacy. In this sense, the Moghul tribes were more traditional and kept better the legacy of the Chaghatai Khanate. The conflicts never ceased between khans who attempted to strengthen their power in alliance with religious leaders and by intervening within intra-tribal disputes versus tribal leaders who did not want to sacrifice their autonomy and independence at any price. We can easily see the similar role which Qazaghan had played at the end of the Chaghatai

[84] Manz, in her work *The Rise and rule of Tamerlane*, provides us an excellent description how he achieved this.

Khanate in the careers of Moghul chiefs like Qamar al-Dīn, Engke Tura, and Khudāīdād. However, they could not become like Temür who reduced the khan to a mere figurehead or like his successors who finally eliminated the khan. This legacy did not disappear until the beginning of the sixteenth century when the Moghuls moved down to the Tarim Basin and gradually ceased to be a tribal confederacy.

Then why could the Moghuls not overcome the limits of tribal politics? The answer brings us to another legacy of the Chaghatai Khanate—the persistence of the idea of political legitimacy. Scholars have frequently pointed out the fact that the Moghuls were more inclined to nomadism and felt proud of it but hardly noticed that their pride was also based upon the notion that they were the legitimate successor of the Chaghatai Khanate.[85] As a matter of fact, they had every reason to think in that way. The khans in the Timurid realm at first were simply puppets manipulated by non-Chinggisid chiefs but later they ceased to exist at all. The Moghuls were different: their khans, descendants of Chaghatai, were symbolically as well as factually the head of the Khanate. There is no doubt that they regarded the Timurids as usurpers. So it is no wonder that we find the *Ming Shilu* stating that in the fifth year of Yong-lo (1407) Shamiʿ-i Jahān, a Moghul khan reigning from 1399 to 1407, sent an envoy to the Ming court with the following words: "Samarqand (= here meaning Transoxania) is the ancient land of our forefathers. Please [help me] by sending a [Ming] army in recovering it."[86] These remarks show that Moghul rulers considered the Timurid dominion over Transoxania illegitimate. The *Tārīkh-i rashīdī* has an interesting episode in this regard. When Sulṭān Abū Saʿīd, a late Timurid ruler, called Yūnus, who was in exile in Iran after having been defeated by Esen Buqa in the succession struggle for the Moghul khanship, and sent him to Moghulistan in order to check the raids of Esen Buqa, he supposedly said "For the future you must not follow the example of your ancestors and say, 'Amīr Temür and the race of Amīr Temür are our vassals, and have been for generations.' For although it was formerly so, things have changed now, and I

[85] For example, see B. Spuler ed., *Geschichte Mittelasiens* (Handbuch der Orientalistik, 1–5–5, Leiden, 1966), p. 219; Bartol'd, *Istoriia kul'turnoi zhizni Turkestana* (Sochineniia, vol. II, pt. 1), p. 265.

[86] *Ming Taizong shilu* (in the fourth month of the 5th year of Yung-lo; p. 0929)

am *pādishāh* in my own right."[87] (italics added) There is no doubt that the Timurid rulers felt a kind of inferiority complex toward the Moghuls in terms of legitimacy.

Because of this legitimacy the Moghuls were very proud of their political and cultural tradition, and their being "Mongols." As a matter of fact, the term Ulus-i Moghul was a Turco-Persian translation of the Mongolian expression of Mongghol Ulus with which the Moghuls proudly described themselves. Although we do not have their own testimony telling exactly from when they adopted this term, it seems that already in 1410s the term was widely used. A Ming envoy, Chen Cheng, who visited Moghulistan and Transoxania in 1413, 1416, and in 1420, mentioned the "Mongol tribe (*Menggu bulo*) in Bishbaliq."[88] Ghiyāth al-Dīn who came to the Ming court in 1420–21 as a Timurid envoy also writes about *Āl-i Moghūl* in his report.[89] Here, both *Āl-i Moghūl* and *Menggu bulo* are corresponding to Mongghol Ulus. The Moghuls used this expression not because they realized that they formed a separate, or a partial, polity originated from the Chaghatai Khanate but because they were proud of their Mongol tradition and legitimacy. The fall of the Yüan empire in 1363 may have boosted such a feeling as testified in the letter of Engke Tura and Namun who called their state "the great empire" (*yeke ulus*). At the same time, unlike the nomads in Transoxania,[90] they held fast to the Mongolian language. Official documents of the second half of the fourteenth century were written in Mongolian.[91] Another example of their respect for the Mongolian tradition is the fact that Khudāīdād, a Dughlat chief, had a very good knowledge about Chinggis Khan's *jasaq* ("law"), which, however, was replaced by the Islamic *Sharī'a* only by the middle of the fifteenth century.[92]

In view of the preceding discussion, we need to reconsider the generally accepted view that the dissolution of the Chaghatai Khanate took place around the middle of the fourteenth century when Qazān

[87] TR/Ross, pp. 83–84.
[88] *Ming Taizong shilu* (in the tenth month of the 13rd year of Yung-lo; 1889).
[89] *A Persian Embassy to China being an Extract from Zubdatu't T'awarikh by Hafiz Abru*, tr. by K.M. Maitra (Lahore, 1934), p. 9.
[90] The last rulers of the Chaghatai Khanate, like Kebek and Tarmashirin, seem to have used Turkish, not Mongolian, language. see Bartol'd, *Dvenadtsat' lektsii po istorii turetskikh narodov Srednei Azii* (Sochineniia, vol. VI), pp. 162–163.
[91] For specimens see Ligeti, *Monuments préclassiques*, 208 ff.
[92] TR/Ross, p. 70.

Khan was killed by Amīr Qazaghan and Tughluq Temür was enthroned by the Moghul tribes.[93] It is true that there was no longer an effective khan after Qazān in Transoxania and that Tughluq Temür became the founder of the Moghul Khanate in Moghulistan. However, as Barthold pointed out, there is no source which defines the final disintegration of the Chaghatai Khanate.[94] Our notion about the Chaghatai disintegration may have originated from a *post factum* judgement made by later generations. People living in the old Chaghatai realm do not seem to have thought in that way at least to the end of the fourteenth century. For example, Niẓām al-Dīn Shāmī who completed his work in 1403–04, listed 31 rulers of the Ulus-i Chaghatai, beginning with Chaghatai, and there he included two Moghul khans, Tughluq Temür and Ilyās Khwāja.[95] Moreover, he did not use the term Ulus-i Moghul, although he used the word "Moghul," which means that he recognized the distinctiveness of tribal groups in Moghulistan but did not attribute them to a separate political entity.[96] On the other hand, Naṭanzī and Sharaf al-Dīn 'Alī Yazdī who finished their works one or two decades after the death of Temür and the completion of Shāmī's work, while omitting the list of the Chaghatai khans, began to use terms like Ulus-i Moghul or Ulus-i Jätä.[97] The appearance of the word Ulus-i Moghul may have reflected the usage of Mongghol Ulus among the Moghuls, but its implications were not the same—the Timurids regarded it as a separate polity. Later historians simply accepted this view that the Chaghatai Khanate ceased to exist after the enthronement of Tughluq Temür.

The difference of terminologies between Shāmī and later Timurid historians reflects the change in the notion about the Chaghatai Khanate after the death of Temür. Until that time the notion of a unified khanate had persisted, but after his death that notion could

[93] Grousset, *The Empire of the Steppes*, pp. 342–346; Pishchulina, *Iugo-vostochnyi Kazakhstan*, pp. 40–41; B.G. Gafurov, *Tadzhiki* (Moscow, 1972), p. 463; Liu Yingsheng, "Chahetai hanguo de fenlie," pp. 99–104.
[94] Bartol'd, *Dvenadtsat' lektsii*, p. 165.
[95] ZNS, I, 13–14.
[96] In ZNS (vol. I) the word "Moghul" is used with the following expressions, such as *mard* or *nafar* ("man" or "people"; pp. 47–48), *wilāyat* or *ṭaraf* ("region" or "direction"; pp. 15, 52, 64, 69), *ṭā'ifa* ("race"; p. 140), *lashkar* ("army"; p. 49), etc.
[97] *Muntakhab*, pp. 114, 130–132, 151, 343, 420; ZNY, I, 33, 346. *jātā* was a pejorative term used by the Timurids when they designated the Moghuls, meaning "rascals," "robbers," or "free booters." See TR/Ross, pp. 75–76 (Elias's "Introduction"), p. 148.

not be held, at least by the Timurids. From the time of Shāhrukh it was practically impossible for the Timurid rulers to hold on to and realize the idea of one unified Chaghatai Khanate. Neither did the Moghuls, since the revolt of Qamar al-Dīn, have enough military power to realize that idea although the idea itself was not completely discarded. In this sense, the war between the Timurids and the Moghuls in the later half of the fourteenth century was waged not simply for booty or conquest but for the unification of the Chaghatai Khanate. However, around the beginning of the fifteenth century, the two neighbouring Central Asian powers both of which had gone through similar stages of expansion and contraction came to stand on a par with each other. Then came the final dissolution of the Chaghatai Khanate.

THE LEGITIMACY OF KHANSHIP AMONG THE OYIRAD (KALMYK) TRIBES IN RELATION TO THE CHINGGISID PRINCIPLE

JUNKO MIYAWAKI

1. *The Chinggisid Principle: A Legacy of the Mongol Empire*

Early in the thirteenth century the Mongol Empire was built by Chinggis Khan when he had established his rule over all the nomadic peoples of Central Eurasia. To put it differently, a congregation of nomadic tribal chiefs, each having his own subjects, elected Chinggis Khan to be their common overlord. In that sense the Mongol Empire was little different from other nomadic polities in being a confederation of nomadic tribes. It follows that even Chinggis Khan himself had no right to extend his rule directly into the fiefs of other tribal chiefs. Be that as it may, the Mongol Empire may be interpreted as the product of unanimous acceptance of Chinggis Khan's great personal charisma as a manifestation of heavenly will and a nucleus of integration by the entire nomadic peoples on the Central Eurasian steppes.

After Chinggis Khan's death, each of his male descendants was equally entitled to succeed him on his imperial throne. On the other hand, any successor to the throne had first to have his qualification verified through an election by the nomadic tribal chiefs who were members of the Great Assembly (*yeke quriltai*), the supreme legislative organ of the empire. Since earlier times, a nomadic polity, which was no more than a confederation of nomadic tribes, was wont to split into fragments as soon as the tribal chiefs put up separate overlords over a clash of their interests. In the Mongol Empire, too, quarrels over imperial succession surfaced in the generation of Chinggis Khan's grandsons in the second half of the thirteenth century and there emerged khans with parallel claims to the sovereignty, giving rise to the situation commonly termed the Four Khanates. After losing its colonies in China, Iran and other sedentary agricultural zones, the Mongol Empire further split into many uluses.

The nomadic descendants of the Mongol Empire on the Central Eurasian steppes, however, never lost their memory of the glorious

name of its founder thereafter up to the present century. As long as they kept to their independent nomadic life and maintained their own political organizations, which were not quite fit to be called states, the Chinggisid principle continued to be effective so that only male descendants of Chinggis Khan were entitled to the title of khan.

The same principle applied even in the western half of the Central Eurasian steppes, where the descendants of Jochi and Chaghatai ruled local nomadic population whose languages are now linguistically classified as Turkic. In the many khanates that sprang up after the breakup of the Jochid Qipchaq Khanate, such as the Kazan, the Crimea and the Astrakhan, only the descendants of Jochi, the eldest son of Chinggis Khan, most of whom came from the house of Batu, were regarded as legitimate monarchs. Among the Uzbeks and the Kazakhs, identities newly formed in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, their khans too had to claim descent from Jochi. Timur, born in West Turkestan after the Chaghatai Khanate had broken up into two entities in the fourteenth century, was not a Chinggisid but a Barlas clansman. As is well-known, he did not dare to assume khanship but only styled himself Amir Qürgen or Lord Son-in-Law after marrying Chaghataid princesses. In the Moghulistan Khanate in East Turkestan and its successors, the khanates of Kashghar and Turfan, the latter of which survived into the eighteenth century, only Chaghataid khans descending from Chinggis Khan occupied their thrones.

In the meanwhile in the eastern part of the Central Eurasian steppes, the Mongol identity took its present form as a new confederation of the tribes that had earlier supported the Qubilaid Yüan Dynasty. After a period of Oyirad (Oirat) ascendancy following the dynasty's loss of its empire, Dayan Khan, who was said to be the last male survivor of the Chinggisid house in Mongolia, ascended the Mongol throne late in the fourteenth century and restored unity among the tribes, most of which accepted his sons and grandsons as their heads.[1] Proliferation of khanship started in Mongolia when

[1] In the days of Dayan Khan's reign, it is said in Mongolian chronicles, the pro-Chinggisid Mongols used to make up six myriarchies, three each of which belonged to a wing. To the Left Wing belonged the myriarchies of the Chaqar, the Qalqa (Khalkha) and the Uriyangqan, and to the Right Wing belonged those of the Ordos, the Tümed and the Yöngshiyebü. See: I. de Rachewiltz, *et al.* (ed.), *Saghang Secen, Erdeni-yin Tobci "Precious Summary," A Mongolian Chronicle of 1662*, I (Canberra, 1990), 128, 65r09–65r16. For their origins, see: Hidehiro Okada, "Dayan Khan in the Battle of Dalan Terigün," *Gedanke und Wirkung: Festschrift zum 90. Geburtstag von Nikolaus Poppe*, ed. W. Heissig and K. Sagaster (Wiesbaden, 1989), pp. 262–270. His conclusion is the following: The Chaqar Myriarchy derived its origin from the personal fief of Qubilai Khan which he had received from his elder brother Möngke Khan in the province of Shensi, and was dedicated to the memories of the brothers' mother, Sorqaqtani Begi of the Kereyid. The Qalqa Myriarchy went back in origin to the five elite corps commanded by Muqali of the Jalayir and his descendants. The Uriyangqan Myriarchy had its origin in the Uriyangqan tribesmen who were assigned with the duty of guarding the tomb of Chinggis Khan in the Kentei Mountains. The Ordos Myriarchy kept up the tradition of serving the soul of Chinggis Khan that went back to the time when Qubilai Khan in 1292 created his grandson Kamala Chin Wang and enfeoffed the latter in the Four Great Ordos of Chinggis Khan on the Kerülen. Ever since that time the tribal chief of the Ordos bore the title of Jinong and acted as the head priest in the cult of Chinggis Khan. The Tümed Myriarchy had developed from the Turkic Önggüd Kingdom in the Yinshan Mountains. The Yöngshiyebü Myriarchy derived its origin from the fief of Prince Göden, a son of Ögedei Khan, in Kansu. For further details, see: H. Okada, "Dayan Hān no roku banko no kigen (Origins of the Six Myriarchies of Dayan Khan)," *Enoki Hakushi Kanreki Kinen Tōyōshi Ronsō (Studies in Asian History dedicated to Prof. Dr. Kazuo Enoki on his Sixtieth Birthday)* (Tokyo, 1975), pp. 127–137. Of this newly-reborn Mongol nation, those in Inner Mongolia fell under the Manchu domination in the first half of the 17th century, followed by those in Outer Mongolia in the second half of the same century. Of the 49 banners forming 6 leagues in Inner Mongolia and the 86 banners forming 4 leagues in Outer Mongolia under the Manchu Ch'ing dynasty, 23 Inner Mongolian banners and 83 Outer Mongolian banners were all governed by descendants of Dayan Khan. All other princes governing other Inner Mongolian banners were descendants of Chinggis Khan's younger brothers.

[2] Dayan Khan had eleven sons. When the khan died in 1524, his eldest son and rightful heir Törö Bolad was already dead since the previous year. The throne was then to go to the latter's eldest son, Bodi Alaq. But it was usurped by Barsubolad, the eldest of Dayan Khan's surviving sons and Jinong in command of the three Right-Wing Myriarchies, who styled himself Sayin Alaq Khan. Bodi Alaq, backed by the Left-Wing Myriarchies, forced his uncle to step down in his favor. After the death of Barsubolad, the Right Wing was headed by his son Gün Bilig Jinong, who accepted the sovereinty of Bodi Alaq Khan. Gün Bilig died in 1542 and was succeeded by his eldest son Noyandara as Jinong. Noyandara was no match in influence to his uncle Altan, younger brother of Gün Bilig and head of the Tümed tribe, who became the virtual supreme leader of the Right Wing. In recognition of Altan's great leadership in the Mongol wars on alien peoples, Bodi Alaq Khan bestowed on him the title Tüshiyetü Sechen Khan. After the death of Bodi Alaq Khan in 1547, his eldest son Darayisun, leading a hundred thousand subjects, moved his pastures to the east of the Khingan Range to keep himself at a distance from Altan Khan. The legitimate heir to the Mongol khanship and head of the Chaqar tribe, Darayisun finally ascended the throne in 1551, even after which the actual power remained in the hands of Altan Khan of the Tümed. Thus it came to pass that two khans reigned simultaneously in Mongolia. For further details see the following: H. Okada, "Life of Dayan Qaghan," *Acta Asiatica*, II (Tokyo, 1966), pp. 46–55.

Altan, a grandson of Dayan Khan, assumed khanship side by side with the legitimate khan.[2] More and more tribal heads adopted the title for themselves thereafter, but all of them were descendants of both Chinggis Khan and Dayan Khan.

2. *The Birth of the Oyirad Khanship*

The Oyirad people, called Qalmaq (Kalmyk) by Turkic speakers of Central Asia, was linguistically Mongolic but regarded as aliens (*qari*) by the Mongols who had been reunified late in the fifteenth century. There was no male descendant of Chinggis Khan to be found among the heads of the tribes making up the Oyirad confederation. Nevertheless the Oyirad produced such famous khans as Güüshi Khan, Galdan Boshoqtu Khan and Ayuuki Khan in the seventeenth century. When and how was the Oyirad khanship born? Who gave it legitimacy? In what way could it be reconciled with the Chinggisid principle?

The answers are that the first khan of the Oyirad people in the practical sense was Güüshi Khan of the Khoshut tribe, whose title was conferred on him by the Fifth Dalai Lama of Tibet on grounds not unrelated to the Chinggisid principle.

Tibetan Buddhism spread itself rapidly among the newly-reunified Mongols in the second half of the sixteenth century and the Oyirad in the seventeenth century, when its rival sects fiercely competed to win patrons among the tribal chiefs. In the end the Dge-lugs-pa sect triumphed over others by skilfully taking advantage of Mongol-Oyirad relations. In 1578 the Third Dalai Lama, head of the Dge-lugs-pa sect, received his title from Altan Khan, who was an auxiliary Mongol khan as his epithet Tüshiyetü or the Supporter indicated.[3] *Dalai* meant "ocean" in Mongolian, translating Tibetan *rgya mtsho* that was the second half of the abbot's name.

The Dge-lugs-pas exploited for propaganda purposes Altan Khan's

Also see H. Okada, "Life and Work of Dayan Khan," *Proceedings of the International Conference on China Border Area Studies* (Taipei, 1985), pp. 491–505; and J. Miyawaki, "The Birth of the Oyirad Khanship," *CAJ*, 41 (1997), 38–75. For Altan Khan's titles, see Jürünggha (ed.), *Erdeni tunumal neretü sudur orosiba* (Peking, 1984), p. 50.

[3] The earliest historical reference to the development of events from the visit of A-seng Bla-ma, a Buddhist missionary, to Altan Khan in 1571 up to the meeting of the khan with the Third Dalai Lama in Kokonor in 1578 is found in the biography of Altan Khan in Mongolian recently published (Jürünggha, *Erdeni*, pp. 83–130). In Tibetan the primary source is the biography of the Third Dalai Lama composed by the Fifth Dalai Lama (*rJe btsun thams cad mkhyen pa bsod nams rgya mtsho'i rnam thar dngos grub rgya mtsho'i shing rta*, 88b–97a). The Mongolian chronicle *Erdeni-yin Tobchi* is the best-known source on the events in question, though it contains errors such that Asing Lam-a met Altan Khan in 1573. The meeting of the khan and the Dalai Lama in this text is found in: I. de Rachewiltz, *Erdeni-yi Tobci*, 75r23–76v13. For bibliography, see G. Tucci, *Tibetan Painted Scrolls* (Rome, 1949), pp. 46–49.

patronage of the Third Dalai Lama by depicting it as a second advent of the relationship that had supposedly existed between Qubilai Sechen Khan and his priest 'Phags-pa Lama in Yüan times. The Tibetan interpretation was that a khan-patron and his lama-priest were equal in standing, taking respective charge of secular and religious government and confirming each other's position by exchange of titles. Following Altan Khan's reign more and more Mongol khans appeared, all flaunting their title at the same time. This general inflation of khanship in Mongolia was caused in no small part by the Tibetans. As an example, Abadai Khan of the Qalqas (Khalkhas) received his title from the Third Dalai Lama in recognition of his standing as a defender of Buddhist faith after the death of Altan Khan.[4]

The Third Dalai Lama was succeeded by his own reincarnation, the Fourth Dalai Lama, who was physically a great-grandson of Altan Khan. Then in the lifetime of the Fifth Dalai Lama, the Mongols began to feel their independence threatened by the Manchus whose power was then on the rise. In 1634 Lingdan Khan of the Chaqars, the last legitimate successor to the throne of Dayan Khan and patron of the Karma Zhwa-dmar-pas, a rival sect of the Dge-lugs-pas, set out on a military expedition to Tibet in an attempt to build a new power base in the west. He died of an illness on the steppe of Shira Tala in Kansu on his way to Kokonor, and in his absence the Mongols in Inner Mongolia south of the Gobi Desert fell under the Manchu domination. Only Choqtu Khong Tayiji, an ally of the Chaqar khan, and his Qalqa army from Outer Mongolia managed to invade and occupy Kokonor, where they subjugated the Seven Tümed, a patron tribe of the Dge-lugs-pas.[5]

[4] Abadai of the Qalqa, grandson of Dayan Khan and a first cousin once removed of Altan Khan, laid the foundation at the ruin of old Qara Qorum north of Shangqutu, on which to build the monastery of Erdeni Juu, in the summer of 1585. The chief visited the Third Dalai Lama in Inner Mongolia in 1586, on which occasion he was recognized as a reincarnation of Vajrapāṇi (*vachirbani-yin qubilghan*) and granted the title *Nom-un yeke vacir qaghan* (Great Vajra King of Law). Altan Khan had already been dead at that time since 1582. See Byamba, *Asaraghchi neretü-yin teüke* (Ulaanbaatar, 1960), pp. 77–78.

[5] *dPag bsam ljon bzang, Collected Works of Sum-pa-mkhan-po*, Vol. I (ka), Śata-Piṭaka series (New Delhi, 1979), Vol. 214, fols. 304b, 106b. For *mTsho sngon gyi lo rgyus* see the following English translation: Ho-chin Yang, *The Annals of Kokonor* (Bloomington, 1969), p. 33. For historical analysis, see Zuihō Yamaguchi, "Gushi kan no Chibetto shihai ni itaru keii (Circumstances leading up to Güshi Khan's control of Tibet)," *Iwai Hakushi Koki Kinen Tenseki Ronshū* (Tokyo, 1963), pp. 741–773.

In the face of approaching danger, the Dge-lugs-pas enlisted the help of the Oyirad this time. Güüshi, head of the Khoshut tribe, responded to their call and marched on Kokonor in 1636. There he defeated and killed Choqtu Khong Taiji in 1637, and received from the Fifth Dalai Lama the Tibetan title of *Bstan 'dzin chos kyi rgyal po*, or the Dharma-King Who Holds Up the Religion, which translated into Oyirad as *Šajin bariqči nomiyin xān*.[6] Güüshi, whose name meant "national preceptor" in Chinese, being an old priestly title once conferred on 'Phags-pa Lama by Qubilai Khan, now became khan in his capacity of a defender of the Tibetan Buddhist faith. The new khan completed subjugation of Tibet by 1642, appointed the Dalai Lama head of the entire Tibetan monastic community and himself became King of Tibet.

3. *The Legitimacy of the Khoshut Khanship*

Had there been Oyirad khans before Güüshi Khan? Let us look into some instances which seem to point to their earlier existence. There was Esen Khan who styled himself *Ta-yüan T'ien-sheng Ta K'o-han*, or the Great Khan of Heavenly Sagacity of the Great Yüan, in the days of the Oyirad Empire in the fifteenth century,[7] but he lost his life at the hands of his rebellious vassals only a year later. His short reign and violent death were interpreted by Mongol chroniclers as a prominent example of heavenly punishment that would befall a non-Chinggisid impudent enough to assume the title of khan.[8] Such being the case, we cannot help doubting if Esen's khanship was universally accepted as legitimate by his contemporaries at all.

Manchu-Chinese sources say that before Güüshi Khan his grandfather was the first khan of the Oyirad, while an Oyirad chronicle attaches to the name of his father an epithet meaning "of Khan" (*xānai*).[9] But neither of them is called khan when mentioned in Mongol chronicles. Their title of khan seems to have been posthumously ascribed to them only on account of the khanship of their descendants. Bayibaghas, eldest brother of Güüshi Khan, is called khan in some later, if not contemporary, Oyirad sources.[10] This chief, however, had little time to reign as khan because he was killed when still young by his half-brother in a quarrel over inheritance.[11] Güüshi Khan married Bayibaghas's widow, succeeded him as head of the Khoshut tribe and adopted his son Ochirtu. This Ochirtu was accorded the title Chechen Khan by the Fifth Dalai Lama after the death of his foster father.[12] Bayibaghas was called khan probably as a reflection of his son's khanship.

We have seen above that, with the single exception of Esen, all those referred to as khans in native sources are somehow related to Güüshi Khan, the Khoshut chief. There must be some particular reason why only Khoshut chiefs are alleged to be the first khan of the Oyirad.

[6] *dPag bsam ljon bzang*, fols. 107a, 311a. Ho-chin Yang, pp. 35–37. Zuihō Yamaguchi, pp. 748–750.

[7] This title of Esen was used in his letter to the Ming Chinese court in 1453. See *Ming Veritable Records*, under the date Ching-t'ai 4/X/wu-hsü.

[8] I. de Rachewiltz, *Erdeni-yin Tobci*, 53v04–54r15. Here is told a quasi-historical tale that Toghon Tayishi, father of Esen, having killed a Mongol khan, was about to ascend the throne and offered sacrifices to the altar of Chinggis Khan; a golden arrow in the quiver of the holy lord shook and the Tayishi fell down bleeding. See J. Miyawaki, "On the Oyirad Khanship," *Aspects of Altaic Civilization III* (Bloomington, 1990), pp. 142–153.

[9] *Hesei Toktobuha Tulergi Monggo Hoise Aiman-i Wang Gung sai Iletun Ulabun/Ch'in ting Wai fan Meng ku Hui pu Wang kung Piao chuan*, Vol. 81, 4b/2b, says that Bōbei Mirdza, Güüshi Khan's grandfather, was first to style himself Oyirad Khan. *Xošuud noyon Bātur ubaši tümeni tuurbiqsan Dörbön oyiradiyin tüüke* (Kalmytskaya Khrestomatiya [Petrograd, 1915], pp. 24–43), p. 26, gives the name of Güüshi Khan's father as Xān Noyon xongghor.

[10] In the Oyirad epic tale *Monggholiyin uwashi xun tayijiyin tuuji orshiboi (Istoriya Ubashi-khuntaidzhiya), Trudy Vostochnago Otdeleniya Imperatorskago Arkheologicheskogo Obshchestva VI* (St. Petersburg, 1858), pp. 199–212, Bayibaghas, commander of the joint Oyirad forces in the battle in which Ubashi Khong Tayiji (the first Altyn-tsar' in Russian sources) is killed, is called khan. See C.R. Bawden, "The Tale of Ubashi Khungtaiji of the Mongols," *New Orient*, 6/2 (1967), 60–62. Also see H. Okada, "Ubasi Hon Tayiji Den Kōshaku (Notes on the Tale of Ubasi Qong Tayiji)," *Yūboku Shakaishi Tankyū*, No. 32 (1968), 1–16.

[11] Zlatkin erroneously identifies the parties involved in the quarrel over inheritance, which started in 1625 and developed into a full-scale civil war engulfing the entire Oyirad nation, as sons of Khara Khula of the Junghars. See I. Ya. Zlatkin, *Istoriya Dzhungarskogo Khanstva (1635–1758)* (Moscow, 1964), pp. 141, 144–147. The author of the present paper, however, has pointed out that the true nature of the incident was a fight over the position of the chief of the Khoshut tribe between Chokur and Bayibaghas, who were half-brothers on the maternal side but first cousins on the paternal side. See J. Miyawaki, "The Qalqa Mongols and the Oyirad in the Seventeenth Century," *Journal of Asian History*, 18–2 (Wiesbaden, 1984), pp. 136–173, and J. Miyawaki, "The Kalmyk Taishas in the Early Seventeenth Century," *Journal of the Anglo-Mongolian Society*, 10/1 (Cambridge, 1987), pp. 6–10.

[12] *Biography of Caya Pandita in Oirat Characters*, Corpus Scriptorum Mongolorum, Tomus V, Fasc. 2–3 (Ulaan Baator, 1967), p. 58, 31b. For summary and textual analysis, see J. Miyawaki, "Historical significance of the Biography of Jaya Pandita," *Proceedings of the XXVIII Permanent International Altaistic Conference, Venice 8–14, July 1985* (Wiesbaden, 1989), pp. 157–164.

Oyirad chronicles tell us that they were a tribal confederation commonly called the Four Oyirad.[13] In spite of the number "four," at least eight groups existed to make up the Oyirad in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, giving rise to a confusion over its interpretation among sources and scholars old and new. Hidehiro Okada studied their origins and reached the following conclusions: In the days of the Mongol Empire, the north and northwest of Mongolia were inhabited by four great tribes, the old Oyirad, the Barghud, the Naiman and the Kereyid. After the fall of the Qubilaid Yüan Dynasty late in the fourteenth century, they joined forces in a new tribal confederation against the Mongol tribes still supporting the dynasty, and came to be called the Four Oyirad. They were later joined by the Khoshuts, a tribe of Mongol origin, when Toghon and his son Esen were leaders of the Oyirad Empire in the first half of the fifteenth century. The well-known Junghars and the Dörbets, tribes that share a common ancestral legend very similar to that of the ancient Uighurs, appear to have descended from the Naimans. The Torguts are obviously descendants of the Kereyid tribe because their princely house has Toghril Ong Khan as its founder. The Khoits are without doubt descendants of the old Oyirad tribe.[14]

Thus the Khoshuts are the only tribe of Mongol origin in the Four Oyirad tribal federation, and all native sources agree that its princely house claims a lineage going back to Jochi Qasar, brother of Chinggis Khan. Yet older princely genealogies of the Qorchin Mongols, a tribe universally acknowledged as rightful heirs of Jochi Qasar, make no reference to the Khoshuts as a branch of their tribe. The Khoshut princes have a clan-name Öjiyed, which casts a doubt over their alleged common ancestry with the Qorchin princes whose clan-name is Borjigid. At least there is little doubt that the Khoshuts were originally Mongols for Öjiyed was a generic name in Mongolian for the

[13] The earliest extant Oyirad chronicle was written by Emchi Ghabang Shesrab, a Torgut of the Volga Kalmyks, in 1737 and is titled *History of the Four Oyirad* (*Dörbön oyirodiyin töüke*, Corpus Scriptorum Mongolorum, Tomus V, Fasc. 2–3 (Ulaan Baatar, 1967), pp. 74–100. The second earliest and equally important one is also titled *History of the Four Oyirad*, written by Bātur Ubashi Tümen of the Khoshut in 1819 (see Note 9 above). In Mongolian chronicles, too, produced in large numbers in the seventeenth century, the number Four (*dörben*) refers to the Oyirad who were enemy aliens to the Mongols.

[14] H. Okada, "Origins of the Dörben Oyirad," *Ural-Altaische Jahrbücher*, Neue Folge, Band 7 (1987), pp. 181–211.

Three-Guard (*San-wei*) Uriyangqan tribes east of the Khingan Range in eastern Mongolia.[15]

The most important question was whether or not one was believed by people to be related to Chinggis Khan by blood, rather than whether one in fact did so or did not. By the seventeenth century both the Mongols and the Oyirad were ardent believers in Tibetan Buddhism. Even the Manchu emperors were eager to act as patrons of the religion. With most of the Mongols now under Manchu domination, the Oyirad must have regarded themselves as the only successors to the Mongol Empire still proudly independent. They needed their own khan also in order better to contend with their neighbors, the Kazakhs and other Central Asian tribes in the west still governed by Chinggisid khans. Their wish was supported by the Dge-lugs-pa regime of the Dalai Lamas in Tibet, itself aiming at an expansion of its own influence. Yet even the ambitious Fifth Dalai Lama was hardly able to ignore the deep-rooted faith in holy Chinggis Khan prevalent among the nomads of Central Eurasia, when he tried to confer khanship on their chiefs.

4. *Galdan Khan of the Junghars*

Güüshi Khan of the Khoshuts was a chief accepted as a descendant of a brother of Chinggis Khan, if not a descendant of Chinggis Khan himself, by the Manchu Ch'ing emperor and his Mongol vassals alike. Thus Güüshi's khanship did not completely go against the Chinggisid principle. Then, what justified khanship in the case of Galdan Khan of the Junghars?

When Güüshi Khan made his successful military expedition to Kokonor at the invitation of the Fifth Dalai Lama, he was accompanied by the head of the Junghar tribe. According to Tibetan sources, the khan, after the victory in Kokonor, bestowed on the Junghar chief the title *khong tayiji* meaning a viceroy, gave him a daughter, Amintāra, to wife, and sent him home.[16] This chief was famous the Bātur Khong Tayiji of the Junghars, and among his many sons only two, Sengge and Galdan, were born to the Khoshut princess.[17] Sengge married

[15] *Ibid.*, pp. 203–207.

[16] Ho-chin Yang, p. 37.

[17] *dPag bsam ljon bzang*, fol. 307b.

Anu Dara, a granddaughter of Ochirtu Chechen Khan of the Khoshuts who was a nephew and adopted son of Güüshi Khan, and succeeded as head of his tribe over the head of his elder half-brothers after the death of his father, Bātur Khong Tayiji, in 1653.[18] Sengge however had no time to inherit the title of *khong tayiji* and was soon assassinated by his half-brothers. Galdan, full brother of Sengge, had studied for ten years as a monk in Tibet and was a disciple of both the First Panchen Lama and the Fifth Dalai Lama.[19] He avenged the murder of Sengge and succeeded as head of the Junghar tribe in 1671, and assumed the title of *khong tayiji* by permission of the Dalai Lama.[20]

Galdan, who was already a grandson of Güüshi Khan of the Khoshuts on the maternal side, married Sengge's widow who was herself a granddaughter of Ochirtu Khan of the Khoshuts. Soon he fell out with Ochirtu and took the latter prisoner in 1676.[21] He was now

[18] For the death of Bātur Khong Tayiji of the Junghars in 1653 and his son Sengge's being a son-in-law of Ochirtu Chechen Khan of the Khoshuts, see *Biography of Caya Pandita in Oirat Characters*, p. 48, 16ab. P.S. Pallas, *Sammlungen historischer Nachrichten über die mongolischen Völkerschaften* (St. Petersburg, 1776), Erster Teil, p. 40, says: "Gleich nach Antritt der Regierung heyrathete [Galdan] seines Bruders Wittwe Ana Dara, eine Tochter des Choschotischen Zäzänchan." Anu was a granddaughter, not daughter, of Ochirtu according to *Iletun Ulabun/Piao chuan*, Vol. 79, 4a–b/2b–3a.

[19] According to the *Autobiography of Dalai Lama V (Za hor gyi bande ngag dbang blo bzang rgya mtsho'i 'di snang 'khrul pa'i rol rtsed rtogs brjod kyi tshul du bkod pa du kū la'i gos bzang)*, dBen sa sprul sku, i.e. Galdan, visited the Fifth Dalai Lama for the first time on the 12th day of the first month of 1656 (Vol. Ka, fol. 245b). Thereafter he stayed in Tibet to study Buddhism. On the 16th day of the eighth month of 1666, the Dalai Lama was visited by some two-hundred Oyirad headed by Sengge's wife Tshe dbang rgyal mo (Vol. Kha, fol. 19b). On the 23rd day of the eleventh month of the same year, the Dalai Lama bestowed on dBen sa sprul sku a Grub rgyal benediction for longevity and many presents including a set of monk's habit, and, with an instruction that he might help the Buddhist cause with his supervision, personally gave him a rosary of pearls upon his departure (Vol. Kha, fols. 26b–27a). On the basis of such references and other evidence, Zuiho Yamaguchi doubts the Mongolian sources in Tibetan which report that dBen sa sprul sku or Galdan renounced his monkhood and returned home only after the violent death of Sengge, and thinks that Galdan returned home as a monk accompanied by Sengge's wife in 1666. See J. Miyawaki, "Birth of Oyirad Khanship," pp. 66–67.

[20] *Autobiography of Dalai Lama V*, Vol. Kha, fol. 107b, ll. 5–6, says that Mgron gnyer Dar dar was dispatched for giving formal recognition to the chief. Vol. Kha, fol. 110a says: " A letter and presents arrived from dBen sa sprul sku." From the entry of the sixth month of 1672 (Vol. Kha, fol. 147a) on, "dGa 'ldan hung tha'i ji" is identified by that name. On this occasion the Dalai Lama dispatched a messenger to Galdan with the presents of a seal and clothes (Vol. Kha, fol. 147b). All references here are owed to communication with Yamaguchi.

[21] Chechen Khan set out against Galdan in the summer of 1675 but was taken prisoner by the latter in the winter of 1676. The khan died in captivity at Boro

uncontested leader of all the Oyirad, and his leadership was confirmed in 1678 by the Dalai Lama with the title *Bstan 'dzin Bo-shog-thu Khang* or the King of Heavenly Destiny Who Holds Up the Religion.[22] Russian sources quote the same title in its Oyirad form, *Šajin bariqči bošoqtu xān*.[23] Galdan shares in his title *bstan 'dzin/šajin bariqči* in common with Güüshi Khan. This means that the Dalai Lama confirmed Galdan as khan of the entire Four Oyirad in his capacity of a defender of the Buddhist faith. The new khan, who was a onetime Dge-lugs-pa monk and now patron of the sect, was an ideal ally to the Dalai Lama, and his relation by blood to Güüshi Khan must have weighed decisively in favor of his khanship.

Galdan Khan began his conquest of the cities of East Turkestan in 1679. Next he marched westward and attacked the Kazakhs and the Kirgizes. Finally in 1688 he invaded the land of the Qalqas and stampeded them into Inner Mongolia, where those formerly-independent Mongols had to seek the protection of the Manchus. Galdan, however successful as he was in building his great nomadic empire, was no match for the Ch'ing Manchus. In June 1696 his army suffered a crushing defeat by the Manchu expeditionary forces at Juun Modu in the land of the Qalqas. He hid himself with a small number of men in the Altai Mountains until he died of an illness in April of the following year.[24]

5. *Ayuuki Khan of the Torguts*

Meanwhile in Tibet, the Fifth Dalai Lama was already dead since 1682 and Regent Sangs-rgyas-rgya-mtsho was in charge of the government in his place. The regent was quick enough to choose Ayuuki of the Volga Torguts as Galdan's successor as khan of the Four Oyirad, and conferred on the Torgut chief the title of *Da'i-ching A-yo-shi Khang*

Tal in the winter of 1680. See *Biography of Caya Pandita in Oirat Characters*, pp. 60–63, 34b–39a.

[22] *Autobiography of Dalai Lama V*, Vol. Ga, fol. 82a.

[23] *Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniya v Tsentral'noi Azii: XVII–XVIII vv* (Moscow, 1989), Doc. No. 73.

[24] Emperor K'ang-hsi of the Ch'ing, who personally commanded the Manchu offensive against Galdan, insisted that the Junghar chief had committed suicide by taking poison. There is no ground, however, on which to doubt Galdan's death having been caused by an illness. See H. Okada, "Galdan's Death: When and How," *Memoires of Research Department of the Toyo Bunko*, 37 (Tokyo, 1979), pp. 91–97.

already in February 1697 when the Junghar chief was still alive.[25] Ayuuki's father Punchuq was a son of Shükür Dayiching, head of the Torgut tribe, and mother, a daughter of Bātur Khong Tayiji of the Junghars. In other words, Ayuuki was Galdan's nephew on his mother's side.[26]

Another nephew of Galdan, Tsevang Rabtan, whose father was Sengge, had revolted against his uncle while the latter was still alive, and established his power in Jungharia. Regent Sangs-rgyas-rgya-mtsho, acting in the name of the then deceased Fifth Dalai Lama, conferred in 1694 on Tsevang Rabtan the title *Erdeni joriqtu xong tayiji* in confirming him as head of the Junghar tribe.[27] Thus Galdan was the only khan among all other Junghar chiefs wielding power over much of Central Asia in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, who all held only the title of *khong tayiji* meaning a viceroy.[28]

Galdan the Junghar was a grandson of Güüshi Khan, who had been regarded as a descendant of Chinggis Khan's younger brother, though only on his mother's side. The khanship of Ayuuki the Torgut was no longer justifiable as far as the Chinggisid Principle was concerned, he being merely a nephew of Galdan Khan on his mother's side. The Fifth Dalai Lama, however, had respected the Chinggisid Principle to a degree, while to his Regent the only concern was the

[25] *Biography of Dalai Lama VI (Thams cad mkhyen pa blo bzang rin chen tshangs dbyangs rgya mtsho'i thun mong phyi'i rnam par thar pa du k4 la'i 'phro 'thud rab gsal gser gyi snye ma)*, fol. 157b. says: "On the fourteenth day [of the first month of 1697], a Thor god representative, Rab 'byams pa bsTan pa rab 'byor, arrived. Although it might have been better if done so after [the Dalai Lama's] arrival [in the Potala], as circumstances indicated that it was the time then, he was given the title of Da'i-ching A-yo-shi Khang, a seal and a set of clothes, together with a scarf (*kha btags*), a knife and other things as presents from myself (= Regent Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho, the author)." This reference too is owed to communication with Yamaguchi.

[26] *Iletun Ulabun/Piao chuan*, Vol. 101, fols. 6a–7a/3b–4a.

[27] Biography of Dalai Lama V, Vol. Cha, fol. 194b. Under the date of the ninth month of 1694, the text (continued by Regent Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho after the death of the Fifth Dalai Lama in 1682) says that Tsevang Rabtan was granted the title Er-te-ni Jo-rig-thu Hong Tha'i-ji, a seal, clothes and a set of Mongolian-style three wheels.

[28] Of the titles that survived among the noyans who contended for hegemony in post-imperial Mongolia, *khong tayiji* was clearly derived from Chinese *huang t'ai tzu* meaning an heir-apparent to the imperial throne. The title *qong tayiji* was first applied to a khan's viceroy at the time of Altan Khan, the first parallel khan of the Mongols. See J. Miyawaki, "The Birth of Oyirad Khanship," pp. 50–61. Also see J. Miyawaki, "The Birth of the Khong Tayiji Viceroyalty in the Mongol-Oyirad World," *Altaica Berolinensia: The Concept of Sovereignty in the Altaic World. Permanent International Altaistic Conference, 34th Meeting, Berlin, 21–26 July, 1991*, ed. Barbara Kellner-Heinkele (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1993), pp. 149–155.

khanship's political usefulness to his sect. Ayuuki the Torgut, a great patron of the Buddhist faith based on the remote Volga, was the best choice for the Oyirad khanship in the eyes of the Dge-lugs-pa Regent.

Sangs-rgyas-rgya-mtsho's political motivation notwithstanding, to Ayuuki himself the khanship meant only one thing: that his new title came down all way from the holy Chinggis Khan. It is reported that a Kalmyk envoy, who arrived at the Porte in 1710, told the Ottoman officials that the Russians had wanted Ayuuki to send his Kalmyks against the Ishtek nomads; Ayuuki refused twice, having told the Russians: "You murdered the Ishtek Sultan, and they [the Ishteks] are still in a blood feud with you, and I cannot and will not stop them. We are in agreement with each other, [because] we are all descendants of Chinggis [Khan] and originated from the same clan."[29]

Here Ayuuki claims descent from holy Chinggis Khan, not from his true ancestor Toghril Ong Khan of the Kereyid, all because of his khanship, indicating that the old Chinggisid Principle had not lost its original significance.

Nor did it lose its significance even in the early twentieth century. In 1903 Gustav John Ramstedt on his field trip near Astrakhan came upon and copied a Volga Kalmyk family tree, in which the Torgut princely house was proudly charted as descendants of "Chinggis Khan who had emerged from the rays of the Sun God."[30]

[29] Michael Khodarkovsky, *Where Two Worlds Met: The Russian State and the Kalmyk Nomads, 1600–1771* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), pp. 146–147.

[30] J. Miyawaki, "A Volga-Kalmyk Family Tree in the Ramstedt Collection," *Journal de la Société Finno-Ougrienne* (Helsinki) 83 (1991), 203–234.

THE VICISSITUDES OF MONGOLIAN HISTORIOGRAPHY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

THOMAS N. HAINING

"Not misunderstanding ancient words,
Not forgetting old words." (Hö'elun-eke)

Any empire which existed hundreds of years ago is likely to appear distant, shrouded in mystery and, possibly, simplistic; it may be depicted in terms of grandeur and chivalry, or as barbaric and despotic; depending on the national, political and ideological affiliations of the historians assessing it and the original sources which they use—few of which are themselves likely to be free from bias—the good which men have done may be allowed to live after them or the evil of their ways may be highlighted. Just imagine for a moment the varied views likely to be espoused by historians of the Year 2100 sitting in their Martian or Lunar Ivory Towers, preparing to participate in yet another Galactic Symposium on the EEC or *perestroika*.

Having immersed myself for two years in the methodology of Professor Paul Ratchnevsky, which he describes as "... approaching historical truth by a comparison of the sources,"[1] I have become acutely aware of the many interpretations which have been ascribed to Chinggis Khan and his empire, not only by historians of the past century but also by Chinggis' near contemporaries on whose reports, sometimes prejudiced, incomplete or misunderstood, historians have relied. Such pronouncements on Chinggis and the Legacy of the Mongol Empire include:

"... whole peoples were uprooted and dispersed and the ethnic character of many regions transformed for ever; Asia was opened up to European penetration by land and sea, and these contacts, once made, were later renewed on the initiative of the West, which in its search for a new way to the Far East discovered both America and the sea route to India round the Cape of Good Hope."[2]

[1] Paul Ratchnevsky, *Genghis Khan: His Life and Legacy*, tr. and ed. Thomas Nivison Haining (Oxford, 1991), Preface.
[2] J.J. Saunders, *The History of the Mongol Conquests* (London, 1971), p. 175.

"... the storm which swept through the Eurasian steppe belt to Central Europe and the Adriatic was not a genuine *Völkerwanderung*. No ... pressure of mighty enemies nor any other disaster forced the Mongol mounted hordes to descend on China, Khorasan, Iran and Europe. They were motivated by one idea, ... the claim to World Dominion."[3]

"Even though there be generation and increase until the Resurrection the population [of Eastern Persia] will not attain to a tenth part of what it was before."[4]

"He [Chinggis] was a man of great worth, great wisdom, and great prowess. And you must know that when he was elected king, all the Tartars in the world ... acknowledged him as their Lord. And this Chinggis wielded his rule well and worthily."[5]

"Fitzgerald has called the Mongol conquest of China an unmitigated curse, but this very accurate assessment should be applied also to all the countries and peoples which became victims of invasion by the Mongols. In all cases the effects were truly disastrous...."[6]

"Modern historians ... have been fond of talking about the *Pax Mongolica*.... If the concept is derived from the *Pax Romana*, the most appropriate comment belongs rightly to the Roman historian, Tacitus, ...: Solitudinem faciunt, et pacem appellant."[7]

"History has condemned Genghis Khan as a heartless conqueror ... yet it would be unjust to judge him from the point of view of our own century. Genghis Khan was the product of his people and of his times. His actions were determined by the brutal law of the steppe...."[8]

The late Professor Owen Lattimore commented that as soon as a modern nationalism comes into being, its exponents appeal to the past history of their people for moral and emotional sanctions, and that among the ancient deeds and sentiments thus recalled some indeed may be recognised as ancestral to nationalism.[9] As Rupert

[3] *Der Mongolensturm. Ungarns Geschichtsschreiber*, vol. III tr. and ed. H. Gockenjahn and J.R. Sweeney (Graz. 1985), p. 7.
[4] Juwaynī, *The History of the World Conqueror*, tr. and ed. J.A. Boyle (Manchester, 1958), I, 79,
[5] L.F. Benedetto, *The Travels of Marco Polo*, tr. A. Ricci (London: Routledge, 1931), p. 79.
[6] Witold Rodzinsky, *The Walled Kingdom* (London, 1984), p. 128. (Quoting C.P. Fitzgerald, *China: A Short Cultural History*, 4th edition [London, 1976].)
[7] D.O. Morgan, *The Mongols* (Oxford, 1986), p. 83.
[8] Ratchnevsky, *Genghis Khan*, Preface.
[9] Owen Lattimore, *Nationalism and Revolution in Mongolia* (Leiden, 1955), p. 83.

Rupen points out, however, in his article "Mongolian Nationalism": "... the truth about the past often suffers considerably from manipulation by nationalists, who seek to adapt it towards their own ends. Old heroes are cast aside—or re-cast as 'antiheroes'; new heroes, real or imaginary, are advanced to play their role in creating a new focus for nationalist sentiment and interested foreign powers play their part in the re-shaping or re-assessment of past history."[10] In the case of Mongolia there is no doubt that it is from its two mighty neighbours, Russia and China (sometimes as a result of their relations with each other), that influences have been exercised, or sometimes even imported, which have significantly influenced, even inhibited any well-planned and objective Mongolian historical research into their imperial past during the past seven decades.

Some historians, concerned about the effect of the Mongol conquests on the lands of their forefathers have, naturally, their own and often strongly expressed opinions. To quote J.J. Saunders, "The Mongol invasion of Europe of 1237–42 has been treated in detail by the scholars of the nations which endured it.... Researches in which patriotism has sometimes, I much fear, triumphed over strict academic detachment."[11] Any such lack of academic detachment on the part of Polish, German, Hungarian or Muslim historians has probably had scant effect upon Mongolian assessments of their imperial past, but ideologically motivated—or, more objectively perhaps, ideologically controlled—Soviet writers have not, I venture to suggest, been without a certain malign influence on Mongolian twentieth century assessments of Mongol history.

The old Russian chronicles such as the Chronicle of Novgorod and the Georgian and Armenian chronicles provided a picture of "clouds of Tatars," after whose invasions and pillage "not an eye was left to weep." Russian historians of the late 19th century debated the role of the Mongols in Russia without reaching any consensus of opinion. Karamzin commented: "Moscow owes its greatness to the Khans" while Soloviev voiced the opinion that there was "... no evidence to assume any great Mongol influence on Russian internal developments."[12] While such classical Russian historians as Barthold and Vladimirtsov cast Chinggis Khan in the role of and criticised

[10] R. Rupen, "Mongolian Nationalism," *JCAS*, 45 (1958), p. 1.
[11] Saunders, *The History of the Mongol Conquest*, p. 4.
[12] G. Vernadsky, *The Mongols and Russia* (New Haven, 1953), p. 333.

him as the archetypal representative of the Mongol tribal aristocracy, they sought to be objective in their assessments of his character and deeds. In his *Life of Genghis Khan* Vladimirtsov agrees with Ratchnevsky: "A careful and critical study of the sources must convince the unprejudiced student of today that, neither when he was but Temuchin, nor later in life when he became the Khan of the Mongols, did Chinggis Khan display any indication of wanton cruelty or any passion for destruction.... He must be judged against the background of his times and milieu..., even in his greatest wars Chinggis' cruelty or his bloodthirstiness never surpassed that which was displayed by contemporary soldiers of other nations...;[13] Barthold, writing in 1917, commented that the results of the Mongol invasions were less annihilating than supposed.

The advent, however, of the Russian Revolution and the spread of Marxism-Leninism certainly brought a new dimension to the Soviet and thus eventually to the Mongolian assessment of Mongolia's imperial history. The changing attitudes are well illustrated in the following comments by N.P. Shastina: "Grumm-Grzhimailo, an ethnologist by education... a person of great versatility, of immense curiosity and industry..., having no sufficient historical education which would have enabled him to take critically the various theories current at that time,... [he] was often biased by misconceptions.... The completeness of bibliographical data is one of his *fortes*; the principal shortcoming was the author's idealist interpretation of the process of history.... The exaggeration of the role of Genghis... the evaluation of Genghis' campaigns not only as a positive process but also beneficial for the Mongolian people [which] 'led to a rebirth of the masses'... is in glaring contradiction to the principles of Marxist science... and compared with Barthold's works marked a regression from the point of view of Mongolic historical studies." Of Vladimirtsov's *Genghis Khan*, Shastina remarks: "Despite the idealisation of Genghis... it is based on rich factual evidence. Vladimirtsov showed sufficient caution in the selection of data from eastern sources: 'Not all Oriental writings on the ruler of the Mongols can be regarded as authentic historical sources', he wrote in the introduction." On Vladimirtsov's *Social System of the Mongols*, Shastina comments: "In his last book Vladimirtsov regards the process of history in materialistic terms, very close to Marxism. Though his book contains no

[13] B. Vladimirtsov, *The Life of Genghis Khan*, tr. D.S. Mirsky (London, 1930), p. 165.

references to the classics of Marxism-Leninism (except for one reference to *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State* by Engels), their influence is quite conspicuous."[14]

On the plane of political expediency it is, of course, understandable that following the Mongolian Revolution the national emphasis on historical researches should be directed towards a negative assessment of the immediate pre-revolution period and, perhaps, not surprising that a Mongolian revolutionary and socialist government should have sought to wipe the slate clean of all pernicious influences, carrying its attack on feudalism further into the past in order to ensure that "false" nationalism did not rear its head. The travails of the occupation of Urga by White Russian forces under Ungern-Sternberg, a self-proclaimed re-incarnation of Chinggis Khan, may have adversely highlighted the less savoury incidents in the Chinggis legend. The advent of Japanese expansion and their attempt to harness pan-Mongolian nationalism for their own political ends, could not but result in the then government of the Mongolian People's Republic (MPR) seeking to suppress any attempt to use Chinggis and memories of past Mongol grandeur as a basis for any popular movement which might ally itself with the Japanese. Despite these factors, however, suppression of overt Mongolian interest in the nation's past was not an automatic result of "The Soviet Period." During the past seven decades the official Mongolian attitude towards historical studies of the Mongol past has, at times, been distinctly ambivalent.

The early Congresses of the Mongolian People's Party and the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP) believed in pan-Mongolianism! The Second Party Congress in 1923 declared that one of the Party's main aims was the re-unification of all people of Mongol race; the Third Congress in 1924 favoured the incorporation of Tannu Tuva into the MPR and even the 1925 Fourth Congress, noting with regret that Mongol tribes of Inner Mongolia had been unable to adhere to the Mongolian Republic—the one aspect of pan-Mongolianism of which the USSR initially approved—reiterated the call for Mongol unity. Indeed, until 1928 there were, despite interference by Soviet and Comintern agents, distinct signs of a degree of conscious Mongol nationalism which sought to reduce Mongolian dependence on and tutelage by the Soviet Union.

[14] N.P. Shastina, *Mongolic Studies* (Moscow, 1968).

In October 1928, however, the Seventh Congress of the MPRP adopted a Comintern resolution which demanded "... the replacement of old officials by younger and more suitable members, the end of all compromise with the church and the elimination of all bourgeois elements which, superficially, might appear to reflect national interests."[15] That Congress launched the Party on a disastrous programme of radical collectivisation, destruction of the feudal nobility and all-out attacks on the Buddhist church which led to civil war and mass emigration; in 1932 the Comintern and the Soviet Union had to rescue the Mongolian Revolutionary Party from its own excesses, dispatching Soviet troops to Mongolia to suppress widespread discontent. From then onwards, given Japanese aggression in the area and the consequent return to the MPR of considerable Soviet forces, opportunities for the continuance of any genuine Mongolian nationalism faded. For the next two decades at least, suppression and purges in Mongolia parallelled those perpetrated in the USSR.

Those political upheavals were reflected in the varied fortunes of Mongol historical literature and in the treatment of those in Socialist Mongolia who were researching and writing about early as well as later Mongolian chronicles. In the early days of Mongolian independence the newly formed Mongolian Scientific Committee (later to become the MPR Academy of Sciences) actually published material in praise of Chinggis Khan.[16] And on a visit to Ulaan Baatar in 1927 Ma Ho-ti'en reported that paintings of Chinggis Khan were to be seen in elementary schools,[17] confirming Lattimore's prediction of the revolutionary need to appeal to past glories. In the following decades, however, came Rupen's predicted creation of "modern heroes," culminating in the personality cult of Choibalsan and later of Tsedenbal. Well known intellectuals and writers such as B. Rintchen and Tsyben Jamtserano (the founder of the Scientific Committee), free to research and write in the 1920s, were arrested in the 1930s; and although the former survived several years of imprisonment, the latter was later shot. As Professor Bawden points out, even the youthful poet D. Natsagdorj, later lauded as "the founder of revolutionary Mongolia's new literature and the embodiment of its revolutionary

[15] Resolution of the Far Eastern Secretariat of the Comintern, dated 27 January 1927.

[16] *Chinggis bogdo-in duraskalin tegübüri* ("Selections from the Memorials of Chinggis Bogdo") (Urga, 1923).

[17] Ma Ho-tien, *Chinese Agent in Mongolia*, tr. J. de Francis (Baltimore, 1949), p. 89.

spirit," was arrested in December 1931 and not released from prison until the defeat of the leftists six months later—only to fall victim to later purges in the second half of the decade.[18]

The picture was not, however, one of unmitigated literary and historiographical gloom. We are reliably informed by the MPR Minister of Culture, Begdzin Balimnyam, speaking on the TV film *Genghis Khan* in August 1990, that in 1940, on the direct orders of Stalin, the CC of the MPRP passed a resolution forbidding any mention of Chinggis Khan and other old Mongolian heroes. Yet in that year Damdinsuren was able to produce a new translation to commemorate the 700th anniversary of the compilation of *The Secret History of the Mongols*, and in 1946 praise was heaped upon *Köke mongolun köke tug* ("The Blue Standard of the Blue Mongols"), under which title the Mongolians had, since the second decade of the century, been reading Jamtserano's translation of Leon Cahun's 1877 novel *La bannière bleue*.[19] In the mid 1940s Rintchen, temporarily rehabilitated, was responsible for the script of a film on the life of the 17th century Mongolian hero-poet, Tsogto Taishi, a film which not only evoked a great response in Mongolia but was even produced in a Russian version, *Knights of the Steppe*.

A decade is, however, a long time in politics and the 1950s saw the balance tip again in the opposite direction. The Tsogto Taishi film was roundly condemned by the Central Committee of the MPRP as early as 1949 for "elements of idealisation of the age and personality of Tsogto Taishi" and for attributing to that period "a harmony of the class interests of the people and their feudal lords." The 1954 Russian-language *History of the Mongolian People's Republic*, a work which claimed that it "played a major role in its day in equipping young Mongolian Cadres with historical knowledge," launched an attack on Chinggis Khan and his destructive wars in the following terms: "Created by fire and sword from the blood of peoples, the Mongolian Empire which was rent by internal contradictions and without one common economic basis, fell under the attack of the peoples of the countries the Mongols had conquered."[20] The praise lavished on *The Blue Banner* in 1946 was attacked in

[18] C.R. Bawden, *A Modern History of Mongolia* (London, 1968), pp. 321 and 413. See also: R. Rupen, *Mongols of the Twentieth Century* (Bloomington, 1964), I, 331.

[19] L. Cahun, *La bannière bleue; avventures d'un muselman, d'un chrétien et d'un paien a l'époque des croissades et de la conquête mongole* (Paris, 1877).

[20] *History of the Mongolian People's Republic* (Moscow, 1954).

the following terms by the Russian critic G.I. Mikhailov in 1951: "... it should be remembered that this novel was written ... by a French bourgeois historian, and translated by an enemy of the Mongolian people"—the latter of course, Jamtserano.[21] Mikhailov also attacked Rintchen for the latter's portrayal of the 18th century Oirat Khan and patriotic hero, Amursana, "as someone who fought for the freedom of his nation." Rintchen's extensive collection of old epics and legends, begun when he studied under Vladimirtsov in Petersburg in the 1920s and continued in the 1930s, could not be published until 1960—and then only abroad; and when some of his work was printed in English in the MPR even as late as 1980 it was presented as "a collection of anti-Manchu stories."

Mongolian academics made a valiant effort to preserve for future research old manuscripts—many of which were still being destroyed in the early 1950s—but even literary historical monuments such as the Geser Epic and *The Secret History of the Mongols* could not be disseminated. In the mid-50s, however, Academician Damdinsuren advocated the rehabilitation of old Mongol literary works on the grounds—just within the limits of debate tolerated by the Party—that these did contain some useful elements, including certain democratic tendencies; bravely, in a series of further essays, he denounced Stalinist propaganda which sought to belittle traditional Mongol culture, to compel Mongol children to grow up in ignorance of the true past of their nation, thus enhancing the glories of the revolution.

In August 1990 I was privileged—as were some others among the participants in this volume—to be a guest of the MPR Academy of Sciences at the Ulaan Baatar Conference which celebrated the 750th Anniversary of *The Secret History of the Mongols*. On that occasion delegates visited Dadal Somon in the Hentei Province, the birthplace of Temuchin (Chinggis Khan). There, out on the Mongolian steppe, stands not only a monument recording Temuchin's birth but also one raised to his memory during the celebrations organised to commemorate the 800th anniversary of that event in 1962. The consequences of those celebrations highlight, perhaps, the dichotomy which has faced Mongolian scholars over several decades.

The pattern of rehabilitation established in the USSR following Khruschev's denunciation of the evils of Stalinism was repeated in the MPR in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Natsagdorj had been

[21] G.I. Mikhailov, *Ocherki istorii mongol'skoi literaturi* (Moscow, 1955).

rehabilitated and his works published in 1961; Jamtserano was rehabilitated and honoured in his native Buriatia; Buyannemekh (1902–1937), even when Natsagdorj's works were reprinted, was still denounced as "a representative of feudalism and capitalism and an enemy of the people," but by early 1962 he was hailed as "one of the first representatives of our new literature, a famous writer and public worker"; Rintchen too, under attack as late as 1959 and made to recant publicly in 1960, was rehabilitated and appointed in 1961 to the newly-formed MPR Academy of Sciences, which was itself embarking at this point on an interesting programme of publishing a selection of older literature, a programme of which the Party did not approve but clearly felt unable to suppress.

In this atmosphere the decision was taken to celebrate in the MPR the 800th anniversary of the birth of the greatest Mongol. The monument to which I have made reference was erected and a set of commemorative stamps was prepared. On 31 May 1962, at a special festive meeting of the Academy of Sciences, Professor Sh. Natsagdorj, Head of the Institute of History of the MFR Academy of Sciences, delivered a lecture, "Chinggis as the Founder of the Mongol State," and the Academy announced that a series of special historical papers would be produced on this subject. Given the ideological considerations on which I have touched, Professor Natsagdorj's lecture was an important contribution to an objective assessment of the role of Chinggis Khan. Although wisely taking the precaution to highlight "Chinese misinterpretation of Chinggis' role in history," Natsagdorj offered his audience—and his lecture was summarised in the national press—a balanced picture of the life and deeds of the great Mongol leader, stressing the positive aspects of Chinggis' achievements in the fields of national unity, civil administration and legal innovation, while drawing attention to the adverse economic factors of military expansion which are widely accepted as having resulted in the eventual impoverishment of the Mongolian homeland.

The perhaps unexpected, but not necessarily unforeseeable consequence of these modest celebrations reminds me of the well-known passage of *The Secret History*, in which the shaman, Teb Tenggeri, relates the fate of the Mongol nation after the dissolution of the Meng-ku Empire: "The Stars were turning in the Heavens . . . the Earth and its crust were turning hither and thither. . . ."[22] Mongolian

[22] *The Secret History of the Mongols*, § 254.

nationalism had raised its head too high above the political parapet, endangering strict adherence to Party dogma; the Soviets immediately counter-attacked with an article by Ivan Maisky in *Voprosy Istoni* and by other Soviet writers in *Istoriya SSSR*, condemning Chinggis Khan as utterly evil and reactionary.[23] Then, in September 1962, Tömör-ochir, a Secretary of the MPRP Central Committee who had been closely associated with the celebrations, was summarily dismissed.

Various reasons were advanced for this dismissal of a leading political figure. None are particularly convincing. Other political leaders, including Yumjagin Tsedenbal, Secretary-General of the Party, had set their names to the resolutions authorising the Chinggis celebrations and Tömör-ochir must be regarded as a sacrificial lamb.[24] The official charges, published in the Mongolian press on 11 September 1962, denounced not only Tömör-ochir, but also Chinggis, in terms which the Soviet press warmly echoed some weeks later: "Tömör-ochir supported the nationalistic tendencies which aimed to extend and idealise the role of Chinggis Khan in Mongolian history, while minimising his reactionary role. Understatement of this reactionary role of Chinggis Khan is a departure from the principles of the Party and stimulates nationalism!" Tömör-ochir was also accused of "over-zealous efforts to publish the verse of some of our poets which was imbued with nationalism" and of a "too vigorous and unbalanced attack on the Choibalsan personality cult."[25]

The ideological points were hammered home the following year at an Ideological Congress in Ulaan Baatar, attended by Ilychev, a member of the Soviet Politburo and the then "Shigi-khutukhu" of the Marxist-Leninist *Jasaq*, who ensured that the MPRP agreed to enforce intellectual conformity in the future. Buyannemekh, so recently rehabilitated, was criticised at the Conference for his "nationalistic views" and suitable directives were drafted for the Union of Young Mongolian Writers and also for the MPR Union of Artists, instructing them to "follow the Khrushchev and Ilychev line." The MPR Union of Writers had already read the omens in the sheep's shoulder-blade and had declared at their Congress in May 1962: ". . . We, Mongolian writers educated by the Party, will, in the struggle for

[23] I. Maisky, "Chinggis Khan," *Voprosy Istorii*, 5 (1962), 74–83.
[24] Sh. Bira, "Address to Opening Session of the Conference Celebrating the 750th Anniversary of The Secret History of the Mongols" (Ulaanbaatar, August 1990).
[25] Rupen, *Mongols of the 20th Century*, p. 321.

the cause of the fatherland and the people and for socialism . . ., learn from the Soviet Union and other fraternal socialist countries, study their rich experience and consolidate our co-operation with them. . . ."[26]

It is, I believe, important to the understanding of the consequences of the 1962 celebrations to realise that Chinggis Khan has never been all things to all men. The Mongols regard him as the founder of their united and independent nation and the focus and symbol of their national history. The Chinese, despite sharp criticism of the Mongol ravages of Northern China and the resultant "Fallow Fields Period" still regard him as the progenitor of the Yüan Dynasty, his ultimate legacy to them a unified China. Indeed, as Academician Bira commented in his opening address to the 1990 Conference on *The Secret History*: "It was some time later, particularly during the Manchu period, that Chinggis was deified as *burkhan*" and this could be easily explained historically;—i.e. in terms of the Chinese tradition of *The Son of Heaven*. Academician Bira went on to say: "On the other hand it was in our time that he was blamed as a 'demon' in history and it is believed that this may have been for the sake of correcting the previous mistake." He will forgive me if I dissociate myself from the particular thesis embodied in that second quotation. . . . For the Soviets, contemplating the history of the Golden Horde, the destruction of Kiev and the subjugation of other Russian city states, Chinggis Khan and his successors were savage, illiterate and destructive foreign invaders. To this add not only the obvious Marxist bias against a feudal and aristocratic oligarchy, but also Soviet fears that latent Mongolian nationalism, especially a national fervour which called upon the *sulde* of Chinggis Khan, could easily strike a responsive chord in the Mongol areas of the Soviet Union; and such flames—"the growth of destructive and separatist forces" as Gorbachev has since described nationalism might well, once lit, spread to other Soviet minorities.

Just as important, however, was the Soviet fear of links between the Mongols of the MPR and those of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region in The People's Republic of China (PRC) where, with the full support of the PRC authorities, there had been lavish celebrations of the 1962 Chinggis Khan anniversary. Any danger that a mutual nationalist interest in Chinggis Khan might strengthen

[26] *Ibid.*, p. 331, note 27.

the ties between the MPR and the PRC and might lead to a weakening of the MPR's role as a (pro-Soviet) buffer zone between Russia and China could not be tolerated.

The next two decades saw constant and increasingly sharp Soviet attacks on Chinese interpretations of the role of Chinggis Khan, attacks perhaps best illustrated from the introduction by S.L. Tikhvinsky, Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, to a series of essays by Soviet historians on the role of the Tartar-Mongols in Asia and Europe:

"From 1961 onwards they (the Chinese) began to voice openly the view that it was necessary to review completely the assessment of the Mongol role in China. Individual Chinese historians stressed . . . 'the period of Yüan rule was the period of great unity of China, only made possible by the conquest of China by the Mongols; . . . contacts between China and the West were strengthened during the Yüan dynasty . . . trade, crafts and transport developed in China.' Such historians also became active in praising the bloody conquests of Chinggis Khan and his successors in East Turkestan, Bokhara, Samarkand, Khorasan, . . . Russia, Poland, Hungary and other European states as progressive and they asserted that only under the Mongols were intellectuals south and east of the Pamirs able to become acquainted with Chinese philosophy, literature and art." Tikhvinsky even took his polemics back 30 years, attacking the Chinese slogan coined for the celebration of Chinggis' birthday in 1942: "Learn from Chinggis Khan's revolutionary spirit the solidarity of national minorities."[27]

Official policing of Mongolian intellectual thought and denigration of ancient Mongolian historical literature was to continue for almost another two decades. It was certainly evident when, in January 1982, Professor Shirendyb, President of the Academy of Sciences since its creation, was suddenly dismissed. Shirendyb was no newcomer to dismissal—he had been removed from office as Deputy Prime Minister in 1957 and sent to "academic work" in the Soviet Union—a common fate for academics who fell from political favour, and one from which many did not return; but in 1982 he was again a close colleague and friend of the then MPR leader, Tsedenbal—and like Tsedenbal he had married a Russian. His credentials seemed impeccable. In

[27] S.L. Tikhvinsky (ed.), *Tataro-Mongoly v Azil I Europe* 2nd ed. (Moscow, 1977), pp. 16–17.

1968 he had written: "Marxist intellectuals regard the conquests of Chinggis Khan and his successors as predatory and reactionary. Any other attitude towards the actions of such conquerors and oppressors indicates a complete deviation from the basic theory of historical materialism and plays into the hands of the aggressors, revanchists, chauvinists and nationalists as a welcome smoke-screen for their predatory aims."[28] It appeared, however, from the accusations levelled at him by colleagues that he had been, perhaps, less than wholehearted in his devotion to everything Soviet. One of the accusations publicly advanced against him was, for example, that he did not "value and learn from the experience of Soviet comrades," nor indeed provide proper facilities for Soviet Academy personnel working in the MPR. "Let them camp out in the valley of the Tula River" was, according to a fellow Academician, one of his many alleged derogatory statements concerning the role of fraternal Soviet academics. Significantly, even in 1982, parallel with anti-Soviet allegations came also the claim that Shirendyb protected academics who were guilty of "expounding history from the point of view of Maoist ideology."[29]

I am, however, here less concerned with the reasons for and the justice of the dismissal (there were certainly undercurrents of which one was not then and is possibly still not aware) than with the attempts made to blacken and mock Shirendyb in public by denigrating a book about him, *Son of the Hangai Mountains*, written by his daughter-in-law in Russian but in the style of classical Mongolian literature. The short extracts published in *Novosti Mongolii* launched an attack which was, one felt, a subtle two-pronged use of the classical Mongolian style. On the one hand it implicitly invited the public to be outraged that anyone should lay any claim to be eulogised in the language of *The Secret History* (even although that work did enjoin daughters-in-law to show respect for their parents-in-law!), or lay claim to the attributes of any heroic figures: "Born in the Year of the Bull, in the morning hour of the Horse . . . and the old people predicted that one who began his life on such a morning would grow up bright and intelligent, bringing light and well-being to the people. . . . And they reminded him of the national hero,

[28] *Partinaya Zhizn*, 14 (1968), 73.
[29] "Report of Party Organisation of the MPR Academy of Sciences," *Novosti Mongolii*, 5 (February, 1982).

Shirendyb, brave and fearless, and the boy began to imitate him . . . believing that with the name he inherited the traits of the great hero." Shirendyb's alleged collusion in this publication proved that he was puffed up with false pride, "suffering from egomania" to quote one of his colleagues.[30] At the same time, the sarcastic official commentaries on the linguistic style of the reported eulogy were nicely calculated to present Shirendyb to the public as an object of ridicule and underscore his utter unsuitability to hold any important academic/political position in modern Socialist Mongolia The incident of Shirendyb's disgrace illustrated, all too clearly and sadly, the accuracy of the conclusions drawn years earlier by Professor Bawden regarding ". . . the ultimate dependence of [Mongolian] artists and scholars upon the requirements of dogma," and ". . . the role which they have to play, which is primarily a political one, and only in second place an artistic or intellectual one."[31]

Rupen remarked more than thirty years ago: "Chinggis Khan continues to be a political factor throughout Mongolia. He represents the glorious past, when all Mongolia was unified and when Mongol influence spread throughout the then known world, His name—linked with that of his successors in the Chinggis symbol—continually appears in Mongolian nationalist movements in all Mongolian areas. He is the one truly representative Mongolian symbol—and although there have been many 'Party' pronouncements regarding him and his achievements, he has proved a remarkably difficult symbol for the Party to sweep aside."[32] Visiting Mongolia today one is certainly made aware of the fervour with which Chinggis is now regarded by the population. This is illustrated not only by the interview in *Literature* of 19 October 1990 with Tenggis Bold, the Mongolian sculptor who is creating a new statue of Chinggis Khan, but also in the classical ballet and operatic performances of *Burte Chino* and *Temuchin*, launched during the official celebrations of the 750th Anniversary of *The Secret History of the Mongols* in August 1990, even in the modern pop song: "Great Khan, Lord Chinggis, we feared to hear your name—let alone speak it! Have mercy on us wretched ones, Children of Blue Mongolia."

The introduction of "openness and renewal" in the MPR has led

[30] *Ibid.*
[31] Bawden, *Modern History of Mongolia*, p. 417.
[32] Rupen, "Mongolian Nationalism."

to the introduction of multiple political parties, with independent parties now holding a considerable number of seats in the executive chamber of the MPR parliament and a number of senior portfolios. Shirendyb, happily, has been rehabilitated. There is now a basis for a continuing and genuine relaxation of political control of the media, new freedoms for academic exchanges and research and, through the re-introduction of the teaching of the old Uighur script, an awakening of general interest in the literary and historical past of the Mongol nation—an interest which many Mongolian intellectuals have, in the face of considerable difficulties, striven to keep alive The way would now seem clear for a fresh and truly Mongolian assessment of the Mongol Empire and of the role of Chinggis Khan himself, an academic reappraisal which will, hopefully, be free from internal and external political pressures and will, by its objectivity, prevent the usurpation of Chinggis and the Mongol past as mere symbols of narrow nationalism, open to exploitation by any political doctrines or parties. As Academician Bira has said, it is essential to "free ourselves of both historical mystification and senseless propaganda, the two extremes which do not stimulate a proper understanding of the real historical role of any person in history."[33]

"I am a gardener," says Rintchen, "and in my garden I lovingly tend the delicate flowers of my thought. Hidden from the sight of men, I warm the magical, brightly coloured flowers of my thought in the golden sunshine of the land where I was born and gently nourish them with the warm blood of my beating heart. I close the gate which leads into my garden, tenderly protecting the flowers from hostile eyes. Only when the time comes will the gate open of itself, and I shall meet my loyal friends joyfully at the threshold as they enter and shall lead them into my garden, the fragrance of which is that of incense. Then will my garden truly become a garden of a myriad of bright joy."[34]

The time has perhaps come when Rintchen would wish to welcome us all at the wide-open gate of his garden!

[33] Bira, "Address."

[34] B. Rintchen, "When The Time Comes," in *Lady Anu: An Anthology of Short Stories and Poems*, tr. B. Damdin (Ulaanbaatar, 1980).

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Note: In the following, the Arabic definite article *al-* has been disregarded in the alphabetical arrangement. The abbreviation "b." stands for *ibn*, "son of," in Muslim names.

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